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ABSTRACT 
Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals, between 1900 and the conclusion of this the-
sis in 1942, consistently narrowed Virginia's Sunday closing law, enacted in 1786 to prevent 
Sunday labor. While paying lip service to the statute's purpose, the court almost unhesitat-
ingly chose statutory interpretations encouraging more Sunday labor, particularly by ex-
panding its ''necessity" and "charity" exceptions. The legislature also granted additional 
statutory closing law exceptions. This reflected the preferences of the public as well, which 
increasingly depended on the services of others laboring on Sunday. These results were al-
so due, in part, to inherent confusions and contradictions in the law itself, as traced back 
through colonial Virginia, to Tudor England, and finally to the biblical origins of sabbath 
work bans. The relatively few closing law prosecutions undertaken as the midcentury ap-
proached, appeared largely motivated by business competitors, rather than by any concern 
for preventing Sunday labor. 
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Partm. PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 
As a practicing attorney, undersigned long believed that many incidents of trials, 
including transcripts, could reveal a great deal of relevant information when keyed to an 
appropriate historical inquiry. The value of such testimony derives from its being under oat~ 
subject to cross examination and penalties of perjury, and immediately recorded by a court 
reporter. Although opinions of appellate courts are frequently noted in history texts, they 
cover only the issues appealed. A great deal more about the era in which the trial occurred 
can sometimes be learned from actual testimony, covering subjects of great interest to his-
torians, even though not examined by the appellate courts. 
The Francisco trial analyzed in Chapter 8 herein met the above criteria, when 
analyzed in conjunction with Virginia's Sunday closing law history. Briefing in appealed 
cases can also provide clues as to who did, or did not, propose arguments appellate court 
adopted, as occurred here. Such considerations were in addition to the more conventional 
library research and examination of original documents also undertaken for this project. 
As to citation of legal materials in this thesis, The Bluebook: A Uniform System of 
Citation (18th ed., 2005), developed by the major law reviews, was the standard followed. 
It generally requires that state ourt case citations be only to ''the regional reporter for the 
region in which the court sits," Blue Pages portion, B5.1.3(v), page 9, ibid. These "regional 
reporters" were begun by the West Publishing Company (now part of the Thompson-West 
concern). All Virginia appellate opinions since 1887, for instance, are in the "South East-
ern" Reporter (Bluebook, supra, Table 1, p. 237), abbreviated "S.E.," followed by a second 
111 
series of more recent opinions to date, abbreviated "S.E. 2d." There are similar abbrevia-
tions for other regional reporters throughout the nation, as provided in the Bluebook. 
This thesis attempts, as fully as possible, to follow the Bluebook. However, being a 
historical study, rather than a legal one only, it was deemed appropriate to also include the 
so-called "official" reports of each state appellate court cited, along with the regional 
reporter. This was because, for historical purposes, it may be important to study the "official" 
state court reports, rather than the national reporter system (an example is in thesis Chapter 
7, n. 72 herein). 
Many court opinions discussed herein were published before the national reporter 
system, so they can only be found in the official reports. This is also why official reports are 
cited for every thesis case, since many could only be located that way in any event. Case 
quotations are cited to relevant pages of the official report, if applicable, in either the United 
States Supreme Court Reports or Virginia cases. In non-Virginia state cases, quotations are 
cited to the official report if only that is available or to the regional reporter system only, if 
that is available. Consistent with the Bluebook, the terms "page," ''p.," or similar references 
for pages are not used, except where needed to avoid confusion because of other reference 
numbers also identifying the document. The highest Virginia court, the "Virginia Supreme 
Court," was once called the "Virginia "Supreme Court of Appeals." For reasons explained in 
this thesis, Chapter 2, footnote IO, that court is described herein as the "Virginia Supreme 
Court," except where th,e older name is quoted. Following the Bluebook, when the first 
letters pf ~urt" or "Supreme Court" are capitalized, that reference is always to the United 
iv 
States Supreme Court. 
A work of this type cannot be accomplished without assistance from others. The 
only difficulty with naming some is the concern that names of others, equally helpful, have 
been inadvertently omitted. Subject to that qualification, the following are especially re-
membered: Joseph D. Kyle, Ph.D., Coordinator of Education Service and Grants for the 
Hanover Tavern Foundation, was extremely helpful in suggesting those in the Hanover area 
familiar with the 1941 Francisco trial. Through his suggestions Mr. Sumpter Priddy, son of 
the late, identically-named Sheriff, in office during the Francisco trial, was located. The 
younger Priddy supplied an informative letter attached to the thesis as Exhibit "H," and 
many keen observations about the thesis subject matter, all extremely appreciated. The 
unparalleled assistance of Hanover County Deputy Clerk Thomas Carlson, head of the 
County Clerk's Office criminal division, is highly appreciated as well as the personal approval 
for that assistance by the Honorable Frank D. Hargrove, Jr., Hanover County Clerk, further 
detailed in Chapter 8, n. 2. Invaluable help also was supplied by the Library of Virginia. 
At the University of Richmond, diligent help was rendered in locating documents, 
books, periodicals, and interlibrary loans. Mr. Keith Weimer, the highly competent govern-
ment information specialist at the University's Boatwright Memorial Library, searched for 
obscure documents with an intensity making it seem his life depended on it, which was more 
than appreciated. Mr. James E. Gwin, Collection Librarian at Boatwright, offered encou-
rage~ent and excellent advice. Assistant History Professor A.H. ("Woody") Holtt'>ll, a very 
quick study, supplied consistently insightful suggestions of pertinent courses of action in this 
v 
thesis. His laser-like analysis of the text improved its professionalism immeasurably. The 
value of his contributions were beyond price. Formal approvals being obtained for thesis 
materials from the Virginia Historical Society and the Historical Society of Western Virginia 
in Roanoke are also much appreciated. 
From the inception of entry into the graduate program in history at the University of 
Richmond, undersigned has appreciated the consistent support, insight and academic 
inspiration provided by faculty advisor John D. Treadway, Professor ofHistory. He has been 
unfailing in encouraging academic initiative well-grounded in underlying scholarship and 
generates academic enthusiasm among those attending his classes and seminars. Under-
signed's progression in the program has benefitted greatly from his encouragement. 
At home, undersigned's spouse, Keitha VanderKloot, when we arrived in Richmond 
in 1999, opined that after talking about history for over twenty years it was high time to begin 
a formal study ofit. It was at her suggestion and withher encouragement that undersigned's 
graduate study was undertaken. Love and appreciation for her encouragement of this very 
worthwhile experience is here expressed as well. For these reasons, this thesis, also sub-
jected to her legal-secretarial proof-reading exactitude, is dedicated to her as well. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William R. V anderKloot 
Dated: July 1, 2005 
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THE TROUBLED INTERSECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF CHRIST 
AND COMMERCE: APPELLATE-COURT REVIEW OF vmGINIA SUNDAY 
CLOSING LAWS IN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW THROUGH 1942. 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Jefferson reckoned his drafting of Virginia's Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom ("Jefferson's Statute") among his three most outstanding achievements.1 Virginia 
has continuously reenacted it in subsequent recodifications of its law.2 
This study was initially undertaken to trace the impact of Jefferson's Statute on the 
history of Virginia appellate litigation. Review of the first hundred years of Virginia appellate 
opinions, however, revealed no reference to it, except Perry v. Commonwealth. 3 
Jefferson's self-written epitaph: "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, author of the 
Declaration of American Independence of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom & 
father of the University of Virginia." Quoted in Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and 
the New Nation: A Biography (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), 988, with a photo-
graph, the third of four between 912-913, ibid, of Jefferson's handwritten instructions, 
directing it contain "not a word more ... because by these, as testimonials that I have lived, 
I wish most to be remembered." Ibid. See also Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819, 822 (1995) (Jefferson viewed University of Virginia's founding ''together with 
authorship of the Declaration of Independence and of the Virginia Act for Religious Free-
dom, Va Code Ann §57-1 (1950), as one of his proudest achievements .... "). 
2 Current statute: Va. Code Ann. (1950), §57-1 (1995 Repl. Vol.). 
3 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 602 (1846). A convicted defendant objected to the trial court's 
admitting testimony of a prosecution witness who denied God punished perjury after death 
but, instead, did so, the witness said, during one's life. Defendant claimed the witness thereby 
expressed "religious opinions [that] disqualified him" from testifying. Ibid, 603-604. 
Virginia's highest court disagreed, observing: "[Formerly] ... one who did not believe in the 
Christian religion could not be a witness. . . . In Virginia, [this] ... was wholly abrogated 
by our Bill of Rights, and the act for securing religious freedom, .... [providing:] 'That 
religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be 
(continued ... ) 
1 
2 
After Perry, Virginia appeals gave little consideration to Jefferson's Statute until li-
tigation later arose concerning Virginia Sunday closing laws (i.e., proscribing Sunday labor 
or commerce) such as Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth in 1922, 4 which declared: "[The 
Sunday closing law][5] ... , cannot be enforced as a religious observance, as that is forbid-
den by our laws on the subject ofreligious freedom."6 Pirkey's discussion of the interplay 
between Virginia's closing laws and its religious freedom laws was incorporated by Virgin-
ia's high court into later closing law opinions in 19427 and 1961.8 Thus the issues embodied 
in Jefferson's Statute first arose in a practical way in appellate review of Sunday closing laws 
and, accordingly, attention was redirected to this narrower topic. 
3( ••• continued) 
directed only by reason ... , and not by force and violence' .... It was said that one who 
holds the proscribed opinions [here, denying that God punished perjury after death] has not 
the 'capacity' to testify .... But the [Virginia] Constitution says that religious opinion shall 
not lessen 'civil capacities' .... The only error ... was in allowing the witness to be 
questioned ... touching his religious principles. This being an error in favor of the 
[defendant] prisoner, the judgment must be affirmed." Ibid, 610-613. Thus, Perry held that 
Jefferson's statute prohibited inquiry into religious opinions of a prospective witness, when 
determining the competency of that witness to testify. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
134 Va. 713, 114 S.E. 769 (1922). 
Then-cod~ed in Virginia Code Ann. (1919) § 4570. 
Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 717 (emphasis added). 
Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 371, 376-377, 23 S.E 2d 234 (1942). 
8 
"[A] Sunday law ena~ted under the police power of the State for ... a day ofrest 
... , to prevent ... debasement ... from ... labor, does not infringe upon the constitutional 
guarantee of religious freedom." Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 988, 121 S.E.2d 516 
(1961), citing Pirkey Bros, discussed further, infra., at nn. 23 through 70, Chapter 7, infra, 
and accompanying text. 
Chapter 2: FRANCISCO v. COMMONWEALTH APPELLATE OPINION STU-
DIED, TO FRAME CLOSING-LAW ANALYSIS IN THIS THESIS 
This thesis begins, and ultimately concludes, studying Virginia Sunday closing laws, 
their dynamics, development, and indications of their eventual quiescence; by examining the 
1942 Francisco v. Commonwealth 1 opinion by Virginia's highest tribunal, the then-entitled 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 2 No claim is made for Francisco as pivotal, but it can be termed 
representative, both as an analytical starting point and as a means to examine social conduct, 
both unifying and divisive, embodied in the operation of Virginia's closing laws as revealed 
in appellate decisions through 1942, when this thesis concludes. 
This Chapter 2 examination of Francisco is confined to the December 7, 1942, text 
of the Virginia high-court's opinion (the "opinion" or "Francisco"). With that backdrop, 
succeeding Chapters 3 through 7, offer a more detailed study of Virginia Sunday closing 
laws, from their prehistory antecedents through 1942. References are also made to relevant 
developments outside Virginia, some much earlier than its colonial founding. With this 
detailed review in hand, the thesis returns to a more detailed examination of Francisco itself, 
in Chapter 8, considering matters not apparent from this Chapter 2 review of the high-court 
180 Va. 371, 23 S.E. 2d 234 (1942). 
2 Virginia's highest court, formerly the "Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals," now 
the "Virginia Supreme Court," retained its predecessors records. For consistency, "Virginia 
Supreme Court" is used herein to identify Virginia's highest court, except in quotations 
containing the other name. It is also used to avoid confusion, because there is now (circa 
2005) a "Virginia Court of Appeals," an intermediate appellate court, unconnected with the 
old "Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals." 
3 
4 
opinion alone. Finally, general conclusions about Virginia closing laws through 1942 are 
offered in Chapter 9. 
Reading Francisco propels the imagination back to the early 1940s in Virginia's 
then-almost wholly bucolic Hanover County, just north of Richmond, the state capital. Ma-
jor arterial highways interlaced the area, encouraging a substantial tourist business, sup-
porting restaurants, gas stations and convenience stores. Their sales were of gasoline, drinks, 
including beer, and other goods, a significant portion of which occurred on Sunday,3 though 
ostensibly prohibited, at least in part, by the Virginia Sunday closing laws. 
The defendant, M. G. Francisco, described as a "country merchant," operated a 
Hanover County general store. He sought to profit :(I-om the tourist traffic by selling on 
Sundays, among other things, beer for off-premises consumption, as did eighty percent of 
Hanover County businesses holding, as he did, a state license to sell beer.4 He was cited for 
violating Virginia's closing law, virtually unchanged since originally adopted by the first post-
revolutionary war Virginia legislature in 1786,5 providing in pertinent part: 
If a person on a Sunday be found laboring at any trade or calling, or 
employ his apprentices or servants in labor or other business except in 
household or other work of necessity or charity, he shall be deemed guilty of 
3 Ibid, 373-374. The facts of Francisco here-stated are only those found in the De-
cember 7, 1942, Virginia Supreme Court opinion at 180 Va. 371. Other facts not in that 
opinion, are discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
4 Francisco, ibid, at 373-374. ''No complaint was lodged against him [Francisco] 
for the sale of articles other than beer." Ibid, at 374. 
5 The original 1786 statute is quoted in text preceding n. 20, Chapter 5, infra. 
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than five 
dollars for each offense .... 6 
5 
Hanover County Circuit Judge Leon M. Bazile presided at the Francisco trial. 7 His 
"written opinion, made part of the record" in that trial, ruled that what was a Sunday ''work 
of necessity," exempted from prosecution, was a question of law for the court, not one of fact 
for the jury. He further held that the defendant's alleged Sunday sale of beer could not, as a 
matter oflaw~ be deemed a statutorily exempted "necessity. "8 He therefore "instructed the 
jury that if they believed . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ... maintained 
a business for the sale of beer and sold beer on the Sunday in question, they should find him 
guilty."9 Since Mr. Francisco never contested these matters, the result was, said the Fran-
cisco opinion, given the judge's jury instruction, "a verdict of guilty necessarily followed." 10 
That is, the judge's instruction effectively compelled the jury to find Mr. Francisco guilty 
merely because the sale occurred on Sunday. He barred the jury from considering whether 
there was an exculpatory "necessity" for the sale, precluding conviction. 
6 Va. Code Ann. (1919) § 4570, quoted in Francisco, 180 Va. at 375. 
7 Francisco, 180 Va. at 373. 
8 Ibid, 180 Va. at 375. The Virginia Supreme Court here summarized, rather than 
quoted, the trial court's ruling. The Supreme Court described the precise charge against 
defendant, as being his unlawful "laboring at his trade and calling by remaining open and 
maintaining a business for the sale of beer and by selling beer on Sunday." Ibid at 373. 
9 Ibid at 374. 
10 Ibid. 
6 
Mr. Francisco's sentence was a five dollar fine, the statutory minimum. 11 His con-
viction, however, was overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court's December 7, 1942, 
Francisco opinion, 12 which assigned two reasons for its reversal: 
First, the trial court erred in concluding ''the sale of beer on Sunday, ... was, as a 
matter oflaw, not a necessity .... " It was, said the Supreme Court, "for the jury and not the 
court to say whether such Sunday sale was or was not reasonably essential to the economic, 
social or moral welfare of the community [i.e., a 'necessity']."13 
Second, said the high court, the trial judge erred in "excluding from the jury evidence 
that the [Hanover County] board of supervisors had considered and failed to enact an or-
dinance prohibiting the sale of beer on Sunday."~ was "pertinent and material on whe-
ther the work of selling beer on Sundays was reasonably essential to the economic, social or 
moral welfare of the community [i.e., an exculpatory 'necessity,' precluding conviction]."14 
11 Ibid at 373. For the five dollar minimum fine imposed, refer to the last line of the 
statute as quoted in thesis text preceding n. 6, this Chapter, supra. 
12 Francisco, 180 Va. at 383. Three of the court's five judges joined in the Francis-
co opinion. The fourth concurred in result only and filed a short opinion. The fifth dissen-
ted but filed no dissenting opinion. 
13 Francisco, 180 Va. at 380 (emphasis and bracketed words added).That is, the Su-
preme Court ruled, the jury could find, in its discretion, as a matter of fact (not law), that in 
this particular circumstance, a sale of beer was, or was not, a "necessity." Trial Judge Ba-
zile, the high court effectively concluded, could not take that decision away from the jury. 
14 Ibid at 381-382. 
7 
Thus ended Francisco's appellate record. ts This did not necessarily mean the lower-
court retrial which Francisco also ordered did not occur, since a retrial, if not appealed, 
would not appear in any appellate record. However, given the defendant's appeal ofhis first 
conviction, he seemed unlikely to be any less inclined to appeal a later one. Conversely, given 
the prosecution's zeal, it also seemed unlikely to simply abandon what it had so vigorously 
pursued, even had there been an acquittal. t6 Lack of further appellate proceedings was, 
therefore, puzzling. 
Equally puzzling was why the County was prosecuting, given the high court's finding 
that "at least eighty percent of those licensed to sell beer [in the county] ... sold it openly on 
Sundays."t7 Paradoxically, local authorities were I?-Ot prosecuting Sunday closing law 
violations by "eighty percent of those licensed to sell beer" who "sold it openly on Sundays," 
while relentlessly pursing this one, seemingly minor, offender. ts 
t5 1 Shepard's Virginia Citations (1995), 703, reveals no further appellate activity. 
t6 A jury acquittal of defendant would prevent his retrial for the same offense, on 
double-jeopardy grounds; e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2. The prosecution, however, might 
have appealed alleged errors of law, even after acquittal, solely to establish favorable 
precedent, as suggested in a parenthetical phrase in thbe following quotation in Common-
wealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 811, 97 S.E. 820 (1919) (dictum): "When the purpose of 
an appeal in a criminal case is to procure on behalf of the State a reversal of the judgment 
and a new trial of the accused (as distinguished from a mere review and decision of the legal 
question involved for use as a precedent in future cases) the rule against a second jeopardy 
for the same offense ... destroy[s] the right of appeal." Alternatively, a subsequent Sunday 
sale by this defendant could have been prosecuted. 
17 
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Francisco at 374. 
America's eminent entry into World War II also, arguably, should have redirected 
(continued ... ) 
8 
Thus, the Francisco opinion, as outlined above, raised questions not answered by the 
facts and circumstances contained within the confines of its text. It was difficult to locate 
additional credible evidence for answers, as will be shown. Although, perhaps not enough 
was learned to reach unassailable conclusions, what was uncovered allowed some well-
informed suppositions about why cases like Francisco arose under the Sunday closing laws, 
not only in Virginia, but elsewhere as well. To better understand what was learned, how-
ever, it is necessary first to examine the origins and development of Sunday closing laws, 
both in Virginia and elsewhere where relevant, from their earliest indications in Judeo-
Christian history through the year-end-194 2 conclusion date of this thesis. 
18( ••• continued) 
Virginia law enforcement attention, in general, towards matters like espionage, sabotage, 
treason and subversion, rather than the prosecution of (in 1941 ), and contesting the appeal 
of (in 1942) this relatively minor state Sunday closing law misdemeanor. 
Chapter 3: OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPING A SEVEN-DAY "WEEK," 
INCLUDING CHANGING THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH TO THE 
FIRST DAY OF THAT WEEK. 
(a) Development of the Seven-Day Week. 
An analysis of laws prohibiting labor on a day-certain (Sunday) within the seven-day 
week, is necessarily incomplete without first considering how the seven day week itself arose. 
This is because the closing law's presumed impact partly depends on its undeviating 
recurrence within the week's seven-day cycle. This Chapter 3, accordingly, also considers 
whether connections can be found between Sabbath requirements of rest and religious 
reflection and the origins of the seven-day week. 
One scholar found the seven-day week's origins a "mystery" whose roots "lie deep, 
too deep to fully understand."1 Another asserted, that "[w]hile various seven-day patterns 
were present in ancient Near Eastern texts, no [non-biblical] sabbath day or seven-day week 
or seven-day creation account has been discovered."2 Still others noted, however, that 
Babylonians, "rested on the fifteenth day of the month, the time of a full moon, [which] they 
called shabuttu, meaning 'cease' or 'rest."' Each "rest"day was called a "sabbath," when 
work stopped for worship and celebration. 3 
Witold Rybczynski, Waiting/or the Weekend (New York: Viking Penguin, 1991), 
49, citing numerous authorities for this conclusion in ''Notes on Sources," 238-239, ibid. 
2 Terence E. Fretheim "Commentary, Genesis 1: 1-2:3, The Creation," New lnterpre-
ter 's Bible (Nashville: Abington Press, 1994), 1:340-347, 346. 
3 Hiley H. Ward, Space Age Sunday (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 55-56, citing 
Wilhelm P .F .F. Lotz, "Sabbath," New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 
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The Babylonians ultimately observed not merely one, but four rest days each month. 
Work ceased, ''probably the first, eighth, fifteenth and twenty-second of the month." Astro-
logy convinced the Babylonians these days were ill-omened, except the mid-month full moon 
date, when they prayed to be saved from divine wrath on the other three. 
Weekly "sabbaths" which were "ill-omened," except at mid-month, seem the oppo-
site of the uniformly exalted holy sabbath-day of biblical tradition. Israelites, exiled to Baby-
Ion when conquered by that Empire around 600 B.C.E., presumably learned there of such 
Babylonian "sabbaths." Perhaps they concluded that whatever their Babylonian enemy feared, 
they should embrace, 4 and thus saw these non-midmonth "sabbaths" as days of gladness and 
rest for Israe~ not of penance or dread, as they were for the Babylonians.5 
Samuel Macauley Jackson, ed., (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1911), 10:135-136. 
4 This somewhat parallels the reputedly middle-eastern saying, "The enemy of my 
enemy is my friend," as explained in Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs, 4th ed., Jennifer 
Speake, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 90. Ward, 56, ibid, explained: "The 
sabbath of the Babylonians was for penance; while to the early Hebrews it was a day of 
gladness and rest." 
5 Ward, n. 3 (this Chapter), supra, at 56, supplied quotations and assertions in the 
text paragraph supported by this footnote and the paragraph immediately preceding; and 
insightfully noted bible texts attributing, presumably due to Babylonian influence, special 
significance to "new moon" and "Sabbath": (1) A husband rebukes his wife (despondent 
over a son's death) for consulting the prophet Elisha: "Why will you go to him today? It is 
neither new moon, nor sabbath." 2 Kings 4:23; (2) The prophet Amos disdainfully 
"quotes" hypothetical greedy merchants: "When will the new moon be over, that we may 
sell grain; and the sabbath, that we may offer wheat for sale?" Amos 8:5 (NRSV). J. A. 
Soggin stated: "A connection [of "sabbath"]with the Akkadian [North Babylonian] 
sablpattu, ... should probably be rejected, as they are unpropitious days, the opposite of 
what the Sabbath seems to be. Nevertheless, the former connection is so obvious 
etymologically that one should ask whether the abstention from work on such a day does 
11 
While the foregoing possibly offers an archeological-historical explanation oflsrael's 
adopting a seven-day week, the Judeo-Christian Bible attributed the week's origin to the 
Israelite deity's creative powers. In Old Testament-Genesis, God's acts of creation consumed 
six days and then, it was said, "God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it 
God rested from all the work that he had done in creation.''6 Humankind, however, was not 
clearly instructed to hallow this seventh day until, we are told, God later said to Moses: 
Six days shall work be done, but the seventh day is a sabbath of solemn rest, 
holy to the Lord; . . . . Therefore the Israelites shall keep the sabbath ... as 
a perpetual covenant. It is a sign forever between me and the people oflsrael 
that in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he 
rested, and was refreshed. 7 
Hiley Ward, asserted that ''periods of fifty day~, or 'pentecontads,' originated at the 
time of Moses [within which] ... were seven weeks of forty-nine days, including seven 
sabbaths, with one extra [holy day]." Then "'at a much later date, during the Babylonian 
captivity, ... the pentecontad plan with its special 50th day was abandoned and a regular 
invariable seventh-day sabbath was introduced .... "'8 
not lead ... to the Israelite concept ofrest." Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, ed., 
The Oxford Guide to Ideas & Issues of the Bible (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), 
s.v., "Sabbath," 444. 
6 Genesis 2:3, NRSV. The arguably incorrect "Old Testament" is used here, because 
its meaning is more widely understood in the vernacular, rather than the historically more 
correct but less-well-understood "Hebrew Bible.'' 
7 Exodus 31:15-17, NRSV. 
8 Ward, Space Age Sunday, 58 (emphasis in original), quoting from Elizabeth Ach-
elis, Of Time and Calendar (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1955), 87, 88. 
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Still another origin for a "sabbath" or "rest" day was offered in the Old Testament 
Book of Deuteronomy, saying Moses told the people oflsrael: 
Six days you shall labor and do all your work. But the seventh day is a sabbath 
to the Lord your God; you shall not do any work . . . . Remember that you 
were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the Lord your God brought you out 
from there ... , therefore the Lord your God commanded you to keep the 
sabbath day.9 
One commentator claimed this passage "subordinated" creation ''to that of the exodus." In 
contrast, another found ''the fundamental sanction of the Sabbath in both statements is 
creation-in Exodus, of the world; in Deuteronomy, of a people. "10 
The Old Testament thus required scrupulous observance of a weekly Sabbath. The 
Israelites believed this covenant with their God was "~o important that penalties for disobe-
dience were severe [death]," and that "desolation awaits the land that pollutes the Sab-
bath. " 11 The meaning of this theological imperative was clouded, however, by confusion over 
what was being ·observed. The "Sabbath," as derived from Babylonian tradition was, some-
how, transmogrified from a day, in the main, to be dreaded, into, in Israelite belief, one to be 
honored. Further, the biblical texts quoted also confused whether that observance honored 
God's resting after six days of creation (Genesis/Exodus) or Israel's escape from Egyptian 
9 Deuteronomy 5:12-15, NRSV. 
10 Walter Brueggemann, "Commentary, Exodus 20:8-11," New Interpreters Bible, 
supra, n. 26, supra, 1 :845, first quotation in the footnoted paragraph. The last quotation, 
comparing Exodus and Deuteronomy passages, was from Winton U. Solberg, Redeem the 
Time: The Puritan Sabbath in Early America (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 9. 
II Ward, Space Age Sunday, 57. Solberg, 9, n. 9, and accompanying text. 
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slavery (Deuteronomy). These confusions seemed to carry over to its contemporary purposes 
and observances, as just discussed in Chapter 2 herein, concerning Francisco. 
(b) Christians Move Sabbath Worship to the First Day of the Week. 
Since Sunday was celebrated as ''the day of the [Christ's] resurrection," Christians 
found it "invested ... with special character as a symbol ofredemption in Christ," inducing 
their shifting its celebration to Sunday. 12 This, however, does not explain how the practice 
became standard in the Roman Empire, where the Israelites and their seventh-day Sabbath 
were a comparatively minor presence. Christians, with a weekly first-day Sabbath, were 
initially a smaller offshoot of these relatively (to the Romans) insignificant Israelites. 
Also impeding the seven-day week's development was the absence of any similar 
measure of days in other cultures the Romans knew. The Egyptians provided for three ten-
day divisions in their thirty-day months. The Greeks had an analogous practice, roughly 
corresponding to the moon's waxing, full-moon, and waning. The Romans divided their 
months into three segments, but of unequal lengths, not similar to seven-day weeks.13 
Scholars studying the seven-day week admit their explanations of its origins are 
speculative. That being said, Witold Rybczynski, for example, theorized that the week's se-
ven days may reflect ancient preoccupations with supposed powers of the numeral seven, 
12 Ward, Space Age Sunday, 74; Solberg, Redeem the Time, 11. The quotations in 
the paragraph's text preceding this footnote are from these sources, ibid, consecutively. 
13 Rybczynski, Waiting for the Weekend, 25-26, cites sources calling the religious 
day shabqttu, instead of shabyftu (Ward's sources, n. 3, this Chapter, supra, and accom-
panying text, or sab/pattu, used by Soggin's sources, n. 5, this Chapter, supra. 
14 
preserved in such expressions as the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, the Seven Labors of Hercules, 
or the Seven Wonders of the World. The ancients also supposedly discerned seven heavenly 
bodies with apparent motion: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, Sun, and Moon. As -
trologers claimed each such ''planet" was supposedly influenced by the god whose name it 
bore. 14 Assigning a different planet god-name to each of seven successive days, now com-
prising a ''week," purportedly ceded influence over each such day to that god as well. How-
ever, "historians have been unable to fully unravel the relationship between the planetary 
week and the Jewish week," though they are "obviously connected."15 
Finally, Jewish communities in the Roman Empire, though small and disdained were, 
nevertheless, heavily involved in trade. This made it convenient, said some scholars, for other 
merchants to conform to the Jewish seven-day week with Saturday-Sabbath work-absten-
tion, since when Jews were not doing business, it was harder for others to do any either. 16 
Other faCtors favored Sunday, not Saturday, as a weekly rest day, such as its reli-
gious observance also by sun-worshiping pagan religions like Mithraism, competing with 
Christianity for dominance in the Empire.17 Also, there was a Roman tradition of"market 
days," every eighth or ninth day. These increasingly recurred within the now-developing 
14 The sun and moon, at that time, were considered "planets." "Tuesday'' through 
"Friday'' were renamed by Northern Europeans for Norse gods whose mythological func-
tions paralleled their Greco-Roman pagan-deity counterparts. Ibid, 30. 
15 Ibid, 34. Previous discussion in this paragraph is drawn from ibid, 22-33. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 36-37. 
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seven-day week, often on Christian Sundays, which commenced with worshipers celebrat-
ing Christian Eucharist, but otherwise was "an ordinary working day."18 
Presumably due to such pressures towards a Sunday cessation from labor, the Roman 
Emperor Constantine, in 321 C.E., issued a Sunday observance edict, providing in part: 
On the venerable day of the sun, let the magistrates and people residing in 
cities rest, and let all workshops be closed. In the country, however, persons 
engaged in the work of cultivation may freely and lawfully continue their 
pursuits; because it often happens that another day is not so suitable for grain-
sowing or vine-planting; lest by neglecting the proper moment ... the bounty 
of heaven should be lost. 19 
Constantine also, significantly, ordered his soldiers to pray, in part: "We acknowledge thee 
the only God: we own thee as our King .... Together we pray to thee, and beseech thee long 
18 Rybczynski, Waiting for the Weekend, 66-61. This ''market day" influence may 
have confused whether Sunday was to be a day for rest and worship or for worship and 
shopping as implied, for example, in Francisco. See Chapters 2 and 8 herein. 
19 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 12, quoting the edict, at n.11, from James A. Hessey, 
Sunday: Its Origin, History, and Present Obligation, 3d ed. (London: 1866.), 58. Ward, 
Space Age Sunday, 11 and n.18, has a slightly different translation, varying little sub-
stantively. Constantine's edict was noted in Richardson v. Goddard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28, 
41 (1859)("The observance of Sunday as a Sabbath or day of ceremonial rest was first 
enjoined by the Emperor Constantine as a civil regulation, in conformity with the practice of 
the Christian church."). In McGowan v. Maryland, 360 U.S. 459 (1962) (concurring 
opinion), however, Justice Frankfurter declared: "Constantine's edict proscribing labor on 
the venerable day of the Sun ... [should be] passed over," and Sunday closing law analysis 
confined to "modem England, the American Colonies, and the States ... ," Ibid, at 470. 
However, the Jewish sabbath's confusing origins (Chapter 3(a), ibid), and confusion 
concerning Constantine's Sunday edict, (Chapter 3(b), herein), perhaps augured later 
confusion about what closing laws restricted in Virginia case law in Chapters 6 through 8, 
herein, for example. Justice Frankfurter may have unduly discounted this earlier history. 
16 
to preserve to us, safe and triumphant, our Emperor Constantine and his pious sons. "20 
Hiley Ward found it unclear if Constantine was a practicing Christian, but saw his 
quoted edict and prayer as political, no matter his religious sincerity.21 Since the Emperor 
was protected by an army of diverse faiths, with Christianity not yet dominant over pagan 
creeds, the prayer was prudently ambiguous, it could be argued, about what religion was 
being followed. It did not mention Christ nor the Fourth Commandment's Sabbath mandate, 
making it congenial to either Christianity or Mithraism. In the Emperor's above-quoted no-
work-on-Sunday edict, only his urban subjects (whom he, presumably, more easily con-
trolled), were ordered to cease work. Those in the country had broader exemptions from 
ceasing labor in part, arguably because, being more r~mote, they were less subject to the 
emperor's control.22 By this explanation, the edict became a face-saving way to excuse its 
nonenforcement in rural areas, probably beyond his power in any event. Furthermore, the 
text of the Emperor's prayer appears more devoted to his glorification, rather than any hen-
20 Hiley H. Ward, Space Age Sunday, 77, citing and quoting, at nn. 62, 67 and 68 
therein, Eusebius, "The Life of the Blessed Emperor Constantine," quoted from Philip 
Schaff and Henry Ware, ed., A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
of the Christian Church (New York: Christian Literature Co, 1890), 1:545. 
21 Ibid. Emperor Constantine's devotion to and understanding of Christianity is a 
complex matter of study, summarized as favorable, but incremental, adjustments towards 
that faith. He was not baptized until on his deathbed in 337 C.E. See Marcel Le Glay, et al., 
A History of Rome, 2d ed. (Malden, Mass./ Oxford: Blackwell, 2001 ), 411-412. 
22 This arguably was so despite the edict's elaborate justification for not ordering 
rural cessation of labor (to the effect that nature does not allow delay of farm tasks) 
which, by its very intricacy suggested, perhaps, a different underlying explanation. 
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efit to his soldiers, subjects, or homage to the deity to whom, ostensibly, it was addressed. 
Thus, Constantine's "prayer" and edict perhaps, were not to be explained solely by religious 
motivation; their religious attributes being to some degree a facade concealing his actual 
purpose of sustaining his political dominance. They could be, instead, an early but by no 
means unique example of allegedly religious government activity also intended to augment 
power of those controlling the government. As will be seen, such suggestions of self-serving 
motivations offer plausible explanations about how later confusions could arise about the 
purpose of statutorily-required Sunday rest, as occurred in the Francisco case.23 
Thus, paralleling the confusion about the original sabbath's meaning in the Old Tes-
tament, Christian views about what was appropriate conduct on the new Christian Sunday 
"sabbath" were. similarly conflicted. This continued into the Middle Ages: 
Although the medieval Church formulated a demanding theory of 
Christian Sabbatarianism, it failed to secure general compliance with its 
expressed ideal. Many laymen ... took their morning sleep on the Lord's 
Day and spent the remainder of Sunday in various innocent or vicious 
pastimes .... Mother Church indulgently winked at these lapses as long as 
offenders did not question her precepts. 24 
So at the very beginning of governmental "Sunday rest" edicts, there was a lack of consensus 
similar to those much later arising, as in Francisco, over what was permitted on Sunday, 
arguably derived from the initial ambiguity over what the Sabbath was observing. 
23 The initial review of Francisco was in Chapter 2 herein, supra. The discussion of 
possible concealed motivations in Francisco will be in Chapter 8 hereinafter. 
24 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 14-15. 
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In the fourth and fifth centuries, C.E., church councils began requiring strict Sunday 
rest and worship attendance. "Civil officials proscribed the payment of debts and legal pro-
ceedings, and in 386 Emperor Theodosius ... forbade the transaction of business on Sun-
day." Nevertheless, recreation was not banned, and ''necessary" duties could be performed, 
if not interfering with worship. In the next thousand years, however, the Church declared ''the 
new Christian ceremonies to be the legitimate successors of the old Jewish ceremonies ... 
rel[ying] on the Fourth Commandment ... [as] a moral law binding all mankind rather than 
a ceremonial law only binding Jews." Increasingly "bishops and princes enjoined ... [Sunday] 
labor and commercial activities and ... travel and recreation." After the Norman conquest, 
Sunday laws in England were enforced with increasing ~trictness. 25 In continuing the topic of 
this thesis, however, the next significant event that principally affected what would become 
Virginia's Sunday closing laws was Henry VIII's takeover of the Catholic church in England. 
It is to this event, its closing law consequences, and the relation of both to Virginia's 
colonization, that we now turn. 
25 Ibid, 13-14 (all quoted passages in this paragraph are from this source). 
Chapter4: IMPACT OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION ON SUNDAY 
LAWS, BOTH IN ENGLAND AND IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA. 
(a) The Henrician Church Confiscation and its Closing Law Impacts. 
Henry VIII broke with Rome in 1533, appropriating to himself that part of the 
Catholic Church in his relm; renamed the "Church of England," which he headed.1 He was 
cautious in reforming Sunday observance. His reconstituted Church initially followed Catholic 
doctrine that the Fourth Commandment was not "literally binding" on Christians, in contrast 
to what were seen as the other commandments' moral imperatives. Therefore, Sunday labor 
was expressly allowed "if necessary ... to save ... corn or cattle; indeed, failure to do so for 
scruple of conscience offended God." Henry's Church thereby "denounced idleness ... [yet] 
offered no sanction for Sunday amusements or recreations. "2 
After a more radical Protestantism under Henry's successor, his boy-king son Ed-
ward VI (1547-1553), then back toward Catholicism in the yet-briefer reign of his daughter 
"Bloody" Mary (1553-1558), England finally "demonstrated the Anglican spirit of compro-
mise," as achieved by Elizabeth I. She induced Parliament to adopt (1) the Act of Supremacy, 
requiring obedience to the sovereign, and (2) the Act of Uniformity which, while "allowing 
wide latitude of belief' promoted ''uniformity of practice" by compulsory Sunday worship 
Euan Cameron, s.v. "Henry VIII," 470-472, 471, Oxford Companion to British 
History, John Cannon, ed. (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1997). Of course, Henry nei-
ther proposed nor provided compensation to Rome for his confiscations. 
2 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 22-24. 
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under a more protestant Book of Common Prayer.3 
But the supporters of Henry's church reorganization wanted more than to merely 
replace resented papal domination with a king doing the same. 4 They increasingly saw re-
ligion as a direct covenant between God and individual worshipers, without intervening hu-
man agents, like a pope and curia or a monarch and court. Central to this concept was their 
view of a sacred obligation to honor the Sunday Sabbath. Solberg found four aspects to this 
increasing centrality of the English Sabbath: (1) the vernacular Bible; (2) covenant theology; 
(3) the so-called Protestant ''work ethic;" and ( 4) condemnation of Sunday recreation. s These 
shaped the life-experience and social outlook of English subjects and influenced those who 
emigrated to Virginia and the pattern of life they adopte~ there, including Sunday closing law 
observances. 6 
As to Solberg's first factor, the vernacular Bible, the 1560 Geneva Bible (so-called 
because translated there by Protestant English exiles during Catholic Queen Mary's reign) 
3 Ibid, 25, 28. 
4 The balance of this Chapter 4(a) draws on Solberg, Redeem the Time, 24-48. 
s Ibid, 33. 
6 This view supported by: Perry Miller, "Religion and Society in the early Litera-
ture of Virginia,"in Errand in the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1956), 101 (In Virginia, religion was ''the really energizing propulsion" for settlement.); 
Thomas N. Page, The Old Dominion: Her Making and Her Manners (New York: Charles 
Scribners & Sons, 1914), 364 ("planting of Virginia had its origin in the religious zeal of the 
people of England."); Solberg, Redeem the Time, 86, though asserting these sources 
"overstate," nevertheless allowed that ''there can be little doubt that a desire to advance the 
kingdom of God as well as to accumulate earthly riches," underlaid Virginia's colonization. 
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generated tremendous interest in the scriptures, now accessible in idiomatic English. Earnest 
men came to ''measure the truth ofreligion by the square of the Word," wrote John Stockman 
in 1578. 7 Increasingly they came to view all scripture as divinely inspired, to be followed and 
applied in full. 
The Thirty-Nine Articles, originally promulgated to resolve then-major issues of faith, 
somewhat straddled the question of obedience to the Fourth Commandment. 8 However, 
increasingly influential doctrinaire Puritans insisted that all Ten Commandments be part of 
English jurisprudence. They saw the Fourth Commandment as requiring Sunday sabbath 
observance, despite what Solberg termed ''momentous theological confusion" in equating this 
7 Solberg, 33, n. 19, quoting Stockman from Michael Walzer, The Revolution of 
the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1965), 187. 
8 Article VII of the Thirty-Nine Articles provided: "The Old Testament is not con-
trary to the New, ... Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies 
and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof of necessity to be re-
ceived ... : yet ... no Christian ... is free from ... the Commandments which are called 
Moral." Solberg, ibid, quoting E. Tyrell Green, The Thirty-Nine Articles and the Age of 
Reformation (London, 1896), 53. The Articles were promulgated by Anglican bishops in 
Convocation in 1563, Rosemary O'Day, Longman Companion to the Tudor Age (New 
York: Longman, 1995), 60, incorporated into English law in 1628. Will and Ariel Durant, 
The Story of Civilization, The Age of Reason Begins (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961 ), 
7:187. The Thirty-Nine Articles' difficulty in distinguishing between mandatory ''moral" 
imperatives of the commandments, contrasted with those "touching Ceremonies and Rites," 
presumably including Fourth Commandment-imposed non-imperative Saturday Sabbath, 
likely confused what civil law permitted (or not) on Sunday. This particularly applied to 
Sunday closing laws, converting theological admonitions into legal requirements, and thus 
contributing, it would seem, to legal uncertainties revealed on appeal by cases such as 
Francisco (see Chapters 2 and 8 herein). 
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with the Jewish sabbath. 9 
Solberg's second factor, covenant theology, was :fundamental to Puritanism. De-
pending on the variant professed, Puritans asserted humankind had bound itself either (1) in 
exchange for God's promise of salvation, to follow the Ten Commandments (the covenant 
of ''works"); or (2) to recommitted fuith in God, in return for God's promise to redeem the 
fallen through a Savior (the covenant of "grace"). By either view, religious preparation was 
needed. This preparation became the Sunday sabbath's central task, making it "born twins" 
with Puritan theology. 10 
Solberg's third sabbath-intensifying factor, the economic impact of the "protestant 
ethic," he derived from Max Weber's classic, though c9ntroverted, Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism .11 In Weber's view, Solberg explained, ''the Calvinist conception of the 
calling spurred the individua~ anxious about the certainty of salvation, to prove his faith by 
strenuous activity in his worldly vocation." While Calvin did not believe salvation required 
good works, "Weber argued the Calvinists regarded them as indispensable signs of 
election."12 As Weber saw it, ''the work ethic became a vital part of the Puritan code of 
9 
JO 
Solberg, ibid, 35. 
Ibid, 35-40. 
11 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Par-
sons (New York: Scribner's, 1958) (hereinafter: "PE"). 
12 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 40 (emphasis added). PE conceded the industrial revo-
lution occurred over a century after events here-described, but claimed the process initia-
ting that revolution originated in earlier-developing Puritanism. Solberg, 42. 
23 
conduct ... , evidenc[ing] a proper understanding of how to realize God's true order .... 
Time was fleeting and precious, a supreme value, which God held men strictly accountable 
to use wisely. " 13 One Puritan divine admonished the faithful to "Redeeme the Time," a variant 
of an admonition by St. Paul. 14 Solberg explained the connection of the ''protestant ethic" to 
Sabbatarianism15 as one which 
13 
facilitated the emergence of modem society by rationalizing time and the 
productive process .... on a ... uniform schedule .... The concentration of 
religious observance on one day a week admirably suited. . . new forms of 
economic organization. Sabbatarianism held workers to their tasks six days 
a week and ... rest on the seventh. Then, strength restored, they could start 
the cycle over again. Thus, the theological convictions of English Calvinists 
and the environment of an incipient capitalistic industrial society reinforced 
each other. 16 
Ibid, 44. 
14 Ibid. Solberg here quotes St. Paul, admonishing the faithful to be "Redeeming the 
time, because the days are evil." Eph. 5:16, King James version, of which Solberg's book-
title (Redeem the Time) is a variant. 
15 
"Sabbatarianism" here means "strict observance of the Sabbath," s.v. "Sabbatar-
ian," American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed.). An alternative meaning is observing "Sa-
turday as the Sabbath, as in Judaism." Ibid. 
l6 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 46 (footnote omitted). Some further observations: 
(1) Solberg noted, ibid, 41, nn. 47 and 48, ''voluminous" literature debating (in 
1977) Weber's thesis. It has increased since then. Alan Sica, "Rationalization and Culture," 
in Stephen Turner, ed, A Cambridge Companion to Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press 
for German Historical Inst., 2000) ("Companion"), 49, n. 12, noted, for example, a pro-
posed bibliography of3,000 secondary works in English on Weber, many about PE. 
(2) Typical of Weberian texts is Weber's Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, 
Contexts ("Evidence"), Hartmut Lehman and Kenneth F. Ledford, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), with PE views from avid support to outright rejection. 
(continued ... ) 
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Weber saw Benjamin Franklin as a quintessential personification of the Protestant Ethic, 
many of whose writings he translated into German to illustrate his PE thesis. Franklin, PE 
notes, recalled his father teaching him, from the Book of Proverbs, "Seest thou a man dili-
16( ••• continued) 
(a) A PE critic, Malcolm H. McKinnon, asserted in "The Longevity of 
the Thesis: A Critique of the Critics," Evidence, 212-213: "[T]here is no crisis ... in 
dogmatic Calvinism [requiring] ... good works ... [;] no call for devotion to a workaday 
pastime .... Calvinism ... did not contribute to capitalism in the way that Weber claims." 
(b) David Zaret, however, objected to MacK.innon, as expressed in (2) 
(a), ibid, arguing he "ignores most of the relevant ... evidence ... and attributes implausible 
tidbits" as applicable Puritan thought, by omitting PE passages "that strongly modify or 
contradict,"those he attacked, "The Use and Abuse of Textual Data," Evidence, 245, 247. 
(c) An uneasy compromise was offered by Evidence co-editor Leh-
mann, conceding PE 's "dated" thesis, but stressing "no one since" Weber "has had an [equal] 
influence on research .... " "Preface," Evidence, viii. As Guenther Roth more perversely 
stated, "the Weber thesis ... has refused to die in spite of ... exasperated efforts to be done 
with it .... [For] quite a few scholars it has become counterproductive; its very longevity 
appears a nuisance." "Introduction," Evidence, 4. 
( d) One might counter Roth in ( c ), ibid, that if a "thesis" has "refused 
to die," no matter how "exasperated" some are to "be done with it," maybe that meant there 
was something to it. As expressed more cautiously by Alastair Hamilton: "[I]t is just as 
difficult to demolish Weber's thesis as it is to substantiate it," "Max Weber's Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism," Companion, 169; conceding, however, "there is in fact not 
much in ... Weber's thesis that stands up to modern examination." Ibid, at 171. 
(3) Such scholarly conflicts might be harmonized by inferring that Weber's in-
formed speculations about Protestantism's relation to Europe's adoption of market capitalism 
many scholars deem models of insight which needed, however, augmentation by current 
research those such as Solberg, for example, seemed interested to undertake, to rectify 
Weber's apparent disinterest in such tasks. 
25 
gent in his business? he shall stand before kings .... " 17 This expressed, to Franklin (and 
Weber), the mores of nascent capitalism united with the obligations ofJudeo-Christian:faith. 
Solberg's fourth factor, the condemnation of Sunday recreation, recognized that 
those "inclined to Puritanism were fundamentally hostile to sportive play" as "essentially 
frivolous." Such diversions obviously interfered with Sabbath observance, "since it was the 
only non-work day," when most persons could participate in them. Pursuit of pleasure, the 
Puritans believed, constituted both mortal danger to the believer's soul, and also, an invi-
tation to violate the religious observances mandated for the Sabbath.18 
Thus, in summary: 
Sabbatarianism was to prove highly ~uential in Anglo-American 
history .... The conviction was gaining ground ... that well-kept Sabbaths 
were essential to the realiz.ation of the New Jerusalem. ... emphasiz[ing] a 
way of life in which duty to God outweighed the claims of Mammon .. .It 
refused to allow ... the desire for material prosperity to deny man his dignity 
and humanity. Sabbatarianism made for the highest moral standards, and 
nowhere would its beneficial effect on individual character and community life 
be more felt than in British America.19 
(b) Sabbath Sanctification by Law in Colonial Virginia. 
The Puritan impetus for greater Sunday-Sabbath sanctity was occurring in England 
at the same time Virginia's colonization significantly got under way. Virginia and the other 
British colonies became, in varying degrees, laboratories for implementing Puritan social 
17 
18 
19 
Proverbs 22:29 (KJV); Weber, PE, 53 (noting Franklin's interest in passage). 
Solberg, Redeem the Time, 48-51. 
Ibid, 48. 
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behavior, including Sabbath observance. 
The perceived need to control Virginia's social behavior was significantly influenced 
by its floundering development from about 1607 to 1610. Its organizers saw this as partly due 
to ''the profune and unruly persons recruited for the undertaking" and the failure of church 
and state to "cooperate[] to restrain wickedness and promote righteousness," but that 
''temporal affairs would prosper if the authorities established religion on a firmer basis." 
Because of these problems, in 1610 the colony was reorganized. Its lieutenant general, 
Sir Thomas Gates, promulgated severe Lawes Divine, Morall and Martial, with mandatory 
Sunday worship and catechism. Guards locked settlement gates and searched dwellings after 
services began, to enforce attendance. Penalties for vi<;>lations included fines, whipping and 
death.20 While ''there is no record of any person suffering the death penalty"21 for not 
attending services, Gates forcefully implemented in Virginia Puritan England's Sabbatarian 
views. These Vrrginia colonial "laws" were more like a military commander's field orders. 
Gates treated colonists like rank and file soldiers, enforcing church attendance to improve 
their behavior, to end the indiscipline impairing colonial development. 
The harsh "Lawes" Gates imposed, while improving colonial discipline, also discour-
20 Gate's Lawes, published by William Strachey, colony historian and first secretary, 
titled For the Colony in Virginia Brittania: Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall (London: 
1612). The death penalty and whippings were rescinded in 1618 and imprisonments, up to 
a year-and-a-day, substituted. Solberg, Redeem the Time, 86-87 & n. 6; 89, from which 
quotations in this footnoted paragraph and the paragraph preceding it were taken. 
21 Leo Pfeffer, "Sunday Closing Laws," Encylopedia of the American Constitution, 
Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth Karst, ed., 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 4:1809. 
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aged immigration. The Virginia Company, the colony's proprietor, sought to remedy this by, 
first, offering generous land grants to those who remained for a given period. Second, it 
established nominal self-government, a colonial "General Assembly'' of"two burgesses out 
of every town, hundred or ... plantation, ... to be respectively chosen by the inhabitants . 
. . to make ... such general laws and orders ... for ... good government, as shall ... appear 
necessary or requisite .... "22 
This supposedly democratic "House of Burgesses," respected historians assert, was, 
nevertheless, controlled by colonists of wealth and position. Additional restraints were 
imposed by the appointed colonial governor and his subordinates.23 Nevertheless this 
Assembly "set the pattern for government which withit;t two centuries led to genuine demo-
cracy." Whatever its democratic shortcomings; its provisions requiring election and adoption 
22 
"An Ordinance and Constitution of the Virginia Company in England for a Council 
of State and General Assembly," if 4, July 24, 1621; Clarence L. Ver Steeg & Richard 
Hofstadter, ed., Great Issues in American History: From Settlement to Revolution, vol. I 
(New York: Vintage Bopks/Random House, 1969), 69, 72. The editors state: (a) The 
Burgesses first met pursuant to the predecessor of this "Ordinance and Constitution," from 
July 30 to August 4, 1619; and (b) Although ''the instructions from ... England authorizing 
the [1619] meeting are missing, ... historians believe the instructions reissued in 1621 [i.e., 
those quoted in the text preceding this n. 22] were based upon the original instructions sent 
in 1619." Ibid, 70. 
23 
"[M]en at the top in Virginia, whether councillors, burgesses, or county commis-
sioners, .... [without] other modes of social control, ... had to keep before the rest of the 
population an exalted view of their position." Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, 
American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: Norton, 1975, paperback 
ed., 1995), 247-248. Thus, Morgan observed, while the Virginia Company "in 1618 had 
inaugurated a popularly elected representative assembly, ... effective power remained in the 
governor and his council," ibid, 123 (footnote omitted). 
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oflegislation by majority vote were almost revolutionary for its time. 
Thus, the House of Burgesses, despite controls exercised by those of higher social 
status, probably reflected popular sentiment to a degree unusual for its era. It is significant, 
therefore, that among measures adopted at its first meeting in 1619 was that "all settlers were 
to attend church on Sunday bringing their weapons with them."24 This underlined the 
importance Virginia's earliest electorate placed on enforcing Sunday religious observance. 
Colonial Virginia's further statutory regulation of Sunday can be followed in a 
recompilation of all Virginia colonial, and immediately post-colonial, legislation, authorized 
in the early nineteenth century by the Virginia General Assembly and meticulously edited by 
William Hening (hereinafter: "Hening"). 25 The sevente.enth century Virginia sentiment for a 
sacrosanct Sunday is illustrated in this text by a 1629 reenactment of 1623 legislation: 
IT is ordered that there bee an especiall care taken ... that the people 
doe repaire to their churches on the Saboth day, and to see that the penalty of 
one pound of tobacco for every time of absence and 50 pound for every 
months absence sett downe in the act of the Generall Assembly 1623, be 
levyed and the delinquents to pay the same, as alsoe to see that the Saboth day 
be not be not ordinarily profaned by working in any imployments or by 
24 Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A History, 1585-1776, 2d ed. (Malden, 
Mass: Blackwell, 1997), 61, is the source of the quotations in the paragraph of text here 
footnoted and also in the paragraph immediately preceding it. 
25 William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; being a Collection of the Laws 
of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, Published Pursuant 
to an Act of the General Assembly of Virginia (13 vols., various publishers, 1819 - 1823; 
Facsimile Reprint, Jamestown Foundation of the Commonwealth of Virginia by Univ. Press 
of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1969) (Hereinafter "Hening," followed by (roman numeral) 
numbered volume and (arabic-numbered) page of the Statutes at Large). Differing publica-
tion data is footnoted for each volume when it is first referenced or Quoted. 
29 
iomeying from place to place. 26 
This statute's asserting that the "Saboth" was not to be "ordinarily" profaned by work sug-
gested, by negative inference, that work could be "[extra-]ordinarily" performed on the 
Sabbath without ''profan[ing]" it. Such "extraordinary" circumstances were, presumably, 
known to those gentlemen called upon to construe the statute. This, also presumably, ren-
dered it, in their minds, unnecessary, to spell out what they were.27 This ambiguity was 
exacerbated by a tendency of the legislators to incorporate by reference other law or prac-
tice, usually of England, trusting to later interpretation for what was actually meant.28 
26 Hening, I:144, Act VII (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823); from General 
Assembly session commencing October 16, 1629. (Bening, in an asterisked footnote, ibid., 
advised that 1629 typographical conventions required "i" be substituted for ')" for "iour-
neying" [journeying] in this quotation.) In 1625, the Virginia Company lost its charter. 
Virginia became a royal colony and the House of Burgesses lost its legislative authority. In 
1639 Charles I granted the colonists power "with the govemour and council" to enact 
legislation "as near as may be to the laws of England." Middleton, Colonial America, 61. 
27 Similar thoughts were expressed in a text closer to the colonial era than the pre-
sent day, Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules which Govern the Interpretation 
and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law (New York: John S. Voorhies, 1857) 
("Constitutional Interpretation"), 242-43: 
28 
It may ... be ... when laws were few ... [and] legislation was confined to 
a small and select class, to which ... the judiciary belonged, ... [it] might . 
. . really possess, a considerable personal knowledge of legislative intent, .. 
. . [~But ... in this country where the judiciary is so completely separated 
from the legislature, it must be untrue in fact that they [the judiciary] can have 
any personal knowledge ... to instruct them as to the legislative intention; . 
. . any general theory ... of this kind must be dangerous in practice." 
Some examples are (with emphasis added): 
(continued ... ) 
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Roman Emperor Constantine's 321 C.E edict, earlier discussed,29 excused agricul-
28( ••• continued) 
(1) The Grand Assembly of March 13, 1657, enacted Act IV, "THE lawes of 
England against biggamy or haveing more than one wife or husband shall be putt in exe-
cution in this countrie." Hening, 1:434. Here a complex body oflaw is casually incorporated 
by reference into Virginia law, without explaining what it was. A seemingly ''understood" way 
of legislating, as this illustrates, was announcing a general principle (i.e., ''the lawes of 
England against biggamy ... shall be putt in execution"), leaving details for later fill-in. 
Extensive initial definition was deemed unnecessary and was thereby avoided. 
(2) Enacted the same session as (1), ibid, was Hening, 1:435, Act VIII: "And 
commanders of shipps respectively to take care that poor servants do not want cloathes and 
bedding in the voyage [to Virginia], in which ... if any shall offend they shall be liable to 
grievous censure here according to the merrit of the offence." The statute did not define 
"grievous censure" or the "merrit of the offence." English gentlemen, the drafters arguably 
supposed, could determine such things if an actual controversy arose. Thus, it "incorporates 
by reference," general practices of English gentry, not any specific body of law. 
(3) As applied to Sunday closing legislation, the March 23, 1660, "Grand As-
semblie," Act IX, Hening, II:48 (New York: R. & W. G. Bartow, 1823)(1660-1682), 
provided that on Sunday "noe other thing be used or done, that may tend to the prophana-
tion of that day," Hening, II:48, Act IX, in part (emphasis added). Thus not only what 
would "prophane" the day, but also what "may tend" to do so was proscribed. As in (2), 
ibid., an incorporation by reference of the community's general understanding was inserted 
as its statutory standard, extended to prosecuting those who "by common fame" [i.e., 
rumor], have been "sabbath abuseing." Hening II:51-52. 
(4) This referencing, within a statute, to other, vaguely-described legal subjects, 
continued in Virginia's revolutionary government. Article VII ofVirginia's June 29, 1776 
Constitution provided: "That the right of suffiage in the election of both Houses shall remain 
as exercised at present .... "Hening, 1:52. Important voting rights thus were not spelled out. 
Instead, reference was made to then-current ( 177 6) practice ("exercised at present"), without 
specifying what it was. This no-doubt worked well when those who drafted and interpreted 
such statutes were small in number and well-known to ~ach other. However, this covered 
over, and later exacerbated, friction concerning, for example, what was, or was not, a 
"necessity" under the Sunday closing laws. As time passed, growing numbers of statutory 
enactors, on one hand, and judicial enforcers, on the other, knew progressively less about 
each other and of any common principles under which they operated, as Sedgwick explained, 
n. 27, supra, this Chapter. This multiplied opportunities for misunderstanding. 
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tural estate-owners from their workers ceasing Sunday labor, otherwise required by the 
remainder of that edict, when abstention could cost "the bounty of heaven." This illustrated 
a recurrent and virtually unyielding tension, repeated in the Virginia colonial statute quoted 
in the previous paragraph, between the perceived mandates of heaven and the actual realities 
on earth: For society's good, some Sunday work, though ostensibly prohibited by God, could 
not, in practice, be deferred. This vexed drafters and would-be enforcers of Sunday closing 
laws as long as such statutes were in force. ''Necessity" was ultimately adopted in closing law 
statutes as a shorthand description of circumstances under which otherwise proscribed 
Sunday-labor was allowed. For example, legislation of the Burgesses "Grand Assemblie" of 
March 2, 1642, provided: 
Be it also enacted & confirmed, for the better observation of the 
Sabbath that no persons shall take a voyage uppon the same, except it be to 
church or for other causes of extreme necessitie upon the penaltie of the 
forfeiture for such offence of twenty pounds of tobacco being justly con-
victed for the same.30 
There was a similar enactment in 1657.31 Absent, however, were explanations of what con-
See the quoted text from the edict herein, preceding n. 19, Chapter 3, supra. 
30 Hening, 1:261, Act XXXV, apparently the first use in Virginia Sunday legislation 
of the term ''necessity." See n. 32, this Chapter, infra, concerning the fine. 
31 Burgesses also used ''Necessity" in their March 13, 1657, "Grand Assembly," 
providing: "THAT the Lord's day be kept holy, and that no journeys be made except in 
cases of emergent necessitie .... " Hening, 1:434, Act III. 
32 
stituted the "necessitie" converting illegal Sunday labor into unpunishable lawful conduct.32 
An analytically comparable problem, centuries later, confronted United States Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart, when attempting to distinguish proscribed "pornography" from 
constitutionally protected artistic expression. Conceding that "perhaps" he could "never 
succeed in intelligently" defining pornography, he triumphantly concluded, "But I know it 
when I see it .... "33 Similarly, in the many Sunday closing law cases arising in Virginia and 
other states, as will be seen, ''necessity" became undefinable by any standards except those 
so elastic as to almost defy analysis.34 To explain how otherwise prohibited Sunday labor 
could become lawful work, excepted from prosecution as a statutory "necessity," judges 
writing those opinions, in effect declared, in so many ~ords, like Justice Stewart, that they 
~'knew it when they saw it." Also like him, however, they had difficulty in articulating how 
32 Solberg termed the twenty-pounds-of-tobacco penalty "staggering," exceeding £7, 
sterling, in 1619 English currency, Redeem the Time, 90. Will Durant valued one 
seventeenth-century English pound-sterling at fifty 1960 U.S. dollars. The Story of 
Civilization: The Age of Reason Begins, 7:ix (Preface), n. 19, Chapter 3, supra. Thus, a 
month's unlawful absence from Sunday worship could have incurred fines equivalent to two-
hundred 1960 U.S. dollars. The Consumer Price Index showed a well-over four-fold cost-of-
living increase since 1960, boosting the fine to a year 2000 equivalent of almost $1,000. See, 
1999 World Almanac and Book of Facts (Mahwah, N.J.: World Almanac Books, 1999), 111 
(U.S. Consumer price Indexes). 
33 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
34 
"[T]he meaning of necessity had traveled a tortuous route" to become "nearly 
meaningless."Alexis McCrossen, Holy Day, Holiday: The American Sunday (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), 109, citing the wide latitude given, 108-110, nn. 29-35. 
33 
they reached such conclusions.35 
In 1661, the Burgesses enacted that "the canons sett downe in the liturgie of the 
church of England" were to be followed. Ministers could not ''teach any other catechisme 
than ... in the booke of common prayer." Church attendance was mandated and the maxi-
mum fine for absence increased to fifty pounds of tobacco. Prosecutions were upon 
presentment by the church wardens and fines were contributed to parish levies.36 
The Burgesses were aware, as a preamble to their 1691 enactment concerning church 
attendance stated, of continuing Sabbath violations, allegedly due to lack of clarity in pun-
ishment. 37 Their remedy was to legislate that absence from church incurred a forfeiture of 
35 See nn. 55-60 and 63, Chapter 7, infra, and supporting text. 
36 Hening, 11:47, Acts VI & VII; ibid, 11:48, Act IX. Although the text shows only 
the commencement, on March 23, 1660, of the legislative session adopting this statute; editor 
Hening, in an asterisked footnote, ibid 33, concluded, from analysis of other contemporary 
documents, that its enactment was in 1661, about a year after the session commenced. See 
also, n 32, this Chapter, supra, concerning the substantiality of a fine of fifty pounds of 
tobacco. 
37 Hening, 111:71, 72 (Philadelphia: Thomas Desilver, 1823): Laws against "sabbath 
abuseing" and other wrongs, "have not produced the desired effect" partly due to ''not 
directing what method shall be followed to [punish offenders] ... , and for want of 
sufficient penalties .... " 
Requiring the "holy keeping of the Lord's day" was enacted in a Burgesses session 
commencing April 16, 1691, providing, Hening, III, 72-73: 
[F]orasmuch as nothing is more acceptable to God than the true and sincere 
... worship ofhimaccording to his holy will, and that the holy keeping of the 
Lords day is a principall part of the true service of God, which in very many 
places of this dominion hath been ... prophained and neglected, ... Bee it 
(continued ... ) 
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twenty shillings.38 The statute's rigors were somewhat relaxed by a 1744 amendment excus-
ing non-attendance on proof of approved worship at another parish,39 marking the last 
Sabbath-law change of substance before the Revolution. 
Prerevolutionary Virginia's legislative enactments enforcing Sunday worship obser-
vance, reviewed in this Chapter 4(b ), emphasized the view of those in society who saw 
themselves enforcing God's dictates. They saw those dictates achieved, in part, by compell-
ing the entire population to cease Sunday secular labor and, instead, actively worship, 
37( ••• continued) 
enacted, . . . That there shall be no meetings, assemblies, or concourse of 
people out of their parishes on the Lords day, and that no person ... shall 
travell upon the said day, and that no other thing or matter whatsoever be 
done on that day which tends to the prophanation of the same, but that the 
same be kept holy in all respects upon pain that every person ... so offending 
... shall ... forfeit twenty shillings. [Hening, III :72-73.] 
38 Ibid, 111:73. A similar statute, prohibiting being ''wilfully absent" from "divine ser-
vice at his ... parish church" for a month except permitted dissenters and "cases of neces-
sity and charity" was enacted at the Assembly session commencing March 19, 1702. Ibid, III: 
358, 360-361: 
39 
That if any person, being of. . . twenty-one years, ... shall wilfully absent 
him or herself from divine service at his or her parish church, the space of one 
month ... and shall not, when there, in a decent and orderly manner, continue 
till the ... service is ended; and if any person shall, on that day ... make any 
journey, and travel upon the road, except to and from church, (cases of 
necessity and charity excepted,) or shall, ... be found working in their com 
or tobacco, or any other labour of their ordinary calling, other than is 
necessary for the sustenance of man and beast; every person ... being ... 
convicted ... shall forfeit and pay, for every such offense, ... five shillings, 
or fifty pounds of tobacco .... 
Ibid, V:220, 226, Chap. II,, IV (Richmond: Franklin Press, 1819) (1738-1748). 
35 
consistent with Christian doctrine promulgated by the Established Church. Solberg pointed 
out, however, that this legislative portrait ofenforced Sabbath observance did not fully reflect 
what was actually happening in Virginia. Instead, he asserted, "economic development 
undermined the physical basis upon which proper sanctification of the Sabbath rested." 
Virginia's then-main source of revenue, tobacco, destroyed the soil, compelling search for 
new lands. The energy the colony's larger landowners necessarily devoted to this task 
"made it difficult to attend church and supervise morality." That this was, indeed, happening, 
Solberg illustrated, in part, through minutes of a "mid-[ seventeenth] century ... grand jury 
of Lower Norfolk County, com- plaining of general indifference of Sunday observance, [and] 
charg[ing] the entire population ... with breach oftht'. day.'"'0 
Thus, as the American Revolution approached, Virginia society was advocating, 
through adoption and enforcement ofits closing laws, an intensely Sunday worship-centered 
life. Simultaneously, however, a significant portion ofits leadership was expanding its search 
for land, and profit-making through its use. This made it difficult, perhaps effectively 
impossible, for them to actually practice the sanctified Sabbath that colonial legislation 
sought to preserve. A paradox resulted: The Sabbath observance called for by puritan 
theology, underpinning the colony's creation, ostensibly enforced by colonial legislation, 
conflicted with the earthly realities of colonial Virginian life. Economic existence made it 
increasingly difficult to cease laboring on the legislatively sanctified Sunday Sabbath. As will 
40 Solberg, Redeem the Time, 92 (footnote omitted). 
36 
be seen hereinafter in this thesis, the complexities of this paradox were exacerbated after the 
Revolution, when it became harder still for this commercial society to both achieve the 
financial success such commerce sought, while at the same time obeying the requirements of 
Sabbatarian legislation to cease labor one day of the week. 
Chapter 5: THE REVOLUTION AND VIRGINIA'S SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS 
(a) The Voiding of Colonial Sunday Closing Laws Immediately After the 
Commencement of the American Revolution. 
What follows is not focused on the American Revolution itse~ but rather its impact 
on Virginia's Sunday closing laws. First, however, before newly-independent Virginia would 
formulate its own closing laws, or any other legislation, its governmental connection with 
England had to be severed. America's July 4, 1776, Declaration oflndependence accom-
plished this by declaring ''these United Colonies" to be" free and independent states" that 
were "absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown," with "all political connection be-
tween them and the state of Great Britain ... totally dissolved .... "1 
Virginia had similarly resolved earlier when ''representatives of the several counties 
and corporations" met at Williamsburg on June 29, 1776. They unanimously adopted 
Virginia's Constitution asserting that ''the government of this country [Virginia], as formerly 
exercised under the crown of Great Britain, is TOTALLY DISSOLVED."2 Virginia's re-
volutionary legislators also sought to void parliamentary religious strictures by providing: 
[O]ppressive acts of parliament respecting religion have been ... enacted, 
and doubts have arisen ... whether the same are in force within this 
commonwealth or not: For prevention whereof, Be it enacted . .. , That ... 
every act of parliament, . . . , which renders criminal the maintaining any 
opinions in matters of religion, forbearing to repair to church, or the exer-
Declaration oflndependence. The sufficiency of this unilateral assertion of the De-
claration ultimately depended, obviously, not on its legal phraseology, but on the military 
ability of the new government uttering it to maintain the independence it asserted. 
2 
"Virginia's Constitution," Article I (in part), Hening, IX:l 12, 113 (emphasis and 
capitalization in original). 
37 
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cising any mode of worship whatsoever, or ... punishments for the same, 
shall henceforth be of no validity or force .... 3 
This voiding of "acts of parliament" punishing "forbearing to repair to church," by 
the act's text, applied only to British parliamentary statutes, not those ofVirginia's House of 
Burgesses. Left unexamined by this statute, therefore, was the validity of colonial pre-
Revolutionary versions of such "Sunday closing" or "blue law''4 legislation. 
The General Assembly enacted the just-quoted statute voiding British parliamentary 
acts concerning religion, soon after its June 29, 1776, adoption of the previously-quoted 
Virginia constitutional provision dissolving Virginia's governance as "formerly exercised" 
by Britain. 5 This statute was enacted, its preamble stated, due to explicit "doubts" about 
whether British parliamentary religious legislation h~ been effectively voided. This was 
despite the earlier-quoted state constitution provision terminating all British governmental 
authority. By parity of reasoning, therefore, similar legislative "doubts" presumably existed 
3 Adopted October 7, 1776, Hening, IX: 164 (emphasis in original). 
4 A "blue law'' regulates or prohibits "commercial activity on Sundays," s. v. "blue 
law" Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.). Its etymology was traced by Marc A Stadtmauer, 
"Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws and the Future of the Establish-
ment Clause," Cardozo Arts & Entertainment L. J., 12(1994):213, 213, n. 2: "There are 
at least two theories," for its origin. The "most prominent" was that it " ... 'originated in 
1781, when the Sunday laws of New Haven, Connecticut were printed on blue paper.' 
.... The second [claimed] ... 'blue' is a synonym for 'puritanical' or 'strict'[citations 
omitted]. "Andrew J. King, "Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century," Albany L. Rev. 
64(2000):675, 676 n. 1, cites other authority favoring the "blue paper" explanation. 
5 See quotation in text preceding n. 2, this Chapter, supra. 
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about whether Virginia's colonial legislation also remained in force.6 
6 Early American scholarly interpretations of "contemporary construction" of con-
stitutions and statutes ("contemporary," that is, to the constitutions or statues being inter-
preted), advancing rules (and limitations on those rules) congruent with this view, are: 
(1) Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 3 vols., 
(Boston: Hilliard, Gray & Co., 1833)("Commentaries"), 1:390: "Contemporary construc-
tion [can] ... explain a doubtful phrase, ... .It can never abrogate the text; ... fritter away 
its obvious sense; [nor] ... enlarge its true boundaries .... "Story was a Supreme Court 
Justice whose Commentaries guided Alexis de Tocqueville in explaining American law. 
Gerald T. Dunne, "Joseph Story," The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789-
1969, Their Lives and Major Opinions, Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, ed. (New York: 
Chelsea House/RR Bowker Co., 1969), I:443. 
(2) Sedgwick, Constitutional Interpretation (1857), 251-52 (see, n. 27, Cbapter4, 
this thesis, supra): "In ... constru[ing] a ... doubtful statute, considerable weight is attached 
to the opinions ... [of] persons learned in the law, at the time ofits passage. 'Great regard,' 
says Lord Coke, 'ought ... to be paid to the construction which the sages of the law who 
lived about the time . . . it was made . . . , because they were best able to judge of the 
intention of the makers . . . . ' A contemporaneous is generally the best construction of a 
statute. It gives the sense ... of the terms made use of by a legislature. Ifthere is ambiguity 
... , the understanding . . . when the statute first comes into operation, sanctioned by long 
acquiescence [by] ... legislature and judicial tribunals, is the strongest evidence that it has 
been explained in practice .... " Sir Edward Coke ( 1552-1634 ), whom Sedgwick quoted, ibid, 
had been Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. His Institutes was a much-cited legal 
treatise, even after the American Revolution, on both sides of the Atlantic. J. A. Sharpe, s.v., 
"Sir Edward Coke," Oxford Companion to British History, 226, at n. 1, Chapter 4, this 
thesis, supra Thus, the. legal doctrine here discussed was long-accepted before the 
Revolution, and in full flower when the Virginia statutes discussed herein were adopted. 
(3) Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon 
the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, 5th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1883) ("Constitutional Limitations"), 81-82 (emphasis added): "Contemporaneous 
interpretation may indicate merely the understanding with which the people received it at the 
time, or it may be accompanied by acts ... putting the instrument in operation .... In the 
first case it can have very little force, because the . . . public understanding, when nothing has 
been done ... , must ... be vague .... But where there has been a practical construction, 
... acquiesced in for a considerable period, considerations in favor of ... this construction 
sometimes present themselves to the courts with a . . . force ... not easy to resist . . . . In 
(continued ... ) 
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It is not here-asserted that the General Assembly's above-quoted 1776 "doubts"7 
about whether British parliamentary acts on religion were void in Virginia, somehow, by 
being so-stated, restored the legality of those British statutes that the Virginia Constitution 
expressly invalidated. Lack of"long acquiescence" to those "doubts," as mandated by the 
three commentators just-quoted, 8 precluded such a conclusion. However, the presence of 
such "doubts" suggested Jefferson's statute on religious freedom could have been enacted, 
in part, to ( 1) Remove any "doubts" about the invalidity of such English legislation and (2) 
Prevent any inference of"long acquiescence" to such "doubts" from arising due to purported 
Assembly inaction. It is also plausible that early General Assembly statutes concerning 
6( ••• continued) 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee [14 U.S.] 1 Wheat. 304, 351 [(1816)], Justice Story, ... say[s]: 
' .... It is an historical fact, that ... when the Judiciary Act was submitted ... [to] the First 
Congress, composed, ... of men of great learning and ability ... who had acted a principal 
part in framing; supporting, or opposing that Constitution . . . . This weight of 
contemporaneous exposition ... , this acquiescence by enlightened State courts, and . . . 
decisions of the Supreme Court through so long a period, ... place the doctrine upon a 
foundation of authority which cannot be shaken .... ' The same doctrine was subsequently 
supported by ChiefJustice Marshall . .. say[ing] that 'great weight has always been attached, 
... to contemporaneous exposition. Cohens v. Virginia, [19 U.S.] 6 Wheat. 264, 418 
[(1821))."' The "Justice Story" quoted here, also wrote the Commentaries quoted in this 
n. 6, part ( 1 ), supra. 
( 4) The application in this thesis of "contemporary construction" to construe le-
gislation is to assert that Declaration oflndependence provisions voiding British parliament-
ary legislation, gave rise to Virginia constitutional provisions, declarations and statutes 
voiding, in the same ("contemporary construction") manner, colonial legislation that 
originated in the pre-revolutionary Virginia House of Burgesses. 
7 In its statute quoted immediately preceding n. 3, this Chapter, supra. 
8 See, for example, n. 6(2), this Chapter, supra. 
9 
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religion, such as Jefferson's religious-freedom statute, were adopted, among other reasons, 
to also end any later argument asserting the validity of pre-Revolutionary Virginia colonial 
laws on religious subjects. 
(b) Post-Revolutionary Enactment of a Virginia Closing Law. 
Consistent with the principles of the just-quoted statute voiding parliamentary 
religious legislation, the Virginia General Assembly, at the Revolution's commencement, 
unanimously adopted, on June 12, 1776, its own "Declaration of Rights," providing: 
16. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our CREATOR, and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
not by force or violence, and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free 
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the 
mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, 
towards each other.9 
Thus, this Article 16, contrary to Virginia colonial Sabbath laws earlier described, 10 
declared a universal entitlement to ''free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience." Under its principles, "conscience," not "force or violence," instructed the 
citizen in religion, suggesting a government barred from mandating church attendance. 11 
Hening, IX:112, 113-114. 
10 For example, see nn. 37-39, Chapter 4, and accompanying text, supra. 
11 Asserting, however, that Jefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom, ambig-
uously, did not "explicitly prohibit establishment" of religion, was Mark De Wolfe Howe, 
The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional 
History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), 44; in Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Religion and 
Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia," Religion and Political Culture in Jefferson's 
Virginia (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 189, 195. 
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Similar to earlier-described incongruities in the history of sabbath legislation, 12 however, new 
logical paradoxes arose concerning Virginia's post-revolutionary Sunday closing laws and 
related enactments. The first was that Virginia's Declaration ofRights, while negating ''force 
or violence" to promote religious observance, still asserted a ''mutual duty" (presumably 
enforceable by the state through ''force or violence") of"Christian" forbearance, love and 
charity."13 Thus, while promoting religious freedom in theory, arguably the Virginia 
Declaration undid its own premise by mandating a "duty'' to obey the "Christian" religion 
to achieve it. Therefore, by inference, legislation encouraging a "Christian" lifestyle, such as 
a Sunday closing law (banning Sabbath work, as the Bible ordained), 14 was necessary (or so 
its proponents plausibly could assert). Its presumed justification, would be to help fashion 
the "Christian forbearance" the Declaration declared was needed. 
The second Virginia Sunday closing law paradox was that in its 1786 enactment 
year, the General Assembly had already adopted the famous "Jefferson's Statute," his 
"Statute on Religious Freedom," annulling prerevolutionary laws requiring any specific 
12 Earlier thesis examples included (1) the Babylonian "shabuttu" day of dread which 
became, instead, the Judeo-Christian "Sabbath" day of rest, veneration and rejoicing; (2) 
Sunday's biblical rest and veneration role, contrasted with a parallel tradition of Sunday 
markets and sports. See nn. 3-5 and 18, and accompanying text, Chapter 3, supra. 
13 
"Virginia Declaration of Rights," art. 16, quoted in text preceding n. 9, supra, this 
Chapter. Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-
1787 (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1977), 19, insightfully comments on this 
passage:" The Revolutionary convention could accept the concept of freedom of conscience, 
but it would not sever the special relationship which bound Virginians to the church of their 
fathers." 
14 As discussed herein in text supported by n. 13, ibid. 
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religious practice. It also seemingly prohibited post-revolutionary statutes on the same sub-
ject, such as Sunday closing laws.15 Regarded by Jefferson as one of his three outstanding 
accomplishments, 16 it provided in part: 
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wor-
ship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, mo-
lested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor ... suffer on account of his 
religious opinions or beliefs; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by 
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, [which] ... shall 
in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities. 17 
This Jefferson-drafted enactment has been readopted verbatim in all Virginia statutory re-
codifications since its 1786 passage. 18 Its plain meaning seemingly precluded governmental 
reliance on, or regulation or support of: Christianity or any religion. This contrasted with the 
Virginia Declaration's reliance on "Christian forbe~ance, love and charity," to achieve 
harmony. Thus, there was an apparent conflict of reasoning underlying these respective 
15 But, ct: n. 11, this Chapter, supra. 
16 Seen. 1, Chapter 1, and supporting text, supra. 
17 Adopted January 16, 1786, Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia (Rich-
mond, Va.: Samuel Shepherd, 1828), 143-144; January 16, 1786, Journal of the Senate . . 
. of Virginia (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827), 92. Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth. 134 
Va. 713, 717, 1148.E. 764(1922),incorrectlydateditsadoptiononDecemberl6, 1785, 
actually the date setting its final legislative reading. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Thomas 
Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the Laws ofVirginia, 1776-1786: New 
light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations," North Carolina L. Rev. (1990), 
69:159-211, 169, n. 60. 
18 Currently, Va. Code Ann. §57-1 (1950) (1995 repl. vol.) (annotating prior enact-
ments). The statute "has been retained in its original form in every revision of the laws from 
... [its 1786 original adoption] until now ... ,"Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 717 (1922). 
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enactments. 19 This seemed resolved by later adoption of Jefferson's religious freedom 
statute, which discouraged legislating religious dogma into state policy. This was after and, 
therefore, presumably rescinded, the Virginia Declaration's seemingly contradictory princi-
pie of expressly requiring "Christian" forbearance for religious toleration. 
However, as this paradox was seemingly resolved, the Assembly enacted another 
one, on November 27, 1786, the Virginia Sunday closing law, providing in part: 
If any person on the sabbath day shall ... be found labouring at his own, or 
any other trade or calling, or shall employ his apprentices, servants or slaves 
in labour or other business, except it be in the ordinary household offices of 
daily necessity, or other work of necessity or charity, he shall forfeit the sum 
of ten shillings for every such offence, .... 20 
19 Note, however, contra analysis of some claiming Jefferson's statute permitted an 
"established" church. See n. 11, this Chapter, supra. 
20 
"An Act for punishing disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath breakers," 
Hening, XII:336, 337. Dreisbach, "Religion and Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia," 
198, at n. 11, this Chapter, supra, contended "Jefferson's use of. .. 'Sabbath' suggests the 
measure was inspired by religious concerns, as opposed to ... promoting recreation and rest 
from secular employment." However, "Sabbath" was in the Act's title which, under Virginia 
law of the time, was generally not used to determine intent, unless there was ambiguity, as 
Jefferson, a practicing attorney, was undoubtedly aware: Commonwealth v. Gaines, 2 Va. 
Cas. 172, 180; 3 Va. Rpts. Ann. 188, 192 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1819) ( "It is true that the title is no 
part of the law, and when plainly repugnant to the enacting clauses, has no weight, but it may 
be resorted to ... remove an ambiguity" [applying a statute to 1786 conduct, the year of the 
closing law's enactment].) Accordingly, the closing law's title would be irrelevant for legal 
interpretation, according to case law applied to acts contemporary to its adoption. Dreisbach 
further noted, supra, this footnote at n. 67: "It is noteworthy that when the Virginia 
legislature enacted Bill 84 it apparently changed the fifth [sic, should be sixth?] word of this 
paragraph from "Sunday" to "Sabbath day." So Jefferson used "Sabbath" only in the act's 
title which, as a practicing attorney, he likely knew was not legally relevant to assess its 
meaning. He originally used what Dreisbach deemed the more secular "Sunday" in its text. 
Thus, Dreisbach's surmise of Jefferson's religious intent concerning the word "sabbath" 
appears contradicted by the evidence his own article references. 
(continued ... ) 
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The statute was slightly amended on December 26, 1792, remaining largely unchanged 
thereafter until the 1960s. 21 The Christian "day of rest" was, by its provisions, required to be 
honored by Virginians, whether Christians or not, through not working. That is, the text's 
underlying logic appeared to foster Christianity through enforcing biblically-inspired sabbath 
work restrictions and thus, collaterally, facilitating worship on that day. As Dreisbach com-
20( ••• continued) 
Other background about this Act provides additional and needed context about it: 
(1) Its adoption was wrongly given as 1779 in(a) Mandell v. Haddon, 202 Va. 979, 
988, 121 S.E.2d 516 (1961) (citing no authority); and (b) Pirkey Bros. v. Common wealth, 
134 Va. 713, 717, 114 S.E. 769 (1922) (citing Hening, XII:337). Hening's page heading, 
however, ibid., shows a 1786 enactment, not 1779. In contrast, its printed margin notes, 
ibid, state: "From Rev. Bills oft 779, Ch. LXXXIV" [i.e., Chapter 84], referring to the 1779 
committee Jefferson chaired, proposing Revolution-mandated statutory revisions, of which 
his religious freedom bill was No. 82, and the closing law No. 84. 
(2) The Act's 1786 adoption is detailed in Daniel L. Dreisbach's 1990 article 
[seen. 17, supra, this Chapter, N. Carolina L. Rev. 69 (1990):159-211; 178-184, 190-193]. 
(3) Jefferson's proposed revisions," ... faded into obscurity ... from 1776 to 
1786, .... " Editorial Note, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, ed. (31 vols. to 
1800 as of2004) (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950) ("Jefferson Papers"), 2:305. As 
Jefferson explained, revising statutes was deferred to winning the Revolution: "[T]he first 
assembly ... appointed a committee to revise the whole code . . . . This work has been 
executed ... ; but probably will not be taken up till a restoration of peace .... " Thomas 
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Frank Shuflleton, ed. (1785) (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1999) ("Notes"), 144. Thus, the Jefferson committee's statutory revisions, proposed 
in 1779 (the seeming origin of the erroneous 1779 closing law adoption date in Mandell, 
supra, this footnote), were not enacted until 1786. 
21 Samuel Shepard, The Statutes at Large of Virginia: from October Session 1792 to 
December session 1806, inclusive, in three volumes (new series), being a continuation of 
Bening (Richmond, Va: 1835, reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970), 1:193, December 26, 
1792. This amendment restated the monetary forfeiture for violating the Act in dollars and 
cents, instead of in shillings, as its original enactment provided. 
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mented, the statute's use of "sabbath," the Judeo-Christian term for the religious day to 
which it applied, was arguably a governmental support of Judeo-Christian religion. (Dreis-
bach further pointed out, however, that legislators substituted "Sabbath" for the "Sunday" 
Jefferson had used.22) 
Nevertheless, the closing law seemingly contradicted Jefferson's religious freedom 
statute that decreed ''no man shall be compelled to :frequent or support any religious wor-
ship," nor be "restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods," for so doing, but 
instead "shall be free to profess ... their opinions in matters ofreligion," which "shall in no 
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities." Certainly the closing law "restrained" 
citizens from ignoring Sunday as a legally mandated rC?st day. Refusing to so-recognize Sun-
day, after this law's passage also "diminish[ed]" one's "civil capacities," since labor on that 
day exposed one to forfeitures, resulting in being ''restrained, molested or burthemed in his 
body or goods" Tor so doing. 23 
A third paradox about Virginia Sunday closing laws concerned Jefferson himself. His 
advocacy of virtual state abstention on religious matters, as in his Bill on Religious Freedom, 
seemed contradicted by his sponsorship and probable drafting of post-revolutionary Virgin-
ia's first Sunday closing law. A meticulous examination of original documents led Julian P. 
Boyd, editing Jefferson's papers, to conclude that "Jefferson drew Bills No. [thereinafter are 
22 See n. 20, this Chapter, supra. 
23 Quotations in this paragraph are extracted from Jefferson's statute, as quoted more 
fully herein at n. 17 and accompanying text, this Chapter, supra. 
listed 51 numbered bills, including the Sunday closing law, No. 84)."24 
Daniel Dreisbach, a student of this statute, concluded: 
Bill 84 and Sunday closing laws in general arguably discriminate 
against individuals who choose not to preserve the ... "day of rest" observed 
by most Christians. Acknowledgment of the Christian "Sabbath" ... and its 
preservation by law conflicts with a strict separationist ban on state support 
for organized religion .... Modern advocates of church-state separation have 
criticized Sunday legislation less restrictive than Bill 84 as a breach in the 
"wall of separation" .... Bill 84 also suggests that Jefferson's desire to 
separate the institutions of church and state ... was merely a means of 
achieving the fullest ... :freedom of religious expression. If religious hoorty 
was realized in its richest sense through cooperation between the state and the 
church, then Jefferson, it would seem, endorsed such a limited union. 25 
47 
Dreisbach cited only secondary sources for his conclusions. This, however, should not de-
tract from the merit of the issue raised: Why would Je~erson either draft or ratify, as chair 
of the committee charged with its drafting, a statute largely prohibiting Sunday work, 
seemingly contradicting the Virginia religious :freedom act he also had drafted? 
Discemirig Jefferson's intentions in pursuing these seemingly conflicting policies is 
therefore pertinent in studying Virginia's 1786 adopting ofits first Sunday closing law. Jef-
ferson and his ideas, however, did not exist in a vacuum, so that Chapter 5(c), immediately 
hereinafter, offers a small sampling of the divergent views then existing. 
24 Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, 2:318-320 (seen. 20(3), supra, this Chapter). Even 
if Jefferson did not personally draft the closing law, editor Boyd's discussion, ibid, makes 
clear Jefferson's extensive review of, and apparent approval of, its final form. 
25 Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Religious and Legal Reforms in Revolutionary Virginia 
[etc]," 198-199, (footnotes omitted), n. 11. Dreisbach's earlier study of the first post-
revolutionary Virginia closing law is in a 1990 article, see n. 17, Both footnotes are in this 
Chapter, supra. 
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(c) Complexity of Church/State Interrelation Attitudes in America in the 
Immediate-Post-Revolutionary War Era. 
The complexities of divergent American Post-Revolutionary War attitudes 
about permitted relations, if any, between church and state, are illustrated by these seemingly 
conflicting viewpoints: Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous United States Supreme Court 
in 1892, but citing authority nearly a century older, declared the United States "a Christian 
nation."26 In contrast, the United States Senate ratified in 1797,27 a treaty with Tripoli 
asserting that "the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded 
on the Christian religion. "28 These both constitute actions taken, seemingly without dissent, 
by powerful government entities, yet simultaneously pointing, metaphorically, in opposite 
26 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (Brewer, 
J., for unanimous Court). See also, Zorach v. Clauson. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., for Court): "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being." (dissenting opinions filed by Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, JJ.) 
27 The United States Senate's power to ratify treaties by two-thirds of Senators pre-
sent, was apparently the basis for a later congressional consensus that the ability of the Senate 
to approve a Constitutional amendment by two-thirds vote, meant two-thirds of Senators 
present, and not two-thirds of the entire body. David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: 
Amending the U.S. Constitution (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 116. 
28 Article 11, Treaty between the United States and Tripoli, January 3, 1797, reach-
ing the Senate on May 26, 1797, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Documents 
Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: Gales and 
Seaton, 1832), 11:18-19. The Senate's undissenting treaty adoption on June 7, 1797, is in 
Journal, The Executive Proceedings, The Senate, The United States of America (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Duff Green, printed by Senate order, 1828); 1:244: "(23 affirming votes): (two-
thirds of the Senators present concurring therein,) Resolved, That the Senate do advise and 
consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace and friendship between the United States of 
America and the Bey and subjects of Tripoli, of Barbary." 
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directions concerning religion's permitted influence upon that government. 
(1) Judicial Assertion of America as a "Christian" Nation. 
The 1892 assertion of America as a "Christian nation" is in the United 
States Supreme Court's Church of the Holy Trinity opinion, deciding if the defendant Church 
violated a federal statute criminalizing "assist[ing]" in "importation" of an "alien." 29 This 
was alleged because the Church hired as its rector a British subject and resident (therefore an 
American "alien"), whose acceptance of the post for which he was hired necessarily caused 
his "importation" into the United States to take the position. 
The Court held the statute applied only to "cheap, unskilled [manual] labor," not 
"importation" of"brain toilers" like the rector, and dis~sed the indictment. This disposed 
of the case's only issue and should have ended the opinion. However, Justice Brewer had 
more to say, even though, following his above-described holding, there was no need to say 
it. 30 He volunteered that it was "historically true," beyond the statutory analysis and holding 
just-summarized, no action against religion could be imputed to any American legislation, 
state or national, because this is a "religious people" and a "Christian nation." Therefore, he 
inferred, for a unanimous Court, that Congress could not have "intended to make it a 
misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services of a Christian minister 
29 143 U.S. at 458. 
30 The American common law defines such a statement as "obiter dictum," meaning 
'judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, ... unnecessary 
to the decision ... and therefore not precedential (though it may be persuasive)," s. v. 
"obiter dictum," Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed. 
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residing in another nation."31 His dictum.32 implied Christianity possessed an inchoate prior-
claim over American law. It suggested, in effect, that Christianity was intended by America's 
predominantly-Christian legislators as inherent in their statutory output, though not expressly 
stated in any given statute nor, indeed, in the Constitution itse1£ 
In so-concluding, the Court quoted Vidal v. Girard's Executors, that "the Christian 
religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania;"33 the 1811 opinion by New York's 
famed Chancellor Kent in People v. Ruggles on Christianity's legal primacy,34 and the 
31 143 U.S. 457, 471. The thesis sentence supported by this footnote asserts that 
the Court "inferred" the rejection of the quoted conclusion, because it was rendered in the 
opinion as a question, which was then answered with prolixity in the negative. 
32 See n. 30, supra, this Chapter. 
33 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844); quoted in Holy Trinity at 471. 
34 Holy Trinity at 471. Chancellor Kent wrote in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 
294, 295 (N. Y., 1811 ): "The people of this State, in common with the ... country, profess 
the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule of their faith and practice, and to scandalize 
the Author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, 
but, even, in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and 
good order." Kent's biographer, however, John Theodore Horton, James Kent: A Study in 
Conservatism, 1763-1847 (New York: D. Appleton-Century for the American Historical 
Ass'n, 1939; Reprint, De Capo Press for The American Scene, Comments and Commenta-
tors, Wallace D. Farnham, gen. ed., 1969), 192, wrote that Kent "in the privacy ofhis club, 
had spoken of Christianity itself as a vulgar superstition from which cultivated men were 
free." Horton's source was, ibid at 115, an acquaintance of Kent's: "The playwright and 
painter, William Dunlop, recorded in his diary: 'Kent remarked that men of information were 
now nearly as free from vulgar superstition or Christian religion as they were in ye [sic] time 
of Cicero from pagan superstition-all, says he, except literary men among the clergy 
[bracketed insertion by Horton],"' Diary I, 151, September 30, 1797, identified in Horton's 
bibliography, ibid, 330, as: "Printed Sources other than Newspapers and Law Journals, ... 
The Diary of William Dunlop, 1766-1829, Collections of the New York Historical Society, 
N.Y., 1930." Horton thus-reconciled Kent's public praising and private disparaging of 
(continued ... ) 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court's admonition that "general Christianity, is and always has been, 
a part of the Common law of Pennsylvania; ... not Christianity with an established church, 
and tithes, and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men."35 
While Holy Trinity's "Christian nation" dictum was hailed by many Christian reli-
gious groups,36 appellate trends concerning it were in the opposite direction. Andrew J King 
surveyed nineteenth century Sunday closing law appellate cases, analyzing rationales for them 
given by then-contemporary legal commentators. He concluded, quoting former Michigan 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Cooley, a noted legal scholar of the time, that as the nine-
teenth century progressed, "laws against the desecration of the Christian Sabbath by labor or 
sports" were ''not so readily defensible .... "37 Consistent with this analysis, courts relying 
on a "Christian nation" rationale to uphold enactments like closing laws, King noted, 
34( ••• continued) 
Christianity: "lfhe [Kent] held that opinion, then his comments on religion from the bench 
were sincere only as they expressed an aristocratic conviction that religious faith is useful as 
a buttress of the social order. To that theory of the case, his hatred of Jefferson and his 
constant fear of Jacobinical commotion lend support." James Kent, 192-193. 
35 Holy Trinity at 471, quoting Updegraf v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 
400 (Pa. 1824). 
36 Articles praising Holy Trinity's "Christian nation" dictum collected in William 
A. Blakely, Compiler and Annotator, American State Papers Bearing on Sunday Legisla-
tion, rev. ed., Willard A. Colcord, ed. (Washington, D.C.: General Conference Corpora-
tion of Seventh-Day Adventists, 1911; New York; reprint, De Capo Press, 1970), 508, n. 1. 
37 Quoted from Cooley, Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (6th ed. 1890), 
584, in Andrew J. King, "Sunday Blue Laws," Albany L. Rev. 64 (2000):675, 677-678, for 
the receding of religion as a basis for decisions supporting Sunday closing laws. Justice 
Cooley is quoted in n. 20 part (3), supra, this Chapter, in another context. 
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markedly declined as the century progressed. Instead, they were sustained as health and 
welfure measures. "Christian nation" rationales usually, he found, were obiter dictum 
afterthoughts, not dispositive of the cases. 38 
(2) Tripoli Treaty: America Not "Founded on the Christian Reli-
gion." 
Article 11 of the 1797 United States-Tripoli Treaty provides, in part: 
~UiIJ~ctltlmaEntn;1}'SI~mkIRUBnl~6tllEntmDdDa:trolfilt1Y 
against the laws, religion, or tranquillity, ofMussulmen; ... no pretext, arising from religious 
opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two 
countries. 39 
The first line and a half of the above-quoted Treaty provision suggested a total divorce 
between Christianity and the federal government. ~ was contrary to the tenor of Justice 
Brewer's Holy Trinity "Christian nation" dictum40 and the authority he cited to support it 
(roughly contemporaneous with, though slightly later than, the Treaty's 1797 rati:fication).41 
In the late 1920s, however, this Treaty was subjected to a State Department-com-
38 Ibid, n. 37. For "obiter dictum," in this footnoted sentence, see n. 30, supra, this 
Chapter. 
39 May 26, 1797, American State Papers, Foreign, Relations, Documents Legislative 
and Executive of the Congress, 11:18-19, n. 119, supra, this text. Thetreatywasrepublished 
in Appendix, Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, containing 
Important State Papers and Public Documents and all the Laws of a Public Nature, 5rh 
Congress (May 15, 1797 to March 3, 1799) (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1851 )("State 
Papers"), 3:3095. 
40 See text preceding n. 26, supra, this Chapter. 
41 The treaty was adopted on June 7, 1797, by the Fifth Congress, whose term was 
from May 15, 1797, through March 3, 1799. See, title page, State Papers; n. 28, supra, 
this Chapter. 
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missioned review, as part of a comprehensive retranslation and study of original texts and 
supporting documents of all treaties since the nation's founding. This included the Tripoli 
Treaty's original arabic, retranslated by specialists. The study concluded this Treaty's original 
eighteenth-century translation to English, directed by Joel Barlow, the United States Counsel 
General at Algiers during its negotiation, had "defects throughout ... obvious and glaring." 
In particular, it concluded, the above-quoted Article 11 (asserting America as ''not founded" 
on the "Christian religion"), "does not exist at all. There is no Article 11." 
Implausibly but truly, the Barlow translation, no matter its defects, including its bogus 
Article 11, was the treaty-version presented to the Senate for its constitutionally-required 
ratification in 1797, remaining the official English t~xt therea:fter.42 That text, including 
42 This Tripoli treaty review is in United States Department of State, Treaties and 
other International Acts of the United States of America, 5 vols, Hunter Miller, ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), 2:384, from which quotations 
and details in text this footnote supports were taken Here is a fuller quotation ( empha-
sized "the" in line 2 is in the original): 
[T]he Barlow translation ... submitted to the Senate ... and . . . the Statutes 
at Large ... always been deemed the [English] text ... is at best a poor ... 
summary of ... the Arabic; ... [with] defects ... obvious and glaring. Most 
extraordinary (and wholly unexplained) is ... that Article 11 ... , with its 
famous phrase, ''the government of the United States ... is not in any sense 
founded on the Christian Religion" does not exist at all. . . . The Arabic text 
... between Articles 10 and 12 is ... a letter, crude and flamboyant and ... 
quite unimportant, from the Dey of Algiers to the Pasha of Tripoli. How that 
. . . came . . . to be regarded . . . as Article 11 . . . , is a mystery . . . . 
Nothing in the diplomatic correspondence throws any light ... on the point. 
['-J A further ... mystery is ... that ... the Barlow translation has been . 
. . accepted as ... equivalent of the Arabic .... 
(continued ... ) 
54 
concededly bogus Article 11, 43 the Senators, the referenced State Department's 1931 study. 
42( ••• continued) 
This account, ibid, was praised for "important corrections in [the treaty's] translations .. 
. [with] most enlightening notes ... of great value." Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gard-
ner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1935; reprint, Glou-
cester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 159 (Bemis was Yale University's Farnam Professor of 
Diplomatic History on the Guide's 1935 publication date). 
43 The State Department report termed bogus Article 11 "a mystery [about which] 
[n]othing in the diplomatic correspondence throws any light ... ,"n. 42, ibid. 
(1) Arguably, Joel Barlow, America's then-counsel-general in Algiers, ad-
ded bogus Article 11, but supporting evidence is lacking. Barlow's 1797 "skillful negotia-
tions" released American sailors the Barbary Pirates enslaved. Thomas A. Bailey, The Di-
plomatic History of the American People, 10th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1980), 1004 (Appendix, sources and commentary on Chapter V). He was condemned, 
however, by his Yale classmate, Noah Webster, among others, for "atheism and licentious-
[ness ]," Arthur L. Ford, Joel Barlow(NewYork: Twayne, 1971), 36, and for Jeffersonian 
deistic, political and social views, ibid. Barlow wrote his wife during Treaty negotiations 
that if he, ''through intoxication or some other accident" entered a mosque whereupon, 
on pain of death, Tripolitan law supposedly required conversion to Islam, he would become 
"a Mohammedan on the spot, for I have not enough religion of any kind to make me a 
martyr," quoted by James Woodress, A Yankee's Odyssey: The Life of Joel Barlow (New 
York: Greenwood, 1958), 164 (emphasis added). 
(2) Joe Barlow's views on the connection between religion and freedom are also 
expressed in: Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe. Resulting 
from the Necessity and Propriety of a General Resolution in the Principle of Government 
(1792) (Reprint, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1956), 23: "The existence of any kind of 
liberty is not compatible with any kind of church. By liberty I mean the enjoyment of equal 
rights and by church I mean any mode of worship declared to be national or declared to have 
any preference in the eyes ofthe law." Quoted in Mark Douglas McGarvie, One Nation 
Under Law: America's Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State (DeKalb, 
Ill: Northern Ill. Univ. Press, 2004), 127, n. 85. 
(3) These quotations show Barlow lacked fixed religious views and, while far 
from proof he inserted bogus Article XI, are enough to fairly characterize him as a suspect. 
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concluded, 44 relied upon as correct in ratifying it. 45 
One can speculate that, even though not agreeing with the treaty's Article 11, the 
Senators may have ratified it to speedily end Barbary commerce raiding and retrieve enslaved 
American crews. Alternatively, they could have viewed Article 11 as unimportant, compro-
mising no American rights worth the delay to negotiate its change.46 All things considered, 
however, it is reasonable to conclude that the Senators approved Article 11 without dissent 
because they genuinely agreed with what it said: There was no foundational relationship 
between the United States government and the Christian religion. 
A review of the Senate leaders ratifying the 1797 Tripoli treaty renders it difficult to 
believe they would casually consent to Article 11 if it did not reflect their views of core 
American political values. Four Senators in the Fifth Congress ratifying the Treaty had been 
Senators in the First Congress (March 1, 1789 to March 3, 1791 ), where what became the 
44 Seen. 42, and accompanying text, supra, this Chapter, where the study is 
quoted. 
45 There were sixteen states at the 1797 treaty ratification, with two Senators per 
State. Thus, 32 Senators comprised the Senate. Biographical Directory of the American 
Congress, 1774-1996, Joel D. Treese, ed. (Alexandria, Va.: CQ StafIDirectories, Inc., 
1997) ("Biographical Directory of Congress"), 50. Thus the treaty's 23 ratifying votes 
exceeded two-thirds of the members, satisfying U.S. Const., art. II,§ 2, cl. 2, that "two-thirds 
of the Senators present concur." 
46 A powerful incentive for Senate ratification was the cost of maintaining the 
navy, greatly expanded to fight the Barbary piracy. There was anticipation that the Treaty, 
by ending the piracy, would allow reduction of this expense. See the discussion in Ray W. 
Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. ofN. Carolina Press, 1931), 79-80. 
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Constitution's first ten amendments ("Bill of Rights") were proposed in 1789, including the-
now First Amendment's prohibition against governmental "establishment of religion," or 
limitation of its ''free exercise. ''47 This arguably gave them a clear understanding of the nature 
of church/state separation that Amendment intended. Of these four "Fifth Congress" Senators 
who also were "First Congress" Senators, two voted for the Tripoli treaty.48 
One of these two Senators was New Hampshire's John Langdon, a signatory of the 
1787 federal constitution, and a company commander at the Battle of Concord. Langdon 
was also first president pro tern of the United States Senate, and administered the first pre-
sidential oath to George Washington. He was a member ofhis state's constitutional ratifying 
convention and, after his Senate service, a five-term N:ew Hampshire govemor.49 The other 
Tripoli treaty-ratifier who was a First Congress Senator, was Rhode Island's Theodore 
Foster, a lawyer and later trustee of his alma mater, Brown University.50 
47 David E. Kyving, Explicit & Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 
1776-1995 (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1996), 105, n.68. The members of the 
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in each Congress are set out, by state, with 
biographies, in the Biographical Directory of Congress, supra, n. 45, this Chapter, supra, 
most importantly for this paper, the First Congress, ibid, 41, when the Bill of Rights was 
proposed, and the Fifth Congress, ibid, 50, when the Tripoli treaty was ratified. 
48 Philip John Schuyler, third of the four" Fifth Congress" Senators who also served 
in the "First Congress" Senate, resigned due to ill health January 3, 1798, dying thereafter. 
Biographical Directory of Congress, 1790 (n. 45, supra, this Chapter). Senate voting 
records near the Tripoli treaty's ratification reveal his continuing absence. His failure to vote 
on the treaty, therefore, suggests absence due to illness, not disapproval of its terms. 
49 
50 
Biographical Directory of Congress, 1363, at n. 45, supra, this Chapter. 
Ibid, at 1032. Foster only became a Senator on June 25, 1790, ibid, 42, n. 24. 
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Five other "Fifth Congress" Senators (Bloodworth ofNorth Carolina, Goodhue of 
Massachusetts. Laurence ofNew York, Sedgwick of Massachusetts, and Vining of Dela-
ware), served in the First-Congresses House of Representatives. Of these, all but Vining 
voted for the Treaty's ratification. Two of these Senators merit additional comment: (1) 
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, a Yale graduate and attorney, was President pro-tem 
of the Fifth Congress Senate, a member of the Massachusetts convention adopting the 
Constitution, and served in the 1775-1776 American expedition to Canada; and (2) John 
T .~nrP.ncP. C)f New York, an English immigrant and attorney, was a Continental officer, 
appointed chief Judge Advocate by Washington. He presided at the 1780 court martial 
convicting British Major John Andre' to hang as a spy, arising from the latter's go-between 
role in Benedict Arnold's treason.51 
The common thread of Sedgwick's and Laurence's service is of practical men risk-
ing their lives for patriotic ideals. The Canadian expedition Sedgwick experienced and the 
Andre' court martial Laurence adjudged, suggested, in separate ways, their high degrees of 
intestinal fortitude. The harrowing expedition Sedgwick endured resulted in American defeat, 
retreat and pursuit by an avenging enemy, causing many deaths and imprisonments.52 Pre-
51 For First Congress Representatives serving as Fifth Congress Senators, see, ibid, 
41-42; and 50-51. For biographical information in footnoted paragraph concerning Senators 
Laurence and Sedgwick, see Biographical Directory of Congress, 1371, 1799, n. 45, supra, 
this Chapter. Each was also, at various times of the Fifth Congress, President pro tem of 
the Senate, ibid, showing the respect with which they were held by their Senate peers. 
52 Arnold's November 27, 1775, thumbnail description of the march to Quebec, ne-
( continued ... ) 
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siding at the court marital hanging British commanding general Sir Henry Clinton's favorite 
aide, Major John Andre', put Laurence at risk had Clinton prevailed over Washington.53 
Those like Laurence and Sedgwick apparently steeled themselves to such dangers for reasons 
of conscience. While such circumstances cannot prove, with geometric precision, the intent 
of the Senators ratifying the Treaty, it supplies reasons to believe they would not do so flip-
pantly, without circumspection, on declarations of conscience like Article 11. That Article's 
52( ••• continued) 
ver challenged for accuracy despite his later treason, was: 
Thus ... we completed a march ... not to be paralleled in history; the men 
having with the greatest fortitude ... wad[ing] almost the whole way ... over 
hills ... and bogs almost impenetrable, ... [ s ]ho rt of provisions, ... ; famine 
... and enemy's country and uncertainty ahead. [The] ... officers and men 
inspired ... with the love of liberty and their country, pushed on with a 
fortitude superior to every obstacle .... 
Quoted by Kenneth Roberts, compiler and annotator, March to Quebec, Journals of the 
Members of Arnold's Expedition, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1947), 98-99. 
Expedition doctor Lewis Beebe observed: ''No person can conceive the distress our people 
endured the winter past, nor was it much less at the time of their retreat." Lewis Beebe, 
"Journal," May 12, 1776; Thomas Fleming, 1776, Year of Illusions (New York: Norton, 
1975), 222, citing, at n. 9, ibid, Frederick R Kirkland, ed., "Journal of a Physician on the 
Expedition against Canada, 1776," Pennsylvania Mag. of Hist. & Biog., 59 (Oct 1935):325. 
53 ThP til'!noPr T .l'lnrPn~P. fqced was revealed in this extract from an October 1, 1780 
Benedict Arnold letter for Sir Henry Clinton to George Washington: "[F]orty of the 
principal inhabitants of South Carolina have justly forfeited their lives" for revolutionary 
activity, and Clinton could not "in justice extend his mercy to them . . . if Major Andre' 
suffers, .... "Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (New York: Wm. 
Morrow, 1990), 567. Randall concluded, ibid: "In other words, Arnold ... threatened ... 
forty-to-one retaliation on hostages if Andre' was executed." Thus, had the British captured 
Judge Advocate John Laurence (later Senator Laurt::nce when ratifying the 1797 Tripoli 
treaty), he had reason to fear death for his role in the Andre' court martial. 
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stark assertion was that the United States was not founded upon the Christian religion. Given 
these ratifying Senators' leadership positions, it seems equally difficult to believe their sup-
port of that provision did not influence their colleagues and constituents. Accordingly, the 
Senate's 1797 ratification of this Treaty is deemed significant in reflecting national views of 
the time on the relation between government and religion. 
While senate votes on this treaty cannot incontrovertibly prove popular inclination 
toward church/state separation, it is suggested those so-voting were not doing it lightly. As 
might be expected, however, the sentiments reflected in the Tripoli treaty vote cannot be 
deemed the whole story. There were other viewpoints to consider, even in this necessarily 
cursory treatment ultimately focused on the narrower ~unday closing law question. 
(3) Possible Reconciliation of Jefferson's Seeming Inconsistencies 
Concerning Government and Religion. 
Truncated examples were just given of America as a "Christian nation" in the Church 
of the Holy Trinity decision and the Tripoli Treaty provision asserting, to the contrary, an 
America not "founded on the Christian religion." They illustrated the existence, virtually 
simultaneously, near the time of the Virginia closing law's adoption, ofpowerfu~ yet con-
tradictory, social inclinations toward governmental attachment to, versus separation from, 
organized religion. 
Jefferson certainly was aware that many Virginians were allied to each of these com-
peting trends. Supporting closer association of government and religion, for example, was 
the Patrick Henry-backed proposal for tax assessments for religious education, ultimately 
60 
defeated, in part, by Jefferson's political colleague, James Madison's, anonymously circulated 
petition. 54 Reflecting, in contrast, movement toward government-religion separation, was the 
General Assembly's refusal to allow churches to incorporate.55 
Contrary to Dreisbach's assertion,56 however, it seemed unlikely that Jefferson 
thought, even tentatively, that "religious liberty was realized in its richest sense through co-
operation between the state and the church,"57 or that this explained his drafting Virginia's 
Sunday closing law. Such were not Jefferson's expressed views in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, whose writing and publication straddled the 1786 enactment of the Virginia Sun-
day closing law he drafted. 58 There he wrote: 
But our rulers can have authority over such i,mtural rights only as we have 
submitted to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not 
54 James Madison," Memorial and Remonstrance," 1785, The Constitution and Re-
ligion, Robert W. Alley, ed. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1999), 18-19, 29-34. 
55 Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., "After Disestablishment: Thomas Jefferson's Wall of 
Separation in Antebellum Virginia," Journal of Southern History, 61(1995):445, 451-480. 
56 See Dreisbach's text quoted immediately before n. 25, where the phrase quoted 
in the footnoted sentence appears in context. His text, however, and his article containing it, 
did not consider Jefferson's views expressed in Notes on the State of Virginia (n. 59 and 
accompanying text, infra), although he cited the Notes on another issue on p. 182, n. 84, in 
his 1990 North Carolina Law Review article (n. 17, supra) examining Jefferson's religious 
freedom statute and Sunday closing law. (All footnote references, supra, except n. 84 in the 
North Carolina Law Review article, are in this Chapter.) 
57 Dreisbach, text preceding n. 25, supra, this Chapter. 
58 Jefferson wrote Notes on the State of Virginia principally in 1781, published, after 
his revisions, in 1787. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Frank Shufileton, 
ed. (New York: Penguin, 1999) ("Notes"), "Introduction," xii-xvi. Joseph L. Ellis, 
American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Knopf, 1998), 85. 
submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me 
no injury for my neighbour [sic] to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg .... Constraint may ... fix him 
obstinately in his errors, but will not cure them. Reason and free enquiry are 
the only effectual agents against error .... [T]hey will support true religion, 
by bringing every false one ... to the test of their investigation. They are the 
natural enemies ... of error only .... If [free inquiry] ... be restrained now, 
the present corruptions will be protected and new ones encouraged. 59 
61 
Thus, according to Jefferson, government "cooperation" to achieve religious liberty, as 
Dreisbach described, was achieved by the government's staying out of the way of religions 
or popular deliberations about religion. Instead he advocated allowing citizens untrammeled 
freedom to decide these matters themselves. Assuming, for argument's sake, this is true, 
however, then the Jefferson-drafted Sunday closing 1:aw certainly appeared contrary to the 
spirit, if not substance, of his religious freedom statute. 
Other Jeffersonian views, in contrast, appeared congenial to government support of 
organized religfon. For example, he urged using his local courthouse as "the common tern-
pie, one Sunday in the month to each [denomination]." There, he continued: 
Episcopalian and Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist, meet together, join in 
hymning their Maker, listen with attention and devotion to each others' 
preachers, and all mix in society with perfect harmony.60 
Jefferson also proposed that his prized creation, the University of Virginia, a state 
59 Thomas Jefferson, Notes, Frank Shuflleton, ed., 165; n. 58, ibid, and accompany-
ing text. 
60 Thomas Jefferson letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, November 2, 1822, The Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols.; Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Ass'n, 1903), 15:404. 
62 
institutio~ allow religious groups to establish separate on-campus religious schools. He 
would have permitted "students to attend religious exercises with a professor of their par-
ticular sect," while also attending "scientific lectures of the University.•'6t Further, Jefferson 
not only did not object to Sunday religious services at the United States Capitol but attended 
himself: though his biographer Merrill Peterson claimed this was merely to allay "criticism of 
his friendliness with [Thomas] Paine," condemned by many for atheism. 62 
All this, however, left unexplained Jefferson's seemingly contradictory views si-
multaneously held about interrelations of church and state. Joseph Ellis wrote of Jefferson's 
tendency "to invent and then embrace" what Ellis called "seductive fictions," and "play fast 
and loose with historical evidence on behalf of a great~r cause."63 
Although evidence remained murky for this thesis as it was also for past investiga-
tions, the "greater cause" in this instance seemed to have been achieving greater societal 
religious freedom through creating, in part through a Sunday closing law, an improved ethi-
61 Thomas Jefferso~ "Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia," October 7, 
1822, Saul K. Padover, The Complete Jefferson (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1943), 
957. 
62 Merrill D. Peterso~ Thomas Jefferson, 713, n. 1, Chapter 1, supra, this thesis. 
63 Joseph J. Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: 
Knopf, 1998), 33. Jefferson was less charitably described in sources Bernard Bailyn col-
lected, To Begin the World Anew : the Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders 
(New York: Knopf, distributed by Random House, 2003), 38 (footnotes omitted): "John 
Quincy Adams ... conceded that Jefferson had an 'ardent passion for liberty and the rights 
of man' but denounced him for infidelity, 'pliability of principle,' and double dealing .... 
Hamilton ... [,] Jefferson's chief enemy[,] ... feared what he called the Virginian's fanaticism 
and believed he was 'crafty' and a 'contemptible hypocrite."' 
cal climate. Analysis supporting such a view was offered by A. James Reichley: 
Some of the positions on ... religion in public life taken by Jefferson 
at different times were simply inconsistent, as he himself would probably have 
acknowledged, attnbuting the inconsistencies to changes of mind or to 
pressing political needs of the moment. His overall view, however, though 
based on two sets of values in natural tension, was not necessarily 
inconsistent. Jefferson firmly believed that government should be barred from 
acting ... as arbiter of religion; but ... that a free society ... uphold[ing] 
personal freedom . . . requires moral sustenance from a religious culture. 
These beliefs ... can exist together within a consistent social philosophy, 
though they may pull against each other in ways that require difficult 
constitutional adjustments. 64 
63 
Thus, one explanation for Jefferson's apparently inconsistent views on church-state 
relations, is as an amalgam of his beliefs in (1) some kind of divine providence; (2) freedom 
of inquiry (even to the extent ofrejecting most of (1) .if one chose to do so); (3) the attemp-
ted accommodation of vastly differing philosophical views for political expediency; and (4) 
society's need for ''moral sustenance" from a "religious culture." 
To simply say, however, that Jefferson advocated a ''religious culture," does not 
adequately convey what he meant. His humanist views about ''free enquiry," sharply con-
trasted with earlier English Puritan ideas about the centrality of the Judaic-Christian scrip-
tures to society's sound operation. 65 Further, though Jefferson's interest in religion was in-
tense, his religious views were anything but conventional for either his time or for most 
64 A. James Reichley, Religion in American Public Life (Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution, 1985), 96. 
65 Concerning "free enquiry," see portion of Jefferson's text from Notes on the State 
of Virginia; quoted preceding n. 59, supra, this Chapter. 
64 
practicing Christians today. He created, for example, a bible of his own editorial desi~ 
omitting Christ's resurrection or New Testament miracles, concepts Jefferson rejected.66 
Jefferson was unable to exert any in-person influence for the 1786 adoption of his 
Bill for Religious Freedom and the Sunday closing law, having been serving as American 
Minister to France in Paris since 1784.67 For enactment of statutory revisions proposed by 
the 1779 committee of''revisors" he chaired, he relied on James Madison, his "faithful lieu-
tenant," with a "keener sense of realities," and "more patience with the drudgeries of poli-
tics" than Jefferson. Madison's was also considered more adept than Jefferson at "political 
maneuvering [that] was an integral part of Virginia's political process."68 
Among Madison's strengths in obtaining enactµient of many of the proposals of the 
"revisors"' committee Jefferson chaired was his "idealism" which, nonetheless, "did not al-
low him to ignore the realities of politics." The two opposed a conservative-inspired as-
sessment bill to support religion with taxes, provoking conservative opposition to the 118 
66 
"To Jefferson ... , miracles violated God's laws of nature, something [he was] 
... sure God would never do .... To ... rationalists, Jesus' virgin birth and other miracles 
... did not prove him to be the Son of God, but ... an 'illegitimate imposter' [which he 
rejected] .... It was sinful men, not God, who killed Jesus .... Jefferson [believed] ... Jesus 
was not a divine being but the greatest man that ever lived, for he omits the New Testament 
accounts of Jesus resurrection, subsequent appearances, and ascension." Charles B. 
Sanford, "The Religious Beliefs ofThomas Jefferson," 64-65, Religion and Popular Culture 
in Jefferson's Virginia, Garrett Ward Sheldon & Daniel L. Dreisbach, ed. (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) (this author an ordained minister), ibid, 236. 
67 Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation, 286; n. 1, Chapter 1, supra. 
68 Ibid, 266. 
65 
bills Jefferson and his revisors proposed. As explained by Madison's editors: 
[Madison] presented 118 bills in the Revised Code early in the session in the 
hope of completing the long-unfinished business. The legislature [in 1785] 
slowly progressed through the bills until conservative, pragmatic Virginians 
balked at Jefferson's bill on crimes . . . . With little time left, [Madison] 
decided to postpone the majority of the bills in favor of trying to pass the 
most important, among them the bill for religious freedom. 69 
Among these "most important" bills that Madison presented for passage was the Sunday 
closing law or, as titled in an October 31, 1785, printed copy prepared for the House of 
Delegates, "A bill 'for punishing disturbers of religious worship and sabbath breakers. "'70 As 
earlier discussed herein, it was ultimately adopted by the legislature, through Madison's 
efforts, on November 27, 1786.71 
Madison's just-described proclivities for ''political maneuvering" (i.e., compromise) 
as "an integral part of Virginia's political process" and his declining "to ignore the realities 
of politics" suggests another reason that could have induced him to offer Jefferson's Sunday 
closing law for legislative adoption and worked for its passage. Such a law could have been 
a means to counter conservative Virginians' concerns about Jefferson's and Madison's (a) 
sponsorship of the religious freedom bill, and (b) opposing conservative religious assessment 
69 Robert A. Rutland and William M. E. Racha~ ed., Papers of James Madison, 
17 vols( Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973) ("Madison Papers") "Editorial Note," 8: 
390 (10 March 1784 - 28 March 1786) (includes quotations in text paragraph 
immediately preceding footnoted paragraph). 
70 Madison Papers, 8:394. 
71 See nn. 17 and 20 parts (1) through (3) and accompanying text, supra, this Chap-
ter. 
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proposals. Introducing a Sunday closing law affording ordinary citizens a day of rest their 
employers could not countennand, because it had the force of law; which also addressed 
religious concerns of Virginia's conservatives through penalizing sabbath work, could have 
been Jefferson's motivation. 
While no documentary proof can be presented that such motives of political com-
promise underlay Madison's proposal of Virginia's Sunday closing law, it certainly offered 
possible political solutions for the Jeffersonians. Despite requiring general abstention from 
Sunday work, Jefferson's closing law, unlike Virginia's colonial versions, contained no 
parallel requirement for mandatory religious observances.72 Thus, for followers of the En-
lightenment, like Jefferson and Madison, it could be S"4pported as a public welfare measure 
to achieve one day per week of mandatory rest, paralleling other public welfare statutes 
Jefferson's "revisors" drafted for Assembly consideration.73 On the other hand, for conser-
vatives such as war-time Governor Patrick Henry, a supporter of the religious assessment 
bill, it legally sanctioned punishing businesses, entertainments and other activities interfering 
with Sunday worship. Even though it did not require such worship, it at least potentially 
mitigated Sunday secular diversions that distracted citizens from worship. Thus the Sunday 
closing law, in part, could have been calculated to achieve compromise and, chameleon-like, 
72 See, for example, nn. 37-39 and accompanying text, Chapter 4, supra. 
73 Among the subjects of these bills: "support of the poor;" "preventing infection of 
the homed cattle," ''preservation of deer," and "preventing frauds by the dealers in flour, 
beef, pork, tar, pitch and turpentine;" from a House of Delegates October 31, 1785, prin-
ted list of them. Madison Papers, 8:394-395. 
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mean different things to those of differing political views. 
In summary, some or all of the reasons discussed above probably explain Jefferson's 
seeming inconsistency in his simultaneous support of both his religious freedom statute and 
the Sunday closing law at the time of their eighteenth century Virginia adoption. 
Chapter 6: SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. 
The national dynamic concerning Sunday closing laws in the nineteenth century was 
crisply summarized by law professor Andrew J. King: 
During the nineteenth century American courts reluctantly gave up 
strict enforcement of Sunday observance. The American theories ofreligious 
liberty-separation of church and state and noncoercion-made it increas-
ingly difficult for courts to give Sunday restrictions a sectarian justification. 
To avoid state constitutional questions, the courts adopted a police power 
justification that relied on the theme of Sunday as a "day ofrest."1 
To apply the trends summarized above to Virginia's nineteenth century Sunday closing laws, 
national developments are here considered with relevance to the Virginia experience. The 
principles derived are applied to Virginia closing-law situations. 
(a) Sunday Closing Law's Nineteenth Century Impact on Liability Arising 
from Sunday Contracts or Negligence. 
(1) Representative State Courts Outside Virginia Denying Liability 
Due to Sunday Closing Law. 
Nineteenth century non-: Virginia appellate cases with Virginia relevance concerned 
Sunday closing law applications to [a] contracts made or performed on Sunday; or [b] ne-
gligence injuring claimants on Sunday. In McGrath v. Merwin, the Massachusetts closing law 
prohibited "any manner of [Sunday] labor, business or work, except ... necessity or charity." 
The plaintiff McGrath, injured by defendants' "carelessness," worked for them on Sunday 
(termed the "Lord's day" by the court) because "it was more convenient and profitable" for 
Andrew J. King, "Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century," Albany L. Rev. 64 
(1990):675, 771-772. When the article was published, its author was an associate profes-
sor oflaw at the University of Maryland School of Law, ibid, 675. 
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the defendants that he do so than "any secular day." The court held the plaintiff's "illegal" 
Sunday work repairing paper mill machinery ''was inseparably connected with the cause of 
action and contributed to his injury," denying recovery solely for that reason.2 
McGrath was relied upon by the defendant in Bucher v. Cheshire R.R. before the Uni-
ted States Supreme Court, an appeal from a Massachusetts federal trial court, which denied 
Bucher's injury claim against the defendant railroad, although the latter's negligence caused 
the injury. This denial was because, the lower court held, (1) plaintiffBucher's Sunday travel 
violated the state closing law; and (2) the travel was not a ''necessity," thus not exempted 
from closing law prosecution. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, due to the pop~ly-termed federal "Rules ofDeci-
sion" Act, 3 requiring substantive state law to control in this federal trial. The Court deter-
mined (1) the applicable Massachusetts law, and (2) that it was required by the "Rules of 
Decision" Act to apply that law in Bucher, even though it preferred not to do so: 
2 
[T]he Supreme Court of Massachusetts ... holding[ s] that a person engaged 
in travel on the Sabbath day, contrary to the statute of the State, ... shall not 
McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467, 468-469 (1873). 
3 Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 582 (1884). The "Rules of Decision Act" 
(see s.v. "Rules of Decision Act" Black's Law Dictionary [ri1 ed]), currently 28 U.S.C. § 
1652, originally §34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c.20, 1 Stat. 73, 
provided ''the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes 
of the United States shall otherwise require ... , shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
trials at common law in the Courts of the United States, .... " Its current text is the same 
except "civil actions" replaced ''trials at common law" to conform to ''terminology of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." See Historical Note in "Official" (2000) edition, United 
States Code, following 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 2000). 
recover against a corporation upon whose road he travels for the negligence 
of its servants, thereby establish . . . a local law . . . of sufficiently long 
standing to establish the rule, ... though giving an effect to it which may not 
meet the approval of this court .... 4 
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Thus, in Bucher, the Court found itself constrained by federal statute to follow Massachusetts 
closing law rules denying the plaintiff recovery, despite its disapproval of those rules. 
Other nineteenth century American courts, mostly in New England, applied Sunday 
closing laws similarly to Massachusetts. In Maine's Parker v. Latner, the defendant leased a 
horse and carriage on a Sunday, allegedly damaged due to his negligent driving. The plaintiff 
lost solely because the contract was made, and the alleged negligence occurred, on a Sunday, 
rendering the contract illegal under Maine's Sunday closing law: 
If the contract had been a valid contract, the defendant would have 
been liable upon the implied promise to use ordinary and common care of the 
property bailed, which the case finds he did not. Being a contract illegal and 
void, his liability upon the contract is at an end. 5 
Similarly, in Rhode Island, a defendant leased a horse and buggy on Sunday from the 
plaintll: but did not return them at the place promised, resulting in alleged damages. Be-
cause the contract was made on Sunday, however, the plaintiff was denied relief: 
That agreement, ... violat[es] ... a statute which prolnbits the 
plaintiff from so contracting on Sunday. . . . [T]he contract was thereby 
rendered illegal. ... [N]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause 
... upon an ... illegal act ... ; and though the objection, said Lord Mans-
4 Bucher,125 U.S. at 584. McGrath (seen. 2, this Chapter, supra, and accompany-
ing text) was cited by defendant railroad in Bucher, ibid at 576, as reflecting Massassa-
chusetts law. 
5 Parker v. Latner, 60 Maine 528, 531 (1872). 
field, ... sound [sic] ill in the mouth of the defendant, it is allowed, not for 
... sake of the defendant, but because the court will not lend its aid to such 
a plainti:ff.6 
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In accord, Vermont held that a traveler without a "necessity" or "charity'' exemption for 
Sunday travel could not recover from a negligent defendant who injured him that day.7 
Andrew King concluded that application of closing laws to deny recovery to injured 
travelers or workers largely ceased by the end of the nineteenthcentury.8 Vestiges, however, 
remained. In Mississippi, as late as 1925 for example, a plaintiff's recovery for damages due 
to drinking the defendant bottler's contaminated beverage was reversed because plaintiff 
bought and consumed the drink on Sunday, violating, the court held, the closing law: 
Before the manufacturer ... was liable .... for a breach ofits warranty 
of . . . fitness . . . , the party injured thereby must have . . . rightful 
possession of the drink. The implied warranty runs with the sale and passes 
with the title, and where the sale ... is made void by [the Sunday closing. 
law] statute, and where he is a participant in the sale, he cannot recover, 
although this statute makes the crime, apparently, apply to the seller alone. 
His [plamtifI's] ... purchase is illegal ... and the courts will not give him 
relief for injuries ... brought about by ... an illegal act in which he is a joint 
participant voluntarily. 9 
6 Whelden v. Chappel, 8 RI. 230, 233 (1865). Lord Mansfield was the "greatest 
judge" of eighteenth century England; Richard A. Smith s.v. "Mansfield, William Murray 
... " Oxford Companion to British History, John Cannon, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press 1997), 616. 
7 Johnson v. Town oflrasburgh, 42 Vt. 23 (1874). (If plaintiff's Sunday travel to 
preserve fish was ''necessary''? held: jury fact-question, not subject to appellate review.) 
8 See n. I, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. (Nineteenth and twentieth 
century Virginia closing laws did not bar Sunday travel, only certain Sunday labor.) 
9 Grapico Bottling Co. v. Ennis, 140 Miss. 502, 106 So. 97, 98-99 (1925). 
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The above-quoted majority opinion generated a biting dissent: 
The [majority] rule ... means that an innocent person, who purchases a 
bottled drink on Sunday ... poisoned ... with filthy flies ... caus[ing] him 
great ... suffering[,] ... has no remedy .... The purchase and drinking .. 
. on Sunday is merely incidental to the breach of the warranty by the 
manufacturer, . . . on a previous day when he bottled the poisoned drink .. 
. . The ... majority opinion will ... free ... every vendor of drinks ... sold 
on Sunday [from liability], regardless of the ... damage. 10 
This dissent well-summarized views of other courts increasingly rejecting older 
common law barring claimants from recovery due to negligence or contract breaches, solely 
because plaintiffs were, at the time of their injury, violating Sunday closing laws. 
(2) Representative State Courts Outside Virginia Retreating from 
Denying Liability Due to Sunday Closing Laws. 
Other late-nineteenth century cases rejected closing laws as a reason to escape from 
liability due to Sunday negligence. An example was Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 11 which 
found a plaintiff passenger's Sunday injury was caused by the railroad's negligently main-
taining a ferryboat boiler. The resulting explosion injured the passenger. Carroll indignantly 
denied New York's closing law could free the defendant from liability: 
to 
II 
It is certainly a startling proposition, that the thousands ... who travel ... on 
Sunday, ... are at the mercy of ... careless engineers ... , for ... their 
negligence . . . . The plaintiff's unlawful act [i.e., Sunday travel] did not ... 
contribute to the explosion .... To hold the carrier exempt from liability, 
because the plaintiff was violating the Sunday statute, would ... shield a 
Holden, J, dissenting, in Grapico Bottling, ibid, 106 So. at 99;joined by Cook, J. 
Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 58 N.Y. 126 (1874). 
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wrongdoer from a just responsibility for his wrongful act. 12 
Ca"ol/ thus rejected earlier Sunday closing law cases supposedly promoting Sunday rest 
through discouraging Sabbath travel and work. These cases led, however, to reprieving 
defendants from their own wanton negligence for no reason except that the harm occurred 
on Sunday. The persuasiveness of Ca"oll 's view caused other states to follow it in denying 
that closing laws should preclude recovery for Sunday injuries. 13 
Implicit in these decisions was technology's social impact as the nineteenth century 
progressed, undoing simpler generalizations of earlier ages facing fewer complications due 
to ceasing secular activities on Sunday. An earlier-nineteenth century discussion of the 
Sunday closing-lawproblemactually couched in such te~ was an 1829 Report by Kentucky 
Senator Richard M. Johnson, chair of the United States Senate Committee on Post Offices 
and Postal Roads. After hearings on demands by some religious groups that the federal 
government, as a "Christian nation" suspend Sunday transport of mails, 14 the Senator 
12 Ibid at 135-136 (Vainly cited by plaintiff in Bucher, nn. 3-4, this Chapter, supra, 
and supporting text; [125 U.S. at 569-570]). 
13 Carroll followed, for example, in Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 14 N.W. 575, 
576 (1883) ("[Deceased's] presence [on Sunday] did not ... cause the accident; and ... 
wrongdoers [due to Sunday travel,] though answerable to the state[,] ... are entitled to the 
protection [from] ... negligence of others."; and in Van Auken v. Chicago & Western 
Mich. R.R., 69 Mich. 307, 55 N.W. 971, 974 (1893) ("In nearly all the states it has been 
held under quite similar [Sunday closing] statutes that a party traveling ... who is injured . 
. . , is not barred from recovery ... [because] the injury occurred on Sunday.") 
14 Senator Johnson commented on these demands: "The transportation of the mail 
on the first day of the week [i.e., Sunday], ... does not interfere with the rights of 
(continued ... ) 
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disagreed: 
The various departments of government require, frequently in peace, always 
in war, the speediest intercourse with the remotest parts of the country; and 
one important object of the mail establishment is to furnish the greatest and 
most economical facilities for such intercourse. The delay of the mails one 
whole day in seven would require the employment of special expresses, at 
great expense, and sometimes with great uncertainty. 
The commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests of our 
country are so intimately connected as to require a constant and the most 
expeditious correspondence between all our seaports, and between them and 
the most interior settlements. 15 
After thus describing difficulties expected from ending Sunday mail transport, Sena-
tor Johnson concluded that continuing Sunday mail best honored the Constitution, despite 
religious objections.16 His report influenced the 1858 ~alifornia Supreme Court in Ex parte 
14( ••• continued) 
conscience. The petitioners for its discontinuance appear to be actuated from a religious zeal, 
which may be commendable if confined to its proper sphere; but they assume a position better 
suited to an ecclesiastical than to a civil institution." Senator Richard M. Johnson, Chair, 
Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Report [on Sunday Observance and Delivery of 
Mail], January 19, 1829, 20th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Report No. 74, The Debates and 
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States with an Appendix Containing Important 
State Papers and Public Documents and All the Laws of a Public Nature; ... Index, 42 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: 1834-1856); Reprinted in Annals of America, Mortimer J. Adler, ed. 
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1976), 5:284, 285. (Hereinafter, "Johnson, Annals") 
15 Johnson, Annals, ibid, 286-287. 
16 
"What other nations call religious toleration, we call religious rights. . . . Let the 
national legislature once perform an act which involves the decision of a religious contro-
versy and it will have passed its legitimate bounds .... Our Constitution recognizes no other 
power than that of persuasion for enforcing religious observances." Ibid, 287. 
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Newman, 17 to declare unconstitutional its state Sunday closing law; a position from which it 
subsequently retreated. 18 Nevertheless, practicality, as shown in Johnson's Report, 19 rather 
than constitutionality, seemed more influential in the Sunday closing laws' demise.20 
(b) An Unsuccessful Attempt to Escape Sunday Liability Through the Vir-
ginia Sunday Closing Law. 
Many of the principles already discussed in this Chapter 6 became relevant in Virginia 
due to the United States Supreme Court's applying them in Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. 
17 Ex Parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 506, 507 (1858), referring to "Mr. Johnson," and 
his "celebrated Sunday-mail report," correctly quoted, but without further citation details. 
18 Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 679, 684 (1861) ("The Act ... requires no man to pro-
fess or support any ... religious faith, or even to have any religion at all. It simply requires 
him to refrain from keeping open his place of business on Sunday.")(Adopting dissent of 
Justice Field in Newman, n. 17, ibid, as part of the Andrews opinion.) 
19 See quotation in text preceding n. 15, this Chapter, supra. 
20 The ubiquitous Tocqueville, in 1831, shortly after Senator Johnson's 1829 report, 
ibid, colorfully described the totality of a Sunday-law closedown in an urban setting: 
There is, notably, a great American town in which, from Saturday evening on, 
social movement is almost suspended. You go through it at the hour that 
seems to invite the mature to business and youth to pleasures, and you find 
yourself in profound solitude. . . . One hears neither the movement of 
industry nor the accents of joy, not even the confused murmur that continually 
rises from within a great city. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, translated 
and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, 2000), 683 (Notes to Vol I., Part I, 
p. 39). Tocqueville was describing New York City, based on his June 29, 1831, letter writ-
ten just after his five week stay there, as set forth in George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in 
America (New York: Oxford, 1938; Reprint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1996 
[paperback]), 153-154, whose text substantially paralleled the above-quoted Democracy in 
America passage. Tocqueville claimed in the letter that "public opinion, much stronger than 
the law," ibid, enforced the Sunday absence of activity. 
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Appomattox R.R. 21 in analyzing the Virginia closing law's impact on the defendant railroad's 
liability for Sunday negligence and contract beach. The steamboat company sought damages 
for goods its ship carried from Baltimore, Maryland, to City Point, Virginia. 22 Reaching City 
Point on Sunday, its crew unloaded the goods into the defendant railroad's wharfside 
warehouse, with the defendant merely unlocking and relocking the warehouse door before 
and after delivery. The railroad ran no Sunday trains and planned to reload the goods on its 
Monday Petersburg (Virginia) freight.23 On the same Sunday the goods reached the ware-
house, however, a fire there destroyed them due to, the trial court found, the defendant's 
negligence. This was a finding not challenged on appeal. 24 
Virginia's Sunday closing law was essentially upchanged in 185325 from its original 
enactment.26 Amendments exempted from prosecution (a) Sunday transport of "mail, or 
passengers and their baggage," (b) anyone ''who conscientiously believes the seventh day of 
21 Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox RR, 65 U.S. [24 How.] 247 (1860). 
22 City Point was "on James River," ibid at 250, twenty miles south of Richmond, 
West Point Atlas of American Wars, 1689-1900, vol. I, Vincent Esposito, ed., (New 
York: Praeger, 1959; reprint: Henry Holt, 1995) (unpaginated), Map 43 (a)," ... 31 May 
1862 ... [,] Battle of Fair Oaks .... "). 
23 Defendant stored the goods "at the risk of the plaintiffs," 65 U.S. at 251, held: not 
to excuse defendant's "subsequent negligence and carelessness," ibid at 256, in that loss. 
24 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 250-251 & 256. 
25 The Court decided Powhatan in 1860, but the fire-loss of plaintiff's goods, liti-
gated in the case, occurred on June 26, 1853. Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 251. 
26 See text preceding n. 20, Chapter 5, supra, for the statute's text. 
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the week [is the] ... Sabbath [Saturday], and actually refrains" from labor that day, 27 and ( c) 
passengers and baggage on Sunday mail-stages. 28 These added exemptions could well have 
been derived from the previously-discussed 1829 Post Office Committee Report objecting to 
suspending Sunday mail transport, which favored them.29 
The Supreme Court summarized the result of the federal trial court proceedings: 
the jury were substantially told by the presiding justice ... , that ... if they 
found . . . the goods were delivered on a Sunday, under a contract between 
the parties, . . . and were destroyed by fire on th[ at] day . . . their verdict 
should be for the defendants.30 
Thus, the lower court attempted to use Virginia's Sunday closing law to generate a 
27 Va. Code, Ch. 196, § 17 (Patton & Robinson rev., 1849), quoted in Powhatan at 
247 & 252. A Saturday worshiper, by the amendment's literal text, was not excused from 
the Sunday ban on labor if not "conscientiously believ[ing]" in the Saturday sabbath, an 
obligation not similarly imposed on a Sunday worshiper. 
28 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 252 (quoting statute). 
29 See nn. 14-16, and accompanying text, this Chapter, supra. See also Johnson, 
Annals, 286, n. 15, this Chapter, supra: "Passengers in the mail stages, if ... not permitted 
to proceed on Sunday, will . . . spend that day . . . under circumstances not friendly to 
devotion, and at an expense which many [cannot] ... encounter." Ibid at 285-286: "[A] 
variety of sentiment exists ... on ... the Sabbath day; and our government is designed for 
the protection of one [sentiment] as much for another. The Jews, who in this country are. 
. . entitled to the same protection from the laws, derive their obligation to keep the Sabbath 
from the Fourth Commandment, and ... pay religious homage to the seventh day of the 
week, which we call Saturday." The Virginia amendment, as in Senator Johnson's Report, 
describes Saturday as the "seventh day of the week," ibid, rather than by name. This suggests 
Virginia's legislators may have based the amendments previously discussed herein on the 
Report's language. 
30 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 251-252. 
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jury _"instruction/' like the jury "instruction" in Francisco,31 effectively removing the de-
cision from the jurors. This was because it was undisputed that the "goods were delivered" 
and "destroyed by fire" on Sunday. This trial ruling, if not reversed, effectively meant that 
the defendant railroad escaped liability as a matter of law, due to the Sunday closing law. 
Also, like Francisco, however, this reliance on the closing law did not survive the appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower Virginia federal trial court. 32 
What Powhatan accomplished, without citing authority beyond the Virginia Sunday 
closing law itself,33 is given context by legal scholar Norman Cantor: 
31 
32 
The common law is sometimes hailed as a kind of fixed heavenly 
firmament, its . . . principles shining down like beautiful and remote stars, 
infinitely set apart from the anxieties . . . and. passions of particular human 
lives. That is not what legal history teaches. On the contrary, contingency, 
relativity, malleability, institutional change in response to modification in con-
text and ambiance-this is what the history of the common law teaches .... 
Reading a case for historical purposes broadens the implications of 
the legal text and joins it with social, political, and cultural trends. This may 
not be what the lawyer always wants; it is what the historian always needs to 
explain judicial change or to use law cases for social history.34 
The analysis by Powhatan of the Virginia closing law exemplified the Court's con-
See n. 10, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text. 
Powhatan at 255-256. 
33 Powhatan's lack of cited authority was not due to a lack of briefing. Instead, the 
Court observed: "The arguments upon both sides contained ... cases ... [concerning] ... 
Sunday laws; but [since] ... this case does not come within the scope of the Virginia code, 
the insertion of these arguments is not considered necessary." 65 U.S. at 249. 
34 Norman F. Cantor, Imagining the Law: Common Law and the Foundations of the 
American Legal System (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 375-376. 
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sideration of"institutional change in response to context and ambiance" as Cantor described. 
Powhatan delineated, without characterizing them as such, complexities that could arise due 
to Virginia's closing law; analogous to the difficulties noted by the dissent in the 1925 Missis-
sippi tainted soda-pop opinion. 35 For example, said Powhatan, if plaintiff steamboat company 
had sued for compensation for its Sunday "labor of landing and depositing the goods" at 
defendant railroad's warehouse, or if defendant had refused "to open and close the ware-
house" on Sunday, or if the defendant had refused on Sunday "to allow the goods to be 
deposited" at the warehouse, then the Sunday closing law "would apply," to deny plaintiff 
recovery it might have asserted, under those assumed, but non-existent, facts. 36 
Such Court-posed hypotheticals seemed calculated to illustrate to the business com-
munity, through this opinion in the Court's much-read Reports,37 how commerce could be 
impeded by Virginia's Sunday closing law. This surmise is strengthened by the Court's first 
35 See nn. 9 and 10, supra, this Chapter, and supporting text. 
36 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 255-256. 
37 Roy M. Mersky, s.v. "Publishing Law," Oxford Companion to American Law, 
Kermit L. Hall, chief ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 679-681: "The reporting 
of decisions of the Supreme Court deserves special mention .... Because of the importance 
of these decisions, the Court's holdings were reported almost from the beginning .... The 
Supreme Court endorsed the principle [in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834), says 
Mersky] that no copyright should exist in the laws governing the nation [such as its own 
opinions], since their wide dissemination is [sic] essential," 680, ibid (Note: The Justices in 
Wheaton were "unanimously of opinion that no reporter has nor can have any copyright 
in the written opinions [of] ... this court ... ," ibid. at 668. Thatthe Justices did so because 
wide dissemination of their opinions was "essential," was Professor's Mersky's inference; no 
doubt well-merited, but not expressly stated in Wheaton.) 
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offering, as just described, a variety of hypothetical circumstances where the Virginia Sun-
day closing law would apply to deny plaintiff relief for commercial losses. The Court then, 
miraculously-or so it might seem-extracted from the case other facts mandating that the 
Sunday closing law should not apply in Powhatan. This meant plaintiff steamboat company 
could recover, according to the Supreme Court, thus reversing the trial court. 
The legal-reasoning mechanism Powhatan applied to deny the closing law's appli-
cation was one of several typically used by common-law courts construing statutes not to 
their liking, which they cannot, or prefer not, to overrule. "[I]nstitutional change in response 
to modification in context and ambiance," as Norman Cantor described,38 is implemented by 
such courts "discovering," as it were, a previously ~iculated underlying principle which 
they assert is, nevertheless, applicable. "Obviously," or words to that effect (according to 
such a court), the principle is one the legislature could not have intended to be impaired by 
the statute it drafted. Powhatan accomplished this by declaring that the issue before it 
was one to which the Sunday laws of Virginia have no application whatever . 
. . . [T]he real claim is grounded on the obligations ... imposed on the 
defendants safely and securely to keep, convey, and deliver the goods, and 
upon their subsequent negligence ... , whereby the goods were lost.39 
Powhatan thus asserted there were underlying "obligations ... imposed on the defendants 
safely and securely to keep ... the goods," independent of any contract with plaintiff steam-
boat company. These obligations, the Court reasoned, could not cease on Sunday, any more 
38 See n. 34, this Chapter, supra, and supporting text. 
39 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 253, 255-256 (emphasis added). 
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than a bank was relieved on Sunday from protecting depositors' funds in its vaults. The logic 
here was similar to the later holding in Carrol/.40 The Powhatan Court declared that if it had 
ruled that defendant railroad's gaining Sunday possession of the goods, excused defendant's 
later negligence in destroying them due to the Sunday fire, this would 
amount to a forfeiture of the goods, ... allow[ing] the carrier ... voluntarily 
to destroy ... or to appropriate them to his own use. [ii] [T]he obligations of 
the defendants, ... were not varied [because] ... the goods were deposited 
in their warehouse by their consent on 'a Sabbath day.' Great injustice would 
result from any different rule, and although the precise question has seldom 
or never been presented for decision, yet we think the analogies of the law 
fully sustain the rule here laid down. For these reasons ... the instruction 
given to the jury was erroneous.41 
Powhatan expressly generated new, judge-made law, by applying "analogies" (as 
stated in the above quotation), rather than relying on precedent. However, it was not content 
to let its ruling rest exclusively on the defendant's duty to protect bailed goods, independent 
of the closing law. It also asserted a statutory "necessity" for labor on Sunday (stretching 
40 Seen. 12, this Chapter, supra, and supporting text quoting Carroll. Powhatan's 
technique of asserting an underlying principle of safekeeping people and property, to negate 
the Sunday closing law's seeming imperative of not working or traveling on that day, was 
also applied in Carroll, 58 N.Y. 126, 133-134, 137: "The graveman of the action is, the 
breach of the duty imposed by law upon the carrier . . . to carry safely . . . persons . . . 
exist[ing] independently of contract, .... The plaintiff went upon [defendant's steamer] .. 
. in ... an unlawful purpose, [i.e., Sunday travel] .... [but since] [t]he action was not 
founded upon contract; ... the principle that courts will not ... to enforce the performance 
of illegal contracts has no application ..... [T]hat the plaintiff was ... traveling contrary to 
the [Sunday closing] statute, is no defense ... " (Emphasis added.) 
41 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added). Virginia overturned Powhatan within 
its borders by statute, 1889-90 Acts of General Assembly, c. 49 ( "[N]o steamboat company 
shall ... load or unload on a Sunday any steamship ... at any port or landings ... of this 
state .... ")(Adopted February 7, 1890). 
back to the earlier-discussed edict of Emperor Constantine )42 by alternatively holding: 
To take care of the goods on "a Sabbath day," and safely and securely keep 
them, after the goods were received, was a work of necessity, and therefore 
was not unlawful, even on the theory assumed by the defendants [i.e., reliance 
on the Sunday closing law and its ''necessity'' exception], and the defendants 
were not expected to convey or deliver the goods until the following day.43 
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Powhatan thus limited Virginia's Sunday closing laws by first denying they applied 
to so-called ''noncontractual" duties of protecting goods or passengers. Second, it afforded 
more scope to the courts to define a given Sunday activity as a "necessity," exempted by the 
closing law from prosecution. These themes reappear in Virginia decisions to dilute closing-
law effectiveness. 44 
42 Emperor Constantine's edict discussed at nn. 19-23, Chapter 3, and accompany-
ing text, supra. 
43 Powhatan, 65 U.S. at 256. 
44 Contra to the trend suggested here was Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Common-
wealth,93 Va. 749, 24 S.E. 837 (1896), holding a Virginia statute denying the right to 
"load, unload, run or transport ... on a Sunday, any car, train ... or locomotive," did not 
violate U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, (interstate commerce clause), since the coal cars in 
question, being empty, lacked "commerce" to regulate. Ibid. at 753. It alternately held: (1) 
this legislation might "affect" commerce, but not unconstitutionally "regulate" it, when 
intended to protect "health and morals" by shielding "persons from the physical and moral 
debasement ... from uninterrupted labor," ibid., at 757, 762, 763; and (2) the lack of 
necessity for Sunday coal-car travel: "[The statute's] only effect upon such commerce 
would be to delay it a few hours .... There is nothing in ... coal ... that requires that the 
laws ... for the preservation of the health and morals ... should be struck down ... [for] 
a more rapid movement." Ibid. at 763. The court's acceptance of delay for "only ... a few 
hours," ibid., ... recalls Justice Holmes' wry comment that ''property rights may be taken 
... without pay if you do not take too much." Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 
446 (1927) (Holmes, J, dissenting). 
Chapter 7: VIRGINIA'S CLOSING LAW ENTERS THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY.1 
(a) Closing Law Appeals Through the Conclusion of the First World 
War. 
Virginia's twentieth-century Sunday closing law appellate litigation began with 
Hortenstein v. Virginia Carolina R.R. 2 The plaintiff, executor of an estate of a decedent 
fatally injured by the defendant railroad, urged the mirror-image opposite of railroads in other 
states who, as earlier discussed,3 urged they should not be liable when those they injured 
were traveling or working contrary to a closing law. The plaintiff here insisted that the 
defendant railroad was liable to his deceased's estate for the same reason: illegal operation 
on a Sunday of the locomotive injuring deceased. Had it not been so operating contrary to 
the Sunday closing law, the executor argued, the deceased could not have been fatally injured. 
Virginia's high court was unimpressed. It found plaintiff failed to show the railroad 
"did not come within the exceptions contained in the [Sunday] statute.',.. Second, it held 
that merely alleging the railroad violated the Sunday law was insufficient. To prevail, ''the 
In this thesis, not every Virginia Sunday closing law appellate decision has been 
cited but it is believed, in good faith, that all major trends are covered. 
2 102 Va. 914, 47 S.E. 996 (1904). Although this appeal was decided in 1904, the 
events litigated occurred in 1901, ibid at 915. 
3 See nn.2 through 4 and accompanying text, Chapter 6, supra. 
4 Ibid. Those exceptions allowed Sunday operations to transport "live stock, ... 
articles of such perishable nature as would be necessarily impaired in value by one day's 
delay," and "ordinary goods ... ''to make a whole train-load." Va. Code,§ 3801. 
83 
84 
same facts ... [as] if the ... negligence" had not occurred on Sunday must be proved. 5 
Procedural nuances of a sort irritating to nearly everyone except lawyers dominated 
Virginia's next twentieth-century Sunday closing law appeal, Wells v. Commonwealth. 6 
The defendant argued he could not be fined for closing law violations, due to a 1904 clos-
ing-law amendment providing in part: "From any judgment rendered under this section, the 
right of appeal shall lie ... as appeals in misdemeanor cases."7 
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, reversing defendant's conviction, first, because 
the closing law did not describe itself as a misdemeanor. Second, the court found that the 
1904 amendment's requiring closing law appeals to proceed like misdemeanor appeals "in-
dicates a conscious knowledge ... of the legislature that the accused already has a right of 
appeal" for misdemeanors. Therefore, the court held, the Sunday closing law was not a 
criminal statute, so criminal law provisions for collecting fines did not apply. The State could 
collect forfeitures at bar, the court held, only through a separate civil suit. 8 
5 Hortenstein, 102 Va. at 924, 926. 
6 107 Va. 834, 57 S.E. 588 (1907). 
7 Va. Code Ann., §3799 (1887). Amendment in 1904 Acts of Assembly at 79. 
The statute's legislative history was traced in 107 Va at 841 (Buchanan, J., disi:;enting). 
8 107 Va. at 835-836, 838. Parsing the amendment's language, Wells found its re-
ference to an appeal from any 'judgment," not any "conviction," also suggested a civil 
rather than criminal proceeding, id. Two judges dissented, swayed by the closing law's 
placement in the misdemeanor portion of the state code; and dictum calling it a misdemea-
nor, ibid at 840-842. See further discussion inn. 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text, 
infra 
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Following Wells,9 Hanger v. Commonwealth10 affirmed a trial-court termination of 
what the appellate court saw as a blatant closing law evasion, commencing shortly after the 
City of Portsmouth threatened to prosecute Hanger for his drugstore's closing law 
violations. In response, Hanger incorporated the "Crawford Social Club" where, its charter 
declared," ... questions of the day may be discussed .... and furnishing [occurs], at .. . 
all times, to its members, for pay, ... [of] refreshments ... and ... other articles .... " 
As Club president, Hanger arranged its "meetings" in his drugstore's back room. The Club 
"rented" the room from the drugstore for ninety percent of the Club's receipts from sales to 
Club members of drugstore merchandise. 
The Club opened Friday, May 11, 1906. Club. ''members" paid no dues but, instead, 
signed applications for immediate admission as Club customers of the drugstore. Club sales 
were in full swing at the drugstore, which members reached through the Club's ''rented" 
back-room, on May 13, the second Sunday after Hanger was warned of future closing law 
prosecu- tions. 11 He was convicted of violating that law by operating his Club. The supreme 
court reversed his conviction, however, holding its recent Wells decision barred criminal 
prosecu-tion for closing-law violations. It then awarded the City a seeming consolation prize 
by affirming the trial court's voiding of the Club's charter because 
9 
10 
11 
Footnotes 6-8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
107 Va. 872, 60 S.E. 67 (1908). 
Hanger, 107 Va. at 876-878. 
the charter ... and the pretended organization of a social club thereunder 
was for the fraudulent purpose of ... selling tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, soda-
water, and other soft drinks on Sunday-a privilege which an individual 
could not exercise without incurring the forfeiture prescribed in [the closing 
law].12 
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Hanger voided the charter, holding the social-club incorporation "clearly never in-
tended to confer upon the organization authority to conduct a business which, if conducted 
by an individual, would be in violation of the law. " 13 By so ruling, however, the Hanger court 
avoided the uncomfortable issue of its own role in producing a result it now saw as 
unfavorable. After all, it was the court's then-recent Wells decision, barring criminal fines for 
Sunday closing law violators,14 not Hanger's incorporating his drugstore, that barred his 
criminal prosecution. The state supreme court argua~ly scapegoated the Social Club and its 
incorporation, when the real culprit the judges could more readily find by collectively looking 
in a mirror. 15 
12 Hanger, 107 Va. at 878-879 (emphasis in original). The referenced Wells decision 
is discussed at nn. 6 - 8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
13 Ibid at 875. 
14 See n. 8, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra. 
15 Wells's interpretation of the 1904 amendment governing closing law appeals (see 
n. 8, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra) as applied in Hanger, was not compelling: 
(1) That the statute did not say it was a misdemeanor, the dissent noted, was not decisive, 
because "[ m]any statutes whose violations are admittedly misdemeanors, do not in terms so 
declare." Ibid at 841. (2) That the 1904 amendment allowed closing law appeals like "appeals 
in misdemeanor cases," ibid at 836, the dissent said, merely provided an alternate appeal 
procedure; not a negation of the statute's misdemeanor status. (3) Further, the closing law 
statute in Wells, 107 Va. at 835, described its violation as an "offence," suggesting a crimi-
nal statute. See Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary: Complete Text 
(continued ... ) 
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In both Wells and Hanger, the legislative modification of closing law appeal 
procedures led to confusion about what it meant and who it was intended to reach. Hanger 
. also illustrated the incipient boldness of Virginia businesses in challenging that law, including 
bearing the expense ofa supreme court appeal, in a case with all the earmarks of a test-case 
appeal. 
In 1908, the legislature amended the closing law, providing a violator. "shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor,"16 statutorily overturning just-discussed Wells and Hanger. The first 
appeal governed by this amendment, Ellis v. Covington, 11 construed a municipal "ordinance 
... substantially in [amendment's] language," in considering whether the defendant could sell 
soft drinks, like Coca-Cola, on Sunday. The court held ~hat defendant's municipal license for 
Sunday meal sales did not include Sunday soft drink sales, since the ordinance required 
separate licenses for each. Ellis then expressed a view whose significance would resurface, 
as will be seen, iil Francisco: That the defendant "plainly could not, though licensed, ply his 
calling of selling such drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape liability under the 
15( ••• continued) 
Reproduced Micrographically (Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1971) ("OED Micrograph") 
1:1978, defining "offence" [no. 7], in a criminal context ("breach of the law").(4) It thus 
seems Wells more nearly revealed high-court dissatisfactions with the closing law itself, ra-
ther than compelled by facts or precedent. 
16 See legislative history in Pirkey v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 713, 729, 114 S.E. 
769 (1922). Wells and Hanger are discussed, supra, nn. 6 - 15, this Chapter, and accom-
panying text. 
17 122 Va. 821, 822-823, 94 SE 154 (1917), quoting Va Acts 1916, c. 751. 
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[Sunday closing law] ordinance."18 Ellis also quoted other provisions of that amendment 
which statutorily defined delivery of"ice cream manufactured on ... other than the Sabbath," 
as a "necessity," exempt from prosecution. 19 This reflected an acceler-ating trend of 
businesses obtaining legislative dispensation redefining their activities as closing-law 
"necessities," exempt from prosecution 
(b) Virginia Closing Law Appeals After World War I Until July 1942. 
Ellis was decided on November 18, 1917. World War I hostilities ended almost 
exactly one year later (less one week), on what came to be called Armistice Day, November 
11, 1918. The war's end saw significant changes in American mores, highlighted by social 
commentator Frederick Lewis Allen: 
During the three or four years that followed ... there came a subtle change 
.... People felt it was about time to relax; to look after themselves, [not] . 
. . the world in general; and to have a good time. . . . [A] contagion of 
delighted concern over things that were exciting but didn't matter 
profoundly-was dominant .... [T]here was a very general desire ... to shake 
off the restraints of puritanism, to upset the long-standing conventions of 
decorum.20 
The changes Allen described were mirrored in Virginia closing law appeals between the 
World War I Armistice through the pre-World War II nineteen-forties. Closing law con-
cerns about work and labor earlier discussed shifted to cases dominated by that law's appli-
18 Ellis at 825, discussed further, infra, nn. 109-113, Chapter 8 and supporting text. 
19 Ellis at 823. 
20 Frederick L. Allen, The Big Change (New York, Harper & Bros, 1952), 131-133. 
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cation in the context of "hav[ing] a good time," through amusement or recreation, in the 
interwar period. The desire to "shake off ... puritanism," that Allen described, can be seen 
in these appeals, suggesting popular dissatisfaction with the Sunday closing-law which, as 
earlier discussed in the thesis was, as Allen put it, one of the "restraints of puritanism."21 
(1) Religious Herald Discussion of Rest on Sunday. 
Some Virginians, immediately after World War I, wanted work to generally cease on 
Sunday for religious reasons, but hesitated about achieving this through secular law. In 
Richmond, the weekly Religious Herald newspaper, speaking for Virginia Baptists, through 
the paper's editor Dr. D. H. Pitt, on December 16, 1920, urged the "necessity of adopting 
some guiding principles for [Sunday closing] legisla~ion," to prevent "great confusion," 
through ''unwonted activity of several Sabbath Observance Associations in favor of some sort 
of national legislation covering this question." He further declared: 
21 
Wholly apart ... from the Sabbath of the decalogue and the Lord's 
Day of the New Testament, is ... a legal day, a civil day, ofrest. This ... 
must be justified not by an ancient law given to the Jewish people, nor by the 
relaxation ... of this law in the New Testament, but by the experience of 
mankind, showing . . . [it] is in the interest of society .... When we come . 
. . to the practical question of providing by law for such a day, it falls in with 
the convenience ... of a great majority of our people to choose the first day 
of the week. ... [W]e are not to legislate on the day as a religious institution 
at all .... [I]t is the duty ofChristian[s] ... to follow the .... early Christian 
example of giving the first day of the week, . . . to worship .... [T]o carry 
out this purpose ... they should refrain from ... unnecessary labor .... As 
to the part which the State shall play[,] let it make no law concerning its civil 
rest day which interferes ... with the ... liberty of the soul in the religious 
Ibid. 
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sphere.22 
Dr. Pitt's was not the only view about closing laws among those of Sabbatarian views. As 
his editorial noted, there were "several Sabbath Observance Associations" seeking ''national 
legislation" enforcing Sunday closings. In the next weekly Religious Herald, however, he 
noted the daily Richmond News-Leader, "copies in full" his closing law editorial, and "in a 
pleasant editorial commends the tone and temper of that utterance." He further deplored 
"laxity in the observance" of Sunday as a "day ofrest" among "Christian people" and " ... 
inconsistent and unreasonable ... legislation" arising without "guiding principles."23 
H. R. Pollard, of the Richmond City Attorney's office then weighed in with a letter 
the Herald published on January 6, 1921, commend~g Dr. Pitt for stating "clearly, ... the 
22 R. H. Pitt, Editorial, "The State and the Sabbath," Religious Herald, 10, 11 (Rich-
mond, Va., December 16, 1920)(Emphasis added). 
23 Ibid, 10-11 (December 23, 1920). Such non-enforcement had been long noted. A 
speaker at the American Bar Association's 1880 annual meeting declared: "The laws for the 
observance of Sunday, though on the statute books ... , have fallen into such disuse that 
they seldom come to the attention even of our profession, except when used as a shorthand 
way of getting rid of some nuisance on Sunday which is not otherwise prohibited; or when 
pleaded by some corporation as a defense to some action for neglect of duty." Quoted in 
Sr. Candida Lund, "The Sunday Closing Cases," The Third Branch of Government: 8 Cases 
in Constitutional Politics, a Harcourt Casebook in Political Science, C. Herman Pritchett 
and Alan F. Westin, ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963 ), 277. Rigorous closing 
law enforcement appeared confined to communities organized for strict religious observance, 
such as Ocean Grove and Asbury Park, New Jersey, though even there, "after the turn of the 
[twentieth] century, [Christian] reform fervor [including for the Sunday closing law] was lost, 
but a comfortable family-oriented resort remained." Glenn Uminowicz, "Recreation in a 
Christian America: Ocean Grove and Asbury Park, New Jersey, 1869-1914," Hard at Play: 
Leisure in America, 1840-1940, Kathryn Grover, ed. (Amherst, Mass: Univ. ofMassachu-
setts Press; and Rochester, N.Y.: The Strong Museum; 1992), 8, 35. 
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principles involved." Pollard declared, like Dr. Pitt, that many Sunday closing law problems 
arose from a "misguided view that ... political authority . . . might ... enforce the Jewish 
Sabbath." Sunday, the "Lord's Day," he said, and the Jewish "Sabbath Day," were ''not even 
as near ... as first cousins."24 Pollard saw the legislating of Sunday observance as ignoring 
that this (quoting Jefferson) "destroys all religious liberty, because the civil magistrate will 
make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve ... the sentiments of others only as they 
shall square with ... his own." Pollard agreed with Dr. Pitt that government's proper role 
was to stay out of the way, to not interfere with religious observances. He quoted the 
doctor's editorial in concluding the state should "make no law concerning its civil rest day 
which interferes ... with the freest and most unrestricted exercise of the liberty of the soul" 
in religion. 25 
(2) Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth: Cave Viewing on Sunday? 
No documentation discovered suggests the Virginia Supreme Court considered the 
views of H.R. Pollard of the Richmond City Attorney's office, or Dr. Pitt, the Religious 
Herald's editor, as discussed above. Remarkably, however, their views mirrored the ap-
24 Pollard also noted: "If the strictures of the Sabbath day law (Mosaic law) is to be 
observed, a large majority of the Christian people could not attend Christian worship on the 
'Lord's Day' by reason of the inhibition against 'making journeys' on the Sabbath Day." Ibid. 
25 H.R. Pollard, "Sound Doctrine," Religious Herald (January 6, 1921), 5, variously 
quoted in this footnoted paragraph. Pollard quoted Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom," as enacted in 1786. For full text, with legislative variants from Jefferson's 
draft see The Constitution and Religion: Leading Supreme Court Cases on Church and 
State, Robert S. Alley, ed. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1999), 34, 35. 
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proach that court ultimately took in Pirkey Bros. v. Commonwealth, 26 more closely than any 
of the litigants' appellate briefs. Pirkey's congruence with Pitt's and Pollard's observations 
perhaps reflected increasing harmony of outlook by would-be Virginia opinion-makers. 27 
Pirkey also revealed the court's increasing inclination to interpret closing laws in ways 
which, in practical terms, weakened their enforceability. 
Defendant Pirkeys owned "Weyer's Cave, or Grottoes of the Shenandoah," a tourist 
attraction for which they charged admission. Heavy Sunday attendance led to church de-
mands that it close that day. When the defendants refused, prosecution ensued. The jury 
convicted them, and the stipulated issue on appeal was ''the simple question [of] whether the 
keeping open of these caverns and admission to the~ of visitors on Sunday, constitute a 
violation of the statute commonly known as the 'Sunday observance law."'28 
Defendant cave-owners contended they did not "labor" on Sunday, as the statute 
26 134 Va. 713, 114 S.E. 764 (1922). In 1919, a new state code designated the 
Sunday closing law as Va. Code Ann. §4570 (1919) at 2:1871, Code of Virginia (1919) 
(2 vols, ann.)(Richmond: David Bottom, Spt. of Public Printing, 1919)(Day of the week for 
closing amended from "Sabbath" to "Sunday"). Donald L. Dreisbach, at n. 20, Chapter, 
5, supra, theorized that ''Sabbath" in its eighteenth-century text reflected a more religious 
orientation than Jefferson's original "Sunday." However, the 1919 Code "Revisors' Notes" 
for the closing law, Code vol. 2 at 1871, stated "Sunday and Sabbath day are synonymous 
terms," ibid, citing out-of-state authority, which conflicts with Dreisbach's opinion. 
27 Reflected by, for example, Dr. Pitt's recounting the Richmond News-Leader's 
adoption of his editorial, as just-described at n. 23, this Chapter, supra, and accompany-
ing text. 
28 134 Va. at 715-716, from the trial court "certificate offacts"in Defendants' "Peti-
tion" for Appeal, Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth of Virginia, File No. 1616 [renum-
bered 6516](Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [ n. d. ]), 7. 
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proscribed, but merely allowed Sunday entry to their caves for a fee (presumably dropped into 
an unattended lockbox, since they also claimed no Sunday employees).29 Conceding no 
"absolute necessity for opening their caverns on Sunday," they insisted doing so was, ne-
vertheless, "reasonably ... necessary'' for wholesome, family diversion. 30 
Pirkey 's reliance on this ground alone reduced the likelihood of appellate success. 
The daunting task in Pirkey was supplying grounds sufficiently compelling for a reviewing 
court to overturn that virtually sacrosanct creation of the common-law, ajuryverdict.31 The 
defendants' appeal, however, contested no jury instructions, asserted no constitutional nor 
closing-law infirmity, cited no legal authority nor legal error, except vaguely asserting it was 
''reasonably necessary" for defendants' business to op~n on Sunday. Such minimal briefing 
29 Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth,"[Defendants'] Reply Brief," File No. 6516 
(Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [no date]), 2: "The defendants permit [tourists] to enter 
the caverns upon payment of an admission fee . [The warrant does not charge they] ... did 
any work [or] ... employed any servants ... on the Sabbath .... " 
30 Petition of Defendants (''plaintiff in error"] for Appeal, 2; supra n. 28, this Chap-
ter. 
31 Chesapeake & Ohio RR v. Williams, 108 Va. 689, 690, 62 S.E. 796 (1908) 
("When a case has been fairly submitted to a jury, ... it ought not to be interfered with by 
the court, unless ... the verdict is clearly not warranted by the facts proved."). Hill v. 
Commonwealth, 43 Va (2 Gratt.) 595, 603 (1845) ("[W]herethejuryandjudge ... concur 
in the weight ... [of] the evidence, it is an abuse of the appellate power ... to set aside a 
verdict . . . , because the judges of this court, from the evidence . . . , would not have 
concurred .... ") Accord, Michie 's Jurisprudence of Virginia and West Virginia 
(Charlottsville, Va: Michie, 1996), vol. 1 B, "Appeal & Error" §267, 480, 482 ("Where the 
case has been fairly submitted to a jury, their verdict will not be disturbed ... because the 
court ... would have given a different verdict.") (Pre-Pirkey cases cited). 
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usually merits scant appellate review. 32 Thus, it was remarkable the reviewing court even 
considered the Pirkey appeal, given its poor preservation of appellate issues. 
Assisting in the Commonwealth's briefing in Pirkey was "Leon M. Bazile, Second 
Assistant Attorney-General," later the trial judge in Francisco, with which this thesis began 
and to which it will return. 33 The issues he dealt with in Pirkey, as will be seen, anticipated 
questions he faced nineteen years later in Francisco. 34 
The Commonwealth's brief first noted that appellants ''failed to [cite] any authority 
in support of the contentions made," but did not urge rejecting the appeal on that ground.35 
Instead, consistent with the parties' stipulation,36 it discussed decisions in other states, af-
32 This rule was first applied two years later in Morris & Co. v. Alvis, 138 Va. 149, 
164-165, 121 S.E. 145 (1924), where appellant's "statement is made without ... discus-
sion, or citation of authority .... (W]e have no disposition to enter the field ... [when] 
counsel ... offer no reason or authority in support of their statement"). Four of the five 
concurring judges in Morris & Co. decided Pirkey. Nothing indicates their 1924 views in 
Morris & Co. were different in 1922, when they decided Pirkey. The rule is currently stated 
in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.App. 373, 389, 457 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1995) 
("Statements unsupported by argument, authority, or citations to the record do not merit 
appellate consideration.") 
33 Pirkey, 134 Va. at 715. Prior discussion of Francisco and Judge Bazile is in 
Chapter 2, supra. Subsequent discussion of both occurs in Chapter 8, infra. 
34 See nn 93-95, and accompanying text, Chapter 8, infra. 
35 
"Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," Pirkey Brothers v. Commonwealth, File 
No. 1616 [renumbered 6516] (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n. d.]), 4. Appellate 
court rejection of an issue due to appellant's failure to cite authority, per n. 32, this Chapter, 
and accompanying text, supra, the Commonwealth presumably did not urge, because there 
was not, as of the Pirkey appeal, any Virginia appellate opinion expressly so holding. 
36 See n. 28, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
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firming convictions of Sunday theater operators under statutes resembling Virginia's, 
providing ground, the Commonwealth urged, to affirm the Pirkeys' convictions.37 
The parties thus briefed on appea4 as stipulated, ''whether the keeping open of these 
caverns and admission to them of visitors on Sunday'' violated Virginia's closing law.38 The 
high court, however, had different view of the issue, revealed by its initial legal analysis: 
The constitutional validity of the statute has not been called in ques-
tion, and we do not doubt that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the 
State. Its provisions, however, cannot be enforced as a religious obser-
vance.39 
Thus the supreme court, though acknowledging the statute's constitutionality "had not been 
called into question," concentrated on that subject,40 even though not briefed by the litigants, 
for the rest ofits opinion (except less than a page in which it disposed of the appeal). 
Pirkey 's constitutional analysis then threaded the needle between recognizing the 
Christian religious preference of most Virginians while still acknowledging the force of Jef-
ferson' s religious freedom statute, by asserting that society must be "at all times according 
37 
"Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," 4, n. 35, this Chapter, supra: "Under 
statutes similar to [Virginia's], the courts of other states have held that the sale ... [of] 
tickets ... to a show ... on Sunday [violates] ... statute[s] prohibiting laboring on Sunday 
[citing cases]." 
38 See n. 28, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
39 Pirkey, 134 Va 713, 717 (emphasis added). 
40 If a reviewing court discerns an unexamined, determinative, constitutional issue on 
appea4 arguably it might pursue that issue. In Pirkey, however, this was not so, since the 
court conceded the statute was constitutional thus, presumably, not requiring analysis. For 
unarticulated reasons, however, it set forth its own constitutional interpretation in Pirkey. 
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freedom of conscience to all men."41 It quoted Perry v. Commonwealth,42 asserting Jef-
ferson's statute purged the common law "of its [religiously] intolerant spirit;" by declaring 
(quoting the statute), that "all men shall be free to profess, and by argument maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion; and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish, or enlarge their 
civil capacities."43 
The religious-freedom statute further provided, Pirkey noted, that in Virginia, reli-
gious discussion "shall be as free as the air [citizens] breathe; that the law is of no sect in 
religion; has no high priest but justice. •'44 While thus acknowledging citizen entitlement to the 
"fullest :freedom of conscience," the court noted that the Virginia Constitution urged, 
specifically, "Christian forbearance,"45 thus emphasizing the "Christian" context of the 
religious :freedom espoused. 
So Pirkey, metaphorically, carried water on both shoulders, by asserting ''there was 
a fixed purpose to sever church and State, and to give the fullest freedom of conscience," and 
also, in contrast, ''that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply 
41 Pirkey, supra, at 717. Jefferson's statute is cited in Pirkey, immediately following 
this quotation. Ibid. Note how this passage in Pirkey parallels the views of Dr. Pitt's 
editorial in the Religious Herald, quoted in the text accompanying nn. 20-25, this Chapter, 
supra. 
42 Discussed at n. 3, Chapter 1, supra. 
43 Pirkey, 134 Va at 718, quoting Perry, 44 Va. at 611 (emphasis in both opinions). 
44 Jefferson's statute, quoted in Pirkey, 134 Va. at 719. 
45 Ibid at 719 (emphasis by the Court). See Fr. Buckley's comments, n.13, Chapter 
5, supra. 
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engrafted upon Christianity.',..6 
Pirkey extracted from Justice Brewer's Holy Trinity Supreme Court decision, 47 
events demonstrating, to its satisfaction, Virginia's and the nation's Christian underpinning, 
thereby justifying Sunday closing laws.48 It declared that while the Sunday closing law "can-
not be enforced as a religious observance, the great moral force that is back of it will make 
itself felt in its enforcement in conformity with the views of that force. "49 Statutorily re-
quiring public rest" on Sunday (i.e., abstention from ordinary labor), the court found, was 
constitutionally justifiable, when not coupled with a statutory obligation to worship. 
Pirkey thus provided elaborate judicial support for the closing law, harmonized to 
existing religious preferences of Virginia's public. Titjs was a preface, however, for some 
metaphorical bombshells Pirkey then tossed, impairing future closing law prosecutions. Be-
fore reviewing these, however, attention is directed to Pirkey's remarkable assertion that 
"We cannot, however, agree with the few courts that hold that the word 'necessity' must be 
46 134 Va. at 720. The last quotation before the footnote was from from People 
v. Ruggles, 8 John. 290, 295, 5 Am. Dec. 335 (N.Y., 1811) (Kent, Chancelior).Pirkey also 
cited Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892), for its "Christian 
nation" dictum, previously discussed at nn. 29-35, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying 
text. 
47 Discussed herein at nn. 26 - 36, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. 
48 Including: (I) Virginia's 1606 colonial charter, partly granted for "propagating of 
Christian religion;" (2) the 1776 revolutionary Virginia declaration of "Christian forbear-
ance;" (3) testimonial oath "to the Almighty"; ( 4) opening "sessions of all deliberative bo-
dies" with prayer; (5) Sunday closing of courts and government offices; and (6) many 
churches promulgating Christian doctrine. Pirkey, 134 Va. at 720-721. 
49 Pirkey, 134 Va. at 720-722. 
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construed to mean the same thing now as it did when the original act was passed in 1779." 
It explained this by asserting: 
Many things that were deemed luxuries then [in the eighteenth century when 
the statute was adopted], or had no existence of all, are now deemed ne-
cessaries. For example, street railways, telegraphs and telephones. The word 
is elastic and relative and must be construed with reference to the conditions 
under which we live, and yet the elasticity must not be extended so far as to 
cover that which is not needful but simply desirable, and thereby defeat the 
manifest purpose of the statute to set apart Sunday as a day of rest from 
ordinary labor.50 
Here the 1922 Virginia Supreme Court condoned in Pirkey what is today considered politi-
cally conservative legislation, prohibiting many forms of Sunday labor, being thereby sup-
portive of a particular (Christian) religious belief. It nevertheless, surprisingly, took a position 
contrary to "original intent" analysis currently fashionable (circa 2005) among conservative 
constitutional interpreters, who typically assert 
that in order to understand the Bill of Rights today, it is necessary to attempt 
to understand the original meaning of the amendments; to understand the Bill 
of Rights the way those who wrote the amendments understood them. ... 51 
50 Pirkey, 134 Va. at 722-723, also covering the short passages from Pirkey in the 
in the immediately preceding text paragraph. As explained at n. 20(1), Chapter 5, supra, 
Virginia enacted the closing law in 1786, not 1779 as quotation here footnoted states. 
51 Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., ed., The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current 
Understanding (Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1991 ), "Introduction," 6 (em-
phasis added). Though discussing the "Bill of Rights" here, the analysis, by force of its 
own logic, applies to other writings, such as other constitutional provisions and statutes 
as well. Some commentators, such as James Madison, argued intent of those ratifying 
the text, not "those who wrote" it, ibid., determined its "original" meaning. He stated: 
"[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the ... men who formed our Constitution, 
the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the 
(continued ... ) 
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In contrast to such "original intent" analysis Pirkey, in a distinctly different approach, 
denied that ''necessity's" eighteenth century meaning, when the closing law was enacted, 
should continue to define its meaning thereafter. Instead, Pirkey posited that ''necessity's" 
meaning "changes, not only through time, but within different geographic locations in the 
jurisdiction at the same time. "52 This method of interpreting the meaning of "necessity" made 
the assessment of its contemporary definition much more difficult for prosecutors. 
Pirkey limited this expansive interpretation of the closing law's "necessity" exemption 
by cautioning against "defeat[ing] the manifest purpose of the statute to set apart Sunday as 
a day ofrest from ordinary labor." The General Assembly, however, arguably contributed to 
just such a "defeat," in practical result, by amending t~e closing law to provide, as quoted in 
Pirkey: "This section shall not apply to :furnaces, kilns, plants and other businesses of like 
51 ( ••• continued) 
Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than a dead letter, until 
[ratified] ... by the ... people, speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were 
to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond [its] face ... , we must look 
... not in the General Convention ... , but in the State Conventions, which ... ratified [it] 
.... " James Madison, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong. 1st sess., V, April 6, 1796. Quoted 
in Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framer's Constitution (New York, Macmillan, 
1988), 14. 
52 As Pirkey put it: ''No :fixed and unvarying definition of 'necessity' as used in the 
statute can be given What may be a necessity in one place may not be in another. A Sun-
day excursion to the seaside . . . in the hot summer months may be a necessity for the 
crowded population in the tenement houses of a large city, when it would not be for the 
inhabitants of a small town. Every case must stand on its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances." 134 Va. at 723. 
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kind that may be necessary to be conducted on Sunday. "s3 The businesses entitled to this new 
exemption (''furnaces, kilns, plants and other businesses of like kind") though vaguely 
described, appeared to be larger manufacturers, employing larger numbers of workers. 
This new exemption, more importantly, made it easier for these (apparently) larger 
businesses to escape the closing Jaw: only that it "may be necessary" to do Sunday business 
was required. This contrasted with the old, actual ''necessity" standard with no qualifying 
"may'' about it, still applying to those (presumably smaller) businesses not granted this new 
exemption. Like the short-lived "ice cream" exemption, s4 this new exemption illustrated how 
some businesses gained special provisions excluding them from closing Jaw prosecution, 
while others were still burdened with the older, more tjgorous, standard. 
Thus, Pirkey described or imposed measures having the practical effect of diluting 
the effectiveness of the Virginia Sunday closing laws, summarized as follows: 
[1] The legislature effectively removed what today is termed "heavy industry" from the 
closing Jaw prohibitions, quoted in the opinion. ss 
[2] The "necessity'' permitting labor on Sunday was not limited to that word's eighteenth 
s
3 
"[D]efeat[ing] the manifest purpose of the statute," Pirkey, ibid, at 723; ''furnaces, 
kilns, plants and other businesses of like kind" amendment, ibid, at 717. 
S4 Seen. 19, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
ss This was a legislative (statutory), not judicial, act. The closing law, however, was 
quoted in full in Pirkey, seen. 53, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text, rendering 
it useful to include its newly amended features that effectively weakened the closing law 
here, where Pirkey 's similar impacts are discussed. 
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century meaning, nor to the same meaning throughout the state. 
[3] The ''necessity" exemption was broadened to be "not a physical and absolute neces 
cessity, but a moral fitness of the ... labor done under the circumstances of each particular 
case."56 
[ 4] "Issues of fact arising under the statute will ... be decided by juries ... reflect[ing] 
the community opinion of moral fitness and propriety."57 What constituted ''moral fitness" 
sufficient to meet the closing law's ''necessity" exemption from prosecution, was also 
"generally a question of fact for the jury and not one of law for the court. "58 This, Pirkey 
conceded, "leaves the question unsettled, with nothing for future guidance," because 
"different juries may reach different results on the s~e evidence."59 Thus, a prosecutor's 
determining whether given activity was a ''necessity," exempt from prosecution, was 
complicated by depending upon what the court frankly conceded would be, due to its 
holding: changillg, and even contradictory, opinions of successive jury panels, not the more 
uniform results presumably obtainable from appellate precedent.60 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Pirkey, 134 Va. at 723. The court listed ten states following this rule. 
Pirkey, 134 Va. at 722. 
134 Va. at 726. 
Ibid at 726-727. 
60 Pirkey qualified the jury's ability to decide the result by directing how the court 
should rule, in place of the jury, if there was either overly sufficient or insufficient evidence: 
"[I]fthe labor is so clearly a work of necessity that no reasonable minds would differ ... ; the 
court may treat it as a matter of law" as necessity, or "if the proof is so clear that no two 
(continued ... ) 
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[5] Finally, the ''work" or "labor" the closing law was intended to prohibit, Pirkey sug-
gested, was only of those who could '"be found'-indicating a public display [of work]," 
"laboring, -suggesting manual labor, rather than intellectual ... employment; at 'any trade 
or calling'- ... seeming to exclude isolated transactions, and ... pursuits higher than manual 
occupations .... "61 Thus, certain types of employment, including those characteristically 
performed by judges and lawyers ["pursuits higher than manual occupations"], were exempt 
from closing law prosecutions, Pirkey suggested It would be a foolhardy prosecutor who 
ignored the unanimous "suggestions" of the judges in Pirkey on this point, that such 
activities were not covered by the closing law, despite the court's further assertion that, being 
dicta, these "suggestions" were not controlling. 62 
After this lengthy analysis, the Pirkey court disposed of the appeal in less than one 
paragraph of the seventeen-printed-page opinion, stating that the conviction of the Pirkeys: 
is not [based on] ... doubtful evidence, or conflicting testimony, but the ver-
dict of a jury, ... [R]easonably fair-minded men might draw different conclu-
60( ••• continued) 
reasonable minds could differ ... that no possible element of necessity ... entered into the 
... labor performed, then the court may, as a matter of law, treat the matter ... not within 
the exception." Ibid at 727, i.e., not exempt from closing law prosecution as a "necsssity." 
61 Pirkey at 728. Note that suggesting closing-law exemptions for "higher than man-
ual occupations" arguably stigmatizes manual labor and, impliedly, those performing it. 
62 After the statement here-quoted, the court then said: "But that question is not 
fore us, and we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion upon it." Ibid. Of 
course, the court had "express[ed]" its "opinion," whose force it now sought to deny. It 
would be difficult for a prosecutor to conclude the court meant other than what it had just 
said, and govern future prosecutions (or, more likely, non-prosecutions), accordingly. 
sions as to the ultimate fact to be ascertained, to-wit, was the work done one 
of necessity in view of modem conditions of life. Under these circumstances 
we do not feel warranted in interfering with the verdict of the jury. 63 
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Virginia precedent compelling this result was previously discussed herein. 64 The Pirkeys, 
based on those precedents, failed to present to the reviewing court an arguably sustainable 
theory to support overturning the jury's decision. However, Pirkey 's above-quoted assertion 
that it did ''not feel warranted in interfering with the verdict of the jury" borders on the ironic. 
The supreme court, indeed, let the verdict stand, as compelled by Virginia precedent. The 
legal underpinnings for many future closing law prosecutions, however, were effectively shot 
asunder by Pirkey's five-part limitation on them, asjust-discussed.65 
The supreme court did all this, as seen by the re~ew of Pirkey appellate briefing, with 
no input from the litigants, supposedly a hallmark of the common law system. 66 This, 
presumably, was because their appellate stipulation assumed constitutionality would not be 
controverted, and therefore was not briefed. Accordingly, the litigants addressed none of 
63 Pirkey at 730-731. Note that the court, almost surreptitiously, here broadened the 
"necessity" exemption by adding it must be considered "in vew of modem conditions of 
life," an expanded meaning certainly not self-evident from the closing law's text. 
64 Seen. 31, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
65 See nn. 55-62, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
66 See appellate briefing, attached Ex "C" & "D." The court could have raised con-
stitutional issues at oral argument. However, Pirkey states "the constitutional validity of 
the statute has not been called into question," 134 Va. at 717, suggesting that if the court 
did so, neither party challenged the constitutionality of the closing laws. This would be 
as expected, given the parties' stipulation. Seen. 28, supra, this Chapter, and accompan-
ying text. 
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court's conclusions on what it deemed the central issue in the case. 
The court's methodology in its resolution of Pirkey uncannily resembles aspects of 
United States Supreme Court ChiefJustice John Marshall's approach in his famous Marbury 
v. Madison opinion. 67 In Marbury, Marshall seemingly deferred to the executive branch of the 
federal government, but in such away as to reserve to his Court the important power of 
declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional. Both the Virginia high court in Pirkey, and the 
United States Supreme Court in Marbury, ruled, ostensibly, for the government. In Pirkey, 
this meant affirming a closing law conviction. In Marbury, it meant negating a minor judicial 
appointment of the outgoing Federalists (Marshall's own party). 
Marshall's method of denying the appointme11:t, however, was to rule that the statute 
Congress enacted to enforce it, unconstitutionally gave "original" (trial) jurisdiction to the 
Supreme Court. This, said Marshall, violated the Constitution's Article III which, he held, 
restricted the Supreme Court to appellate proceedings only (with minor exceptions not here 
applicable). Marshall, therefore, declared the statute unconstitutional, rendering it 
unenforceable to validate the Marbury judicial appointment. 
Marshall's new analytical technique, it was quickly realized, could block other legis-
lation as also supposedly "infirm." These new "infirmities" would be present, Marshall could 
contend, because this other legislation also was allegedly "inconsistent" in some way with the 
67 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Text comments that follow consider Marbury not 
only as a judicial opinion, but also as crafted for a specific political result. Pirkey also 
appears to have had the political purpose of impeding closing-law prosecutions. 
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Constitution whose interpretation he had, by his adroit opinion, arrogated to his Federalist-
controlled Supreme Court. Similarly, closing-law prosecution restrictions in the Virginia high-
court's affinnance in Pirkey could not but impede future prosecutions under that law, given 
their common-sense consequences, as just described. 68 With the undoubted familiarity of the 
Virginia high-court judges with Virginia-native Chief Justice Marshall's landmark Marbury 
decision, the similarities in dispositional techniques of the two cases seem more than 
coincidence. 
Through Marshall's opinions, commencing in Marbury, the United States Supreme 
Court-the last national bastion of the Federalist party-established itself as the final arbiter 
of the constitutionality oflegis1ation proposed by the n~w Democratic-Republican Jefferson 
administration. In Marbury, that administration could not dispute his decision, since it was 
the prevailing party: 
68 
supra. 
Because the opinion denied relief to William Marbury [the Federalist judicial 
minor-court appointee], there was no order to be enforced against the wishes 
of the executive branch of government. Hence the Jeffersonians were refused 
the opportunity to actively oppose the opinion . . . . At the same time, 
however, [the Marbury opinion] ... thoroughly entrenched judicial review . 
. . and undermined Jeffersonian insistence upon legislative supremacy. Mar-
bury v. Madison stands as one of the most artful utiliz.ations of judicial pow-
er in the history of the Supreme Court.69 
Those restrictions are discussed in the text supported by nn. 55-62, this Chapter, 
69 Herbert Alan Johnson, "John Marshall," The Justices of the United States Su-
preme Court 1789-1969: Their Lives and Opinions, Leo Friedman & Fred L. Israel, ed. 
(New York: Chelsea House & RR Bowker, 1969), 1 :285, 292 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, in Pirkey, the Virginia Supreme Court imposed limitations on future closing law 
prosecutions the Commonwealth could not challenge, because, like the Jeffersonians in 
Marbury, it prevailed on appeal. Thus, Pirkey and Marbury each allowed the respective 
government appearing before each to win the appeal, but in a way auguring ultimate loss by 
each government of the respective political war each was fighting.70 
(3) Lakeside Inn Corp. v Commonwealth: Swimming on Sunday? 
On November 16, 1922, the day the Virginia Supreme Court decided Pirkey Bros. v. 
70 To counter denials that Pirkey intended to. weaken closing law prosecutions, 
Abraham Lincoln's masterful Cooper Union response to those objecting to his similar 
assertion that [Dred] Scott v Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was politically 
motivated through a conspiracy, is a persuasive answer: 
But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we 
know have been gotten out at different times and places and by different 
workmen--[Senator] Stephan [Douglas], Franklin [Pierce] and James [Bu-
chanan] and [Chief Justice] Rodger [Taney] for instance-and when we see 
these timbers joined together, and see they exactly [are] ... adapted to their 
respective places ... we find it impossible to not believe that Stephen and 
Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, 
and all worked upon a common plan or draft .... 
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler, ed, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), 2:465-66 (emphasis in original). 
As will be seen, another case analyzed herein at nn. 71-87, this Chapter, and accompanying 
text, infra, (Lakeside Inn, Corp. v. Commonwealth) was published immediately after Pirkey 
on the same day, with Pirkey's rulings incorporated into it. The new closing law 
procedural restrictions in Pirkey were applied in Lakeside. Publishing these two cases on the 
same subject (closing laws) on the same day suggests judicial preplanning for a specific result, 
just as Lincoln described in his Cooper Union speech, supra, this footnote. 
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Commonwealth, 71 it also released a second Sunday closing law opinion, Lakeside Inn Corp. 
v. Commonwealth ("Lakeside"). 72 Lakeside held that in a jury trial, the trial judge could not 
decide whether the Inn's operating a Sunday fee-for-use swimming pool, supposedly thereby 
reducing county-wide nude bathing, was a closing-law "necessity," exempting it from 
prosecution. Instead, that was a fact question reserved for the jury. As to exactly how nude-
bathing reduction could conceivably become a closing law ''necessity," the reader can only 
be asked to read on. 
Lakeside Inn was convicted of violating the closing law by keeping "open on Sunday 
a public resort, ... for ... bathing, [with] ... employees ... selling admission tickets to the 
pool, ... [and] furnishing bathing suits ... :m Unlike ~irkey, Lakeside alleged two trial-court 
71 See nn 26 through 70, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
72 Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 696, 114 S.E. 769 (1922). Lake-
side was the "second" closing law opinion that day, even though (1) earlier (p. 696) in the 
volume than Pirkey (p. 713), and (2) earlier-appealed (January 9, 1922) than Pirkey (May 
20, 1922). (See Lakeside, 134 Va. at 699; and Defendant-Appellants' "Petition" to the 
Virgitlla Supreme Court, 3, at n. 74, infra, this Chapter.) Lakeside confirms this, 134 Va. 
at 700: "Sunday observance under the [closing law] is discussed ... in Pirkey Bros . ... , 
decided today, and much that is there said has an important bearing on the questions 
hereinafter discussed." It appears Pirkey was issued not so much on its own merits, but to 
underpin the court's Lakeside opinion, hereinafter discussed in this Chapter 7(b)(3). 
73 Lakeside, at 696 and 699. Peter Wallenstein, ''Never on Sunday: Blue Laws 
and Roanoke, Virginia," Virginia Cavalcade, 43(1994):132-143, 133, reports Lakeside's 
prosecution began shortly after "a delegation from a local church arrived on a Sunday [at the 
Inn], bought tickets, looked around, and then complained that they bad been al- lowed to 
do so." Thus, the Inn's prosecution was apparently sparked by a local church, similar to 
Pirkey, as set forth inn. 28, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
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legal errors, for which proper lower-court foundational objections had been laid 74 
The supreme court, before discussing Lakeside 's facts, explained the rule of law 
whose application theoretically could justify reversing the jury's guilty verdict: 
It is the function of the court to interpret the statute, but ... the function of 
the jury, as representative of the morality of the community, to determine ''the 
moral fitness or propriety of the work" in question. But the jury cannot 
discharge its function, unless it is permitted to hear all the pertinent and 
relevant testimony on the subject. 75 
The "pertinent and relevant testimony'' the court found improperly withheld from the 
jury, was from witnesses "examined before the judge, in the absence of the jury, so that there 
is no doubt or uncertainty as to what the testimony would have been. "76 That testimony, from 
the county sheriff and one of his deputies, s~d by the court, was that 
prior to the opening of Lakeside swimming poo4 the persons ... along ... 
streams [near] ... Roanoke city and ... roads ... near those streams, had 
been shocked ... by the great number of nude men ... and partially nude 
women who could be seen on Sundays bathing ... and undressing .... 77 
74 Also favoring the appellant was that, unlike Pirkey, in Lakeside a shorthand repor-
ter recorded all testimony, allowing appellants to present precisely on appeal the excluded 
evidence and rulings for which they sought reversal. See, Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Common-
wealth, "Petition for Writ ofError, No. 6453 (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n.d.]), 
13, naming the shorthand reporter. 
15 Lakeside, 134 Va. at 701 (emphasis added). 
76 Ibid, at 701-702. In this way, testimony excluded at trial from the jury was pre-
served. If the party offering it lost at trial and appealed its exclusion as error, the appellate 
court could review the excluded testimony. If disagreeing with the exclusion and deeming 
its exclusion significant, the appellate court could set aside the verdict for a new trial. The 
testimony then could be admitted into evidence on retrial. 
77 Ibid at 702. 
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Before the pool's opening, they testified, complaints were :frequent, with "thirty some" in-
decent exposure arrests on one Sunday alone. After the pool opened, however, this problem 
was "greatly relieved," with indecent exposure complaints "practically eliminated," reducing 
"disorder in the community." The court held: "This testimony had an important bearing on 
the moral fitness and propriety of the work in question [i.e., Lakeside's pool operation], and 
it was error [for the trial judge] to exclude it."78 
The testimonial exclusion the supreme court found to be the first error, led directly 
to its second determination of error, the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as follows, as 
the defendant, Lakeside, had unsuccessfully requested: 
[I]f ... the opening of Lakeside swimming po<;>l on Sunday ... tends to pre-
vent disorder or indecent exposure ... along the streams in Roanoke county, 
... and the work ... was morally fit ... [for] Sunday, then ... [the jury] 
may find that the work [at the pool] ... is a necessity within the meaning of 
the [Sunday closing ] statute and they should find the defendant not guilty. 79 
The supreme coUrt held "the [trial] court erred" in refusing this instruction80 and had erron-
eously instructed the jury that the evidence presented " ... no element of necessity either 
78 Lakeside at 703-704. 
79 Ibid at 705. Defendant proposed four additional instructions, which the trial court 
also rejected, which the supreme court also reversed , for the same rationale given above. 
80 Ibid. Unlike Pirkey, Lakeside "laid the foundation" as lawyers put it, for appel-
late review of this alleged error, by asking the trial judge that this testimony be heard by the 
jury with a proper instruction. The judge refused both, thus providing the basis for the 
appeal of both the evidence excluded and the jury instruction refused. 
llO 
physical or moral within ... the Virginia statute for the protection of Sunday,"81 The Su-
preme Court concluded that: ''Under the testimony actually admitted, and the instructions 
given, the jury could not have found any other verdict than the [guilty] one found"82 and, 
accordingly, reversed the instruction as well. 
The future, however, for Virginia closing law prosecutions, given the holdings in 
Pirkey and Lakeside, was decidedly cloudy: Pirkey affirmed ajury verdict that Sunday (for-
fee) cave-viewing, was not a "necessity," thus not exempted from closing law prosecution. 
In seeming contradiction, that court, the same day, reversed a conviction in Lakeside, be-
cause the trial court barred the jury from deciding if the Inn's fee-paid bathing was a ''ne-
cessity," exempting it from prosecution. To add to ~he sense of contradiction, the Inn, in 
Lakeside, whose conviction was reversed, had employees working on Sunday, while the 
convicted cave-owners in Pirkey, did not. Thus, the supreme court was prepared to accept, 
for instance, a defense victory in Lakeside 's retrial, based on the supposed "necessity" for 
the Inn's Sunday pool operation to alleviate nude bathing, simultaneously with ajury con-
viction in Pirkey criminalizing fee-paid viewing of defendants' caves. The court conceded 
that this left closing law questions the jury would decide "unsettled, with nothing for future 
81 Ibid at 706. 
82 Ibid at 701. Another seeming error, not addressed by the reviewing court, was the 
trial judge's assertion in the quoted instruction that the closing law was intended to ''pro-
tect Sunday," ibid at 706, instruction no. I. It would be more accurate to say that its con-
stitutionally sanctioned object was to protect people, by allowing them to rest on Sunday. 
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guidance," because "different juries may reach different results on the same evidence. "83 Thus, 
jury verdicts could contradict each other from an ordinary person's common-sense 
viewpoint and still be legally sustainable, according to Pirkey and Lakeside. 
The Virginia Supreme Court accomplished this result completely on its own initiative. 
There was no briefing of any substance by either party in Lakeside on this issue. 84 Lakeside 's 
final paradox, therefore, was that the Virginia high court, citing no authority, had utterly 
changed the nature of the "necessity" exempting defendants from closing law prosecution. 
The statute prohibited being, on Sunday, "found laboring at any trade or calling ... in labor 
or other business, except in household or other work of necessity or charity."85 This had 
previously been thought to mean that only the defen~t' s own ''necessity," or that of another 
83 Quoting from Pirkey, at n. 59, supra, this Chapter, and accompanying text. Re-
call that Lakeside expressly stated that Pirkey was applicable to Lakeside 's holdings, see 
n. 72, supra, and accompanying text. (Footnote references are to this Chapter.) 
84 The Commonwealth's brief treated this issue in only two sentences: "The Com-
pany [Lakeside Inn], ... undertook to bring the business conducted by it within the 
exception of the statute . by . . . show[ing] that men and women had before . . . this 
swimming pool gone in swimming in sight of the public road. We do not see how this ... 
ha[d] any bearing upon ... the necessity of conducting ... business ... on Sundays." 
Lakeside Inn Corp v Commonwealth, "Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth ... ," 
Docket No. 6453 (Richmond: Virginia Supreme Court [n.d.]), 11. The Defendant's "Pe-
tition for Writ of Error," ibid, 7, was even terser, saying only: "[T]his Court will recognize 
... , as a matter or [sic, "of'?] public policy, it is to the best interest of our state ... that 
persons . . . confined closely to hard labor, during week days ... have such places as those 
conducted by the company where on Sundays they can relax." Whether such Sunday bathing 
was in "the best interest of our state," however, appears irrelevant, when the question 
impliedly presented was how such Sunday commerce constituted a "necessity" for Lakeside, 
which was not directly, however, either asked or answered. 
85 Pirkey, 134 Va at 717 (emphasis added). 
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in immediate peril the defendant assisted, excused prosecution. This was suggested by the 
appellate court when it gave, as an example, a case that was ''plainly one of necessity, as 
where the owner lifts his ox out of the ditch."86 
Virginia's high-court ultimately did not so-interpret the statute, however. In Lake-
side, the "necessity'' was the protecting of the sensibilities of others in the community 
ostensibly "shocked" by nude bathing, not any "necessity'' of the defendant itself, nor of 
anyone else in peril defendant was attempting to assist. Further, though nude-bathing 
complaints to the sheriff supposedly abated after Lakeside's pool opened, that did not 
necessarily mean former nude bathers were now using Lakeside's pool on Sunday. Those 
bathing along roadways arguably did so because they could not afford Lakeside's Sunday 
pool charges. Thus, they would not be benefitted, nor the supposed "necessity'' of curtailing 
nude bathing expedited, by defendant's pool. Although this was arguably contradicted by the 
sheriff's testimoriy of indecent exposure arrests sharply declining after the pool opened, that 
also could be explained by a vigorous arrest policy that his testimony appeared to reveal. 
Regardless of whether Lakeside's pool-opening reduced nude bathing, beyond ques-
86 Pirkey Bros., 134 Va. at 726 (emphasis added), paraphrasing Jesus's rebuke to 
"lawyers and Pharisees" in Lk. 14:3-7 (KN) for stopping sabbath work: "Which of you shall 
have an ass or ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the sabbath 
day?" which they "could not answer." The court's paraphrase capsulized the problems of 
trying to place the closing law's secular and religious aspects in their ostensibly separate 
spheres. In the quoted passage Jesus rebukes enforcing Sabbath "rest" in an inflexible, 
legalistic, way. Some argued that was exactly what state closing laws misguidedly 
attempted. This was also inferred by Jesus's chiding ofhis pharisee and lawyer hosts, v. 3, 
ibid, about whether it was "lawful to cure people [from disease] on the sabbath, or not?" in 
response to which they, in apparent discomfort, ''were silent." 
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tion Virginia's high court introduced, in Lakeside and Pirkey, new "necessity" analysis in 
Virginia closing law litigation, whose practical effect was to make closing law enforcement 
more difficult. It also was congenial to, if not caused by, popular disinclination to continue 
following puritan strictures, generally identified as a significant post-World-War-I viewpoint 
shift, of which declining obedience to Sunday closing laws would be a prime example.87 
(4) Crook v. Commonwealth: "Play Ball" on Sunday? 
An indication of the growth of recreation in the form of spectator-viewed of 
professional sports was the increasing interwar hold of big-league baseball on the national 
psyche. 88 As a result, whether professional baseball on Sunday violated the closing laws was 
litigated in several states. In Virginia, this occurred in Crook v Commonwealth. 89 
In Crook, the entire starting teams fielded for the Richmond and Portsmouth minor-
87 See n. 20, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
88 The intensity of interest is evident in The Greatest Sports Stories from the New 
York Times, A. Danzig & P. Brandwein, eds. (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1951),"The 
Golden Age of Sport, 1920-1930," 139-355. Two of the baseball "greatest sports stories" 
in this collection were Sunday games, ibid at 147 (World Series, Cleveland v Brooklyn, Oct 
10, 1920) and ibid. at 169 (World Series, Giants v Yankees, Oct 8, 1922) (Sunday dates 
confirmed by"PerpetualCalendar," WorldAlmanac-1999, 320-321). The pressureofmajor-
league Sunday games on minor-leagues for Sunday play, like the Richmond/Portsmouth 
game in Crook, was probably significant. 
89 147 Va. 593, 136 S.E. 565, 50 A.L.R. 1043 (1927), citing opinions from three 
other states, ibid. at 598-599, illustrating the frequency of litigation on the topic. To put 
Crook in context, the 1950 version of the closing law, Va. Code Ann. §18-329 (1950) 
(identically worded to the earlier code versions studied in this thesis), was amended in 1960, 
beyond the 1942 termination date of this thesis, to exempt "sports" and" athletic events" 
from its provisions. Va. Acts 1960, c. 267 and c. 358. 
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league baseball clubs, and the umpires,90 were all arrested at a Sunday exhibition game. The 
circumstances suggest this, perhaps, was a ''test case," that is, a "lawsuit brought to establish 
an important legal principle ... ,"91 of whether Sunday professional baseball was subject to 
closing law prosecution. These circumstances included: completing the first inning before the 
arrests so that nine defendants from each team were in play and, presumably, subject to the 
statute; the clubs' not charging admission;92 the ballplayers' contract-terms resulting in the 
game being played at the "request" of the Portsmouth club president, purportedly not by 
express contract; and sentencing on conviction confined to the five-dollar-per-defendant 
statutory minimum. Thus, fines for all players and umpires totaled one hundred dollars, 
relatively nominal for the twenty defendants, even allowing for the dollar's greater 1927 
purchasing power compared to today. Yet the case was tried twice, and appealed.93 
The Crook defendants claimed immunity because they were not "laboring at a trade 
or calling" on Sunday as the closing law prohibited,94 which the court's majority brushed 
aside, easily concluding professional baseball was a ''trade or calling," based on defendant 
players receiving monthly wages for full-time play. The majority also refused to dismiss due 
90 One of these umpires, T. A. Crook, was the first-named defendant in the case cap-
tion, giving the opinion its citation-name, 147 Va. at 595. 
91 S.V. ''test case," Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.). 
92 Crook, ibid, at 596; although the norm was to charge admission, ibid at 599. 
93 Ibid at 595 Gustice court, circuit court, and appeal to supreme court). 
94 Quoting the statute set forth, ibid at 596. 
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to lack of admission charges since "[ t ]he Sunday game being more largely patronized, tended 
to stimulate the interest of the public ... and thereby increase the gate receipts ... on week 
days,"95 establishing a commercial purpose for this no-charge exhibition game.96 
The court in Crook also shelved its earlier suggestion, in Pirkey, of a "physicaV 
mental work" distinction, so that only "manual labor rather than mental," was within the 
closing-law's prohibition.97 Crook, to the contrary, concluded one "can be 'found laboring' 
at his desk, in violation of the statute, just as surely as another can be 'found laboring' upon 
his farm. "98 This ''physical/mental work" distinction, however, appeared irrelevant in Crook, 
since professional baseball has both elements, rendering this analysis dictum only.99 
Out-of-state decisions reviewed in Crook hel4 professional baseball players exempt 
from Sunday closing laws because those laws were enacted long before "professional baseball 
clubs were first organized," and "could not, ... , have [been] intended to apply to a game not 
then in existence." These other state courts, said Crook, also gave weight to legislative 
95 Ibid at 599. 
96 The dissenters, however, concluded the ballplayers were playing ''without compul-
sion and without remuneration," and were not "under contract to play exhibition games for 
their club at all," and thus were not subject to prosecution. Ibid at 606. 
97 See nn. 61 and 62, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
98 Crook, 147 Va. at 598. 
99 Seen. 30, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text for definition of"dictum." 
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failures to expressly prohibit ''the playing ofbaseball on Sunday. " 100 Virginia's experience was 
different, said Crook, because its closing law was never designated a misdemeanor until 
amended in 1908, "long after professional baseball was known and played in Virginia .... " 101 
Thus, the court held, the criminalizing of Sunday labor fairly could include professional 
baseball, along with other types of work. 
The court also noted the Virginia legislature failed to adopt a proposed closing-law 
amendment that would exempt from prosecution "outdoor sports open to the general public" 
after 2:00 PM Sunday, 102 finding this an "indication of the legislative policy ofVirginia." This 
supposedly meant, by inference, that the legislature did not favor exempting Sunday baseball 
from the closing law's prohibitions. It is difficult, ho~ever, to confirm a change in the law 
by the legislature's failure to act, as opposed to its taking action 103 In Pirkey and Lakeside, 
100 Crook, 14 7 Va at 600-601. 
101 Ibid at 601. The 1908 amendment is discussed at n. 16, Chapter 7, supra, and ac-
companying text. The reasoning of the out-of-state "baseball" cases as Crook explains them, 
appeared flawed, since many occupations, such as paper-mill machinery repair (seen. 2, 
Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text),· arose after those states adopted Sunday closing 
laws, yet no difficulty arose in enforcing such laws against them. 
102 Crook at 601. 
103 Ibid. 
(1) Abraham Lincoln, in his Cooper Union speech, denied that intent could be 
inferred from a legislative failure to act, when he argued the Constitution authorized "our 
Federal Government to control ... slavery in our Federal Territories." He documented that 
a majority of the thirty-nine signers of the original Constitution so-interpreted it when vot-
ing later in Congress for issues where such Constitutional authority was necessarily im-
plied. Critical to this discussion was his analysis of two such founding fathers who voted 
(continued ... ) 
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103( ••• continued) 
against proposed legislation that, by its terms, implicitly presumed federal authority to 
regulate slavery in the Territories. Lincoln cautioned that such votes declining to act, 
unaccompanied by explanation, could not be deemed to mean that those so-voting neces-
sarily thought congress lacked constitutional power to control slavery in the territories: 
". . . . They may have . . . so [voted] because they thought a proper division 
of local from federal authority, or some provision . . . of the Constitution 
stood in the way; or they may . . . have voted . . . on ... grounds of 
expediency. . ... It, therefore, would be unsafe to set down even the two 
who voted against the prohibition, as having done so because, in their un-
derstanding, . . . anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Govern-
ment to control as to slavery federal territory." 
Abraham Lincoln, "Address at Cooper Institute, February 27, 1860," The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln, Roy B. Basler, ed, 8 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 
1953), 3: 522, 523, 530-531 (emphasis added). 
(2) Similarly, in Crook, though the legislature rejected an amendment broad-
ening closing law exemptions, why it did so was unstated. Its reasons, paralleling Lincoln's 
argument above, could have been unrelated to excluding professional baseball from the 
closing law exemption. Thus, legislative failure to adopt the measure should not be, by 
itself, "an indication of the legislative policy in Virginia" as the Crook opinion stated. 
(a) Paradoxically, the balance of Crook proves the above argument: 
If legislative failure to act changed legislative policy on ''necessity'' then, by parity of 
reasoning, the jury in Crook should have been barred from deciding if this ball game was 
a closing law "necessity" or "charity'' exemption. This would have been because the 
Legislature's failure to adopt a "baseball" exemption supposedly showed, according to the 
Crook opinion, a contrary ''policy." 
(b) Crook, however, held the jury still should decide if this Sunday ball 
game was a closing law "necessity," and therefore free from prosecution. This meant the 
court found by implication that legislative failure to amend did not change state policy on 
"necessity." This shows the difference between inferences that can be drawn from adopting 
legislation, contrasted with inferences that cannot be drawn from failing to adopt 
legislation. Thus Crook contradicted itself, on the one hand treating legislative non-action 
as a "policy" change, while still allowing the jury to decide the issue that the legislature's 
(continued ... ) 
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as previously described 104 (reaffirmed and quoted in Crook), the Court effectively broadened 
exemptions to the Sunday closing law, and procedural changes that made closing law 
cases more difficult to prosecute. 
The Crook jury instructions scrupulously followed Pirkey and Lakeside Inn, directing 
that whether this Sunday professional baseball game was "a work of necessity within the 
meaning of the statute, is a question for the jury .... " 105 Thus, despite everything previously 
discussed, Crook boiled down to whether the jurors thought this particular Sunday profes-
sional baseball game was a "necessity" exempting it from prosecution. 106 Pirkey recognized 
this meant that "different juries may reach different re~ults on the same evidence, " 107 yet that 
was what the supreme court approved. In short, in Crook the Virginia Supreme Court, 
103( ••• continued) 
declining to act supposedly settled. 
(3) In the Francisco trial, Chapter 8, infra, the Commonwealth's attorney also made 
the same argument as that Abraham Lincoln's quoted in part (1 ), and applied in part (2)this 
footnote. See n. 120, Chapter 8, infra, and accompanying text. This shows it was not an 
interpretive rule that favored one "side" or the other in a closing law case. 
104 Supra at 26-87, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
105 Crook, 147 Va. at 602, ibid at 604: "[C]areful consideration of these instructions 
fails to disclose any error." 
106 Crook exempted amateur ballplayers from the closing law: "Unlike the professional 
player, whether he plays on Sunday or a week day, the amateur engages in the game as 
a sport and not for ... procuring a livelihood." Ibid at 599. 
107 Pirkey, 134 Va. at 726-727. 
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without overruling prior holdings, accommodated the objects of the Sunday closing law, while 
still allowing itself maneuver room to later change its thrust, if it chose to do so. 
(5) Williams v Commonwealth: Movies on Sunday? 
The problems posed by Sunday closing laws for profit-based motion picture film 
exhibitors were first considered on appeal in Virginia in Williams v Commonwealth. 108 Be-
fore reviewing Williams, however, it is useful to consider Professor Wallenstein's historical 
study of the closing law's impact, among other things, on Roanoke 1930s film exhibitions.109 
A copy of a 1935 announcement illustrated in the above-referenced Roanoke study, 
publicizing a Sunday film exhibition is attached."1'° declaring: ''NEW PRICES effective 
tomorrow SUNDAY," listing the ticket prices, fo]).owed by the statement: "Starting 
Tomorrow Sunday[,] Jean Harlow and William Powell in 'RECKLESS'." In its smallest 
type, is written: "SUNDAY PERFORMANCES by and for the benefit of Chapter 3 ofUnited 
Spanish War Veterans and Auxiliary." 111 
This "announcement" in Exhibit "A" of a Sunday movie brings to mind the court's 
discussion in Crook (though Crook's Sunday game was admission-free) that Sunday 
108 179 Va. 741; 20 S.E.2d 493 (1942). To put Crook in context, the 1950 version of 
the closing law, Va Code Ann. §18-329 (1950) (identically worded to the earlier code-
versions studied in this thesis), was amended in 1954, after the 1942 termination date of this 
thesis, to exempt "operation of motion picture theatres," from its provisions. Va. Acts 1954, 
c. 131, pp. 127-128. 
109 Wallenstein, "Never on Sunday," see n. 73, this Chapter, supra. 
110 Ibid at 138. See copy in Appendix, Exhibit "A." 
Ill Ibid. 
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attendance ''tended to stimulate the interest of the public in professional baseball and thereby 
increase the gate receipts ... on week days."112 Replacing ''professional baseball" in this 
quotation with "motion pictures," could describe Exhibit "A's" purpose as well. That is, 
Sunday attendance, Crook suggested, as a matter of practical business, promoted more 
revenue the rest of the week. 
In this context, on Sunday, March 24, 1935, Professor Wallenstein recounted 
Roanoke's American Theatre manager, S. G. Richardson, was arrested for selling tickets and 
presenting films that day, and "(a]ccused of violating a local ordinance against Sunday 
movies[.] [H]e was convicted in the Roanoke Civil and Police Court ... , [and] paid a fine 
of two dollars .... " 113 For seven weeks this scenario recurred, so that by ''mid-May, 
Richardson had been convicted ... seven different times for violating Sunday closing 
laws," all of which he appealed on the ground that "each one of the Sunday performances 
had been advertised as a benefit for "Chapter 3 of the United States Spanish War Veterans 
Auxiliary. "114 While awaiting dispositions of his appeals, Richardson continued to sell tickets, 
and exhibit Sunday films. Professor Peter Wallenstein asserted that, in 1935, "Richardson 
could have been required to post a substantial bond. But the judge decided that he had no 
112 Crook at 599. Earlier quoted, n. 95, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
113 Wallenstein, ''Never on Sunday ... ," 136-138, n. 73, this Chapter, supra. 
114 Ibid. His next six convictions were under state law, not municipal ordinance. In 
the first of these, his fine was ten dollars, the remainder incurred fines of $25 each. 
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authority to do so while the cases were under appeal. "115 
Seeming inaction followed these convictions because the judge to whom they were 
appealed "was ilL and his replacement declined ... to become embroiled in potentially 
volatile Sunday-closing cases." The Roanoke Times observed that 
[T]he unedifying spectacle [continues] of Sunday movies ruled illegal ... for 
six or seven consecutive weeks, an appeal noted to a higher court, and a ... 
theatre [sic] continuing to open ... Sunday after Sunday, with no disposition 
... to press the issue and get the thing settled definitely 116 
The deadlock was broken by a May 1935 appointment of another out-of-town judge 
for a a retrial deciding if Richardson should be acquitted under the Sunday law's "necessity'' 
or "charity" exclusions. At the retrial, ''the five-man jury could not agree . . . . Three 
members voted to convict; two disagreed. At a second trial in July, however, Richardson 
finally won acquittal."117 
llS 
116 
117 
118 
On 19July1935, the [local newspaper] editor remarked that the issue seemed 
settled,[:] "[T]heatres of ... [Roanoke] can throw open their doors on 
Sunday ... without hindrance by the authorities." Not even the pretense of 
a charitable purpose would be required .... "Sunday movies," he added, "are 
not a necessity, in the strictest sense ... , but neither are they objectionable." 
[I]fthere is ... sentiment ... in favor of them, we can see no objection ... 
Certainly the trend generally seems to be in that direction .... "'118 
These 1935 experiences of a Roanoke theater manager in the local police court and 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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appeals therefrom, as extracted from Professor Wallenstein's study, 119 suggested Sunday film 
exhibitors had possible, though not iron-clad, chances of escaping the somewhat indifferent 
local closing law prosecutions. Williams, in 1942, improved such defendants' odds by male-
ing Sunday "charitable" exemptions not only easier to claim but also, as will be seen, 
effectively reducing operational costs to businesses benefitted by them. 120 
Williams, in its essence, was a jury instruction battle. The trial judge approved 
instruction "V," concerning defendant theater manager, providing that: 
"[W]ork of charity" ... means ... that if the defendant was working at his 
usual trade or calling which . . . is not charitable, and was receiving 
consideration for such work even though the net proceeds ... ofhis labor are 
given to charity, he has violated the statute .... 121 
How the Sunday charity film exhibitions operated in Williams was explained as follows: 
[T]he [theater] owners ... arrange[d] ... with the Junior Woman's Club [to]. 
. . operate[] on Sundays, and the net proceeds above actual operating 
expense would be turned over to the Junior Woman's Club for ... charitable 
work .. ~ [to a $1,000 total, estimated to take four to six months]. 122 
Thus, in Williams, the theater-owner's charitable contribution was carried out by its agree-
119 Supra, nn. 110 through 118, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
120 Williams quoted, without discussion, new closing law exemptions, 179 Va. at 
740:"This section shall not apply . . . to the sale of gasoline , or any motor vehicle fuel, or 
any motor oil or oils." Va. Code Ann. §4570 (1919), as amended by Va. Acts 1932, c. 328 
(March 25, 1932). For the closing law reducing operating expenses, seen. 126, this Chap-
ter, infra. 
121 Williams, 179 Va. at 748-749. The supreme court ultimately rejected this instruc-
tion, seen. 124, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying test. 
122 Ibid, 743-744. 
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ment to donate to a bona fide charity the Sunday profits of the theater from film receipts (less 
operating expenses) up to $1,000. The Williams trial court jury instruction, however, provided 
that even with all those elements in place, the defendant theater manager could not avail 
himself of the "charity'' exemption from prosecution for Sunday work, unless he received no 
pay for his regular work of managing the theater on that Sunday. Defendant Williams objected 
to the trial-court instruction "V" quoted above, and unsuccessfully insisted at trial that, instead, 
the court should have given his following proposed instruction "A": 
[I]f ... [the jury] believe ... that the [theater] exhibitor[s] ... received no 
compensation from the proceeds of the Sunday ... motion pictures ... and 
. . . proceeds above actual operating expenses are . . . used for charitable 
purposes, then you should find the defendant not guilty. . . . [T]he payment 
out of gross receipts of the actual expenses .. : in operating the theatres on 
Sunday [is not] ... compensation to the exhibitor. 123 
The Virginia Supreme Court held "it was reversible error for the [trial] court to give 
instruction 'V' ... "Instead, the court ruled," instruction 'A', which the trial court refused[,] 
properly gave the true ... application of the statute to ... this case."124 The high court favored 
defendant's proposed instruction "A" over the instruction "V" the trial court gave, because: 
123 
We do not think that the test as to whether the particular work of [defen-
dant] Williams was to be found solely in his actual work itself to the exclusion 
of a consideration of the primary purpose of the exhibition; to-wit, that the 
profits will be devoted to charity .... 
[T]he record shows a plan to dedicate to charity a substantial sum . . . . Yet 
Ibid at 748. 
124 Ibid; supreme court rejected instruction ''V," as discussed at n. 121, this Chap-
ter, supra, and accompanying text. 
instruction "V" told the jury that they could not consider this fact whic~ 
according to our view, was the principal element . . . . The actual work of 
Williams [defendant manager] was purely incidental if the exhibitions were 
solely for charitable purposes, and here this has been conclusively shown 125 
124 
Williams made a significant difference in the commercial feasability of using the "charitable" 
closing law exemption, contrasted with previously-quoted instruction ''V"which the trial court 
was reversed for using. Instruction ''V" denied defendant Williams the charitable exemption 
at trial because he was paid for supervising the theaters' Sunday "charitable" film exhibition. 
Virginia's high court, in contrast, deemed his salary "purely incidental" to the film exhib-
ition's "charitable purposes" which the court held to have been "conclusively shown." 
In Williams, the supreme court effectively stood the closing law on its head. The law's 
eighteenth century purpose was providing Sunday rest by barring Sunday employment. In 
contrast, the theater employees in Williams, including the defendant manager, were working 
on Sunday, not resting. Further, the supreme court approved using charitable proceeds thereby 
obtained to pay Sunday employee wages and operating expenses for the theater, thereby 
encouraging, rather than discouraging, labor on Sunday. 
A theater using the closing law's "charitable exemption" to avoid Sunday prosecution, 
as Williams approved, potentially could make a greater profit than another theater, closed on 
Sunday, but with equal non-Sunday gross revenues and expenses, all other things being equal. 
Although such a "charitable exemption" theater must surrender its Sunday net profits to 
charity, the Williams-approved jury instruction allowed it to satisfy its Sunday operating 
125 Ibid, 748-749 (emphasis added). 
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expenses from its Sunday charity receipts. This could reduce the amount of operating ex-
penses needing to be paid from gross revenues received the other six days of the week's 
business, effectively increasing its net profit. 126 Thus, through the economic incentives 
provided by the closing law charity exemption as interpreted in Williams, that law could 
effectively act precisely contrary to its original purpose of reducing Sunday labor. Further, the 
increase of net profits in this way probably assured increases in Sunday employment. 
(c) Conclusions About Twentieth-Century Virginia Closing Law 
Appeals Before Francisco. 
Frederick Lewis Allen pinpointed World War I's aftermath as the beginning of a 
"subtle change" to "shake off the restraints ofpuritanism."127 Popular disaffection with closing 
laws would be an example of such "change."128 Virginia anti-closing-law sentiment arose 
slightly earlier. Appellant-plaintiff in Hartenstein v. Virginia Carolina RR, the first twentieth-
century Virginia closing law appeal, however, did not reflect this trend; unsuccessfully 
126 Paying Sunday contingent operating expenses from charitable proceeds, like 
wages, would not necessarily increase net profits, since these expenses would generally 
increase as revenue increased. Paying Sunday fixed operating expenses from Sunday 
charitable proceeds, however, (apportioned to meet the Sunday portion only [1/7 of the 
week] of those expenses), such as the lease (or mortgage), insurance, and property taxes, 
reduced what must otherwise be paid for those expenses from receipts of the remaining six 
days of the week (other than Sunday). In this way, net profits from overall theater 
operations were increased through partial satisfaction of theater fixed expenses from char-
itable proceeds (revenue which would not have been realized had the theater not operated 
on Sunday). 
127 See n. 20, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
128 The relation between puritanism and Sunday closing laws is discussed at nn. 4 -
18, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
126 
attempting to apply closing laws to liability arising from Sunday personal injuries.129 The 
remaining two pre-World War I-Armistice twentieth-century appeals, however, arose in an 
entertainment or leisure context. The first, Hanger v. Commonwealth ( 1908), held the closing 
law could not be avoided through an incorporated "social club" from which ''members" 
purchased Sunday cigarettes, soft drinks and sundries.130 The second, Ellis v. Covington 
(1917), seemed to state, in non-binding dictum, that a restaurant's selling Sunday meals and 
soft drinks, even with a municipal license, unconditionally violated the closing law, 131 further 
discussed hereinafter. 132 
Both Hanger and Ellis could hardly have arisen without a market-demand from 
consumers with sufficient leisure and disposable inco,ne to significantly support the contro-
verted Sunday sales, which authorities sought to interdict by closing law prosecutions. It 
appears that growth of such retail consumer markets significantly influenced closing-law 
interwar Virginia Supreme Court appeals. That court's closing-law decisions, with minor 
exceptions, reflected a greater sympathy for Sunday commerce, than providing a Sunday "day 
129 See nn. 10 - 15, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. Wells, another 
pre-World War I twentieth-century closing law case, discussed at nn. 6 - 8, this Chapter, 
supra, and accompanying text, immediately after Hortenstein, did not disclose the nature of 
its closing law offense, but treated only the propriety of the punishment imposed for the 
violation. 
130 
131 
132 
At nn. 10 - 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra 
At nn. 17 - 18, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
See nn. 109 - 113, Chapter 8 and accompanying text, infra 
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of rest" to ordinary workers, the supposed object of the closing law. 
From the World War I Armistice through the 1942 conclusion of this thesis, the 
appealed closing law cases unfolded much in accord with Frederick Lewis Allen's ob-
servations. Subtly underlying the reported decisions can be seen, from their fact statements and 
documentation supplied in the thesis outside of the case-law, manifestations of public 
disaffection with puritan strictures, such as closing laws. This was reflected in part by a pub-
lic insistence, as a practical matter, divorced from ideology, on access to entertainment and 
dining on Sunday, carried out by paid employees on that day, like any other day, contrary to 
the closing law's ostensible intent. 
As a prelude to this apparent interwar relaxatio~ of closing law enforcement, one legal 
hiccup remained. The conviction-failures in Wells and Hanger, 133 ostensibly resulted from the 
statutory text not expressly describing the statute as criminal. An explicit criminal sanction was 
inserted in the closing law by a 1908 amendment effectively overruling Wells and Hanger. 134 
Virginia's high-court, however, with fair consistency, construed the statute so as to favor 
Sunday business, as opposed to concerns for worker-rest on Sundays, the closing law's 
supposed purpose. 135 The court would not countenance crude, head-on charges against the 
closing law, like the bogus "social club"druggist S. T. Hanger clumsily and unsuccessfully 
133 
134 
135 
pra. 
At nn. 6 - 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
Seen. 16, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
See discussion of Wells at nn. 8 and 12; this Chapter, and accompanying text, su-
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attempted.136 It tended to acquiesce, however, to more subtle arguments undermining closing 
laws, reducing their effectiveness in a context which, with reasonable consistency, favored 
business efficiency and profitability. The result was a mimicing, in closing law litigation, of 
what British military historian B. H. Liddell-Hart described as the "indirect approach" in 
warfare: "Avoid a frontal attack on a long established position; instead, seek to turn it by flank 
movement, so that a more penetrable side is exposed .... " 137 It was to such "indirect 
approach"138 attacks on closing laws that the Virginia Supreme Court favorably responded. 
These supported what Virginia's appellate judges appeared to perceive, namely that Virginia 
citizens after World War I, even though their conduct exhibited dissatisfaction with the Sunday 
closing law, did not seek its outright repeal, so long ~judicial interpretations allowed them 
to remain relatively unaffected by its ostensible labor-reduction purposes. This accorded with 
what happened in Commonwealth v. Pirkey, including (1) a legislative broadening of closing 
law exemptions for manufacturers; (2) expanding the "necessity'' exemption to include matters 
that were perceived to have become necessities "in view of modem circumstances of life,"139 
but may not have been "necessities" at the closing law's eighteenth-century enactment; (3) 
allowing a closing law "necessity" that need not be "physical" or "absolute;" (4) requiring 
136 
137 
138 
139 
See nn. 10 - 15, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1955), 19-20. 
Ibid. 
Seen. 63, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
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jury-decisions for virtually all major closing law issues, rather than judicial rulings. 140 
To confirm the complete extent and all the reasons for the apparent decline in 
enforcement of the closing law during the circa 1920-1940 interwar years would require an 
examination of appellate cases, the appellate judges who presided over them and the per-
sonalities who participated in them. This would need to be undertaken with an intensity and 
scope comparable to, or exceeding, the review that will later be undertaken of the Francisco 
trial in Chapter 8 of this thesiS. 
Such an investigation should attempt to confirm or refute, the effect of the following 
as potential causes of declining closing law enforcement: First, greater self-transportation due 
to greater auto ownership. This logically led to more restaurants, sporting events and other 
Sunday activities such travel attracted, which the public wanted on Sunday, in nominal 
violation of the closing laws. Second, national prohibition's repeal in the early 1930s also 
increased the attractiveness of such roadside sales, dining and entertainment, by including sale 
of alcoholic beverages. Third, particularly in the 1930s, a desire to shake off the throes of the 
great depression, by encouraging additional employment, including on Sundays. Fourth, the 
increase of defense work, with its emphasis on twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week 
plant operation would erode, as a practical matter, strictures against Sunday work. Fifth, 
many seeking appointments as Virginia appellate judges could well have been products of 
successful business backgrounds and law firms with ingrained preferences against govern-
140 See Pirkey Bros., nn. 57 through 60, this Chapter, supra, and supporting text. 
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ment policies encouraging expansion of business and industry and for less government regu-
lation. Such lawyers, when elevated to the bench, while not necessarily dismissive of the 
closing law, perhaps tended to interpret its ambiguities in ways favoring business expansion, 
on Sunday or any other day. Some combination of the above factors likely accounted for the 
consistently permissive attitude of the public and the appellate court, concerning "necessity" 
or "charity" exceptions to Sunday closing law enforcement. 
Two other dynamic interwar closing law changes achieved by the Virginia Supreme 
Court were (I) judicial expansion of closing-law "necessity" further exempting Sunday labor 
from closing-law prosecution in Lakeside Inn Corp. v. Commonwealth; and (2) expansion of 
the "charity" prosecution-exemption of the same Iaw_in Williams v. Commonwealth. 
Lakeside permitted the exemption to apply not only to the "necessity" of the defend-
ant or those with whom defendant dealt directly, but also to the defendant's actions arguably 
affecting the world at large, whether defendant intended any "necessity'' benefit from them 
or not. This led to the Virginia high-court's remarkable ruling that the defendant Inn was 
entitled to a "necessity'' closing law exemption should the jury find, on retrial, that opening 
the Inn's pool reduced Sunday nude bathing in drainage ditches adjourning public road- ways 
in the rest of the county where the pool was located. 
In evaluating the Lakeside "necessity" issue, it is instructive to examine the Exhibit 
"B" (Appendix) photo of the Inn's pool from the Wallenstein article about Roanoke, Virginia, 
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closing law enforcement.141 In particular, the ambiance of the formally dressed patrons at the 
pool area (being serenaded by a dance orchestra, according to the Exhibit "B" picture 
caption), renders it difficult to believe the Inn's pool was planned or financed with any 
expectation of reducing Sunday nude bathing. The well-coi:Jfured Inn patrons pictured, 
furthermore, do not resemble those the Sheriff described at the Lakeside trial as arrested for 
nude swimming in drainage ditches adjoining public highways (such arrests supposedly being 
"greatly relieved" due to, the pool's opening). 142 The apparently high-society individuals in the 
photo, Exhibit "B," seemed unlikely to be those who changed their aquatic habits from 
roadside ditches to Lakeside's pool to escape indecent exposure arrests. Nevertheless, the 
high Court concluded the alleged reduction in nude Qathing created a ''necessity'' jury issue 
on whether the decrease justified operating the Inn pool on Sunday.143 
During the interwar era Virginia's high court, as Lakeside exemplified, tended to 
interpret closing-law statutory ambiguities in ways benefiting increases in Sunday commerce. 
The practical result was to diminish the closing law's intended ameliorative, Sunday labor-
reducing, purpose. This was true even though in some cases, such as Crook v. Common-
141 The photo, Exhibit "B" in the attached Appendix, is from Wallenstein, ''Never on 
Sunday," n. 73, this Chapter, supra. Exhibit "B" is at 135 in the Wallenstein article, ibid. 
The article suggests Exhibit B was taken at about the time of the 1921 Lakeside trial. 
142 See n. 78, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
143 See nn. 76-78, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. The actual decision 
was a reversal for new trial, because the trial court jury instructions mandating a verdict 
against the Inn were deemed incorrect by the higher court. 
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wealth, the appellate court affirmed a trial court verdict rejecting a "necessity'' exemption for 
Sunday professional baseball. The Virginia high court made clear in Crook that its a:ffirmance 
was because the question was entirely one of fact for the jury to decide. Under Pirkey and 
Lakeside, the Crook opinion continued, later juries could reach the opposite conclusion on the 
same facts. 
The supreme court's inclination to encourage Sunday commercial activities, thereby 
limiting the rest from labor sought by the Sunday closing law, reached something of an apo-
gee in Commonwealth v. Williams (1942). 144 There the court approved a "charity" closing law 
exemption for a Sunday motion picture where the net profit of that showing, after subtracting 
operating expenses from gross receipts, was contributed to a bona fide charity. 145 Williams 
further found the theater-manager-defendant was not subject to closing law prosecution 
merely because his salary for Sunday management of the theater was part of those expenses. 
If the ''primary purpose of the [film] exhibition" was "that the profits will be devoted to 
charity," held the court; then the manager's Sunday "actual work" and resulting salary was 
"purely incidental," for which he could not be prosecuted under the closing law. 146 
Williams offered businesses using the closing law charitable exemption an opportun 
ity for increased profits by so doing. This was because the court approved the a theater's 
144 See, generally, nn. 120 - 126, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
145 The applicable portions of the Virginia Closing Law, circa 1942 (the date of the 
Williams decision), is set forth in the text accompanying n. 6, Chapter 2, supra. 
146 See text supporting n. 125, this Chapter, supra, quoted from Williams opinion. 
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subtracting its Sunday operating expenses from its Sunday charitable gross receipts. This 
appeared to include satisfying fixed operating expenses (such as rent [or mortgage], insurance 
and property taxes), pro rata from Sunday charitable revenues, reducing the amount of such 
expenses needing satisfaction from revenues of the rest of the week. The prospective result 
was greater net profits, overall, for businesses taking advantage of the charitable exemption 
under the Sunday closing law, than if they did not operate on Sunday. The further result was 
that the Sunday closing law, instead of achieving rest for from labor on Sunday, accomplished 
the opposite, encouraging more Sunday labor on a charitable exemption basis, with potentially 
greater profits for the business taking advantage of the exemption.147 
147 See nn. 120 - 122 and 126, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
Chapter 8: REVISITING FRANCISCO v. COMMONWEALTH-THE TRIAL. 
(a) Introduction. 
The Virginia Supreme Court's 1942 Francisco v. Commonwealth opinion was al-
ready reviewed. 1 That discussion concluded by asking: (1) Why was Mr. Francisco 
prosecuted for Sunday beer sales when eighty percent of licensed county merchants also 
doing so were not? (2) Did the supreme court-ordered new trial ever occur? 
To answer these questions, Chapters 3 through 7 reviewed the development of 
Sunday closing laws. What was learned allowed clearer answers to the above questions and 
better understanding of such laws in general. This Chapter 8, besides offering answers to the 
questions posed above, also examines details of the Francisco trial not contained in the 
appellate opinion discussion in Chapter 2, and reveals how the trial re-echos major themes 
concerning Virginia closing law history. 
(b) Dramatis Personae and SimilarMatters in Francisco. 
It is useful, in analyzing the Francisco trial, to first consider the following significant 
personalities and other matters related to it. 
(1) Transcript and Court Record. 
Locating Francisco's trial-transcript was a problem. Inquiry at the Hanover County 
Circuit Court revealed a bare cupboard. Prodigious searches by the Clerk's office, disclosed 
only a few Francisco-related documents. The transcript and virtually all trial-papers could 
See, Chapter 2, herein, supra. 
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not be found.2 Fortunately, the Virginia Supreme Court retained Defendant's Petition for 
Writ of Error ("Petition") in Francisco, with transcript, brief, rulings and other papers from 
the 1941 trial and the 1942 appeal, attached to the Appendix herein as Exhibit "C,"3 along 
with the Commonwealth's responsive brief, also attached as Exhibit "D."4 
(2) The Prosecutor: Attorney Edward F. Simpkins, Jr. 
The current Hanover County Commonwealth Attorney's office explained its records 
only commenced with its professionalization after World War II. Before then, it explained, 
Hanover County Commonwealth Attorneys were in private practice, representing the Com-
monwealth along with other clients, and kept their prosecutorial files when their terms ended 
like any other client files. In any event, neither former. Commonwealth Attorney Edward P. 
Simpkins, Jr., nor his files, could be found. 
(3) The Defendant: M. G. Francisco. 
Defendant M. G. Francisco was deceased, but telephone listings with his surname led 
to his son T. Waddy Francisco, whose bitter explanation for the trial was "Joe Johnson, the 
2 No fault for this, if any there be, falls on today's Hanover County Clerk's Office. 
Deputy Clerk Thomas Carlson, criminal division head, exhaustively searched and provi-
ded every assistance, including accessing documents, photocopy facilities and work space. 
Thanks are extended to him and to the Hon. Frank D. Hargrove, Jr., County Clerk. 
3 Exhibit "C," Appendix: M. G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, [Defendant's] Peti-
tion for Writ of Error[ "Petition"] No. 2633, filed September 16, 1942 (Richmond: Vir-
ginia Supreme Court). (Page references are to the Petition page numbering itself, NOT 
the page numbering of internal documents within the Petition.) 
4 Exhibit "D," Appendix: M. G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, Brief on Behalf of 
the Commonwealth, Record No. 2633, filed October 8, 1942 (Richmond: Va. Sp. Ct.). 
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County Supervisor, didn't like my old man." Johnson, he said, attended the trial, reminding 
the Judge during recesses to "don't forget who made you a judge."5 His recollections of 
prejudice, as he saw it, of Johnson toward his father, were not "history'' for him, but a 
present, living-memory. It would be unwise scholarship, however, to solely rely on anyone's 
sixty-year old memories, no matter how sincere or intense. 
T. Waddy Francisco's description of County Supervisor Johnson, however, possibly 
explained some testimony of witness Charlie Williams in the Francisco transcript: 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Williams? 
A. I live on Mr. Johnson's place. 
Q. What Johnson? 
A. Joseph Johnson. 
Q. Joseph Johnson? 
A. Yes, sir. He is in the courtroom. 
Q. Where does Mr. Cauthorne live? 
A. Mr. Cauthorne, he lives on Mr. Johnson's place. 
Q. The same Mr. Joe Johnson who is sitting in this courtroom? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He [Cauthorne] is the other [complaining] witness in this case, isn't he? 
A. I suppose so. 
Q. Who took you up there to Mr. Francisco's [on Sunday, September 7, 1941]? 
A. Mr. Nichols. 
Q. Well, can you explain how you and Mr. Nichols and Mr. Cauthorne all 
happened to meet in Mr. Joe Johnson's house this Sunday afternoon? 
A. Well, I couldn't tell you that. I can't answer that question.6 
5 T. Waddy Francisco, telephone interview, February 22, 2002. His phone number 
was obtained from his son, Peter, an executive at Lakeside Appliances, Richmond, Va. 
6 Exhibit "C", Petition, 43-45 (emphasis added). The witnesses given name was 
shown in the transcript as "Charlie," not "Charles," ibid at 42 and 99 (transcript index). 
137 
This testimony seemed unconnected with the rest of the case, before the Francisco phone 
interview. Comparing the two, however, suggested possible connections: Williams, one of the 
Francisco Sunday beer purchasers, testified to living "on Mr. Johnson's place." Furthermore, 
Williams' testimony recites, Johnson was at the trial when he (Williams) testified, as T. 
Waddy Francisco recalled about "Supervisor Joe Johnson." The transcript did not identify this 
"Joseph Johnson" as a Supervisor, as Mr. Francisco recalled. It seemed unlikely, however, 
that another "Joseph Johnson" was at the trial, other than one well-enough known in this 
small community, that his name alone, as the cross-examiner used, was enough for all to 
know who was meant. 
The above transcript extract also suggested loJ?nson' s primacy in the prosecution: ( 1) 
Complaining witness Charlie Williams said he met the other two complaining witnesses at 
Johnson's home for the Sunday beer-buy at Francisco's; and (2) Two of these three wit-
nesses, he testified, were Johnson's tenants. Not con firmed, however, was Mr. Francisco's 
recalling Johnson as a County Supervisor. Johnson was, indeed, a County Supervisor, but not 
until December 30, 1941, over two months after the trial was over.7 He was appointed by 
none other than the Honorable Leon M. Bazile, the Francisco trial judge, as revealed in the 
Court's Order Book providing in part: 
It appearing to the Court that T. M. Thompson, the member of the Board of 
Supervisors of Hanover County from Beaver Dam District, has departed this 
life, thereby creating a vacancy in said office, IT IS ORDERED that J.Z. 
7 The transcript shows all trial proceedings occurring on one day, October 17, 1941. 
See Ex "C", Petition, 35 (trial commences) and 93 (verdict). 
Johnson, a qualified voter resident of Beaver Dam District, Hanover County, 
be and he is hereby appointed Supervisor ... to fill the unexpired term. ... 
[no signature] 
Leon M. Bazile, Judge8 
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Thus, according to the Order Book, it was not Johnson, the Supervisor who, to paraphrase 
T. Waddy Francisco, "made him [Bazile] a Judge" but rather Bazile, the Judge, who made 
Johnson a Supervisor. 
(4) The Newspapers. 
Given current (circa 2005) coverage of spectacular criminal trials by television, it is 
hard to believe that the 1941 Francisco trial, carrying a fine-only penalty, ultimately five 
dollars, was big news. Richmond's two daily papers, however, provided front-page cover-
age. The Judge's order prohibiting Sunday beer sales garnered a favorable Methodist 
Conference resolution as well, also on the front-pages.9 
8 Common Law Order Book No. 19 (June 8, 1939-November 20, 1944), Hanover 
County Cir. Ct.) (Clerk's Office, Hanover County, Virginia), December 30, 1941, p. 214 
(photo-reduced and Attached as Exhibit "E") (capitals in original). Circuit judges made 
such appointments pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 136 (1919). Section 5962, ibid, also 
required: "The proceedings of every court shall be entered in . . . the order book." Snod-
grass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 679, 687; 17 S.E. 238 (1893) held that order book entries 
need only be read in court in the term entered to be valid, meaning the Judge's failure to sign 
the appointment he made in the Order Book, Exhibit "E", did not invalidate it. 
9 Richmond News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 1: "Bazile Beer Ban Hailed by 
Methodists; .•. : The Virginia Methodist Conference meeting today in Lynchburg, adopted 
a resolution hailing 'with joy' Judge Bazile's decision that the sale of Beer on Sunday vio-
lated Virginia's blue law .... " Times-Dispatch, October 19: "Methodists Praise Ruling on 
Beer Ban," 1, identifying resolution sponsor, J. W. Moore, as president of ''Virginia Anti-
SaloonLeague." News-Leader, October 18, 1941, trialcoverageonp.12:"Bazi/e Will Hear 
Argument on Blue Law Beer Verdict." [All italic and bold-faced type in the originals.] 
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(5) The Judge: Honorable Leon M. Bazile. 
Papers of the late Leon M. Bazile, Circuit Judge (1890-1967) ("Bazile Papers"),10 
are at the Virginia Historical Society. The Society's Guide to his Papers revealed he was a 
graduateofT.C. Williams SchoolofLaw, UniversityofRichmond (1910), who after private 
practice, served in the Virginia Attorney-General's Office ( 1916-1930), interrupted by World 
War I Army duty in France. His prewar Assistant Attorney-General service intertwined with 
his courting ofVirginia Hamilton Bowcock (1889-1970). Some ofhis letters to her he called 
his "briefs," proselytizing his Baptist fiancee about his Catholic faith. None of the Papers 
show either converted the other but they married, nevertheless, on January 26, 1918.11 
10 Leon Maurice [Nelson] Bazile Papers, 1826-1967, MSSl B33483 a FA2 (Rich-
mond: Virginia Historical Society, accessioned December 14, 1987) ("Bazile Papers"). The 
Society's 18-page "Description and Guide" ("Guide") for the Papers, advised there were 
over 10,000 items, in 27 archival boxes. The Judge's other interior name, ''Nelson," 
bracketed in this footnote, ibid, is from the Guide, as is the other information in the text. 
11 Guide, 3-4, n.10, ibid. Each of the pair engaged in a seemingly complicated yet 
familiar minuet danced to one of one of the world's oldest tunes. He was verbally aggres-
sive, and she, perhaps more effectively, seemed to yield, thereby raising his intensity. Thus, 
he wrote what he called a July 24, 1917, "Reply Brief' letter stating he realized she had 
"determined never to marry." He "never loved anyone as I do you and I shall never love 
anyone else in the same way." He described his courtship, however, in military metaphor: 
"Battles have never been won by giving up. I am sure the problem can be solved if we will 
but try." She responded in a way that could hardly fail to increase his ardor: "I do wish I 
could help you in some way just now when you need me most, but instead of being a help to 
you I am only another Problem to cause you worry and anxiety. If our Problem were only 
solved I might- but I won't tell you any more until it is solved or it would be useless. Leon, 
I am sure we can never find a 'common ground' unless you could accept my faith, but I 
would not and could not ask you to do that unless you could truly believe in the Baptist 
Doctrines and be as sincere a Christian as you are now. Try to forget all about me, I often 
wonder why God brought us together, perhaps some day [I] will understand [dated July 31, 
(continued ... ) 
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After his Attorney-General service, Bazile practiced law privately for eleven years 
(1930-1941) including four years in Virginia's General Assembly (1936-1940). Appointed 
circuit judge in 1941, he served until illness forced a 1965 retirement, followed by his death 
in 1967.12 He and his wife had one child, daughter Virginia Lee Bazile (1920-1972), who 
married Dr. John Edward Miller (1944). Her Estate donated the Papers to the Society.13 
The deaths of the Judge (1967), his wife (1970) and daughter (1972), impeded loca-
tion ofrelations or acquaintances. Many of his Papers were routine congratulatory letters to 
or from him for achievements, promotions or the like, revealing few personal qualities of 
writer or recipient. There were, however, exceptions. Between his religious "briefs" to his 
future bride (1916-1918),14 were his letters to her car~fully analyzing prohibition influences 
on vote-getting.15 This would be significant in Francisco, where the defendant was prosecuted 
11( ••• continued) 
1917, by an archivist]." Bazile Papers, Box 3 (underlining in original). Despite their mutual 
protestations, within six months they were married, with no evidence either had converted the 
other. 
12 
13 
14 
Ibid, 4. 
Ibid, 1, 6. 
Already discussed, at n. 11, this Chapter, supra and accompanying text. 
15 An example is, Bazile Papers, n. 10, this Chapter, supra (box 2, July 21, 1917, 
letter, Leon M. Bazile to Virginia Hamilton Bowcock, his future bride, providing in part: 
The leaders - not the rank and file - of the Prohibition element are for the 
most part identified with the 'machine' ... giving their support to Mr. El-
lyson who is the candidate of that faction. Mr. Pollard having been a more 
staunch prohibitionor [sic] than Mr. Ellyson, these dry leaders have been 
(continued ... ) 
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only for Sunday beer sales. 16 Such a beer-only prosecution in Francisco may have been the 
Judge's suggestion, since testimony had him instructing a witness, before prosecution began, 
on how ''to bring evidence in court."17 
Other correspondence was more fruitful in assessing personal character. For exam-
ple in 1941, while a judge, Leon Bazile wrote the U. S. Attorney General (attached Exhibit 
"F"18), accusing labor leader John L. Lewis of treason and demanding his indictment. On 
15( ••• continued) 
somewhat embarrassed as to how they should proceed. For some time Dr. 
Cannon has had his friends write letters to Mr. Pollard and the press sug-
gesting that Mr. Pollard withdraw as the chance of two dry men beating one 
wet candidate was not very bright. 
This showed Bazile's deep interest in "dry" and ''wet" voting dynamics, presumably equally 
so in 1941, when prohibition sentiments were still important in Virginia politics. This 
importance was evidenced by prominent press coverage given the Methodist resolution 
praising the Judge's Francisco ruling banning Sunday sales on prohibition grounds. Seen. 
9, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
16 
''No complaint was lodged against him [Francisco] for the sale of articles other 
than beer." Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. at 374. So he was not prosecuted for the 
"cigarettes and tobacco, soft drinks and ice cream," ibid, 373-374, he also sold on Sunday. 
17 Ex "C", Petition, 38: "I was directed by the Honorable Judge and the Com-
monwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court." (Complaining witness Nichols.). The 
prosecutor spoke of Nichols discussing ''with the Judge and me ... what you could do to 
bring a prosecution ... ," 39, ibid. 
18 Exhibit "F", Bazile Papers, November 20, 1941 (n.10, this Chapter, supra, box 
10, photo-reduced, handwritten copy on 8 Yz x 14-inch, lined paper, typescript attached for 
easier reading [Exhibit "F-1", immediately after Ex "F"]). David M. Kennedy wrote: 
"John L. Lewis ... demonstrated his continuing capacity for mischief in 1941 when he called 
his United Mine Workers out on a nationwide strike .... After a long, acrimonious standoff, 
amid mounting wintertime coal shortages and bitter denunciations of Lewis as a traitor and 
saboteur, the miners finally went back to work --on December 7, 1941." Freedom from 
(continued ... ) 
142 
Exhibit F's left margin, he wrote, "This was sent to the Attorney General of the United 
States ... , but he did not have the courtesy to acknowledge it." 
About fifteen years after Francisco, Judge Bazile achieved a kind of celebrity due to 
the Supreme Court's Loving v Virginia opinion, 19 where an interracial married couple was 
charged in his court with violating Virginia's miscegenation laws. Upon their guilty plea, he 
sentenced them to a year in jail, suspended for 25 years on condition they leave Virginia for 
that 25-year period. Although the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed (with modifications not 
here relevant), the couple obtained review by the United States Supreme Court, challenging 
Virginia's miscegenation laws on equal-protection and due process grounds. In holding the 
laws unconstitutional, Chief Justice Warren quoted t~e ''trial judge" as follows: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he 
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his 
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. 20 
Judge Bazile was not named by Chief Justice Warren, but was listed as the trial judge in the 
Virginia Supreme Court opinion for which U.S. Supreme Court review was granted, mean-
18( ••• continued) 
Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, vol. 9, The Oxford History 
of the United States, C. Vann Woodward, gen. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), 639. 
Thus, without accepting or defending the Judge's 1941 view of Lewis as a traitor, his was 
far from an isolated opinion at the time. 
19 388 U.S. 1 (1967), reversing, sub nom, Commonwealth v. Loving, 206 Va. 924; 
147 S.E. 2d 78 (1966). 
20 388 U.S. at 3. 
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ing he was the ''trial judge" whose opinion Justice Warren quoted in Loving v Virginia. 21 
(6) The Defense Counsel: George Haw and Andrew Ellis. 
Little was discovered about defense counsel, except that one of Judge Basile's former 
Virginia legislative colleagues, Albert G. Boschen, Delegate from Richmond, wrote him a 
December 28, 1941 letter stating, in part (attached Exhibit "G"): 
While talking to the Governor, your name came up and I told him that he did 
one big act when he appointed you as Judge. He told me that he had splendid 
reports of your good work. I did not know that Geo Haw and Andrew Ellis 
opposed you but I understand it now. 22 
Thus "Geo Haw and Andrew Ellis" purportedly "opposed" Bazile, ambiguously meaning 
either "opposed" his judicial appointment or "opposed" him in Francisco. Either interpre-
tation suggests an antagonism between them which the trial, in some way, continued. 23 
21 This is also confirmed (1) in 206 Va. at 924, listing Hon. Leon M. Bazile as trial 
judge (seen. 21, ibid); and (2) in Record [on appeal], Commonwealth v. Loving, No. 6163 
(Richmond: Virginia Sp. Ct., filed November 4, 1965) (Univ. of Richmond Law Library 
duplicates official filings since 190 Va, including bound filings for 260 Va. pp. 899-944 
[within which is Loving's Record, containing the Judge's Opinion at Record, 8-14, supra, 
identifying Bazile as author, with the passage quoted in the U.S. Supreme Court Loving 
Opinion, 388 U.S. at 3 [Record, 14, ibid]). Loving arose in Caroline County, not Hanover 
County where Francisco was tried. However, both counties are in Virginia's Fifteenth 
Circuit Court, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (2004) (Matthew Bender/ Lexus-
Nexus ), 29, as presumably was true in 1965 when Loving was decided, meaning the same 
judges presided in both counties. 
22 Albert 0. Boschen, Delegate, Virginia House of Delegates, December 28, 1941 
letter to Hon. Leon M. Basile (emphasis added). Bazile Papers, Exhibit "G". 
23 Seen. 101, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying text, as an example of the anta-
gomsm. 
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(7) The Sheriff: Sumpter Priddy 
Sumpter Priddy was Hanover County Sheriff during the Francisco trial. Although he 
has passed o~ his so~ identically named, though advanced in years, was very much alive and 
agreed to be interviewed about what his father told him about the Francisco prosecution. The 
son's answer to the first question posed about Francisco at the end of Chapter 2 (i.e., Why 
Francisco was singled out for prosecution) is in Attached Exhibit "H", undersigned's April 
16, 2002, letter to him, based on information he supplied and countersigned to confirm its 
accuracy, providing in part: 
You advised that your father had told you, ... this case was brought . . . be-
cause a County Commissioner, Joseph Johnson ... , from the Beaverdam 
area . . . had a daughter who operated a store similar to the one allegedly 
operated illegally by Mr. Francisco on a Sunday. The inference was ... that 
Johnson hoped thereby that his daughter could gain a commercial advantage 
over Francisco, due to the latter's having been prosecuted in this case for 
operating his business on Sunday in violation of the ... Closing Law .... 24 
Of course the younger Priddy's confirming signature on Exhibit "H" proves, at most, his 
understanding, of what his father, the Sheriff, told him about Francisco. Further, Joseph 
Johnson's views are unkno~ since neither he nor his relations or acquaintances could be 
located, cutting off the potentially quite different views of Francisco and his participation in 
them, that might have been thereby obtained. 
What favors reliance on Exhibit "H's" story is that it appears to have been the 
24 Exhibit "H" (extract), in Appendix. Attached Exhibit "H" errata: Priddy's ad-
address is on "Goshen" not "Ocean" Road (phonetic error due to telephone transmission); 
Joseph Johnson was County "Supervisor" not "Commissioner." Finally, Mr. Priddy dated 
his signature "4/16/2001" rather than the correct "4/16/2002," see Ex "H". 
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Sheriff's confidential and uncompelled disclosure to his son. Further, his story suggested he 
yielded to a County Supervisor's pressure. This also encourages reliance, in that a speaker's 
uncorroborated admission arguably unfavorable to himself, is more credible than, in contrast, 
an uncorroborated admission favorable to himself 
There also were several then-contemporary, though partial and indirect, corrob-
orations ofExhibit "H". One of these was on October 18, 1941, the day after trial, when the 
Times-Dispatch reported that Sheriff Priddy declared a closing law moratorium:25 
While no official announcement was made, Sheriff Sumpter Priddy 
said he did not plan to make any arrests for Sunder [sic, Sunday?] beer selling 
until the [Francisco] case is finally decided by the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals. Judge Bazile and the Commonwealth's Attorney Simpkins indicated 
their approval of this procedure.26 
The Sheriff's announced intent to not enforce closing laws seems unusual. Imagine, 
for instance, if he had refused to make arrests consistent with local judicial rulings on rob-
bery or murder until an appeals court approved. Public protests would have been expected. 
In any event, he cared not for this prosecution, either for reasons his son advised in under-
signed's letter, Exhibit "H", or those inferred from the transcript, Exhibit "C". 
Whatever the Sheriff's motives, the above-quoted Times-Dispatch October 18, 1941 
article amounted to a challenge to the other officials named to oppose his abstention from 
25 The second corroboration was his trial testimony; see nn. 79-80, this Chapter, in-
fra, and accompanying text. 
26 Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of 
Sunday Beer As Blue Law Violation; Judge Bazile's Decision Based Upon 24-Year-Old 
Court Ruling," 1, footnoted quotation in text is at continuation page 10. 
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closing law prosecutions. The Sheri.fr was refusing to enforce the closing law as the pro-
secutor had urged it was written and as the Judge had ruled it meant. This constituted unu-
sual defiance his part. Yet the article closed stating that prosecutor and judge "indicat[ ed] 
their approval ... ," acquiescing to his seeming defiance, also unusual. 
The Times-Dispatch provocatively recycled the story the next day, October 19, 1941, 
as if daring the Judge and prosecutor to contest it: 
Sheriff Priddy was quoted in yesterday's Times-Dispatch as saying he 
did not plan to make any arrests for Sunday beer selling until the Francisco 
case is finally decided by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, and it was 
considered probable that the sherifrs promise had been taken by the licen-
sees as an assurance that they can remain open. No licensee will be arrested 
for selling beer on Sunday unless some citizen swears out a warrant such as 
was done in the Francisco case[,] the sheriff explained.27 
The Sheriff, accordingly, had slightly modified his stand: He now would arrest licensees who 
were alleged closing-law violators only if a citizen "swears out a warrant."28 That is, he will 
not allow closing law prosecutions based on observations by deputies during regular duty, as 
he did concerning other law violations, unless Francisco is affirmed. 
Thus, late Sheriff Priddy suggested to his son that he was pressured by Hanover 
County Supervisor Johnson to prosecute Francisco to competitively advantage Johnson's 
daughter. Of the three complaining witnesses who made the Francisco Sunday beer pur-
chases two met at Johnson's to do so (picking up the third on the way), and two were John-
27 Times-Dispatch, October 19, 1941, "Methodists Praise Ruling on Beer Ban," 16. 
28 That is, the same way the Francisco prosecution was filed. 
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son's tenants. 29 These facts support viewing Johnson as Francisco 's initiator, plus his 
attending the trial. Conversely, the Sheriff's reluctance to rely on Francisco, as reported by 
contemporary newspaper accounts, supported his son's recollections in Exhibit "C", of his 
father's lukewarm view of the Francisco prosecution. 
The trial transcript (Exhibit "C"), however, also allowed an inference that the 
Francisco prosecution was motivated by a variant of Exhibit "H" (undersigned's letter), as 
brought out by complaining witness William Nichols' testimony:30 
Q. You operate a store yourself, don't you? 
A. We operate a grocery store. 
Q. About how far from Mr. Francisco? 
A. About three miles, around three miles to the west. 
Q. You are a competitor, are you? 
A. Sir? 
Q. You are a competitor? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Not a competitor within three miles of him? 
A. My wife operates the store in her own name. I haven't anything to do 
with it. 
Q. Well, your wife is a competitor of Mr. Francisco's? 
A. No, sir, we don't consider it that way. That has been our home down 
there for about 26 years, a long time before he [Francisco] came to 
Hanover County. 31 
Nichols, despite denying his wife's being Francisco's "competitor," testified to facts 
showing the contrary: His wife solely owned a store only three miles from Francisco's. He 
29 On this point, however, seen. 57, this Chapter, infra, and accompanying text. 
30 The Francisco complaining witnesses were Charlie Williams, Conway Cauthorne 
and William J. Nichols, "Indictment for Misdemeanor," Ex "C", Petition, 20. 
31 Ibid, 40. 
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was a County "special officer"32 overseeing Sunday beer purchases at Francisco's as a prelude 
+to prosecution. 33 He was logically motivated to economically advantage his wife as a store 
owner not open on Sunday by collecting evidence for this prosecution against a competing 
store owner (Francisco) who was open and selling beer on Sunday.34 
The parallels, described above, of the Exhibit "C" transcript story with Sheriff 
Priddy' s account in Exhibit "H", also expose differences: Both describe Francisco arising to 
benefit a competing female store owner. If she was Johnson's daughter, however, as the 
Sheriff said, that would have been widely known and would have dominated the trial testi-
mony, which it did not (there was no mention of any such relation); just as Johnson's relation 
to this prosecution, in contrast, did dominate earlier-quoted, cross-examination. 35 
Thus, two plausible and somewhat similar stories36 emerge of Francisco's origin, 
neither completely consistent with the other, and each with documentary support. Under 
such circumstances, eminent constitutional historians warn: "The German historian Leopold 
32 
33 
34 
Ibid, 36. 
Ibid, 38. 
Ibid, 36. 
35 See n. 6, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. Although Johnson was not 
County Supervisor during Francisco (see n.9, this Chapter, and accompanying text), he 
still may have had political influence, leading to his Francisco involvement before appointed 
Supervisor. It could well be that those recalling the trial, because of Johnson's local 
prominence, incorrectly remembered his being a Supervisor before Francisco. 
36 The word "stories" here is not used to denigrate, nor to imply that "story" means 
fiction. "Story" here-means a coherent account based on reasonably reliable information. 
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von Rank.e's exhortation ... to determine 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' ('how it actually was') 
is noble and human, but at times futile."37 Attempts here to learn "how it actually was" about 
Francisco's origin may not quite be "futile," but they do present difficulties, with no clear ba-
sis to prefer one story over the other. 
It seems reasonable, however, to consider common threads in both stories as the 
closest approximation of "how it actually was." Thus: both the transcript (Ex "C") and 
Sumpter Priddy's recollections (Ex "H") described Francisco's store competing with a 
female-owned store as causing the prosecution. Both stories also involved County Super vi-
sor Joseph Johnson. His involvement could be, in Priddy's version (Ex "H"), because he 
was the female store owner's father; or because, in the transcript version (Ex "C"), as an 
important County political figure, he was consulted due to complaining witness Nichols, the 
female store owner's husband, seeking Francisco's prosecution. 38 Both versions have common 
themes of commercial competition as a prosecution motive and Johnson's importance in 
bringing that motive to fruition. This is probably as close as one can come, from the record 
here assembled, to the "real" reasons for the Francisco prosecution. 
What is noteworthy about commercial-competition as Francisco's supposed moti-
vation, is not its novelty, but its frequency. Two of four landmark closing-law cases col-
37 Henry J. Abraham & Barbara A. Perry, Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and 
Liberties in the United States, 6th ed (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 42. 
38 Francisco does not show Nichols speaking to Johnson, but Johnson certainly 
seemed involved, given the complainants were his tenants and his home was their rendez-
vous for the beer purchases (See nn. 6 - 7, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text). 
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lectively reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in 1961, Gallagher v Crown Kosher 
Super Market, Inc, 39 and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v McGinley,40 reflected 
commercial rivalry similar to Francisco, 41 according to Sister Candida Lund's research. 
In Crown Kosher Super Market,42 she found, a grocery chain, following its stock-
holders' religious convictions, closed its Springfield, Massachusetts, store at sundown Fri-
day, reopening on Sunday, thus violating the state closing law. In Crown, Springfield police 
chief/plaintiff Gallagher, refused "reporters the names of those" seeking arrests of Crown's 
employees. "The answer ... could be found in the small kosher butchers," who "wished to 
39 
40 
366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
41 The Supreme Court reviewed, besides Crown Kosher and Two Guys from Har-
rison-Allentown, the cases Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In all four the Court held Sunday closing laws enforceable 
for the secular purpose of affording workers a weekly rest day, regardless of religious 
persuasion, and thus did not offend US Const, amend. XIV. Justice Frankfurter wrote an 
encyclopedic concurring opinion in McGowan, 366 U.S. 420 at 459-581 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring, joined by Harlan, J.) historically reviewing Sunday closing laws in Britain and 
the United States, citing Francisco as one of "the large majority" state court examples of 
considering closing laws as "having either an exclusively secular function or ... accomodat-
ing both ... civil and secular needs .... ,"ibid at 497, n. 82. Justice Frankfurter also re-
viewed closing laws in Roman times, and in England, ibid at 470-483, and English colonial 
times in Virginia, ibid at 484-486, 492-496, 549 (Part of Appendix I of his opinion) and then-
current Virginia closing law provisions (part of Appendix II of his opinion). 
42 Sister Candida Lund, "Religion and Commerce, The Sunday Closing Cases," The 
Third Branch of Government: 8 Cases in Constitutional Politics, a Harcourt Casebook 
in Political Science, C. Herman Pritchett & Alan F. Westin, ed. (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1963), 277. Lund examined court records and briefs, interviewed police 
and counsel, and reviewed newspaper files, supported by an American Association of 
University Women fellowship, ibid. at 308, for material not in the appellate opinions. 
151 
work a five-day week but were disturbed by the competitive advantage that Crown Market had 
through . . . staying open on Sunday . . . . " She discovered they were the complainants 
against their Crown co-religionists.43 
The Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown closing law prosecution, Sister Lund dis-
covered, was "[s]imilar to Crown in ... economic motivation .... " Two Guys aggres-
sively price-competed through "low rental, ... large ... parking lot, centralized warehous-
ing ... , computer inventory ... , volume purchasing, low advertising, spare decor, ... 
almost total absence of ... service," and doing Sunday business. The Hess department store 
chain threatened Sunday sales also, she said, but it became "apparent that Hess took this step 
to give [the] District Attorney ... opportunity to act." When he, in response, announced he 
would prosecute, Hess advertising made its sentiment clear: "Our Hats Are Off to District 
Attorney Paul McGinley for his Dynamic Action Against Sunday Selling. "44 
The Connecticut Court of Common Pleas similarly discovered patterns of private-
citizen complaints initiating closing law prosecutions for commercial advantage. On this basis, 
it held its state's closing law unconstitutional because, said the court, public prosecutors 
became "tools of the private interest of the complainants and thus prostitute the State's law 
enforcement power to the service of selfish private goals." This unfavorably and unconsti-
tutionally contrasted, the court found, with Connecticut's enforcing the rest of the criminal 
43 
44 
Ibid at 278-279. 
Ibid at 283-285. 
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code almost exclusively through police investigations and complainants.45 
(8) Summary of "Dramatis Personae." 
Closer examination of underlying facts provides a basis to conclude Mr. Francisco was 
prosecuted for business competition reasons: A nearby competing female store-owner store 
lost business to Francisco's store because he operated on Sunday while she did not. She sought 
to disadvantage Francisco by having him prosecuted, with her husband, Nichols, as chief 
prosecution witness, the police officer in charge. 
The prosecution may have originated because the store owner was the daughter of a 
politically powerful Hanover County personality, Joseph Johnson. Alternatively, it may sim-
ply be that Johnson, along with the Judge and prosecutor, all major county figures, were 
involved through a business-competitor's seeking prosecution. The prosecution's use of 
Johnson's tenants as complaining witnesses, his home as a rendezvous for their travel, and 
his attendance at trial, all support his involvement. A limited sampling of closing law appeals 
before the United States Supreme Court and in Connecticut suggests such closing law 
motives were the norm, rather than the exception. 
Judge Leon M. Bazile emerged as a principal Francisco figure. He had long Attorney 
45 Connecticut [(State of)] v. Anonymous (1976-7), 33 Conn. Supp. 56; 364 A. 2d 
244, 246 (Common Pleas, 1976 ). The quotation in the footnoted paragraph is from the 
dissent in Playtogs Factory Outlet, Inc v. County of Orange, 57 App. Div. 772 ; 379 N. Y.S. 
2d 859, 867 (1976), a New York closing law case, incorporated into Connecticut's 
Anonymous (197 6-7) as part of the court's opinion. The Connecticut Supreme Court 
declared that Anonymous (1976-7), supra, forced the legislature to revise Connecticut's 
closing law. Caldor's Inc v Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304; 417 A. 2d 343, 346 (1979). 
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General's Office experience briefing closing law cases, some of which were pivotal in 
Francisco. 46 He gained political influence by his General Assembly service, presumably aiding 
in his judicial appointment. 47 
The Judge's inclination to push his own strongly held views was evidenced early in 
his career by his vigorous "battles" to convert his fiancee to his Catholic faith.48 In his midlife 
it was again suggested by his 1941 letter to the U.S. Attorney General demanding prosecution 
of labor leader John L. Lewis. Near the end ofhis life, his strongly-held racial attitudes caused 
implicit comment in a United States Supreme Court opinion. His personality, however, was 
illuminated most keenly by his marginal note on his 1941 draft letter to the U.S. Attorney 
General, complaining of the latter's lack of"courtesy to acknowledge it,"49 revealing a pride 
of status which he strongly felt others should acknowledge. 
The Judge's letters to his fiancee analyzing 1916-18 prohibition voting illustrated his 
political interest. 50 He plausibly saw opportunity to enhance his status with the prohibition 
movement, still powerful in 1941 Virginia, by encouraging the Francisco prosecution. His 
efforts to induce filing the case were confirmed by trial testimony. High local interest in 
46 See Pirkey, 134 Va. at 715; and Lakeside, 134 Va. at 699, where Leon Bazile's 
service as an Assistant Attorney General in each case was noted. 
47 This can be inferred from attached Ex "G", Delegate Albert 0. Boschen's letter. 
48 Seen. 11, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
49 See n. 18, this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra, following that footnote. 
50 Example extracted inn. 15, this Chapter, supra. 
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prohibition was evidenced by Richmond papers first-page coverage of the Methodist 
Conference Resolution, commending the Judge's ruling against Sunday beer sales. 
Some other persons turned out to be more important than might be expected: 
• The Francisco defense counsels were apparent political opponents of the 
Judge. Comments from the Judge's former legislative colleague suggests that their prior 
conflicts, at least partly, accounted for their representing Mr. Francisco; 
• Sheriff Sumpter Priddy effectively stopped the use of the Judge's Francisco 
closing law ruling. Richmond papers at first were replete with breathless intimations of 
Francisco's larger significance in dramatically decreasing Sunday sales.51 The Sheriff halted 
such speculation, however, by deferring such prosecutions pending Francisco's appeal. Press 
coverage of his decision was written so as to challenge the Judge and Commonwealth's 
attorney to oppose his prosecution moratorium, which they declined to do. Ultimately, of 
course, Francisco's supposed wider enforcing of the closing law came to nothing with the 
Virginia Supreme Court's reversal of the trial verdict. The high court ruled that whether 
51 Examples: (1) Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, front-page, by Over-
ton Jones: "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of Sunday Beer As Blue Law Violation . .. ,"(a) 
"Every ABC licensee in ... Virginia who sells beer on Sunday is guilty of violating the so-
called Blue Law, according to a far-reaching verdict in a Hanover County Circuit Court case 
... ;" and (b) "[T]he ruling has almost unlimited ramifications since it would appear that 
hundreds of articles now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue law [Emphasis in 
original]." (2) Richmond News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 1, coverage of Methodist 
Convention resolution commending the Judge's Francisco ruling, emphasizing the ruling's 
presumed effect on the entire state, 12: "Bazile Will Hear Argument On Blue Law Beer 
Verdict; •••• Questions of the legality of Sunday sales of beer and wine, ... in a case that 
may be State-wide in its decision [sic], is [sic] still undecided today, while indications point 
to an eventual ruling by the Virginia Court of Appeals ..... [emphasis in original]." 
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Francisco's beer sales were "necessary" on Sunday, and thus exempt from a closing law 
prosecution, was the jury's decision, not the Judge's. 52 Prior to the Virginia Supreme 
Court's year-later Francisco's decision reversing Judge Bazile's prohibition of Sunday beer 
sales, however, it was Sheriff Priddy's refusal to follow the Judge's ruling, as much as 
anything else, that drew from that ruling its sting of Sunday labor prohibition. 
(c) More Detailed Examination of Witness Testimony. 
In this Chapter 9(c), testimony of various witnesses is further reviewed, to develop 
major themes herein. 
(1) Witness William J. Nichols. 
Nichols, the first prosecution witness, was a Cpunty "special officer" for closing law 
prosecutions.53 After testifying he saw Francisco selling beer to the other complaining 
witnesses on Sunday, Nichols was asked "at whose direction" he went to Francisco's for 
"securing evidence." He answered he ''was directed by the Honorable Judge [Bazile] and the 
Commonwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court."54 Accordingly, the Judge, far from 
being a neutral adjudicator, was important in initiating the prosecution, and telling witness 
52 Seen. 13, Chapter 2, and supporting text, supra. 
53 Attached Exhibit "C", Petition, 36. 
54 Ibid, 38. He reconfirmed this to the prosecutor: "Q. You had discussed, Mr. Ni-
chols, ... with the Judge and with me here what you could do to bring a prosecution, 
had you not? A. Yes, Sir." Ibid. 
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Nichols what evidence to obtain.55 
(2) Other Complaining Witnesses. 
Complaining witness Williams testified that Nichols, as just discussed, drove him 
and Cauthorne to Francisco's store for the Sunday beer purchases.56 Although his testimony 
differed slightly from Cauthorne and Nichols,57 all versions showed the three traveling 
55 Conduct like the Judge's in Francisco is today proscribed in Virginia, Rules of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia, Section III, "Cannons of Judicial Conduct [effective 
1999]," 3B(7), Virginia Court Rules and Procedure - State (n.p.: Thompson-West 2005), 
221: "A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications made to the 
judge outside the presence of[both] ... parties concerning a pending or impending case .. 
. . "(emphasis added) (With exceptions not here relevant). The Supreme Court held, con-
cerning contempt prosecutions by state-court judges: "Fair trials are too important a part 
of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of charges they prefer." In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955). Though Murchison was some years after Fran-
cisco, it cited an older cases on this point : Wisconsin ex rel Getchel v. Bradish, 95 Wis. 
205, 70 N.W. 172 (1897): Liquor license revocation by town board member who hired mi-
nor to make illegal purchase from licensee; held that seriousness of alleged offense "does 
not justify members of such board ... prejudicing themselves by ... procuring and abetting 
[its] commission ... that they may pronounce judgment on the offender .... " Ibid. Get-
chel was followed by respected courts, such as in Wilcox v. Supreme Council of Royal Ar-
canum, 210 N.Y. 370, 104 N.E. 624, 627 (1914) (society directors who initiated vigorous 
public demands for society member's expulsion, held: disqualified from conducting expul-
sion hearing). Thus, there was authority for the Judge's removal at the time of Francisco. 
At that time, however, Virginia courts were extremely reluctant to recuse judges for such 
reasons. For example, in Ewing v. Haas, 132 Va. 215, 223, 111S.E.255 (1923), the judge 
supplied to one side only in a case over which he presided, legal authority and proposed 
written argument for that side's appellate brief. Held, that while this was "indiscrete, un-
wise and injudicious" it did not warrant removing the judge from a second case between 
the same parties. Therefore, it is unclear if removal could have been obtained in 1941 when 
Francisco was tried. No such motion was filed, nor the issue raised on appeal. 
56 
57 
Exhibit "C", 44. 
Williams recalled meeting Nichols and Cauthorne at Johnsons, see Ex "C", Peti-
( continued ... ) 
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together to Francisco's, with at least two of them meet-ing at Johnson's for that trip, with 
two of them Johnson's tenants. All versions also agree that they proceeded with the third 
witness (Williams) to Francisco's. These events and Johnson's attendance at trial, all 
suggested his involvement in Francisco. 
(3) Other Merchant Witnesses. 
Local merchant/restaurant-owners testified, for the defense,58 that most of their 
customers ordering meals also ordered beer or wine; that merchants not primarily serving 
meals sold a great deal of beer and wine for off-site consumption; that Sundays were a major 
sales-day, economically vital; that tourist beer-purchases were substantial, and that no one 
arrested them for Sunday beer sales, even with police frequenting their businesses. 59 The 
Times-Dispatch, on October 18, 1941, reported "a number of ABC licensees who had sat 
through the trial began asking questions as to their right to sell beer this coming Sunday,"60 
one of whom shifted from courtroom spectator to defense witness.61 
57( ••• continued) 
tion, see Ex "C", 44. Nichols and Cawthorne, however, testified only the two of them met 
at Johnson's, then drove from there to pick up Williams. Ex "C", 38, 49, whereupon 
all three traveled in Nichols' car to Francisco's for the beer purchases. 
58 Exhibit "C", Petition, lists these witnesses as: I. Keeton, 52-59; Mrs. Mary K. 
Winn, 72-75; Robert Stone, 76-79; F. R. Baker, 80-82; and Frank Bradley, 82-85. 
59 Examples are in Ex "C", Petition, 76-77 (testimony of Robert Stone); 80-81, ibid, 
(testimony ofF.R. Baker). 
60 
61 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 1, on continuation page 10. 
See Exhibit "C", Petition, 75, merchant/witness, Mrs. Mary Winn: "Q. [by 
(continued ... ) 
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Presumably these witnesses were called to persuade the jury that Francisco was un-
fairly singled out for prosecution. 62 Appellate opinions contemporary to Francisco made 
clear, however, that supposed closing law selective prosecutions (i.e., charging some with the 
offense, but not others) was not a defense.63 Only later did some courts change this view.64 
( 4) R. K. Turner, ABC Inspector. 
R K. Turner, inspector for the "Alcohol Beverage Control Board [ABC]," testified 
that of his "own knowledge, approximately 80 percent of the 61 [ABC licensees] in ... 
[Hanover] County are selling [beer] on Sunday."65 This was presumably why the supreme 
court stated in Francisco that "at least eighty per cent of those licensed to sell beer ... sold 
61( ••• continued) 
prosecutor] And you, of course, are down here ... tying to save your Sunday business?/ A. 
No, sir, I didn't have any idea that I would be called as a witness .... I am operating that 
business, and I came here ... as a spectator. I was asked if I would be a witness and I 
consented out there.IQ. But you are interested in the outcome?/ A. Of course I am interested 
in the outcome." 
62 Asking the Judge to rule for the defense on this ground was presumably viewed as 
futile, given testimony that he helped plan the prosecution (seen. 54, Chapter 8, supra, 
and accompanying text). 
63 Arrigo v. Lincoln [(City of)], 154 Neb. 537; 48 N.W. 2d 643, 648 (1950) ("To es-
tablish arbitrary discrimination ... , there must be more than a showing that a law or 
dinance has not been enforced against others .... Abuse in its enforcement does not affect 
its validity [citations omitted].)" The Francisco's Commonwealth appellate brief, Exhibit 
"D", 3, also quoted a case so holding: Gallen v. State, 156 Md. 459, 144 Atl. 350, 353 
(1929) ("[G]uilt or innocence ... could not ... depend upon ... whether other parties had 
been guilty of similar acts without prosecution .... "). 
64 See n. 45, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra, as an example. 
65 Exhibit "C", Petition, 72. 
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it openly on Sundays. •'66 The inspector's unrefuted testimony also seemed intended to portray 
Francisco as unfairly singled-out for prosecution. As already noted, this was insufficient 
according to legal authority of the time to excuse the defendant, 67 though some later cases 
saw things di:fferently.68 
(5) The M. G. Franciscos, Husband and Wife. 
The testimony of defendant M. G. Francisco and his wife about their Sunday beer 
sales was essentially undisputed. 69 For ten years they had lived near their store which was 
licensed to sell beer. Mr. Francisco made the Sunday beer sales to complaining witnesses 
Cauthorne and Williams, he said, along with chewing tobacco and Coca-Cola. He knew that 
complaining witness Nichols, a special officer, could see there was no disorder due to beer 
sales. Mrs. Francisco described helping at the store from the family's nearby home where six 
of their eight children also lived.70 
Unexpected trial humor arose as Mr. Francisco, while describing Sunday beer sales 
interjected, "I have sold to a Judge on Sunday," whereupon Judge Bazile expostulated, on 
66 Francisco v Commonwealth, 180 Va. at 374. 
67 Seen. 63, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra. 
68 Seen. 45, this Chapter, and supporting text, supra. 
69 Their transcribed testimony is in Ex "C", Petition, the defendant's at 60-67, 69-71 
and 79, ibid; his wife's at 67-69, ibid, summarized in paragraph containing this footnote. 
70 Exhibit "C", Petition, 68. The oldest Francisco children were out of the home, a 
22 year old son in Florida, and an 18 year old daughter in school. The only son at home was 
aged 14. Ibid. This, presumably, was T. Waddy Francisco, interviewed via telephone by 
undersigned in February 2002; seen. 5, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
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the record, "Not this one."71 This was reported in both papers, the News-Leader noting the 
Judge's response was ''to the amusement of the courtroom spectators."72 
(6) C. W. Taylor, Clerk, Hanover County Board of Supervisors. 
The Times-Dispatch 's Overton Jones gave the clearest account of why Francisco 
defense counsel Andrew Ellis sought documentary evidence from the Board of Supervisors, 
through testimony from the Board's clerk, C. W. Taylor: 
Mr. Ellis sought to bring before the jury ... that on July 1 ... [1941] 
the ... Board of Supervisors refused to ... ban ... Sunday sale of beer ... , 
as an additional indication that the ... people of Hanover County considered 
beer selling a necessity. Mr. Simpkins [prosecutor] maintained that the 
board's action had no bearing ... ; and Judge Bazile upheld that view and 
refused to allow [it] . . . before the jury. However, in the absence of the 
jurors, the defense inserted in the ... record a statement of the supervisor's 
action .... 73 
In Francisco, the defense argued that the Board of Supervisors' rejection of requests 
to prohibit Sunday alcoholic beverage sales amounted to its agreeing there was an economic 
"necessity" for such sales, entitling the defendant to seek jury acquittal on that ground. Judge 
71 Ex "C", Petition, 70. 
72 News-Leader, October 18, 1941, "Bazile Will Hear Argument in Blue Law Beer 
Verdict," 12. The Times-Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 10, also reported this interchange. 
The Judge was concerned to clarify that this did not refer to him. ("The Court: Just a minute. 
I do not mean to reflect on Mr. Francisco at all, but I do not think I have ever been to his 
place .... Q. [By Judge to Francisco] You didn't mean that this Judge [speaking of himself] 
- You don't mean this Judge-? A. [by M.J. Francisco] No, I certainly did not. It was a 
different Judge. But I have sold to a Circuit Judge." Ex "C", Petition, 70-71.) This shows 
the Judge's concern to have nothing he regarded as improper attached to his name. 
73 Richmond Times Dispatch, October 18, 1941 [day after trial], supra, 1. The foot-
footnoted quotation from the article is from its page 10 continuation. 
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Bazile denied admission of the Board's records of its action on that subject in July 1941, 
produced by its clerk under subpoena.74 As occurred in Lakeside, however, he allowed the 
Defendant to preserve evidence on a separate record apart from the jury, for appellate review 
if a conviction occurred. 75 Defendants' use, in closing law cases, of such sophisticated evi-
dence techniques, partly helped explain closing-law defense victories in Lakeside and, as will 
be seen, in Francisco as well. In both cases, relatively unique "necessity" claims were ad-
vanced, and were more persuasively expounded on appeal through transcribed testimony. 76 
The Judge's questions from the bench elicited from the witness, Board Clerk C.W. 
Taylor (referencing Supervisors' meeting records to answer), that (1) There were about 75 
spectators at the Board meeting considering banning Sunday beer-sales; (2) A majority of 
those attending (apparently beer-selling merchants) opposed a sale ban; but (3) That the 
written petitions the Board received contained about a thousand signatures favoring a ban. 77 
74 Exhibit "C", Petition, 86. The Judge ruled immediately thereafter that the re-
cords in question were to be "put in the record," ibid, of the trial, for the appeal. 
75 See nn. 75-77, Chapter 7, and accompanying text, supra, discussing use of this 
technique in Lakeside (part of Chapter 7(b)(3), supra). 
76 In theory, prosecutors also could do this, but not much would usually be gained, 
since prosecutorial retrials mostly would be barred on double-jeopardy grounds. 
77 Exhibit "C", Petition, 88. Defense counsel asserted these 1,000 signatures were 
''[ o Jut of twenty-five thousand," ibid, presumably meaning out of a Hanover County popu-
lation of25,000. However, the 1940 federal County census was only 18,500. Virginia Sta-
tistical Abstract (2000)(Charlottesville: Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service, Univ. of 
Virginia, 1999), Table 16.6C, "Decennial Census Counts for Virginia's Counties and Cities: 
1790 - 1990," 64 7. If half the population was under 21, those wanting to ban Sunday beer 
sales impressively obtained supporting signatures of over 10% of Hanover County adults. 
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The Judge's questioning suggested he was aware, in advance, of the answers he was eliciting. 
This would be consistent, as earlier discussed, with his interest in analyzing the politics of 
prohibition issues. 78 
(7) The Sheriff: Sumpter Priddy. 
The Sheriff testified he saw complaining witnesses Williams and Cauthorne purchas-
ing beer from Francisco on a Sunday, but could not recall the date, though he was at 
Francisco's "on quite a number of Sundays." He was the last witness. 79 
The Sheriff's testimony was unenthusiastic about the prosecution. His testifying for 
for the defense was odd as a matter of form. As a law enforcement officer, a Sheriff typically 
testified for the prosecution and not, as here, for the defense. This was followed by a 
prosecution cross-examination of him with incredulity almost approaching disdain. 80 
78 See n. 15; this Chapter, and accompanying text, supra. 
79 Sheriff Priddy's testimony, Ex. "C", Petition, 89-91, the quoted phrase at 89. 
80 Extract of prosecutor's cross-examination of Sheriff: "Q. How did you happen to 
be visiting Mr. Francisco on two occasions on that Sunday? A. I went ... in Louisa County, 
just over the line, ... and when I came back I stopped by Mr. Francisco's. Q. You stopped 
on the way up? A. I didn't stop on the way up.? Q. You said you visited him on two 
occasions? A. I said I slowed up when I went by; I didn't stop. Q. You didn't stop, but you 
stopped when you came back? A. I stopped when I came back. Q. You just stopped in there 
as you would ... any other place? A. Yes, sir. Q. Didn't stop for any purpose other than to 
buy the Coca-Cola? A. Well, I was riding around ... the County. I stop any time ... to see 
if everything is quiet, and no drunks riding around. Q. Then you did stop under your duties 
as Sheriff to see if everything was orderly? A. Well, I do most everywhere ... in line of duty. 
Q Had you had any request by anyone to stop there? A. No, sir. Q. Or to observe that place 
for orderliness or disorderliness on Sundays? A. No, sir. Q. Had one at all from anyone? A. 
No, sir. [ending trial testimony]" Exhibit "C", Petition, 90-91 (emphasis added). This was 
(continued ... ) 
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The Sheriff's professed non-recall of the "exact date" of the Sunday beer purchases 
bordered on the disingenuous. 81 As an experienced law enforcement officer, he would know 
that if he could not testify to the purchase's "exact date," he was not supporting the state's 
criminal charge. This was because the indictment specified a date, Sunday, September 7, 
1941, when the unlawful Sunday "labor" of beer-selling occurred. He admitted his presence 
at Francisco's when the complaining witnesses purchased the beer, but did not give the date. 
He easily could have refreshed his recollection before testifying merely by asking the date of 
purchase from any complaining witness. Since he had observed the purchases, in this way he 
also could have testified as to its date. Yet his testimony suggested (but did not expressly 
state), that he could not do so. 
The Sheriff's withdrawn manner and ineffectual testimony, however, were consistent 
with his unwilling involvement in a prosecution initiated merely to commercially advantage 
a local merchant, as can be inferred from his son's recollections in Exhibit "H". This also 
agreed with the Sheriff's public stance of not relying on Francisco for other closing-law 
80( ••• continued) 
not a particularly '':friendly'' prosecutorial cross examination of the Sheriff. It also showed the 
Sheriff was not advised in advance on the plans for the September 7, 1941 Francisco 
prosecution beer purchases. Nichols' testimony showed, to the contrary, that the prosecutor 
and Judge were informed, and discussed with him what to do '"to bring a prosecution" and 
"bring evidence to Court" in Francisco, ibid at 38-40. 
81 The sheriff testified, answering defense counsel's questions: "Q. Did you have oc-
casion to be in Mr. Francisco's store or filling station on Sunday, September 7, 1941? A. I 
don't remember the exact date, but I was there on quite a number of Sundays. Q. Do you 
recall seeing Mr. Cauthorne or Mr. Williams come in and purchase a bottle of beer on any 
Sunday that you were there? A. Yes, sir." Ex "C", Petition, 90 (emphasis added). 
164 
prosecutions unless affirmed by Virginia's high court. 
(d) The Judge's Francisco Closing Law Ruling. 
This Chapter 9(d) contrasts Judge Bazile's Francisco Sunday beer-sale ruling 
reported in the press, with what the trial record shows the Judge actually ordered. What is 
learned is that the most newsworthy aspects of this ruling did not appear in the trial tran-
script. The jury, first of all, only knew of the Judge's instructions to them:82 
Note [by court reporter]: At this point the Court read 
to the jury Instruction No. 1 
[INSTRUCTION NO. I] 83 
[The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence ... beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
M. G. Francisco did keep open ... on Sunday the Jib of 
September in Hanover County a business for the sale of beer 
and did on said Sunday sell beer, they should find him guilty 
and fix his punishment at a fine of not less than five dollars.] 
Note [by court reporter]: Following a discussion with counsel, 
the Court addressed the jury as follows: 
The Court: .... Now, if you believe ... beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he [defendant M. G. Francisco] sold beer on Sunday, then you 
must find him guilty, and five dollars will be a sufficient fine ..... 84 
82 Although referred-to as the "Judge's" instructions, they were actually proposed by 
Commonwealth's Attorney Simpkins and approved by the Judge. 
83 This Instruction No. 1 [in brackets] is set forth in the text, exactly as the court re-
porter's ''Note," quoted above the instruction, says the jury actually heard it at trial. 
84 Attached Ex "C", Petition, 92 
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Mr. Francisco, the defendant, never disputed the Sunday beer sales, but claimed a 
prosecution exemption due to the closing law's ''necessity" exception. The Judge's instruc-
tions, however, cut off that ''necessity" defense. Thus, as Francisco stated, "a verdict of 
guilty necessarily followed, "85 because eliminating the "necessity" issue left nothing to decide. 
The jury's deliberations were, accordingly, virtually non-existent, as the court reporter 
described: "After staying out five minutes the jury knocks" and announced its verdict that: 
"'We, the jury, find the accused guilty ... and fix his punishment at a fine of $5.00. "'86 
Following in the transcript (Ex "C") after the just-quoted instructions, were defense-
requested instructions the Judge refused. 87 They all expressly or impliedly assumed a "neces-
sity'' defense, absent from the Judge's instructions .. Nevertheless, nowhere in the tran-
script, 88 was there any ruling by the Judge ''that sale of beer on Sunday violates Virginia's 
blue laws," as the News-Leader, for example, claimed he decided.89 
85 Francisco, 180 Va. at 174 (emphasis added). 
86 Exhibit "C", Petition, 93. The Judge eliminated the fine's amount as an issue by 
by instructing "$5.00 will be a sufficient fine," ibid (maximum was $500, see, 92, ibid). 
87 Attached Ex "C", Petition, 94-97. 
88 The Judge certified in Ex. "C", Petition, 97, that the transcript "is a true and 
correct stenographic copy . . . of all the testimony and evidence ... including all of the 
instructions requested, given, and refused and objections and exceptions .... [a]s well as all 
questions raised,[ and] rulings thereon ... in the trial .... " Ibid, 98. 
89 Quotation in footnoted sentence is from part of the following in the October 18, 
1941 News-Leader, 1: "The Virginia Methodist Conference ... adopted a resolution hailing 
'with joy' Judge Bazile's decision that sale of beer on Sunday violates Virginia's blue laws." 
There also was nothing in the transcript, resembling a similar first sentence in Times-
( continued ... ) 
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The Judge's instructions to the Francisco jury earlier quoted herein, stated that in this 
particular case, if the jury believed "Francisco did keep open ... on Sunday the 7th of 
September in Hanover County a business for the sale ofbeer and did on said Sunday sell beer, 
they should find him guilty. "9° Further, the Judge, as already discussed, refused instructions 
permitting the jurors to acquit the defendant on "necessity" grounds."91 Thus, the jury 
never heard, in the recorded trial transcript, anything concerning exempting defendant's beer 
sales as a closing law "necessity." That the Judge's Francisco jury instructions lacked any 
reference to the closing law "necessity" exception, however, did not also mean, under then-
controlling case law, that the "necessity" exemption, due to the Judge's ruling, was barred 
in every Sunday sale in the state. This approach was expressly rejected in the Virginia 
Supreme Court's 1922 Pirkey opinion.92 
The Judge well knew this because, in 1922, he had been an Assistant Attorney General 
briefing that court in Pirkey, and included Pirkey 's holding on this point in his Francisco 
89( ••• continued) 
Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 1: "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of Sunday Beer as Blue 
Law Violation: Every ABC licensee in the State of Virginia who sells beer on Sunday is 
guilty of violating the so-called Blue Law, according to a far-reaching verdict in a Hanover 
County Circuit Court case yesterday." 
90 See n. 83, this Chapter, and accompanying text. 
91 See n. 85, this Chapter, supra. 
92 See nn. 55-60 Chapter 7, supra, and supporting text, supra, discussing this point. 
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"Opinion of the Court."93 Pirkey recognized alternatives could arise of either so much 
evidence that no reasonable juror could doubt the "necessity," thereby excepting prosecution 
under the exemption; or so little evidence that no reasonable juror could conclude "neces-
sity" existed. Either alternative precluded submitting the issue to ajury.94 However, if the 
"necessity" evidence was between these two extremes, Pirkey held, a defendant was entitled 
to a jury decision.95 
The first evidence in the appellate record of the trial Judge, Leon Bazile, ruling at trial 
leveL to unequivocally bar Sunday liquor sales, denying defendants any recourse to the 
closing law "necessity" exception, was when his "Opinion of the Court" stated in part: 
[H]ow can it be said that the sale of beer on ~unday is a work of necessity 
or capable of being made such? The vendor of beer cannot show that its sale 
on Sunday is necessary to save himself from serious or unexpected loss or that 
its sale on Sunday is necessary to save the public from unusual discomfort or 
inconvenience. 96 
This accords with the Judge's supposed ruling during the Francisco trial, as the Times-
93 Leon Bazile was listed as an Assistant Attorney General briefing in Pirkey, 134 
Va. 713, 715 and Lakeside, 134 Va. 696, 699. For Judge recognizing Pirkey and Lakeside 
did not hold that Sunday sales always barred by the closing law, see his "Opinion of the 
Court," Exhibit "C", Petition, 28: "The decisions in Pirkey . .. [and] Lakeside . .. involved 
acts about which fair-minded men might reasonably differ as to whether ... [it, sic] was a 
work of necessity [emphasis added]." (Judge held Pirkey and Lakeside not controlling, 
because not specifically permitting Sunday beverage sales). 
94 Seen. 60, Chapter 7, supra, where this rule from Pirkey is quoted. The Judge also 
quoted it in his later, January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court" in Francisco. Exhibit"C", 
Petition, 24 and 28 (date of Opinion at 34, ibid). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 27. 
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Dispatch and News-Leader both reported on the day following the trial. The "Opinion" from 
which it was quoted, however, was dated January 14, 1942, almost four months later.97 
Thus, it was not available at the time of the Francisco jury verdict on October 17, 1941, nor 
the day after, when the Richmond papers first-claimed the Judge so-ruled,98 so they could 
not have based their reporting on it. 
Even though Francisco attorney arguments were not transcribed, all the Judge's 
rulings following those arguments were in the transcript.99 None of them declared the Vir-
ginia Sunday closing law barred Sunday beer sales without exception, as a reference to the 
attached transcript (Exhibit "C") will show. The only other source of information for the 
press about the judge's rulings would be statements by .lawyers or the Judge during arguments 
before the court. The most lengthy of these arguments was over jury instructions, commenc-
ing immediately after testimony of the last witness (Sheriff Sumpter Priddy) was conclu-
ded. 100 The news reports revealed that the interchanges between defense counsels and court 
at times became heated. JOI Nevertheless, it is plausible that during these arguments the Judge 
97 Ibid, 34. The Opinion is at 22-34 of Petition, Exhibit "C". 
98 See n. 89, this Chapter, supra. 
99 Seen. 88, this Chapter, supra, quoting the Judge's certification in the appeal pa-
pers that all his rulings in Francisco were set forth in the trial transcript. 
JOO Exhibit "C", Petition, 91, shows the conclusion of Sumpter Priddy's testimony 
and the court reporter's characteristic notation "Here followed extended argument on 
instructions." showing the commencement of jury-instruction argument. 
101 For example, the News-Leader reported defense attorney Ellis saying that when 
(continued ... ) 
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asserted, as reported by Times-Dispatch writer Overton Jones, "that beer selling on Sunday 
is a violation of Section 4570 of the Virginia Code, known as the Blue Law, ... based on a 
24-year-old ruling ... in ... Ellis vs. the Town of Covington." That being said, it is critical 
to reassert here that nowhere in the October 17, 1941, trial transcript did Judge Bazile un-
equivocally announce such a rule. This was not accomplished in the trial record until the 
Judge filed his January 14, 1942 "Opinion of the Court" announcing such a rule, nearly three 
months after the trial ended. 
It is hard to believe that the Richmond newspaper reporters and their editors, and le-
gal counsel presumably advising them, were unaware that their October 18 and 19, 1941, 
articles describing the Judge's ruling did not match the trial record. One can only speculate 
that the Judge either gave the reporters private assurances of his later issuing a written 
opinion, as he ultimately did; or that they were sufficiently certain, without his express 
promises, that he would do so. For either reason, their articles treated his formal opinion as 
completed, even though the Judge only published it months later, and even though this 
conditionally-future nature of the Judge's ruling banning Sunday beer sales was not revealed 
in the Richmond papers' press-reports of the Francisco trial. 
101( ••• continued) 
Ellis v Covington (at n. 17, Chapter 7, supra) was decided, "Virginia was under the sway 
and rule of religious fanatics and bigots, 'to which Judge Bazile volunteered, 'racketeers and 
crooks as well ... ,"'News-Leader, October 18, 1941, 12 (not in trial transcript, Exhibit 
"C", Petition, because it was part ofuntranscribed attorney argument). 
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(e) Judge Bazile's January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court" and its Treat-
ment by the Virginia Supreme Court. 
Judge Bazile's January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court," occupied twelve printed 
pages of the appellate record. 102 Reflecting extensive research, it was the centerpiece for his 
view, shared with many Virginians of prohibitionist or conservative-religious outlook, that 
the Virginia closing law absolutely prohibited Sunday beer sales, including M. G. Francisco's 
beer sales on Sunday, September 7, 1941.103 
The delay in the Judge's writing the opinion until almost four months after the jury 
verdict appeared due to the defense motion at the end of the trial to set aside the jury verdict, 
on which the Judge ruled argument would be held later. 104 Presumably this generated mo-
tions and arguments for some time after the trial, after which the Judge issued his January 19, 
1942, "Opinion of the Court," and denying defendant's motion to set aside the jury verdict 
on March 16, 1942. 105 Additional argument presumably occurred after that ruling, since the 
May, 1942 "Hanover County Criminal Docket," still listed Francisco as "pending on 
102 Exhibit "C", Petition, 22-34. 
103 The intensity of prohibitionist views was suggested by accounts of the October 
18, 1941 Methodist Conference, whose resolution praised the Judge's supposed (but non-
existent) "ruling" barring Sunday beer sales at the previous day's Francisco trial. One re-
port, for instance, stated the Conference "adopted a resolution approving the decision of 
Judge Leon Bazile against the sale of beer and volleyed 'amens' last night as it heard a re-
port calling upon church people to 'make America as dry as the Sahara Desert.'" Times-
Dispatch, 1, October 19, 1941, "Methodist Praise Ruling on Beer Ban." 
104 Exhibit "C", Petition, 94. 
105 Ibid, 21. 
171 
motion."106 The last circuit court docket date was July 29, 1942.107 The defendant's appeal 
was filed on September 16, 1942.108 
The Judge's January 11, 1942 "Opinion of the Court" was the fulcrum of the oppo-
sition to defendant Francisco's appeal, buttressed by two propositions. First, as to the ban-
ning of Francisco's Sunday beer-sales, the Judge relied on Ellis v. Covington, 109 which had 
declared the defendant in that case ''plainly could not, though licensed, ply his calling of sell-
ing such drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape liability .... "110 Asserting El-
/is decreed unqualified opposition against Sunday sales, the Judge characterized the above-
quoted Ellis ruling as "a definite holding by the highest Court of the Commonwealth that the 
selling on Sunday of soft drinks pursuant to one's regular business is a violation of the 
Sunday law." This meant, the Judge reasoned that, in so many words, no "necessity" 
exception applied in Francisco, 111 because he considered beer sales, for purposes of the 
106 
"Hanover County Criminal Docket, May 1942," Hanover County Circuit Court 
Clerk's Office, Commonwealth v. Francisco files. (One of the handful of documents 
concerning Francisco remaining in the county clerk's office. Seen. 2, Chapter 8, supra, and 
accompanying text.) Attached as Exhibit "I". 
107 Exhibit "C" Petition, 19, grant of writ of error (for appeal). 
108 Ibid, cover sheet (rear). 
109 122 Va.821, 94 S.E. 154 (1917); discussed at n.17, Chapter 7, supra and accom-
panying text. 
I JO Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion," 25, quoting Ellis, 122 Va. at 825. 
Ill Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion," 25. 
closing law, a "similar act" to the soft drink sales in Ellis. 112 
The Virginia Supreme Court, however, dismissed Ellis as superficial: 
[B]ecause the conduct of such a business was held, as a matter oflaw, not to 
be a work of necessity ... in Ellis ... in 1917, it does not necessarily follow 
that such a business is to be outlawed in every community in the State, 
regardless of the ... present day mode, habits and demands of a particular 
community. To adhere to that view is to shut our eyes to the known fact that 
the habits, customs, demands and necessities of the people, in some if not all 
the communities throughout the State, have undergone a change in the past 
twenty five years. 113 
172 
Francisco's formulation here almost parallels Frederick Lewis Allen's description of post-
World War I American social change. 114 It mandated a substantial broadening of the closing 
law "necessity" exception and threw on the scrapheap holdings like Ellis and Hanger, due 
to what the supreme court saw as the "change in the past twenty five years" of the "habits, 
customs, demands and necessities of the people." A prosecutor seeking to enforce the closing 
law under Francisco, faced complex arguments that the Sunday labors prosecuted could be 
exempted by a jury as a ''necessity" due to "change" in "some if not all the communities 
throughout the state." The Supreme Court had given fair notice that it could find many ac-
tivities, under this reasoning, exempt from the Sunday closing law. The first supreme court 
112 Ibid, 26. The supreme court agreed with part of the Judge's analysis: "We agree 
with the trial court that, in so far as the Sunday law is concerned, the sale of beer cannot be 
distinguished in principle from the sale of soft drinks, cigarettes or tobacco." 180 Va. at 3 80. 
113 Francisco, 180 Va. at 376 and 380. 
114 Seen. 20, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text, 
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flexing of its procedural muscle to do just that was Francisco itself 
The second underpinning to Judge Bazile's opinion concerned the Hanover County 
Board of Supervisors not barring Sunday beer sales. This, the defense unsuccessfully argued 
at tria4 required a jury-determination of whether defendant should be acquitted for the 
Sunday beer-sales due to the closing law's "necessity" exemption. A statute provided that 
the county board of supervisors had "authority to ... prohibit ... sale of beer and wine .. 
. between .. each Saturday and ... Monday," and that "no provision herein ... shall ... 
alter[] ... or repeal[] Section [4570] ... of the Code ofVirginia."115 
The Judge's opinion focused on the last sentence of the above quotation: "[T]he 
General Assembly must have concluded that section 4570 ... prohibited the sale of wine and 
beer on Sunday and that it was, by Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1938 merely giving to the 
localities the authority, by ordinance, to parallel the existing State law .... 116 Thus, he as-
serted the above referenced closing law statute (Section 4570) barred Sunday labor. Beer 
sales, he correspondingly claimed, could not qualify for the "necessity" exception. Further, 
the Judge reasoned, the Board of Supervisors' right to control beer sales on Sunday, granted 
by the 1938 enabling Act, was expressly subject to the statutory closing law. Thus, the 
Judge's concluded, the Supervisors could not permit Sunday beer and wine sales, because 
115 Virginia Acts of 1938, p. 194, quoted in Exhibit "C", Defendant's Petition, 12, 
further described in the Judge's Opinion as Chapter 129 of the Acts of 1938; ibid at 29. 
116 Exhibit "D", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 32. Section 4570 is, of course, the 
Virginia Sunday closing law itself, incorporated by reference into the enabling act, the lat-
latter act allowing the Board of Supervisors to ban Sunday beer sales. 
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that conflicted with the closing law's prohibition of doing Sunday business. 
The reason the Francisco opinion reversed the Judge was most clearly explained by 
"Mr. Dooley," a mythical Irish-American saloon-keeper (created by syndicated columnist 
Finley Peter Dunne a century ago), who "commented on politics and society in a rich Irish 
brogue."117 As "Mr. Dooley" was described as commenting: "A law ... that might look like 
look like a wall to you or me wud look like a triumphal arch to th' expeeryenced eye iv a 
lawyer."118 In "Mr. Dooley's" terms, Judge Bazile saw the statutory closing law's 
incorporation into the 1938 Act enabling the Board of Supervisors to ban beer sales as a 
''wall," barring such Sunday sales. To the contrary, the supreme court held, the closing law 
actually contained what Mr. Dooley called the ''triun;iphal arch": its "necessity" exception, 
allowing the jury to bar its enforcement. The court explained: 
[T]he legislature ... did not intend that the sale of beer on Sunday should be 
prohibited,[ as] ... shown by ... authoriz[ing] ... localities to fix the hours 
between . . . Saturday and ... Monday [when] ... beer and wine ... might 
be sold [and a] ... proviso that no such local ordinance shall be construed as 
... altering, amending or repealing Code, section 4570 [the closing law]. This 
... indicates that the legislature was fully aware that the sale of beer on 
Sunday might or might not be a violation of ... section 4570, depending on 
the circumstances ... in each locality, under ... Pirkey Bros .... and later 
cases. Hence, the ... enabling act was not to validate the sale of beer on 
Sunday in a community or locality where it was not a work of necessity 
117 S.V., "Finley Peter Dunne" (1867-1936), Encyclopaedia Britannica, 4:277 (15th 
ed., 1974-1994): Early syndicated columnist, creator of "Mr. Dooley," whose ''witty pe-
netration of shams and hypocrisies" became "a force for clear thinking and tolerance .... " 
118 Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 5th ed. (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1999), 285:14 [quoting from "Mr. Dooley and the Power of the Press," American 
Magazine, 62:607, 607 (1906)]. 
within the_meaning of the Sunday law. [ii] [I]f the sale of beer on Sunday was 
unlawful ... , [ w ]hy the necessity of regulating such sale if it be prohibited? 
119 
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Based on the above analysis, the Francisco opinion laid out a new form of jury instruction, 
overturning Mr. Francisco's jury-conviction: 
In view of what we have said [the contested] ... instruction should be 
modified to read as follows: 
The court instructs the jury that if they find ... the keeping open by 
the defendant of his place of business on Sunday, and the sale therein of beer 
... was reasonably essential to the economic, social or moral welfare of the 
community, ... then they may find that such work was necessary within the 
meaning of the [closing law] statute, and if they so find, they should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
Thus, incorporating the closing law statute into the 19~8 enabling act, allowing counties to 
bar Sunday beer sales, which Judge Bazile concluded prohibited sales on Sunday, the su-
preme court said showed exactly the opposite. It proved, said the high court, that the le-
gislature allowed local communities to decide that issue themselves. They could, according 
to the portion of Francisco above quoted, determine there was no "necessity" for beer sales 
at certain times on Sunday, by expressly prohibiting sales at those times. In any event, 
concluded the supreme court, had the legislature intended the closing law to absolutely bar 
local allowance of Sunday beer sales without exception, it would not have enacted the 1938 
enabling act amendment, which provided for the opposite. 
It should be noted in passing that what appeared to be the most persuasive argument 
119 Francisco, 180 Va. 371, 381, 382 (including further indented quotation from opin-
ion later on this page). 
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against the defense contention that the Board of Supervisors records should be considered 
by the jury, was made spontaneously by the Commonwealth's Attorney at trial: 
Mr. Simpkins: Now, the Commonwealth desires to object ... that the 
record of the Board of Supervisors ... does not show any action at all by the 
Board. It merely shows a motion and failure of a second, which could show 
no action or failure to act on anything ... before the Board . . . . 120 
This was precisely, as noted earlier herein when discussing the Virginia Supreme Court's 
Crook case, 121 what Abraham Lincoln raised in his Cooper Union speech. Lincoln cautioned 
that it is usually difficult to discern any intent from a legislative failure to act, as opposed to 
legislative action Francisco's appellate briefing, however, was by the Attorney General's 
office (not the local Commonwealth's Attorney), which did not reassert that argument. 122 As 
a matter of sheer logic, however, Mr. Simpkins' above-quoted argument at trial made eminent 
sense. The failure of the Board of Supervisors to take any action or make any statement about 
Sunday beer sal~s, due to lack of a seconding of a motion to do so, could well be argued to 
amount to no action by the Board at all. 
The Francisco supreme court opinion thus went out ofits way to refute every point 
of Judge Bazile's "Opinion of the Court" as has been discussed in Chapter 2 and this 
Chapter 8. The high court made it clear that an increasingly wide number of yet-undefined 
120 Exhibit "C", Petition, 83. 
121 Seen. 103, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
122 Exhibit "D", "Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth," 2, only says that the enab-
ling Act provides "by special proviso in the Act [that it] does not alter the provision of sec-
tion 4570 [the closing law]." 
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circumstances potentially could constitute a "necessity,"123 entitling the defendant to seek a 
jury verdict of exemption from the closing law on that ground. 
(t) Epilogue- End of the Francisco Prosecution. 
The News Leader carried a December 7, 1942, page 1 article reporting the supreme 
court Francisco opinion reversing, that day, defendant's conviction. 124 Upon remand to the 
trial court, the Commonwealth's Attorney, after cogitating most of the ensuing year, 
dismissed the case by filing a no/le prosequi motion on September 20, 1943, without 
attempting the new trial Francisco authorized. 125 This answers in the negative the second 
123 Although decrying the inadequacy of past definitions, the court essentially re-
tained them, despite attempting to restate the issues discussed. Thus Francisco asserts, 180 
180 Va. 371, 379: "[l]t is difficult to understand how a particular work may be moral and 
fit in one community and immoral and unfit in another. And yet, on the other hand, all of the 
authorities agree that a particular work may be a necessity in one community and not in 
another, depending upon the peculiar circumstances of the case." Paraphrasing Justice Potter 
Stewart, seen. 33, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text, the Virginia high court justices 
knew "necessity" after-the-fact "when they saw it." It was becoming evident that if nude 
bathing suppression (Lakeside Inn) or beer sales (.Francisco) could constitute a Sunday 
''necessity," according to the supreme court, then just about anything else could be a 
''necessity" as well, rendering the term "nearly meaningless," seen. 34, Chapter 4, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
124 News-Leader, December 7, 1942, 1: "Sunday Sale Of Beer Held Not Illegal ..•. 
The State Supreme Court today held that the sale of wine and beer in Virginia on Sunday 
is not unlawful and remanded the case brought against M.G. Francisco, a Hanover County 
merchant, to the Hanover Circuit Court for a new trial .... " 
125 Common Law Order Book #19, Hanover County Circuit Court, 379. Exhibit "J". 
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), s. v. "nolle prosequi": "[A] formal entry on the record by the 
prosecuting officer ... that he will not prosecute the case further. . . . It is a judicial 
determination in favor of the accused and against his conviction, but it is not an acquittal, nor 
is it equivalent to a pardon. [citing 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 419 at 1(1989)]." 
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question first raised in Chapter 2 herein (i.e., whether a new trial was ever held). 126 
(g) Concluding Comments on Francisco. 
Many of the paradoxes characterizing Sunday closing laws since their inception were 
reprised in Francisco. In probably the earliest governmental restricting of Sunday work, the 
Edict of Constantine in 321 C.E., agricultural workers, could work on Sunday "lest by 
neglecting the proper moment ... the bounty of heaven should be lost."127 This described, in 
a roundabout way, ''necessity" as permitting Sunday labor, a concept still troublesome to 
define in Francisco, over 1,600 years later, as its testimony revealed. 
Confusion over just what was permitted on Sunday was no doubt exacerbated in Ro-
man times because their "market days", traditionally r.ecurring in an eight to nine day-cycle, 
were incorporated into the weekly Christian Sabbath. 128 This made it difficult to determine 
if the Sabbath was for "rest" or ''recreation," the latter, of course, giving rise to Sunday 
employments to satisfy popular recreational tastes. These were arguably in violation of closing 
laws, whether that labor be in village fairs in the middle ages 129 or M. J. Francisco dispensing 
beer at his store in Hanover County, Virginia on September 7, 1941. 
Not so much the closing law itself, but its "necessity" exception, was at the crux of 
Francisco. Charles E. Clark, writing of rules in procedural codes, described how "bad or 
126 
127 
128 
129 
See Chapter 8(a), supra; and n. 16, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text. 
Seen. 19, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 18, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 25, Chapter 3, and n. 19, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
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harsh" decisions "drive out the good, so that in time a rule becomes entirely obscured by its 
interpretive barnacles."130 Similarly, the ostensible closing law ''rule" banning Sunday labor 
became "entirely obscured" in Virginia appeals from 1922 to 1942, by its "necessity" ex-
ception. Such a "necessity" defense came to the forefront in Francisco when the defendant 
learned of petitions to the County Board of Supervisors to ban Sunday beer sales. Thereafter, 
on July 1, 1941, Super visor Thompson moved that the Board prohibit ''the sale of beer and 
wine in Hanover County on Sunday, which received no second and was lost."131 
Defendant's appeal brief almost, but not quite, anticipated the Francisco appeal's 
outcome. Key to the supreme court's decision was the Hanover County Board of Supervi-
sors not banning Sunday beer sales, even though it had new authority to do so, due to a 
1938 amendment to the enabling act. Francisco's lawyers explained that the significance of 
the Board of Supervisors actions was as follows: 
[W]hat is or is not a necessity is . . . determined by juries who reflect the 
community's opinion .... [A] necessity in one place may not be in another. 
Under this [Pirkey] holding ajury ... might say that the sale of beer is not a 
13° Charles E. Clark, "Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes 
and Rules," Vanderbilt L. Rev., 3(1950):493, 498. 
131 Exhibit "C", Petition, 86 (Testimony of C. W. Taylor, Clerk, Board of Super-
visors, summarizing a "certified copy of the [Board] minutes" which he had been sub-
poenaed to produce, to which he "refer[ red] in the record," and which was, by the Judge's 
order, "put ... in the record [for the appeal, but] not for the jury," ibid.) It is interesting, 
perhaps almost ironic, that "Supervisor Thompson" in this footnoted sentence, is probably 
the same "Supervisor J.M. Thompson" whose death resulted in Judge Bazile's appointing 
Joseph z. Johnson as Supervisor in his place. Johnson was extensively discussed in nn. 8 and 
35-38, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. See attached Exhibit "E", in the Ap-
pendix for the full text for his appointment as a County Supervisor. 
. . . necessity, . . . . [or] that it is . . . , in which case the sale would not be 
unlawful . . . . Then, if that jury did not truly reflect the community's opinion, 
[it] ... could be reflected by adoption of a local ordinance by the Board of 
Supervisors, making the sale unlawful, regardless of ... the jury. 
[Thus] . . . , each locality is now given two opportunities to express the 
community's opinion of the ... propriety of selling beer on Sunday, one 
though its juries and the other through its duly elected representatives, 
whereas it had only one prior to the ... [enabling] Act of 1938.132 
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Comparing this portion of defendant's brief with the Francisco holding quoted earlier, 133 the 
supreme court went defendant Francisco one better by concluding 
the trial court erred in excluding from the jury evidence that the board of 
supervisors ... had considered and failed to enact an ordinance prohibiting 
the sale of beer on Sunday [which was] ... pertinent and material on whether 
the work of selling beer on Sundays was reasonably essential to the economic, 
social or moral welfare of the community. 134 
That is, the court went beyond merely holding that the jury could decide if beer sales qual-
ified as a Sunday "necessity." It additionally ruled that in so deciding, the jury could also 
infer, at its option, that the Board of Supervisors' not banning Sunday beer sales was evi-
dence the community viewed such sales as a closing law "necessity," exempt from prose-
cution. In so doing the court engaged in verbal sleight-of-hand, by describing "necessity" in 
the immediately preceding quotation135 as "reasonably essential to the economic, social or 
132 Exhibit "C". Petition, 13 (Defendant's brief to the Supreme Court). 
133 See n. 119, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text, quoting the relevant por-
tion of the Virginia Supreme Court's "necessity" instructions. 
134 
135 
Francisco, 180 Va. 371, 381-382. 
As the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in the portion of its Francisco opinion 
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moral welfare of the community." This gave a far broader meaning to "necessity'' than Judge 
Bazile contemplated in his January 19, 1941 "Opinion of the Court": 
[H]ow can it be said that the sale of beer on Sunday is a work of necessity or 
capable of being made such? The vendor of beer cannot show that its sale on 
Sunday is necessary to save himself from serious or unexpected loss or that 
its sale on Sunday is necessary to save the public from unusual discomfort or 
inconvenience. 136 
The practical result of this broader "necessity'' definition was that many more cir-
cumstances, based on Francisco, jurors could decide was a closing law "necessity," ex-
empting a defendant from prosecution. Virginia thus conformed to a national trend to more 
broadly define closing-law "necessity", so that it became, in the opinion of at least one 
scholar, ''virtually meaningless."137 Indeed, judges in Virginia and elsewhere in the United 
States essentially defined "necessity" by paraphrasing, in so many words, Supreme Court 
Justice Potter Stewart: they "knew it when they saw it,"138 but without reasoned analysis. 
In plain fact, in Francisco, Hanover County's Board of Supervisors took no action 
concerning Sunday beer sales. A motion was made to ban such sales, which died for want of 
a second. There was no evidence at trial of any further Board consideration of the issue. 
135( ••• continued) 
quoted at n.119 and accompanying text, this Chapter 8, supra. 
136 Exhibit "C", Petition, "Opinion of the Court," 27 (Bazile, circuit judge). The 
high court's definition of"necessity" was also broader than standard dictionary definitions, 
seen. 68, Chapter 9, infra. 
137 See n. 34, Chapter 4, supra. 
138 Seen. 33, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
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Although the supreme court, as already quoted, said the jury could take into account that the 
Board "had considered and failed to enact the ordinance" prohibiting Sunday beer sales, that 
premise appears mistaken. The Board could not have "considered" a resolution not secon-
ded, because it was never brought before the meeting, an elementary and widely-recognized 
parliamentary procedure rule for conducting meetings of businesses and elective bodies. 139 
As significant as the problems confronting closing law defendants was the issue of 
how someone became such a defendant. Clearly M. G. Francisco was not prosecuted be-
cause of Hanover County's abstract desire to prevent Sunday labor. Instead, that prosecu-
tion was due to a competing business, closed on Sunday, seeking to advantage itself over 
Francisco, who was open on Sunday. Examples were_given from other jurisdictions of clos-
ing laws being used for commercial advantage, similar to what was found in Francisco.140 
The Francisco press coverage clearly reported that the Sunday commercial activity 
was expected to significantly decline if Judge Bazile's opinion was actually enforced state-
139 See The Scott Forseman Robert's Rules of Order, newly revised, 9th ed., Henry 
M. Robert Ill, William J. Evans and James W. Cleary, ed. (n.p.: Scott Forseman, 1990), 34-
35: "After a motion has been made, ... [i]f no member seconds the motion ... the chair says, 
'The motion [or 'resolution'] is not seconded; or, 'Since there is no second, the motion is not 
before the meeting."' Of course, Roberts Rules of Order could not prevail against the state's 
highest court holding, as in Francisco, that the jury could consider the Board of Supervi-
sors' failure to act as evidence of a community determination of beer sales as a Sunday 
"necessity." The Rules, however, show how contrary the court's interpretation was to long-
established meeting procedure rules. Although the rule is more detailed in the above 1990 
version, the same general result is suggested in General Henry M. Robert, Robert's Rules of 
Order Revised (Chicago: Scott-Forseman, 1943), 36-37. 
140 See nn. 39 - 45, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
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wide. The Times-Dispatch the day after the trial, for example, stated "hundreds of articles 
now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue law" if the Virginia Supreme Court 
affirmed that ruling .141 
The closing law's, intent to regulate social conduct by banning Virginia Sunday labor, 
was not achieving its goal in 1941. 142 Actual public behavior was markedly different from the 
norm the statute sought to enforce. Thus, as in Francisco, the comparatively few prosecu-
tions brought probably had an impetus other than a benign desire for uniform suppression of 
Sunday labor, most likely a commercial advantage sought by a business rival. 143 
141 Seen. 51 [subdivision (l)(b) therein (dated October 18, 1941)], this Chapter. 
142 As de Tocqueville observed, "public opinion, much stronger than the law," made 
Sunday work-suspension effective. See n. 20, Chapter 6, supra, and that opinion was 
changing in 1941 Virginia. 
143 Arguably, too much weight concerning a hidden business-competition motive for 
closing-law prosecutions was drawn from Francisco alone. However, (1) Indications of 
wider problem concerning commercial business-competition motives were discussed, see nn. 
42-45, supra, and accompanying text; and (2) The Francisco court, by disclosing the vast 
numbers not being prosecuted for closing law violations, (see n. 66, supra, and accom-
panying text), recognized that (a) unfair selective prosecution was occurring; and (b) since 
directly voiding a prosecution for that reason was proscribed by current law, (seen. 63, supra, 
and accompanying text), (c) reached the same result indirectly through holdings like 
Francisco, making closing law prosecutions more difficult. [All referenced footnotes are in 
this Chapter.]· 
Chapter 9~ CONCLUDING ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS. 
Laws requiring cessation of labor on the primary day of weekly religious observan-
ces, Sunday in traditionally Christian nations ("Sunday closing laws"), were characteristic 
in many States of the United States, including Virginia, until relatively recently. The fre-
q_uency of this practice paralleled confusion about its origins and purposes, still-apparent in 
VirQinia closing-law litigation in Francisco in 1942, when this thesis concludes. 
Judeo-Christian tradition ascribed a religious basis for the seven-day week and its 
recurring primary religious observance on one day of that week, commanded by the He brew 
deity. Labor also was to cease that day, the deity reportedly commanded, to commemorate 
the deity's day of rest following six days spent creating the universe. 1 
Confusion, however, about this seemingly straightforward biblical explanation arose, 
first, from another Bible passage ascribing Israel's escape from Egyptian bondage as the 
origin of the week's seventh day rest, not the universe's divine creation.2 Second, scholars 
learned the Babylonian Empire, while dominating Israel, had a new-moon, mid-month, 
religious-day celebration, spawning three other similar religious days spread through each 
month; each approximately seven days apart from any the of other such days (including the 
mid-month celebration). Work ceased on each such day. These four special days were called 
shabbutu meaning ''rest" to the Babylonians, obviously similar to the later Hebrew sabbath 
2 
Seen. 7, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 9, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
184 
185 
for the Jewish weekly religious-observance day, 3 suggesting the latter was derived from the 
former. These days of "shabbutu" which the Babylonians feared (except at mid-month), 
however. contrasted with the joy accorded the biblical sabbath. This created a basis for 
confusion about whether dread or joy was to be associated with the sabbath, among the 
earliest ofmanv such confusions about its purpose.4 
Christianity's derivation from Judaism created more sabbath confusion. The reputed 
spring resurrection of its namesake on a Sunday (now Easter Sunday) caused Christians to 
shift their weekly sabbath to Sunday. Since this occurred within the Roman Empire, a wide 
venue was provided to disseminate this new religion. It also expanded, in part, due to a 
newly common acceptance of the seven-day week.. Traditional Roman ''market days," 
recurring every eight-to-nine days, were incorporated into Sunday. This likely increased 
confusion, present in Francisco, of whether "rest" of the Old Testament sabbath or 
"recreation" of the Roman market days, was to occur on Sunday. 5 
Christianity's widening acceptance presumably influenced Roman Emperor Con-
stantine's 321 C.E. decree to suspend work on ''the venerable day of the sun;" exempting 
agricultural workers, however, "lest ... the bounty of heaven may be lost. "6 The early 
European Middle Ages lacked consensus about whether Christian Sunday sabbaths required 
3 
4 
5 
6 
See n. 5, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 3, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
See nn. 12, 16 and 18, Chapter 3, and accompanying text. 
Seen. 19, Chapter 3, and accompanying text. 
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the same work cessation as the original Hebrew sabbaths.7 Work restrictions, however, 
gradually became increasingly enforced in England and continental Europe. 8 
England's views on Sunday work regulation after English King Henry VIII's 1533 
confiscation of the English Catholic Church were influenced by a developing Puritan ide-
ology. English Puritans, increasingly dominant in government and church, saw the Sunday 
sabbath as critical preparation-time to assure a better secular Kingdom on earth and more 
likely salvation thereafter. The protestant work-ethic reemphasized Sunday's importance for 
rest and reflection, to better prepare for even more diligent work on the week's other six 
days. All this fed into a Puritan dislike of Sunday sportive play, also encouraging govern-
ment Sunday regulation, to assure worship was conducted and attended, without the inter-
ference of labor or recreation.9 
After the Virginia colony's foundering start from 1607 to 1610, its proprietors there-
after applied, among other things, Puritan strictures against Sunday secularism, to improve 
the discipline and through it, the performance, of the colonists. Church attendance was 
required. enforced by guards locking settlement gates and searching non-church buildings for 
shirkers during worship services. 10 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
This severe discipline impeded immigration, which the proprietors sought to over-
Seen. 25, Chapter 3, supra, and accompanying text. 
Ibid. 
See nn. 4 - 19, Chapter 4, supra. 
See n. 20, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
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come by creating a an elected colonial assembly. The resulting "House of Burgesses," though 
manipulated by upper classes, reflected self-government unusual for its time. 11 Review of its 
legislation shows the importance colonists placed on regulation of Sunday labor and wor-
ship.12 The difficulty with laws prohibiting Sunday work, however, as events (including the 
Francisco case) would show, was not so much that general rule; but rather how to define 
exceptions so essential work could be performed on Sunday, despite the general prohibition. 
The result was unremitting tension between heaven's perceived mandates against sabbath 
work, contrasted with an earthly reality that certain work could not be deferred, despite 
closing-law dictates. The shorthand description of the type of Sunday work allowed was 
embodied in the statutory term ''necessitie" the Burg~sses used 13 
As a practical matter, the closing law "necessity" exception to Sunday work (and its 
first-cousin "charity" exception as well), to a significant degree, swallowed up the general 
rule that Sunday work was not allowed. As the years progressed, reviewing courts deemed 
a continually wider range of conduct to satisfy the ''necessity" exception, rendering the term 
"nearly meaningless. "14 The metaphorical handwriting leading to this conclusion was clearly 
on the wall in 1942 when Francisco was decided. Indications of the problem, however, were 
already visible in the colonial era, when prominent landowners considered themselves 
11 
12 
13 
14 
See n. 23, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
Ibid, n. 24, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 30, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
Seen. 34, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
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compelled to work on Sunday, searching for new lands to replace plantations worn out by 
soil-destroying tobacco farming. 15 
America's independence resulted in the Declaration oflndependence and Virginia's 
177 6 Constitution declaring Virginia free from prior connections with Britain.16 Virginia post-
revolutionary legislation voided all English religious regulation statutes.17 At about the same 
time, Virginia enacted, in its 1776 "Declaration of Rights," provisions for religious freedom. 
Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom18 was adopted on January 16, 
1786.19 Leaving aside scholarly disagreements on its meaning,20 its text says that ''no man 
shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship," nor be "restrained, mo-
lested or burthened ... on account of his religious opirµons," but "shall be free to profess, and 
by argument to maintain ... opinions in matters of religion"21 without diminishing one's "civil 
15 See n. 40, Chapter 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
16 See n. 2, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. 
17 Seen. 3, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. 
18 A Jefferson biographer called this enactment the "Bill for Religious Freedom" be-
fore adoption, and "Statute for Religious Freedom" thereafter, Peterson, Thomas Jeffer-
son and the New Nation, 141. Jefferson's self-written epitaph called it the "Statute of 
Virginia for religious freedom," n. 1, Chapter 1, supra, herein. 
19 Details of its adoption are set forth in n. 20, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying 
text. 
20 See n. 11, Chapter 5, supra 
21 Seen. 17. Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. 
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capacities. "22 This fairly seemed to preclude, or at least discourage, governmental reliance on, 
or regulation or support ot: any religion. 
A little over ten months later, in contrast, the legislature enacted the first post-
revolutionary Sunday closing law, imposing monetary forfeiture on one who, on Sunday, "be 
found labouring at his own or any other trade or calling ... in labour or other business except 
. . . work of necessity or charity. "23 These provisions were relatively unchanged from 1786 
through the Francisco 1942 appellate decision with which this thesis concludes. 
At the least, the closing law seemed to contradict major assumptions of Jefferson's 
religious freedom statute. The closing law "restrained" citizens from ignoring Sunday's 
mandated rest. ·If they did not do so, they were stat:utorily "diminish[ ed]" in their "civil 
capacities," through forfeitures.24 Remarkably, research of Julian Boyd, editor of a major 
Thomas Jefferson document compilation, revealed that Jefferson, drafter of the Virginia 
Statute of Religious Freedom, also either drafted or approved Virginia's closing law.25 
Jefferson's virtually simultaneous proposal of two such philosophically contradic-
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. The quotations in the paragraph are from Jefferson's Religious Freedom 
Statue, as quoted two paragraphs before the footnoted paragraph. 
25 See n. 24, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. Jefferson chaired a legisla-
tive committee tasked to formulate new legislation required by the Revolution. Jef-
ferson himself drafted much of this legislation and, as Committee chair, reviewed virtually 
all the rest. The legislation was presented to the legislature in 1779, but not adopted until 
the Revolution was over in 1785-1786. Seen. 20(3), Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying 
text. 
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tory statutes is puzzling.26 His statute for religious freedom eloquently decried government 
interference with or support of religion In contrast, Virginia's Sunday closing law mandated 
ceasing Sunday labor, obviously supporting strictures against Sunday work that organized 
Christianity required. 
Jefferson's seemingly contradictory, simultaneously-held, attitudes about the rela-
tion of government and religion, revealed by his involvement in the two above-described 
statutes, mirrored conflicting public attitudes on the same topic. This conflict was illustrated 
by the United States Supreme Court's unanimous conclusion in Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. United States that this was a "Christian nation;"27 contrasted with the American Treaty with 
Tripoli stating the country was "not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion," 
approved without dissent by the United States Senate in 1797.28 
These examples reveal powerful, contradictory, national forces, for and against go-
vernment attachment to religion, near the closing law's 1786 adoption. Jefferson had a 
penchant for what Joseph Ellis called "seductive fictions" and to play ''fast and loose with 
26 Jefferson did not literally make these "virtually simultaneous proposals" of legisla-
tion in 1786 because he was then in Paris as minister to France. His "faithful lieuten-
ant" James Madison did so. See nn. 159 and 160, supra, and accompanying text. 
27 An 1892 case, but relying on 100-year-earlier precedent, see Chapter S(c)(l) 
herein, supra. 
28 Seen. 39, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. The quoted treaty text was 
was authoritatively determined in the 1920s to be a false translation of the original arabic. 
It was nevertheless believed genuine by the United States Senate in 1797, which ratified 
the Treaty containing it without dissent. See Chapter 5(c)(2) herein. 
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historical evidence on behalf of a greater cause. "29 Perhaps, a murky record suggests, this was 
congenial to his sponsoring the closing law as an offset to obtaining adoption of his Virginia 
Religious Freedom Statute and other statutory welfare measures.Jo 
In the nineteenth century there was limited appellate activity under the Virginia 
Sunday closing law. Appeals in other states, however, gave fair indication of how its 
enforcement was developing, providing valuable guidance for later Virginia appeals. It is 
evident that nineteenth century appeals in states other than Virginia, collected in Chapter6( a) 
( 1) herein, supra, did not arise from an abstract desire to reduce Sunday work. Instead, they 
involved defendants, including large businesses of the day, using the closing law as a foil to 
avoid otherwise unpardonable injuries to plaintiffs, whose ''misdeeds" were little more than 
inoffensively traveling or working on that day, a nominal closing law violation.JI 
Other New England courts similarly applied their state closing laws to excuse breach-
of-contract defendants from liability for Sunday failures to properly care for leased horses 
and livery. J2 Still other courts, however, held that Sunday wrongdoings by tort or contract 
defendants were not excused by the plaintiffs' traveling or working on Sunday, even if 
29 Seen. 63, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text. 
30 See n. 72, Chapter 5, supra, and accompanying text preceding and following that 
footnote. 
JI See nn. 2 - 4, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
J2 See nn. 5 - 7, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
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violating a state closing law.33 Society was becoming too complicated, concluded the 1829 
U.S. Senate Report of the Committee on Post Offices and Postal Roads, to have vital parts 
of it, including Sunday mail transport, interrupted for 24 hours. 34 His Committee thus declined 
church-group petitions to ban such Sunday transport for religious reasons. Virginia's Sun-
day closing law received United States Supreme Court review in Powhatan Steamboat Co. 
v. Appomattox R.R. (1860). 35 Plaintiff steamboat company sued for damages to goods it 
shipped from Baltimore to City Point, Virginia, which were un-loaded on a Sunday to 
defendant railroad's City Point warehouse, for transshipping the following day (Monday). The 
trial court found the Sunday fire that destroyed plaintiff's goods was caused by defendant's 
breach of duty, a finding not challenged on appeal.36 That court, however, also effectively 
held defendant railroad not liable for the Sunday fire in its warehouse destroying plaintiff's 
goods, solely due to the Sunday closing law.37 
33 
34 
35 
The Supreme Court adroitly reversed the trial court. Without overtly criticizing 
See nn. 11 - 13, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
See nn. 14 - 16, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
65 U.S. (24 How.) 247 (1860). See also Chapter 6(b) herein, supra. 
36 See nn. 21-24, Chapter 6 and accompanying text. Powhatan was a "diversity'' 
action [federal civil suit with parties from different states; s.v. "diversity," Black's Law 
Dictionary (Jh ed.)]. The "Rules of Decision Act" requires that state law applies (unless 
barred by federal constitution or statute), see n. 3, Chapter 6, supra. That would include 
Virginia's closing law because the damage litigated occurred on Sunday in Virginia. 
37 See nn. 30 - 32, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
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Virginia's closing law, the Court emphasized interpretation difficulties that law created, 38 
disapproving ofit by implication. The Court's holding, consistent with that implied criticism, 
significantly narrowed the closing law by first holding that certain of defendant's duties, 
such as safekeeping plaintiff's entrusted goods, were independent of defendant's contract to 
store and transship them. These duties were, therefore, unaffected by the closing law as well 
and thus, the Court held, that law could not prohibit their Sunday performance. 39 
Second, Powhatan alternatively held that even if these non-contractual duties were 
assumed to be subject to the closing law, that defendant railroad was still required to protect 
the plaintiff steamboat company's property on Sunday as a closing-law "necessity.''40 The 
failure to do so, evidenced by the Sunday fire destroying plaintiff's goods in defendant's 
warehouse, rendered defendant liable to plaintiff despite the closing law.41 
The Virginia Supreme Court's closing law holdings generally, with occasional 
exceptions, resembled the United States Supreme Court's approach just described in Pow-
hatan. It espoused no overt distaste for Virginia's closing law, but when no clear precedent 
38 See n. 36, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. The Court was conscious 
of the influence ofits opinions long before 1860, seen. 37, Chapter 6, supra. 
39 See n. 41, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
40 See nn. 43 and 44, Chapter 6, supra, and accompanying text. 
41 Technically, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to "issue a new venire," 
65 U.S. at 257, i.e. a new 'jury panel" for a new trial. See s.v. ''venire", Black's Law 
Dictionary (7th ed.). However, given the rulings of law based on undisputed facts in 
Powhatan by the highest court of the land, such a "new trial" would be confined to 
damages, not liability, since the latter had already been determined by the Supreme Court. 
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or statute stood in its way, with fair consistency it narrowed the law's impact, favoring the 
freeing of Sunday labor from its restrictions. Though this thesis debated details of some of 
the Virginia Supreme Court's closing-law opinions,42 from a different view they can be said 
to collectively comprise a complicated verbal tapestry with a defined object. The court first 
buttressed, unasked, the closing law's constitutionality, apparently conforming to popular 
Virginia opinion. 43 Then, it interpreted the closing law in succeeding cases to generally allow 
continuing expansion of labor and other Sunday business activity, contrary to that law's 
supposed intention. This apparently accorded with the preferences ofVirginia' s public. 44 That 
is, Virginians wanted the comfort of a closing law, but did not, as a practical matter, want it 
to to materially restrict their Sunday activities, particularly recreation. The Virginia Supreme 
Court's unarticulated but nearly-consistently-followed twentieth century response until the 
1942 conclusion of this thesis seemed, in essence, to strive to give the public what it wanted, 
42 See Chapter 7, nn,: 15, 27(sentence following n.27) 21-32, 50, 52-66, 77, 83-87, 
103, 107, 112, 120, 123-126, 135, andl37~147 and accompanying text; and Chapter 8, nn. 
118, 123, 127-128, 137-138 (and paragraph following n. 138), and 140-141, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
43 See nn. 39-49, Chapter 7, and accompanying text. 
44 Public satisfaction with existence (contrasted with enforcement) of the closing law 
is inferred from the absence of any contrary claims in the briefing of Pirkey, Lakeside and 
Francisco, and the absence of dissatisfaction expressed about the law, per the Francisco 
news reports quoted, even with reason to fear substantial inconvenience because of it. See 
nn. 89 and 92, Chapter 8, supra. For public desire to not actually be restricted by closing law, 
seen. 92, ibid.: (1) Times Dispatch, October 18, 1941 ... (b) " ... it would appear [due to 
Francisco trial] hundreds of articles now sold on Sunday are sold in violation of the blue 
law." Thus, the public, as this passage made clear, understood they were extensively 
benefiting from businesses operating on Sunday that the closing law prohibited. 
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by interpreting the closing law to simultaneously achieve both these contradictory public 
desires, as best it could. 
This pattern began in Hortenstein v. Virginia Carolina RR (1904), 45 Virginia's first 
twentieth-century closing law appeal. The court denied that a recovery could be solely based 
on defendant railroad having caused an injury while running locomotives on Sunday in 
violation of the closing law. Proof of negligence was still required, as in any other personal 
injury claim. 46 By reverse inference, this presumably meant that Virginia aligned itself with 
cases collected in thesis Chapter 6( a) (2) herein, supra, denying that the closing law excused 
negligence or contract breaches inflicted on Sunday closing law violators. That is, if 
defendant's closing law violation in Hartenstein did not allow plaintiff to forego proofs of 
negligence to win; then neither, in logic, could a defendant use a plaintiff's closing law 
violation, to overcome defendant's negligence, so the defendant could win. 
The Virginia Supreme Court further limited the closing law in Wells v. Common-
wealth (1907), by ruling it was not a criminal statute, so that its monetary ''forfeit" was not 
a criminal fine, and wa8 collectable only through a separate civil suit.47 Wells, however, 
created new confusions which, metaphorically speaking, blew up in the Virginia Supreme 
Court's face in Hanger v. Commonwealth (1908) shortly thereafter. In Hanger, a blatantly 
45 
46 
47 
See n. 2, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
Seen. 5, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 6 - 8, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
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improper attempt to evade the closing law48 left the supreme court powerless to fine the 
closing law offender, because in Wells this same court had taken away the power ofitself and 
the rest of the judicial branch to do so. 
Wells and Hanger were legislatively overturned by a 1908 closing law amendment, 
specifying its violations were misdemeanors.49 Ellis v. Covington (1917),50 the first closing 
law appeal reaching the court thereafter, construed a municipal ordinance duplicating the 
amendment. Ellis's significance, however, is not due to its case-facts. Its closing law 
importance was its dictum intimating that Ellis, the appellant, a restaurant-owner in 
Covington, Virginia, ''plainly could not, though licensed, ply his calling of selling such [soft] 
drinks on the Sabbath day in any way so as to escape.liability under the ordinance."51 Judge 
Bazile relied on this passage in his Francisco "Opinion of the Court," calling it "a definite 
holding by the highest Court of the Commonwealth that the selling on Sunday of soft drinks 
pursuant to one;s regular business is a violation of the Sunday law."52 The Judge's point was 
that, in Francisco, any County-Supervisor beer-sale approval, still permitted no sales on 
Sunday, due to the closing law being engrafted onto the Supervisors' beer-approval statute. 
48 See nn. 10-15, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
49 Seen. 16, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
50 See nn. 17 - 19, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
SI Ellis, 122 Va. 821, 825 (emphasis added). 
52 See nn. 109 - 112, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. Exhibit "C", Pe-
tition, "Opinion of the Court," 25. 
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Today, with 20/20 hindsight, Judge Bazile's reliance on Ellis in Francisco appears 
misplaced. The statement quoted was not a "holding" as the Judge termed it, but "dictum" 
upon which, by definition, one cannot rely.53 The above Ellis quotation ostensibly limiting 
the right to sell soft drinks on Sunday,54 was contrary to the express words of the statute and, 
in any event, was not the precise point decided by the Ellis case. 55 The closing Jaw provided 
that one could, indeed, escape its liability by exemptions under its "necessity" or "charity" 
exceptions from its otherwise-required Sunday suspension of labor. The Judge, however, 
apparently failed to anticipate the ingenuity with which ''necessity'' or "charity'' exemptions 
could be found, and the receptiveness of the Virginia Supreme Court to them, rendering the 
closing Jaw, like the necessity exception itself, ''nearly meaningless. "56 
This thesis offered several illustrations of the country's mood on matters related to 
53 Definition of "dictum" provided at n. 30, Chapter 5, supra. 
54 See n. 50, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
55 The danger of relying on dictum, a:s Judge Bazile relied on Ellis dictum in Fran-
cisco, was cogently explained by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821): "It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general 
expressions in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which these 
expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to 
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The 
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with 
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are 
considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases 
is seldom completely investigated." 
56 See n. 34, Chapter 4, supra; although this was a year 2000 viewpoint, for in-
informed perception of disuse of existing closing Jaws as early as 1880, see n. 23, Chap-
ter 7, supra (speaker at American Bar Association meeting). 
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closing laws immediately after World War I. The first was social commentator Frederick 
Lewis Allen's noting in the ''three to four years" following the Armistice, a "subtle change" 
revealing, he said, a citizenry seeking to "relax," to have "a good time," to "shake off the 
bonds of puritanism," and "upset the long-standing conventions of decorum."57 This 
suggested public passive resistance to enactments like Virginia's closing law. 
Viewpoints were also supplied from the 1920-1921 issues of the Richmond, Virginia-
based Religious Herald weekly newspaper, speaking for Virginia Baptists. An editorial, 
generating a supportive response from a reader in the Richmond city attorney's office, indi-
cated reluctance by those who were both religiously inclined and educationally informed to 
rely upon, or recommend, a law of compulsory sabba~h work-abstinence.58 The distaste of 
those Virginia opinion makers about using closing laws to carry out religious aims, proved 
them better predictors of the Virginia Supreme Court's constitutional rulings in major 1920s 
closing law cases than the briefs of any of the litigants. 
The importance of the next Virginia Supreme Court closing law appeai Pirkey Bro-
thers v. Commonwealth (1922) ("Pirkey"), was not about the issue appealed.59 The 
defendant-appellants were jury-convicted for operating their cave-viewing tourist attraction 
57 
58 
59 
Seen. 20, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
See nn. 22-25, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
Pirkey, 134 Va. 713; 114 S.E. 765 (1922); and n. 237, supra. 
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on Sunday.60 Their briefing to the Virginia Supreme Court was woefully deficient, under-
lined by that court's describing their case as "anomalous,"61 rejecting it in a half-page 
paragraph in the supreme court's eighteen printed opinion in the case. The supreme court 
in Pirkey used about five and one-half printed pages to supply a constitutional justification 
for the closing law (unasked by either litigant), apparently assisting closing law proponents. 62 
Then, similar to the technique used by United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
MarshallinMarburyv. Madison (1803),63 Pirkey next spent about seven more printed pages 
imposing closing law trial procedures sure to impede future prosecutions. The Common-
Commonwealth could not complain because, like the Jeffersonian executive-branch officials 
prevailing in Marbury, it had won the issues actually .contested in the appeal. 64 
Thus it appears the court decided Pirkey, not because of the importance of any issue 
raised in its appeal, but as an opportunity to lay down rules controlling how future closing 
60 Seen. 28, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
61 See nn. 29-32, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text; and Pirkey at 730 
(speaking of the case as an "anomalous" appeal). 
62 Pirkey held, 134 Va. at 725: "'Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are up-
held not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of religious ob-
servance, but from the right to protect all persons from the . . . debasement which comes 
from uninterrupted labor."' Quoting Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885). 
63 See nn. 67 - 70, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
64 Primary Pirkey rulings restricting closing law prosecutions were: (A) ''Necessi-
ty" was not confined to its eighteenth century meaning, but broader contemporary meaning; 
and (B) Virtually every issue was to be decided by jury, even if different juries reached 
contradictory verdicts under the same facts. See nn. 56-60, Chapter 7, supra, and accom-
panying text. 
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law cases were to be presented and decided at trial. The first rule supported the closing law's 
constitutionality, thus seemingly strengthening its enforceability. The second, in contrast, 
provided restrictive procedures for trying closing law cases, weakening the enforceability of 
the statute that the court's constitutionality rulings had just sustained. Pirkey was immedi-
ately used for the latter purpose by the supreme court in Lakeside Inn, Corp. v. Common-
wealth ("Lakeside"), 65 a closing law opinion released the same day. Lakeside expanded the 
"necessity'' exception to further restrict the success of closing law prosecutions. 
The defendant Inn was jury-convicted for operating its swimming pool on Sunday. 
The supreme court reversed the trial court's barring of defendant Inn's evidence and jury 
instructions. The evidence was the sheriff's testimony that its Sunday pool operation reduced 
nude-swimming arrests, which the court held it was error to exclude. 66 The jury instruction 
error, the court held, was to deny defendant the opportunity it unsuccessfully requested at 
trial for the jury to consider if ''the work of conducting [Lakeside 's] ... bathing pool is a 
necessity within the meaning of the statute" and if so "find the defendant not guilty," because 
the Sunday pool operation (supposedly) reduced nude bathing67 
Lakeside 's critical widening of the closing law ''necessity" exemption no longer 
limited it to the defendant's necessity, or the necessity of anyone with whom defendant dealt. 
65 See, nn. 71 - 87, Chapter 7, supra. 
66 See nn. 73 - 78, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text. 
67 Seen; 79, Chapter 7, supra, and accompanying text [quoting Lakeside, 134 Va at 
705 (defendant's proposed instruction no. 4)]. 
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Instead, the "necessity" was the benefit to anyone in the surrounding county, including some 
not having any contact with the defendant; all supposedly benefitted by the absence of nude 
bathing. The supreme court did not require that the defendant intended any such benefit 
(reducing nude-bathing) by its Sunday pool operation. In fact, defendant's decision to operate 
its pool on Sunday appeared to be motivated by nothing more nor less than typical business 
profit-seeking. No proofs were adduced that it was intended to "benefit" anything except 
defendant's bottom-line; certainly not the local county moral climate (through nude bathing 
reduction). Further, reducing nude-bathing, however arguably beneficial, could hardly be; 
deemed a "necessity" in the ordinary sense of the word. 68 
What Lakeside further suggested was that th~ supreme court was willing to allow, 
through the "necessity" exemption, additional avenues for businesses to escape the closing 
law. The extent to which new "necessities" could now be "discovered" was even more 
tellingly revealed in Francisco, discussed in thesis Chapter 8 herein, supra. Sunday beer 
sales, the Francisco court held, could be a ''necessity," if the jury so-decided. The court also 
reduced the threshold needed to satisfy the statute's "necessity'' standard by redefining the 
word to mean "reasonably essen-tial to the economic, social or moral welfare of the 
68 See, s.v. "necessity", American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed., 2000), "Pressing or 
urgent need .... "; OED Micrograph (seen. 224, supra): "3. The constraining power of 
circumstances; a condition or state of things compelling to a certain course of action." 
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969), "indispensability, ... impossibility 
of a contrary order or condition, ... urgent need or desire." 
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community,"69 certainly not sounding like "necessity" in the conventional dictionary 
understanding. 7° Further, in no real sense could it be said Hanover County determined there 
was any "necessity'' for Sunday beer sales. Francisco deemed this decided (if the jury agreed) 
by the Board of Supervisors' failure to act, as opposed to taking action, to ban or allow beer 
sales. A motion by one of the Supervisor's to ban County Sunday beer sales died for want 
of a second to the motion, meaning there was no record of the Board of Supervisors as a 
whole reaching any decision on the matter. 71 
What was apparent in Francisco, as detailed in thesis Chapter 8 herein, supra, was 
that the Sunday Closing Law's effectiveness in late 1941 Virginia, even in bucolic Hanover 
County, to actually enforce cessation of Sunday labor.was virtually a dead letter, in place as 
a matter of form but actually ineffective. The supreme court, in Francisco, indirectly 
acknowledged this by stating that eighty percent of the licensed merchants in the County were 
"openly" selling.beer on Sundays.72 The transcript (Exhibit "C") reveals, as the appellate 
opinion does not, that this evidence came from the County's ABC inspector's unchallenged 
testimony.73 The supreme court's adding "openly" to its description of the selling, 
69 See n. 119, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, quoting from the Francisco 
opinion. 
70 
71 
72 
73 
See n. 68, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
See nn. 120-122, this Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 66, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. 
See n. 65, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, citing to the transcript testi-
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emphasized the wholesale dearth of closing law enforcement in the area, even though case law 
of the period did not allow such considerations to bar convictions. 74 The lack of such 
enforcement was what today is called "the elephant in the room," the obvious fact that no one 
wants to discuss. 
The Francisco transcript, also reveals, in a way the appellate opinion does not, trial 
Judge Leon Bazile's deep involvement in generating the prosecution, in this close-knit 
community of over sixty years ago, in a way that would be almost unimaginable today. The 
chief complaining witness (Nichols) and the prosecutor acknowledged he was "directed by 
the Honorable Judge and the Commonwealth's Attorney to bring evidence in Court," before 
a criminal warrant was filed. 75 
In retrospect, the Judge's involvement may have impaired the prosecution. Confin-
ing the indictment only to beer sales76 could have occurred at the Judge's suggestion because 
of his long tenuie as an assistant attorney general dealing with closing law appeals, and later 
legislative service when enabling acts allowing communities to ban sales of regulated pro-
73( ••• continued) 
mony. 
74 See n. 63, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. 
15 See n. 54, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, citing the transcript in Ex-
hibit "C". 
76 See n. 4, Chapter 2, supra, and accompanying text, citing supreme court Francis-
CO Opllllon. 
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ucts such as spirits, were adopted.77 Had the prosecution been limited to non-beer Sunday 
sales at Francisco's store,78 there would have been less opportunity for the defendant to 
argue that the actions of the Board of Supervisors authorized Sunday beer sales on 
''necessity'' grounds. No equivalent statutory power was given the Board to approve Sunday 
sales of non-alcohol items. Accordingly, defendant's "necessity" defense. based on the need 
for additional County economic activity could not have been mounted as easily if a beer sale 
had not been the basis of the prosecution. 79 
77 See nn.115-116, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. The Judge's "Opin-
ion of the Court," Exhibit "C", Petition, 29, revealed he contacted the attorney general's staff 
(perhaps his former colleagues at that office) to learn its policy concerning Sunday beer sales 
by ABC licensees. He also explained his view of the purposes of enabling acts allowing local 
communities to set (or eliminate) Sunday beer sale hours (e.g., "During ... the prohibition 
regime in Virginia (1916-1933) the General Assembly acquired the extremely bad habit of 
enacting statutes allowing the political sub-divisions to parallel the criminal statutes relating 
to the prohibition of ... ardent spirits." Ibid., 31-32). 
78 There is basis to reasonably conclude that a prosecution could easily have been 
based on non-beer items sold. The supreme court in Francisco made clear it was undisputed 
that there was widespread sale on Sunday of merchandise nominally prohibited by the closing 
law: "It developed [from the trial testimony] that throughout Hanover county, which is just 
north of Richmond, and through which several arterial State highways run, restaurants, filling 
stations, and the like habitually sell such articles as sandwiches, beer, wine, soft drinks, cigars, 
cigarettes and tobacco to the local trade, picnickers, tourists and the traveling public on 
Sunday." 180 Va. at 374. Complaining witness Charlie Williams freely admitted he had 
bought beer on Sunday from Francisco's store for his own consumption, not as part of any 
prosecution "many a time." Exhibit "C", Petition, 45 (Response to question by the Court), 
further showing the widespread ignoring of the closing law, even as it concerned Mr. 
Francisco specifically, before this prosecution. 
79 See n. 119, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text, showing how the closing 
law (section 4570) and its "necessity" exception was connected to County Board of Su-
pervisors regulation of Sunday beer sales under the 1938 enabling act. 
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A topic for further investigation would be whether Judge Bazile's involvement in 
Francisco was more than presiding at trial and advising complaining witness Nichols prior 
to the prosecution. Reasons for such considerations include the seeming uniqueness of two 
big-city (Richmond) newspapers covering what would otherwise be a distinctly minor mis-
demeanor trial. Press coverage, or even knowledge, of such a trial would seem to require 
notification from someone at court, presumably the Judge or someone acting at his direc-
tion. 80 (The Defendant, it is surmised, would want as little publicity as possible concerning the 
charges against him. )81 In addition, the trial was set on the Judge's docket at exactly the time 
the Methodists, well known for prohibition sentiments, 82 were holding their state convention. 
80 It is unlikely that in Richmond front pages on October 18, 1941, had excess space 
due to absence of news that reports of the October 17 Francisco trial were needed to 
fill. For example, on October 17, the U.S. destroyer Kearny was torpedoed bya U-boat off 
Greenland, killing eleven sailors, raising concern of war commencing with Germany. 
Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, 
499, n. 375, supra. The Kearny story, along with substantial amounts of other crisis-ridden 
war news, crowded the front pages the same day as accounts of the Francisco trial: Times-
Dispatch, October 18, 1941, 1: "Berlin Finds Kearny Attack, Arms Debate 'Interesting.'" 
81 Conceivably the prosecution could be the source of the publicity, but Common-
wealth's Attorney Simpkins seemed, despite his competence, retiring and not given to 
such initiative. This, however, is admittedly highly speculative; we simply do not know. 
82 In a "lengthy reply to critics," a group of Methodist notables, during the 1928 pre-
sidential campaign, including Virginia's Methodist Bishop James Cannon, Jr., declared that 
''the Southern Methodist Church had long been 'a prohibition church' and had urged its 
members repeatedly to elect public officials committed to prohibition enforcement." Robert 
A. Hohner, Prohibition and Politics: Life of Bishop James Cannon, Jr. (Columbia, S.C.: 
Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1999) ( eBook), 222, incl. n. 25, referencing an article in the 
July 22, 1928 Richmond Times-Dispatch, apparently containing the above quotation, in 
substance. Concerning the October 18, 1941, Virginia Methodist Conference, whose 
(continued ... ) 
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The Judge presumably would have more control than anyone else over setting trial dates for 
cases on his docket. Accordingly, the occurrence of the Francisco trial at the same date as 
the Methodist Convention is arguably more than mere coincidence. 
The Judge's long interest in the details of prohibition-related politics has been de-
scribed. 83 The Methodists' traditional interest in the political ramifications of prohibition, was 
energetically reflected at their Conference, shown by statements reported in the local press 
accompanying the commendatory resolution for the Judge on October 18, 1941, the day after 
the Francisco trial, revealing the atmosphere ofits adoption. 84 It seemingly would have taken 
a great deal of preplanning for passage of the Judge's commendatory resolution to be adopted 
at the Methodist conference the day after trial. 85 Even µiore effort would be needed to obtain 
82( ••• continued) 
resolution praised Judge Bazile's Francisco rulings, the October 19, 1941, Times Dispatch 
front-page article reporting its proceedings, listed "Bishop James Cannon, retired," subject 
of the above biography, supra, this footnote, as "on the program." The stridency of the 
Conference proceedings on prohibition matters reported by the press, very much reflected the 
attitudes and approach of Bishop Cannon as disclosed by his biography, supra, this footnote. 
83 See n. 15, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. 
84 Times Dispatch, October 19, 1941, p. 1: "LYNCHBURG (AP): The Virginia Me-
thodist Conference yesterday adopted a resolution approving the decision of Judge Leon 
Bazile against the sale of beer on Sunday and volleyed 'amens' last night as it heard a report 
calling upon church people to 'make America as dry as the Sahara Desert.'. . . . Last night's 
report . . . recommended that the State Legislature pass a bill confining the sale of all 
alcoholic beverages to ABC stores, requiring State-wide closing on Sunday of all wine and 
beer stores .... " 
85 Typically, conferences such as the Methodists' on October 18, when convened, al-
ready have a full agenda, making the addition of new agenda items difficult. The Judge's 
"blue-law" ruling had to have been issued later than 4:00 PM of the day before the 
(continued ... ) 
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press coverage of that resolution's passage the day after that. Transmitting the Judge's 
Francisco ruling after 4:00 PM or later of the October 17 trial in Hanover County, 86 to the 
85( ••• continued) 
commendatory resolution (seen. 86, infra, this Chapter). For that resolution to be adopted, 
delegates must learn of its circumstances. This could not happen sooner than very late 
afternoon or early evening of the day before, of a minor trial, the details of which most 
persons in the state probably knew nothing. Further, a sufficient number of delegates would 
also have to agree to such a resolution. Typically also, a motion would then be needed to 
place the matter on the agenda, followed by debate, then drafting an appropriate resolution-
text and its adoption, and :finally its release early enough on October 18 for front-page 
placement on the earliest available coverage, October 19 morning Times-Dispatch. This 
appears difficult even if the Conference had known about the judge's ruling the morning of 
the trial on October 17. To accomplish adopting the Resolution within these same time limits 
when the Judge's ruling was not known until late-afternoon or evening of October 17 seems 
very difficult at best, if not impossible based on what is so far known. This suggests, 
therefore, pre-knowledge of how the judge would rule, before the Conference commenced. 
86 The Judge's ruling (commended by Methodist Conference the next day) being later 
than 4:00 PM of the October 17, 1941, Francisco trial is established through the transcript 
(Ex. "C") and Times-Dispatch coverage. The transcript reveals witness testimony until the 
lunch-break (usually lasting.an hour-and-a-half in most courts, presumably beginning at 
noon). The transcript notes the lunch recess commencement (Exhibit "C", Petition, 86). 
After lunch, two final witnesses were examined, ibid, 86-91 (one of whom, the Supervisors 
Clerk was, took longer due to lengthy evidence admission arguments), followed by the Sheriff 
(see nn. 435-437, supra and accompanying text) followed by "extended argument on [jury] 
instructions," 91, ibid. (court reporter notes), which Overton Jones reported consumed two 
hours, Times-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1941, "Hanover Verdict Bans Sale of Sunday Beer as Blue 
Law Violation," 1, continuation p. 12, resulting in the judge's instructing the jury, as 
incorrectly described by the press, ''that a sale of beer on Sunday is a violation of the blue 
law." Ibid. (Incorrect because reading the trial transcript, Ex. "C", Petition, shows no such 
judicial statement). Assuming one-hour for lunch, starting at noon, plus an hour for the final 
two witnesses, including the argument over admitting the Board of Supervisors' records, and 
two hours of jury instruction argument (as Overton-Jones of the Times-Dispatch reported), 
it was not certain what "blue law'' ruling the Judge would finally issue, until the jury 
instruction argument concluded. Accordingly, the Judge's ruling was unlikely to have been 
final earlier than 4:00 P.M. and very probably later (due to a likely longer lunch-break, and 
the Judge's presence on the bench until the end of trial, preventing his discussing the trial 
(continued ... ) 
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Methodist Convention in Lynchburg, over one-hundred road miles away, resulting in a 
resolution praising the Judge's decision the Convention adopted the next day, October 18, 
and also generating front-page headlines about the resolution on the same day in one 
Richmond paper, the News-Leader, 81 and the day after, October 19, in the other, the Times-
Dispatch88 (also a hundred miles away from the convention), suggest preplanning and 
coordination to accomplish all this within the time it happened. Further investigation might 
confirm or refute the Judge's involvement, as above speculated, but not within the time 
confines of this thesis. 
The other two interwar appeals were, first, Commonwealth v. Crook (1927), which 
affirmed the conviction of the Richmond and Portsmouth professional baseball teams and 
umpires of the game on question for playing on Sunday. From a close reading, however, it 
is clear that this one case seemingly supporting the closing law, differing in that way from 
most of the other interwar cases, was actually no different. Pirkey had ruled that the jury, 
86( ••• continued) 
with Conference delegates in Lynchburg until later than his jury-instruction rulings). It would 
be difficult for anyone, except the Judge himself, even by telephone, to advise anyone at the 
Methodist Conference about just what had occurred in the Hanover trial and what the Judge 
had ruled. His rulings on the record did not prohibit Sunday beer sales without exception. 
The first public notice of such a ruling was in his January 19, 1942, "Opinion of the Court" 
(Ex "C," 22-34, especially 27), not issued until three months after the trial. The details of 
this minor trial were unlikely to be known by anyone at the conference on October 18, 
without the Judge's elaboration of them. 
87 See n. 9, Chapter 8, supra, and accompanying text. 
88 See n. 84, this Chapter, supra, and accompanying text. 
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generally speaking, must decide if the Sunday labor was excused by the statute's "necessity'' 
exemption. Crook followed that rule, 89 and the jury found for the prosecution. However, the 
Pirkey case, under which the jury decision was allowed, recognized that there could be 
inconsistent rulings by differing jury panels on the same facts. 
Finally, the closing law "charity'' exemption, as explained in the commentary of this 
thesis on Williams v. Commonwealth (1942),90 allowed a business, to possibly (and 
paradoxically) better its overall :financial return under the closing law by donating its Sunday 
net profits to charity. An additional irony was that the closing law, in this way, came close to 
being stood on its head: It was being used to encourage Sunday employment instead of its 
purported purpose of allowing that day as a rest for laborers. 
In retrospect, the controversies and confusions that once dominated public discourse 
and litigation concerning Sunday closing laws, may provide insights to cautiously draw from 
a review of these once hotly-contested and now quiet, or at least quiescent, controversies. 
The first cautious insight is, that an absence of a strongly-felt public need for a statute 
ostensibly guiding public conduct, like the Sunday closing law, tends to result in disuse of the 
statute for its intended purpose, even though it nominally remains on the books. To sanction 
its repeal requires, to the inward mind, perhaps, some explanation about why it is no longer 
89 147 Va. at 597. 
90 Seen. 108, Chapter 7, supra, and Chapter 7(b)(5) herein, supra. 
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followed, a discussion the public might just as soon not undertake. So nothing is said, and all 
concerned hope nothing more comes of it, without actually taking action, such as repealing 
its provisions, to formally bring its influence to an end. 
This is often not the end of the matter, however. The ancient adage that ''the devil 
:finds work for idle hands to do,"91 applies in a secular sense to idle statutes as well. When a 
statute, ostensibly intended to improve human behavior, becomes "idle" because it is deemed 
by the public, and hence by enforcement officials the public selects, as no longer appropriate 
for its intended use; it can be used by others to commit mischief for personal advantage. Such 
improper use can range from a business person seeking to hurt another's business for 
commercial advantage to a crank seeking to tar a d~fendant with a criminal record for 
engaging in conduct equally practiced by many others without penalty. 
The development of the Sunday closing law is a convenient vehicle through which to 
observe such conduct, since the time has passed when it was enforced with any regularity, 
yet the memories of such times are still fixed in many minds. It stands as a warning that any 
such statute, intended for the good of the citizenry, if not widely supported, can well be-
come a tool of favoritism for the few. That is among the reasons the title of this thesis speaks 
of the "troubled" intersection of Christ and Commerce.92 Tracing the closing law's 
91 Derived from the writings of St. Jerome, see Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs, 70, 
n. 4, Chapter 3, supra. 
92 
"Christ" is used here as a metaphor for the public desire to foster in secular society 
the Christ-like virtue ofa day ofrest and reflection for its working members, while avoid-
( continued ... ) 
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development from earliest times to the present era of appellate-court opinions, it would not 
be out of bounds for many to conclude from the review herein of such opinions, that pre-
cious little benefit was obtained for either alternative, Christ or Commerce, through the 
operations of such laws, when viewed in a Virginia microcosm. 
The statute's objective of enforcing a uniform day of rest was undercut, in the first 
place, by a series of statutory exemptions from prosecutions, such as for ''furnaces, kilns, 
plants and other businesses" that ''may" be ''necessary to be conducted on Sunday.''93 Large 
businesses, therefore, and their equally large numbers of employees, effectively escaped the 
closing law. The public could observe additional amendments further restricting the closing 
law's force such as, in 1932, "sale of gasoline, or any ~otor vehicle fuel, or any motor oil . 
• • • "
94 This both provided another significant exemption from the Sunday closing law and a 
means, through the fuel sales, for additional long-range Sunday travel for the public in 
general, leading tO more Sunday commercial activities, also violating the closing law, due to 
that travel. 
In addition, the statutory opening of the exemption door appeared to encourage the 
Virginia Supreme Court to join the legislature in expanding the ''necessity" and "charity" 
92( ••• continued) 
ing constitutionally undue deference to the Christian religion's claims on Sunday as a day 
of worship. 
93 
94 
Va. Code §4570, as amended; quoted in Francisco, 180 Va. at 374-375. 
Ibid, amendment contained in Va. Acts of 1932, c. 328, p. 596. 
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closing law exemptions, as additional escapes from its enforcement. In this way the closing 
law, designed to reduce the incidents of sabbath work, was seemingly used, to the contrary 
to do just the opposite, increasing the amount of such Sunday work. From this can be 
generalized a third insight derived from the history of Virginia's closing law as it operated in 
the real world: The public's view of a statute designed to improve human behavior, but not 
popularly supported and consequently falling into disuse, becomes encrusted with cynicism 
when business ostensibly affected by it use their influence with governmental authorities to 
avoid whatever rigor the statute retained. 
Thus, closing laws were trending towards being used either without reference to, or 
contrary to, their intended purposes, leading to their fjnal extinction in 1988. 95 This ultimate 
denouement was after the 1942 end-point of this thesis. Crystaliz.ation of that conclusion, 
however, could be surmised from the trends and tendencies described in this thesis. 
95 Henderson Development Co., Inc. v. Sciortino, 236 Va. 136, 150, 372 S.E.2d 751 
(1988) ("[The record discloses] the local-option feature and the fact that over half the 
population of the Commonwealth has utilized it to escape the law's effects entirely; . . . 
repeated acts of the General Assembly creating additional and broader exemptions ... and 
. . . prosecutions only on 'private complaint.' . . . . [N]one of these steps was in itself 
improper ... , but ... their combined effects have reduced the application of a general law 
to the kind of special legislation prohibited by Article IV, section 14 and 15 of the Virginia 
Constitution [(1971)].")(Note that two of the features of Francisco, a de facto "private 
complaint" by the husband of the store owner competing with the defendant, and a form of 
"local option" through the Board of Supervisors' ability to control Sunday beer sales, in 
somewhat different form, became part of the basis for ultimately finding the closing law 
unconstitutional in 1988, as above quoted in Sciortino, ibid.) 
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APPENDIX-ATTACHED EXHIBITS 
Ex. Description 
ALL PHOTOREDUCED, EXCEPT EXHIBIT "F-1" 
"A" Motion Picture Announcement: Breathless, Jean Harlow & 
William Powell, Roanoke, Virginia (1935). 
"B" Photograph, Lakeside Inn pool and patrons, Roanoke, 
Virginia, in the 1920s. 
"C" M.G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, Petition for Writ of Error 
[by Defendant], filed September 16, 1942, Virginia Supreme 
Court ["Petition '1-
"D" M.G. Francisco v. Commonwealth, Brief on Behalf of the Com-
monwealth, filed October 8, 1942, Virginia Supreme Court. 
"E" Hanover Circuit Court, Common Law Order Book No. 19, 
page 214, Appointment of Joseph Johnson as County 
Supervisor, December 30, 1941. 
"F" November 20, 1941, Draft Hon. Leon M. Bazile letter to 
Attorney General (hand written by the Judge). 
"F-1" Typescript copy of above Exhibit "F" (tabbed under 
Exhibit "F", following that handwritten copy). 
"G" Albert 0. Boschen, Delegate, December 28, 1941, letter to 
Hon. Leon M. Bazile. 
"H" Author's April 16, 2002, letter to Sumpter Priddy, 
countersigned by him. 
"I" Hanover County Criminal Docket, May 1942. 
"J" Hanover Circuit Court, Common Law Order Book No. 19, 
Page 379. Edward Simpkins, Commonwealth Attorney, Nolle 
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131, n. 141 
135, n. 3 
135, n. 4 
138, n. 3 
141, n. 18 
141, n. 18 
143, n. 22 
144, n. 24 
171, n. 106 
Prosequi, Francisco v. Commonwealth, September 20, 194 3. 177. n. 125 
Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "A" 
Motion Picture Announcement for Movie Breathless 
Jean Harlow and William Powell 
Roanoke, Virginia (1935) 
Poster Programmed for Charitable Sunday Movie Exhibition 
(Courtesy of the Historical Society of Western Virginia, Roanoke) 
First Page of Discussion of the Exhibit in Thesis Text: 
Page 119, footnote 110 
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Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "B" 
1920's Photo of Lakeside Inn Pool 
Subjected to Virginia Supreme Court Closing Law Appeal 
in Lakeside Inn Corp v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 136 (1922) 
Roanoke, Virginia (early 1920s) 
(Courtesy of the Historical Society of Western Virginia, Roanoke) 
First Page of Discussion of the Exhibit in Thesis Text: 
Page 131, footnote 141 
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Virginia Cavalcade 
43(1994):132-143, ·135. 
Above: W/1111 tht LnktsiM park opr11rtl i11 1920 ii w1.1 //ir fi131 limt 
Roa11Qkl'-<l>Tll rrside11ts had /Jrrll 11/,U. lo 1l.lt a swi111111i11g pool rnl/ttr 1Jia11 
local mda 1111d 1itimfor splasbi11g about. Tiii' pa1it a/lo offmd ot/1er nlltn<· 
6011.1 i11clw!ing 1111 ordvslrtl for d1111cing. 
EXHIBIT 
B 
Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "C" 
Defendant Francisco's Petition for Writ of Error ("Petition'') 
For Virginia Supreme Court Closing Law Appeal 
in Francisco v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 371 (1942) 
Hanover County, Virginia (1942) 
Contains Complete Trial Transcript 
First Page of Discussion of the Exhibit in Thesis Text: 
Page 135, footnote 3 
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ni°THE' .. 
Supreme Court of Appeals of· Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2633 
M. G. FRANCISCO 
JJersus 
COMMONWEALTH 
..••• ' a PETITION If'OR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Oo11rt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, M. G. Fl'ancil!<!o, l'espectfully repl'esents 
that he is aggrieved by a final judgment entered agamst him 
bv the Circuit Court of Hanover Countv on the 16th dav of 
l'vial'ch, 1942, in the case wherein the Coinmonwealth w11s the 
plaintiff and your petitioner was the defendant. A tl"lln-
scr_ipt of the record of the cnse is filed herewith. 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE U>WER COURT. 
Petitioner was indicted on the clmrge of unlawfullv labol'-
ing at his trade or calling, otherwise than in a work of neces-
sity or charity, on !Sunday, in violation of Section 4570 of 
the Code of Virginia, the specific charge being that he "did 
keep open and maintain o~ the sai.d Sunday a business 
2• •for the sale of beer, and did on said Sunday sell beer." 
He pleaded not guilty to tl1e charge. The case was tried 
by a jury on October 17, 1941. The sale of the ·beer on Sun-
day was admitted by the petitioner, and the jury, on a manda-
YSiipteme; :Coiirf of Appeals of Virgfula 
=.· ·•. .. . 
.tory, or finding, instruction given by the court for the Comt: 
monwealth, found petitioner guilty nud fixed his punishmen 
at a fine of fivq dolln'rs. A motion wns mnde to set aside thn~ 
verc1ict as being contrary to the law and the evidence, m1C 
for misdirection of the jurv by the court; which motion Wll!t;: 
overruled, and judgment was e11te1·ed by the Court againsk 
petitioner, in accordnnce with the jury's verdict, on Marci.&.J 
16, 1942, for reasons stnted in writiui~ and made a part ot' tho 
record. It is to that judgment thnt petitioner now seeks 11 
writ of error. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
'!'he question involved in the cnsc i11: Did the sale of beer 
on Sunday by the petitioner coui;titute a work of neces11it,v 
within I.he meaning of Section 4570 of the Code of Virgi11i11 ! 
'l'he uext pri111nry question is: lK tlw nnswer to the first ques-
tion one of fact for the jury to dc(•i1lc, or oue of law fo1· tlw 
court t The incidentnl question11 iuvokccl concern the c1.•r-
reetncRs of the court's net ion in ret'nsing all of t.he iustnw-
tions asked fo1• by the petitioul'r, nml iu n•fusiug to ndmil 
ns evidence certain testimony otl'<!rc1l hy the petitiouer. 
3• •sTATE·MEN'.l' lW l<,AC'l'S. 
u 
l\f. G. Francisco was a country merchnnt operating n gen-
eral store in Hnnover .County, Vir1.d11i11, at which he so!.l 
11:eneralmerelmndise, gasoline n111l oil, cigarettes, cigars, mui I--
tobacco, soft drinks, snmlwich<'1'1, hc•e.r 1111<1 wine. He hml 
the necesRary licenses to do all ol' thl'.~c things. He hnd b1ii~ll C::l 
in business for nbont ten yc11r11. He did not operate hi:o1 
!(e11e1·al merchandise business 011 811111l11y11, but clid sell gai;o· ::c: 
line and oils, cigarettes nnil tol•m·1·0, 1111ft drinks nud iec >< 
~rt!am, and beer aml wine, on tl111t 1l11y. He cliil this openly LU 
on Sunday, 8eptemher 7!11, l!J4l. 1111.J Juul done so for a loug 
time p1-io1· thereto. 
On this p11rticnlar Sumlny, tll'n 11w11, who were sent into 
the sto1·e by n Co11nty policenum for th" purpose, each houp;ht 
~ bottle of beer. It WllS for tho /m.•im'.•.~ of opernting hi" 
dore au<l nmkiug thel'le sale;; thal f<'rmwisco was convicted. 
l'here wns no q11estio11 about tli><111·1forl.v conduct or of tlm 
store linving hc.>cm imp1·opcrly n111. tu fnct the Sheriff of t hn 
Connty, who wns known to l\fr. l<'r11111"ixc•o, wns in the stor•J 
Rt the time the sales were m111fo 111111 luicl been thel'C for 1111 
hour. 1-fo. himself, pnrchnsed ><ouw ><oft drinks antl ice cr1m111 
(R., p. 121). 
(...) 
M. a .. Franciticio.~o~o~we~itii 
.R. K. Turner, th'e Insp~tor ··for the. Virginia .Alci>h<ili~ 
Beverage Control Board for Hanover County, testified that 
there were 61 licensed establishments in Hanover County; 
that of his own knowledge, BO per cent of them were engaged 
in selling beer on Sunday; and that lie did not know how 
many more were doing so. · · 
4• •Six or more pe1·sons, who opel'ated filling stations 
and restaurants at various plnces on the highwavs lead-
ing through the County, !cstified that they i·egularly sold 
bee1· on Sundays, the1·e bemg 25 01• 30 such places on No. 1 
Hig}1way alone (R., p. 58) and that the travelling public de-
mnndcd it. 
It further appeared from the evidence that throughout tho 
County genernlly, restaurants, tilling stations and the like, 
Jinhitually sold sucli nrticles as beer, wine, soft drinks, cigars, 
cig-nrcttcs and tobncco to the local trnde, picnickers, tom·ists 
1111<1 the truvelliug public 011 S1111d11y.9. 
r.. 
,) •ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
It is submitted thnt tho trinl eotu·t erred in the following 
pa1·ticnlnrs, 111unely: 
1. In 1·c.>f11ilinl! to set nsiilo the verdict of the jurv ns being 
couti-1111,· to tire' lnw and the evidence. • 
:!. In'lwlcliiw thut the snlc of beer ·by the petitioner con-
stit.uted a violi1tio11 of section 4570 of the Code of Virginia 
ns n n111ttcr of lnw. 
:-i. In givili!-{ to the jm·:v In11fruetion No. 1 nt the i·equest 
of the Couunouwcnlth (R., p. 128) nncl 11n unnumbered ve1·bnl 
im1tmction hy th!! court (R., p. 124). 
+. Ju refusing to give to the jnr:v Instructions Nos. 2, a, 4, 
5, ll, 7, 8, J1 nnd 11-A, nil 1·c1111estecl by petitioner (R., pp. 128 
to 133). . . 
u. In rcfusin!I; to ndmit the l.'\•i<lcnco of C. W. Tnylor, Clerk 
of tlie Board of Supc1·viH01·s of H1111over County, to the ef-
fect thnt n resolution prohibiting the snle of beer iu Hnnover 
County on S11111lny l11ul hc.>en offcrecl fo1· ndoptiou by tho 
Bonr1l at a meetiug thereof l1el«l 011July1, 1941; (R., pp. 114-
J Jf>) tlmt clelclgntions both in bchalt'.of nncl in opposition to the 
acloptiou of the resolution nppt!llrecl before the Board; aucl 
tlmt the Bom·cl clid not adopt it. 
" 
· Supteuie Court of Appeals of Virginia 
5• ,; ARGUMENT. 
. The pertinent· part of .the statute involved, Section 4570 
Of the Code of Virginia, is as follows: · · 
·~If a person on a Sunday be found laboring at any trade 
or calling • • • except in bouseho.l<l or other work of nece:>· 
sity 01· charity, he shall be deemed guilty of misdemeuuor 
... ,, 
The trial court held that the work engaged in by peti-
tioner was not a work of neccs11ity us a matter of law, und 
gave the following instructions to the jury: 
Instruction No. 1: The Coul't instructs the jury t1111t if 
they believe from the evidem:e beyond a i·easonable doubt 
that the accused, M. G. Frnncisco, dicl keep open and main-
tain on Sunclny the 7th of :-:lcpll•lllher in Hanover County 
a business for the sale of 111wr 111111 llicl on snicl Sunday t<cll 
beer, they should fincl him guilty und fix his punishment ut n 
fine of not less thnn five doll111·11 (H., p. 128). 
Verbal Instruction: "Thnt i,:; .what the insfruction tell;; 
I-
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UJ 
yo~ ~entlcmcn, that. the only q1Wl!tion involved is, do ~·011 
believe from the evidence hl•voml a 1·cnsonnblc clouht that ~fr. l<'ranci~~o sold beer on Snndu~·· Now, if you helicVl'. 
from the ev1clcncc beyond a rcni<onable cloubt that :Im 1<11hl 1-
beer on Sunduy, then you must fiiiil him i..•uilty, and five 1lol-
lars will be n snffidcnt fine to he lixe1l" (R., 11· 124). co 
ASSIGNMEN'l'H 1, 2, AND 3. ::c ::>< 
Since assignment<i of:crror, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 nll chnllcng11 LL.I 
tl1e correctm•o;s of the coul't'K hohling mill in giving these two 
inHtructi01u; they will he clisctu<l'l!ll together. 
It is snhmitted thnt thh1 l'nsc is controllecl bv t11e l'llKcs ol' 
Pirkey Brot11ers v. Com111011'11't'111tl1, i:l4 Vil'ginin 713, nml 
J.,11k1isitle l1m v. Comm.11111111•11/111, J:l4 Virginia 69G •uml 
7• that uncle1· the principles th1•rl'in lniil down, the qneKliun 
involved in the cnRe waK 1i11e of fnct for the jury 1111.l 1111\ 
of law fol' the conrt. : In the Pirkey Brothers CRl'l', the defendants were chnl'l!:•'" 
with lnhoring ut their trnde or e1llli11g in that they opemle1l 
Weyer's Cave and that \hl! 1<11itl work was not one of m•c·l•s· 
sitv or charity. 'P.hcre the cviill•IWl' wns submitted to a jury, 
and on its vel'Clil't of guilty n judi.,rn1ent was entcrecl. I >11 
!!PP.tal, this court did not declare that the operution Qf lh_e 
<-f> 
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cave was not a nel'essity'aa a.matter of law, but On p~ge~'731;" 
it said: "We are unable to say that the verdict of the jury, 
approved bv the trial court, is erroneous, and in such cases 
the statute· requires us to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court." 
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court dis-
cussed the ques.tim of what constitutes a "necessity" within 
the meaning oLlhe law, at length, and held among other 
things: 
1. That the issue is one of fal't to be determined by juries 
who reflect a community opinion of moral fitness and pro-
priety ( p. 722). 
~. Tlmt the word "necessity" cannot be construed to mean 
the same thing now as it clicl when the original net was passed 
in 1779. The word is- elastic ancl relative nnd must be con-
11trucc1 with refel'ence-to the conditions under which we live 
(p. 722). 
3. 'r.l1at the necessity meant is not a physical or ubsolule 
nccessitv, hut a moral fitness or propriety of the work and 
lnhor done under the circumstances of ench particular case 
(p. 72:~). 
4. 'l'hnt 110 fixed ancl unvnrying definition of "necessity" 
ns used in the stntute cnn be given1 •·but what may be a s• necessity in one pla~e may not be m another, nnd every 
cnse mmit stancl 011 1t11 own peculiar facts (p. 723). 
5. " 'Laws settiug aside Snndny ns a dny of rest are up-
held not from nny riid1t of government to legislate for tho 
promotion of reli.i:tious ohservnnce, hut from its l'i.~ht to pro-
tect nil personR from the plwsica\ and moral 1lcbnsement 
which comes from uninterrupt~cl lnbor. Such laws hnve nl-
wnys bceu deemed beneficent ancl merciful luws, especially 
to the poor nllll dependent to the laborers in our fnctories 
. 111111 workshops, and in the heated rooms of om· cities· nncl 
·:. flll'il' yaJidity lmR hcen sustained by the highest courts ~f the 
. Stntes.' " 
"These expres11ions, however, while clearlv condemning 
lnhor 011 Sunclny, anrl mlvoenting the observm:1ce of the clay 
a dny of rest, conve~· ·but little i<lea of how thnt rest hi to be 
taken. The l'Ourts have heh! many things to he works of 
.necesRity uncler cxi~tin~ eomlition11 of society, ancl have con-
clemnecl many more, but lmve heen unable to formulate any 
rnfo of univcrs11l 11pplil'11tion. 37 Cyc. 552, rt .~eq.; 25 n.. C. r .... , 
pp. l41S-142B. Under theM circumstances, with no fixed rule 
for our gniclnncc, we find no other course to pursue than 
to apply to the statute the snmc rules of construction thnt 
_..,, 
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are applied to other statutes. The statute should 1ia1•e a rea- 1--
sonaile constniction so us to promote the cud for which il 
was enacted, and thus cover e\·cry cln.s~ of labor at C\'cr)' ~ 
trnde, c11lling or othE"r businclls not excepted by the st.ntuk. :::c: 
'l'hc statute ~houl<l nlso be ru11.itn11·tl iu Ilic li_qlit of tl•r 11_qr >< 
in u.1liitl1 we !ii:e, reco~itin~ the met thnt thcre are thin;.:,; ~ 
which the communitv rcl{nrd as m~-..·,w1ry thnt were not nl·n·s-
aities when the stat-utc -wus fir:<l cum·k<l; that to e.icapc thl· 
pcnnltv pronouuce<l by the stntutc, lhl• L1l>or performed must 
l>C of the clns~ c.i:ccptc<l by thl• stutnll', or rceog11itl'<\ liy th" 
commuuity n~ a nC<'l's•ity, 1111</ t/111/ w/111/ is or i.i uot a t1,..·r.<-
irity is gC11er11lly a question uf f11d fur //1t• jury n111l not 11111 
of law for Ilic court. 'l'hcre on> rnl'l•,; when• the question i, 
one of law for the court. Wlicn· tl•l' net ilonc is plainly ; 
\'iolotiou of the stntut~. nK wli<·n• a n111tr11l'lor, without cllll'r-~·!ncy, is ruuniu~ n stcntll 1'\11n'l·\ "" :-\l\th.lay, 01· tl10 net i:-.. 
p!ainly one of IIL'~c~sit_,., 11~ wli,·n· tl1<· """"<'r lifts Iii• ox out 
uf tl1c <litch; in t.•itlil·r e1\:'\~, tl1l.' 1jlll''tio11 i~ Olh! of la\\' for 
·the court. But if tlil! 11cl lie 11111· 11lu111t whic!1 fain11i11.J<'d 
men rni~hl rc:1so11nbh· differ ns to wl><·ll1 .. r ur 11ot it is a work 
of nccc.••ity, thc11 it· is a questiu11 of f;1d for th<• jnry. l f 
it lie _ohjl'\:tetl that ti.is ll•a\'l'S Ilic 1Jtll''tiu11 1111s<•ttle.J, 
!J• •with nothin~ for fut11n"' ):t1i.!a111·<., 1111,\ tli;1t ,1i1Y..n·11I 
juries nwy real'l1 ditYerl'lll n• .... 11lts u11 th1..' sa111l' e\'itll'11l·1..•, 
we cnn only reply thnt this is trn•· of ;ill qu~~ti1111< of fad 
onJ is c'pecinlly uoticcnlile in l'ri111i1111J <'II'-'" 11111\ ens''"- i11-
vol\'ing questions of 11~:..:li~e11cc" (ilali,•s supplic>t\). (I'. 
7'.!5.) 
The most recc11t case dcci<\,.,\ l·~· the \'in:inin Court 111' 
Appeals is thot of J/11Hell L .. Jl'illi11111< \". ('0111111011u•c11/llr 1lt•-
ci1lcd on June 8th, 19.\:!, (not yet '"'l'"rl<'<l). ' 
Jt is signilicn11t thnt the opi11i1111 i11 ti"• Willinms en~•· l'll· 
tirely il{1111res the ens<! of r:llis '" c• .. ,.;u11l<i11, (1'.!'.? Vo. S:!I), 
which ~\'l\S so can1e~11~· t"die<l 1111<•11 I"' tl1<• .l!lll:,:e of tlic 'l'ri;iJ 
Cuurt 111 the instant ruse. 
ll'illi11111s v. Cu11111101111w11lll. i11\·ol\'1'll the d111r~l'<l violntion 
of Section 4!i70 i11 tl111t 'Villi11111,, '" the 1111111ni:<'l' of two 
thc11tres in F'arl\\\'illc, opcrntl'd tl1<•111 1111 S1111<1:i\' i11 lll-C11l"ll· 
nnce with 1111 ll){r!.'ClllC'nt with tl11· \\'11111a11's Clnh.that till' 111·1 
-. 1irocec1ls o~ the thcntrcs fro111 t 11<· S1111.lay perfon1111m"<'' 
wonld Jie !.i1Vt'll to the C'lnh to Ju• "·""! t'or chnritnhle \'llr-
)1oscs. 
On PBA'C 3 of the opinion, ?.Ir . .Tnstin' Urcgory, Rpcukin~ 
for the Court, snys: 
"There hove been three Vir;..:inin <'nst•s iu which our stnt-
L.) 
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ute has been construed: Pirkty ..Brothtrs v. Commnnwealth.._ 
134 Va. 713, 114 S. E. 764; Lakeside Inn v. Cotnmonwealt/i, 
134 \'n.. G9G, 114' S. E. 769 and Crooks v. Commo11wenlth, 147 
Va. 593, l;Jli R E. 51i5. However, these cas1>s considereJ only 
works of• necessity 1 and not works of' clinrity'. • • • 
"In the Pirkey IJros. cnse the question for Jecision was 
whether it was n \'iQlf!!ion of the statute to keep open a cave 011 
Sunday where an odmission fee was chuq;ed. 'l'hc cu~e was 
snhmitted to a jury on the question of necessity um! a couvic-
tion followcJ. This Court nffirmed the judh'lnent of the tri11l 
Court. Judge Mortin P. Burks, speal:in~ for the Court 
anid thnt ••no fixed and unvarying dclinition of "ncccs-
10• sity" ns used in the Statute cnn he gi\'cn,' thnt the issue 
must be de<"idcd hy the juries in the 1·cspcctive locolities 
who nrc select ell for their 1it11ess nnd who will ret\el'l the com-
111n11ity opinion ot' the lllornl titnes• n11d propriety of tlw work. 
.l u'11!e Hur:.;s :-:nid: 
· \\'e <':11111ut liu\\"e\'cr, ngre<• with the few l'llllrts that 
liold tlint tl1e word "m•<·cssit\·'' 111nst be eo11strncd tu 
Iltl'Hll tl1e s:uu~ tliinK now H!'\~ it did wl1L·n t\1p ori.~inul 
11.-t was pn""'"I in li7!l. ~hwy tl1i11~s that ""-''"~ dec111l'd 
luxurit•s then, or h111l IHI existence nt nll, arc now dee1m•<l 
11<'1.'l''""ri<·s. I•'or <'Xnmple, "tn•••t rnilwnys, l••le:~rapl1s 1111,l 
h·h·phlllll's. '\'h<' won\ i" ..J11,..li<· nnd r<'!ati\'c, :rn<l 111nst lie 
l'1111-.... tna·tl witl1 n•fl1 l'l1 1H.~1...' to t11\! eoihlitio11 .... l\llll1..•r ,,,.J1il'l1 we 
Ii"'" nnd ~·..,t lhl' ••lnstirity mnst 11ot h<• cxh•1Hl,•d "" far llH 
\u <'"<I""'' thnt wlii<·h is 1101 IH'<•dt'ul 11111 si111ply .t.•sirnlile, 11111! 
tlil·n·h~· ,h•t\·nt tlil.• 1uunit\•i;t p1t1·po-;l' of tl11..• ~tntuh• to ~L·l 
npnrt ~11nd11y UK u tln.v ot' n·sl frunl onlinnry 111\iur. S/11/r• v. 
J111rr.-s, Sl S. C. 1!17, l;:! S. E. :!14, l~ L. IL.\.(~. S.) 1;17, l:!'l 
,\ 111. !-it. Hep. !lO:!, Hi A 1111. Cn,, 277 . 
"' J 11 :in l'nrly ~!11ss:i..11ust•tb •·n.sc ( Fl111u1 \" .. lli//l111ry, 4 
l~ush. :!4::), it wns s11i1l thnt lhl• ll<'C<'ssitv lll<'llnt was 1111t n 
phy,.;ic:il nnd uhsolutc lll'<'••ssily, hut n lll~rnl 1it11<•,.;s or pro-
P•~<·t~- ot' tlll' work nn<l lnlior done 1111d,•r the ,·irv11111•t111"''"' of 
P:tl'h pn rt it.·nln r c.·nst..1 • • •.' 
"It wns 11~1,1 !lint tho hurilen of proof wns upon the Com-
lllOllW<'11llh to pro\'l' thnt tho work <lonl' ll'llS 1101 n work of 
lll'l'1'ssitv1 or tl1nt it 11'<1.• 1101 11 work of <'lrnritv. 'J'h,• 1111r,J.·11 
uf provin~ l'\'\.·r~· t·h.•int•nt of the on\•n..:~ \\':\~ \0)\t\\..'1..•d nputa tlie 
\ \n11nw11weulth.' 1 
"'l'hc l.al.-i·sit/1• 11111 Corp. l'llSl' fullo\1-.·d \'1•ry .. 1,,s .. ly tl1<• 
Pirkey Bros. rnso nml the prirll'ipl<'' of th<• f1in11 .. r ""''"' np-
plic<I in the lnttnr \\·hen• tlil• qll•'<lion was wl1<•ll11•r 1;,.,,pi111: 
11pl111 on ~ttndny n swinuuing pool \\"111-i n work uf lll~ct·s~ity. 
'l'his Court re\'l'l'SC<I tl1c j111l~111••11t of the low"r <'unrt 011 i11-
'8 
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atructionB, and on the failure of the lower court to admit cer-
tain material evidence. In the l'Ollrl'C of the opinion, Judge 
I.lurks said: · -
'' 'Preliminary to this discus.sion, it may be stated that 
i! wl111t i~ done by one- is justified unJer the statute a.s 11 
necessity, then the labor which is thereby entailed on another 
as a necessary incident is likewise justified. Hence we 11ee<l 
only inquire aio to the necc~sity of the act entailing the con-
sequent labor, for without tht> labor the 11ct couhl not be douc. 
As pointed out in the Pirkev Brus. l'asc, the 1wcessity meunt 
by the st11tute is uot 11 physical n<,'<.'ssity, llllt a moral fitm~s• 
or propriety of the work nnd lnhor tlone under the circu111-
Rtances of the partic11lnr case, nn<I whether or not the net in 
question i$ mor:d!y f:t nntl proper i~ usually 11 ~uestion 
n • of fnct to Le «leterminl'<I !"· a jury alter heurin~ tl1t· 
tl'stimony rek•,·:int to th:it parli~nlar net, und n..:civi11;.: 
proper i11,trnctio11s from ti•<' <"u11rt, 11pun r<'t\Uest, ns tu th ... 
proper i11tcrpret:1tiun ul .. 111.."i..'l':"':...it,·" ;1s used in the statull'. 
It i< tlie !nnction of the court to i11l•·q11«·t th<> st11tute, Lnt wlll'll 
l!1is has l1cen <lone, it is usua\h- ti"• f\\nction of the jury, as 
tile n•prcscntntivc of the muralih· uf the communitv to ,h•-
tcnui11e utl1e lllUI";:\\ lillH.'SS ur pruJ7ril'tY uf t\1~: WUI J~ ,) {u q\ll'.'"· 
t iun. 1 11 • 
On pngc 8 the Court instruct<'ol II' followR: 
"The Court in~tructs thl' jun· that n 'work of chnrity n-< 
used in the Mlntntc menn~ thnt thl· \wrk itself mnst h<• cl1nri-
tnble; that if th(> <l<'f,•ntlnnt was work in!( at his nsnnl \nu\,. 
011<! cn\lin!( which itst•lf w:i~ not d1aritnhk', lltlll wn~ n•,·,•iv-
illg consideration for such work, '""''" thonl.'l• the tll't pru-
c<•<>cls of lhe result of Iii~ lnh11r an• !(i\'<'11 lo chnritv, J,.., lo:1s 
violntcd the Statute, 111dcs.~ the inn· sl1all hL·lil'Vl' that tlw 
ucen:-;e<l was <.·n~n~~ll in :l \'t'Ork of \H;l'l•ssih· H'i dcfincll in t 111' 
other instruct i~11s." · 
It will he noted thnt thr Trial ( 'uurt i11 the Russell \\'il-
liams cnse foll into n similnr Nr11r :1s tli<l the .Jml~'"C uf lhl' 
Circuit Court of Hnnov<>r, in th:1t hl' g-ave 11 fimlint: instrn,·· 
tiun which took tlw clcterminntion of lhl' question of ;,chnrity" 
out of the hnnds of the jnry, an1l \\'Hs in violntion of tl11•"' 
principles i;o clt>nrly cnuncintcll h." ,Jntlg"c Burks in the Pirkey 
nml Lnkeside cnse~. 
'l'he forc!(oin!( principles linvin.!( h<•c>u so <"lcarly stutell, wu 
confess thnt W<> nre 11nnhle lo <·<11nprchcncl how the lenrlll'<I 
.Tmh~e of the trinl conrt arrivn\ nt the <"onclusion he <li1l in 
the instnnt cnse. It may hl', hm''l'\'l'r, thnt he wns llllllnly 
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impress~ with th<.! alcoholic contents of the J?roduet that w48 ·. 
sold, for in the very first sentrnce of his opinion, which will 
i~ founJ C'ornmN1ci119 on paqe 5 of the clerk's transcript of the 
rrcorJ, he says: "'.l'he accused was indict eel for the. sole 
13" of "beer 011 Sunday." Of course, he was mistaken in 
this. The accused was not so indicted. He WRS indicted 
for l11boring at n. trade or calling on Sunday. It is no crime 
to sell bffr, Ill! sucJi..on Sunduy, and from a strictly legul 
standpoint, the fnct that in this instunce the article sold wllS 
hecr do<>s not put the case on any ditforent basis t1.1an if tl,iut 
nrticJ., had been 11e11r-bcer. or nny other soft drink, wluch 
the public 1ni"ht con•idcr t~ be '.' !1ecessity. • 
It further uppenrs frotn Ins op1111011 thnl he buses bis con-
clusions luqrcly upon the nuthority of lei/is v. Covi,,91011, 
l:!:! \'iq~inin ~:!l, 111al /fougrr v. Cumtno11u·ccilth, 107 \'irg-i11ia 
~7:"!, thl• lntll:r huving hel'll tlecitkd in l~l(N, fourte<•n yenrs 
k•fur,• the l'irkl'y Hruthers case, nn<I the furma i11 1~H7, tivc 
vl•:1rs lit..•fon.•. 
· It, tlier,•fon', }..,hooves us to cxuminl' these two case~ with 
c111«•. I 11 t lie E\lis ens<', cocn-cula w11s ~,,\,] on Snndny uml 
the ~nlc wns u1ndl.' in l ~HG, over lwl'nty-t\\'e years 11:,u. In 
tl111t case', thl'1·c wns no jury tri11I, the jnry lo:1vin'( Leen 
w:iin·d :111,I th.: '!ll<'s\ious of lnw a!lll fol'! wc•rc· liot 11 ~nl1-
111itt,•il tu thL' court, who fo11111l the• n•:cns.•d guilty. '!' 11is 
l'onrt, in its upi11io11, did nut discn.;~ th,• qllcstiun of what 
io n work of nl'<"<'<sily 111al whnt is nut, or wl1,•ther that 
'llll':stion i" ou<• of lnw for thl' court, or olll' of fad for t!1e 
jnr.'·, or wln.•tht•r wl1:1t is or is Hot u Ul'~l:'~=--ity l'l'lllnins ~tnti(~ 
Hill! is th<' sanw nl nll p\:\c,•s 1111,] 11111h•r 11!! l'1111,!itiotl', or 
wli<•lh<•r it mn~· vnn· with thl.' ti1m•s, pl:ic<•s a111l , ... ll,1i-
H" lions, "hut in 1111 op\niun of !,•so.; t!1n11 n pa;:'' in l.·11'.!'tli, 
lll<'r<'IY nl~irrne<l lh<· jmkllll'lll of tl1,• tri:d nmrt, wl1il'l1, 
m; "lnlt-tl, ncl<•1l ns hot!1 jn<k•· nut! jury, 1111,J wl1<•tl1"r tl1e 
q11cstio11 wns <ll'ci<ll'd ns n rnatln uf lnw ur ns :i lllattcr of 
fact. doc~ uot llJ'\ll'llr. 
We, then•fon', snhmit thnt thl• Ellis ens<' is 11nthoritv for 
1101 hing-, c~cept thnt it wu~ unlawfnl to ,,.11 <'m•a-cula ;;1 tl1c 
towu of (\.ivlH~ton n qunrter of a l'l•ntur\' a~u. Certain~\' 
th,• tit11l'.S 111HI l'Un<litions hnvc cli11n\.'.1'd ,:onsidcrnhlv "in1·«· 
~hn.t dav'. li~it 11~twithst11n1li11g- thi~, if th,• .trinl l'ollrt Ii;•""'"''! 
111 1b op1tllon, 111 the 111st1111t cnsc, th,•n 11 t'ullu11·s thnt it is 
nnln\\'fnl to sl'll n cot•n.culn ur other Hoft 1lrinb 011 .'-'1111dav """· 
\\'hcrc in thL• ~t11lc a., 11 maller of /,111•. \\',. know 1•1111" t\o,.; . ., 
l\l"l' ~llllllY S<..'nsillt..• rC'sorts, nnd r1..•cn.•ntion:d l'nrl.;!'I lllld l'l)JJl-
llllllllty center~, wl11ch hnvc hcen csl11hlishcd lioth hv the "UY· 
c;rnttll'llt 111111 hy privnte ctt!l'rprisc, "'.hi,:h tll"l' ,·is~tcd c;ery 
:->n11(lt1y liy tltrou:-:s of lonn~ls nntl 111c111ckl'rs 1111d nl whit:h 
:.-· 
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10ft drinka are regularly sold. If such sales be unlawful, 
as a matter of law, then judgt>R, proi;t-cuting attorneys am! 
other luw-enforcement officers arc lmowiugly "winking" nt 
law violutions all over the Stak 
It will l>e noted that the case of R1Usdl L. Williams against 
I~ (:omr11ot1111eallh (S11pra) not only i~non:11 the Ellis v. Cou-
it1glcm e11se but sustains our position that the luw which cou-
trola ia tl111t lnid down in Pirkey llrotl·~r" v. Comn1ot1wealtlt 
and in Lakeside /nH v. Commonwt'alll•, in thnt the question 
Ila lo whether or not the work i~ o ... ·ork of 11~-ccssity should 
be ~ubmitted to n jury. . • 
15° 0 ln l!anqa v. Curnr110H1cenltli, ""/ira, tho 111a1D ques-
tion invoh·<.'<l was the forfeiture of n ch11rtcr of n social 
clnb on a quo 1carrClf1to p~t>tlin):'~, uml tlic entire opinion 
of the l'ourt wns llevote1l to a 1li>cll"''iu11 of Ilic luw with 
respt-ct thereto. It i~ true thnt i11 tlit• t·unrse of the opinion 
t!ie ('UUrt ~ni1! thnt ''tlae prl'lcnilc-.1 ·11~:111iwtion of n ~oc·ial 
c:1d.1 w:1s fur till' frau1lu'.l!11l purpu•l! .. r ''"·11ri11:.: tl1c privil.::.:c· 
oi sc!liux toLaecu, ci~ar!I, cignreth•:-o., :--lll\;l-wutcr, nnll other 
soft dri11k~ ou Su111by-privile>:" wlii«l1 au i11clivi1lnnl cou Id 
11ot e~ercisc without incurriu>: the furf•·ilml! i11 Sc'Clion :li'!l!I 
of thl! Code (new 'coelion 4S:u)" but tl1i, ,c•,•111~ tu l1a\'c IK 0 c•11 
· coucet!ed for the 1mrpo":s of tl111t <-:1.'L'. ,\I :11<.\' rate there• 
wns 110 discus•ion us to !lac prop<•r 1·•111-trudiun of the "~un· 
c.lny Lnw" 11ml no priuciplcs of law will, n·spl!d tlierdo Wt•rc 
enn11c1nted. 
All lhnt we have· just i;ni<l witli "'''l""·I tu the Ellis cnsc· 
mii.:ht l~ repeated here with rl!spl'('( tu tlw llune;cr ease. "\' 
hes!, it mcrl'iy held lhnt thl! snlc of tolia•"<"'• soft 11ri11k•, ck., 
in the City of l'orts111onth in 1!1e y1·nr l!K~"--::4 yenr" u~o-­
was unlawful. I·'nrtl1crmorc, if 1111ythi11.: 1111<1 ht•t•n s11id iu 
Ilic llnll!jl'r c&llc whirh wns in 1·11ulli.-1 with th<! l'irkt·,· 
llrotlacrs cnsc, tlccidc1l iu 1!1:22, (11n1l ti1<·r1• was not), it wuul;l 
hnvc hcl•n overrule>1l liv the lnl<•r C:l'L', wl1id1 sp1'Cilicnllv luilds 
that 111ercly hccan~~ 1; thin~ 11u1y 1101 11;1\'l• IR"l'll a n~Cl.'~sity 
nt one time or nt one place, it 1lul!s 1101 follow that tl1c ~11111e 
thinl.\' 11111y not be 11 11t-ccs~it.v 11t n11otl11·1· li111c oi- nl nnotla1•r 
place. 'l'hnt thi~ st11lc1m•11t is trn1", we• k11uw •not univ 
16° from the Pirlw~· c:1s<! lint nlso fru111 our ):l'llL'rlll knuwi-
cde;c und experie11cc. We lrnow 111111 nt various times 
in the )Jn~t it was not considert'll ll<'<'<'':~ary tu kiss one's wifo, 
or to 11rcpnrCJ. n hot meal, or to pulih~h n m•wspnpcr, or to 
operate n frc1~ht train 011 8nn<lnv. y,.t nll of the~c thin"s 
ure now rC!!lll'llcd ns nccc.isnr~· o;· pn>p<•r. ~ 
I...ikcwiso, Wl' <lo 11ot think tlai11 court will huhl lhnt hcl'nasc 
the sale of soft 1lrinks in Port~month in the rcnr 1!)0~ was 
11ot n uec~ssi,ty, it follows as 11 111111/•·r 11[ l11tc th:it their sulc 
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now anywhere in the State i~ "Still-not a necessity.· In 19M · 
pcoplc stayed at home on Snndny. In 1942 they drive all 
uver the St:itc, nnd to sny that on such trips thev coul<l nut 
lawfully purchase !'Oft drinks for themselves and their chil-
dren would work a l1anlship indet>d. 
Further in the opinion of the trial Judge, he quotes the 
following extract frolll-Eirkcy Brothers v. Commonwealth, 
.rnpra: 
"' • • • There arc l'n&es where the question is one of law 
for the Court. Where the act done is plninly a violntion of 
the stntute, ns where 11 control'tor, without emcr~cncy, i~ 
runnin~ n ~lcnru slaovl'! on Sundny, or tlae uct i~ plninly ono 
of m•cc·s~ity, ns where the owner lifts his ox out of till' ditch; 
in cithl!r t:nsc, tl1e <JllC~tion i~ one of l:w: for the Con1·t. llnt 
if tl1e 11t:t OL' une nhont which fnir111indc1l men mi).!'hl rcuso11-
uh1'· (liffl•r u~ to wla·1l1er or 11ot it is n work of necL·~-;ity, then 
it is u question of fnl't for tlu.~ jnry.' " 
lie tlien 1lrnws the ('Unrlnsion thnt liL-causc th~ Supreme 
\ 'nurt of Ap1ll'nls in Iii<' Ellig c11st• lll'l<l thnt tlw snl<! .of coca-
1·ola in l'ovi11;:lo11 in l~)lli wns not :i work of lll'<'l!Ss1ty, !lien 
110 fnir-111i11d<•1l 11111111':111 <litfor on the qm•stion of wh<!tlaer 
li• or nut •tlae 8nk• of ht•er in Hanover Co1111tv in 1!1·11 is 
n work of Ul'N.'••ity. !11 vil•w of nil of the ,;ll1cr princi-
ples, with n•SJl<>ct lo lli<• word "lll'<'l'~nily" ht·in~ cl11stic 111Hl 
rPlntin• 111ul ils 11w1111in~ vnn·in~ with the ti1111', plm·e, 1'lc., 
wl1icl1 wt•rt 1 ~o clt•nrl\' J1J1uounrl•tl in tlil' \'l•rv 1•nsl• fn1111 wliiclt 
llil· 11110\'l' l:'Xln1<·t i!'\ iula•u, Wl' Nttlnnit thnt rill•rel~· to ~tntc tl11.~ 
l't1lh'~11siou tlrnwn is su!,icit11tt proof of it~ f:tll1H·y. 
It is s11lJ111ill1•1l thnt the sale of h1•<'r do,•s 11ol 1•0111<' witl1i11 
thl• cnh·.1 ~lu·y of n contrnt•tnr npernti11J.!' n t-.lt•:1111 sho\'l'I, for 
fainni1ul1•d 11w11 tlu diffor 011 till• quc•,fio11 uf whdlic·r ur 11<1t 
111<• forn1L•r is 11 lll'CL'"ity. 1f nil f:1ir-111i11<le1l 1m·11 tlaou;:lat 
it wns· not n work of nece••il~', it \\'011ld he nnlawflll tu ~1·11 
lll't•r 011 e-;nmlny 11nvwlll•n• in tlw Rt:1te, y1•! it is !1t•i11v; suld 
111u·nh·. '!'la,• Ah-oholic Bl.'verni:-<! Co11trol llonnl, wlail'h is 
"'l'POS('t\ lo hl' ('Otnpose1l of fnir-111i111h•1l lllCll, ]ll'l'lllits ii to 
Ii .. "'''1 on Smuin~· i11 nil pln<'l'S, CXl'<'l'l in 1laos1• pl:11·1•s i11 
whi1·la local onli1111ne1•8 prohihitin~ siwh snlc•s 1111\'c• l1<•en 
1ulopll'<l. 'l'he \l•:nl'rn) AR<emhly of \'iq,iuin, lik.·wis.• "'l'-
posed to lw cu111post•«I of fllir-minch•d 111<•11, iu l!J:1-; pns<pd 1111 
11<'1 (Acts J!l:I~, I'· 1!14) !!iVini:: to thl' Bo:1rd of S11p1•r\'i>ors lilt• 
nnthoritv to n<lopt onli111111t·1·~ prohiliilin'! tla.- snl1• of 1,..,.r 011 
!'-;nntln\' in thl•ir l'l'NJlcclivt? Connlil•s. If fnir-111i11th•1l 11H•n 1lid 
1111t dilTcr, nnd if it WL'l'l' conce11t•1l thnt lhe snl" of liel'r 11 11 
:-;nml:iy viol11tl•1l St•ction 4:'.i70 of tlic Co<le, why, mny we usk, 
·1r:· Sil·p~eme'Court of Appeals of vlrginl& 
·.ahould the General Auembly gh·c to the Board of 'Super-
visors thi? power to declare nu uct, that was 11\ready unlawful 
under the general law, lo l.>C unlawful 1 
1s• Hfhe full te:it of the Act of 1~:>5 is as follows: 
"Be it clll!cted bv Ute Ocuer.il ..\t;J;t>wbly of Virginin, 'l'h;it 
tl1e board of supervi,cm1 or otl1l'r ~""\'eming bo<ly of l·m·h 
county shall havt! authority to mlopt or<linances effecti\·., iu 
that portion of such couul\· 1101 l'llllirut'l'<l within the 1'tlr· 
porutc limits of any city ur lm"'q"'rntcJ town, nn1l the coun-
cil or other governin!(' IJ<xly of 1·11d1 <"ity auJ lowu shall hu\'l' 
11uthority to u1lopt onli111111cc,; 1•ff"·ti,·c in such city or bw11, 
pruliibitin!{ the imlc of 1..,a mul "·i1ll', or either hct•r or wi111•, 
uet\\'ccll the J1uur~ ui twdn· u'duc:k post 111cri1lia11 of l'lll'h 
o:-;utun111y nml six o'cl~\; u111l' 1111:ri1liau of t•ucla \!omluy, ur 
f::ting- liours within snil1 t>t•riut! ,1uri11~ vd1ic11 wiue unll IK.'1'1', 
or l.'it11er, 111uy In~ sulll, nnd pn·-.cril1i11~ filll'S litlll otl11...•r )Wtl-
uJties for ,.·juJntious uf ... uclt unli11:111n .. •:; wbic!1 :--hnll Ix: ''11-
fun·L'll by proc-L''"li11,,->' i11 Iii;,• 11.a!lll<'r !Ill<\ with likt• ri;:l1t cd 
uppcnl us if ~11ch ,·iulntiu11~ "'''"' 111i,-.k111c:\llurs. !'ru\'i<h-<I, 
l1owe\·er, tliul snd1 unli11a11<·t'" -liall 1111! L'il'L'l'l ll1t• tWI,• uf (,,., ... 
Hll'-1 wive on pn,sen::l·r train ... ur !"le111u ,·e~sl1 ls wllill• up· 
crutiuo; in inten•tutl' cun11111·n·,•. 
"Upon the 111loptio11 uf a11y ~1 ... li 11nli11n11ce a copy th,•n·uf, 
tluly l'Crtificd I)\' thl' t·lcrk of till' ;:o\·,·rni11){ ix><h• 11.Jupti11,,. 
thl• l!l.llllL' shnll he lrnt1•111ilh•I !11 tlu• \"ir;:i11i:1 Ak;1!10li,· (\,., .. 
cru~c Coutrul Hunnl, 1111d lln•r,,.1f1t•r l'\"l•rv rct11il lir-l'11M' ( ... 
~llc<l by sni<l boar,\ for till' "d'· ur 1,. ..... 1111;1 wi11,• ur ,·it111·r .. r 
tlie111 in the l"OU11ty, l·ity or tow11 i11 wliit·h slH~h on.li11n11c,· """'-" 
mlopk<l, .. !ml! he li111i!t-1l in ""'urcla111·<· with the pro,·i~i1111-
of snch onli111111cc. lipu11 n•· .. ipl of the n·~onl of llll• c·u11-
vietion of 1111\' lict'll~<'t• uf till' l11i:11.J for the viul11tio11 uf 1111\' 
sncli onlinnnrc, th(' lionrtl 111:iy, i11 it..; tli ... l·nltiou, ':'nsp,·11d .;r 
l"l'Vnke su<:h I iccuse. 
"lt is fnrlhl!I' provi11t'tl, l11J\\·,.,·,·r, tl111t 110 pro\·i~io11 lu·r.·i11 
co11tninc1l, 1101· 1111~· onli111111<'<' that 11111.'· he pa~~e1l in p11r'11· 
!111c·e tht>rcof, shnll he co11strn1·tl a" i11 :111y wny 11!tcri11!.!, 11111•""'· 
1n;; 01· rept..•nliu.~ s~ctio11 furt_,·-t'l\.l' l1111ulrt•d n1Hl Sl'\'l'lll ,. 111' 
lhl! Code of Viq.(iniu." · 
'l'hi~ Act is refcl'l'l•d to, 111111 t!IC' proviso embrncccl iu tl1t· 
Inst pnrn!.!rnph tl1crt>of is q11olt-cl. i11 th" opinion of !ht• tri:.J 
Jmh:c. ln colllllll!llting tl11·n•1111 Ill' su.1·s tlmt if sc•ctiun .i;,711 
of the Coile llill not prohibit 1111• snl1• of hcer, Jllll'sl1a11t 111 
one's trnc1e or c:illin,., thc11 lhl'I'<' wunlcl hnve hccn 110 llt't'l'~sity 
fur this proviso, nm\ thnt: "Oi' 11<·1·cssity, the General ,\s-
~emhly must h:ivc 1:011t"illllcd tl1:1! Sl'elion 4.'i70 of the l'o1h· 
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prohibited the saleof wi.xi.~and beer on s11n:daf~nd Qiat'? 
rn• 1t was, by "ch11pler 129 of the Acts of 1939, merely !!'iv-
ing to tho l0t•alities tlw nuthority to parallel the exist-
ing State law·• • • ". He then likens the Act lo the various 
statutes enacted during tht> prohibition em permitting lo-
cnlitics to ndopt ordinances parnllelling the State luws, so 
that such lo<"nlitic~ could colll'Cl the fines, nnd intimates or 
concludes that this.Act wall adopted for the same purpose. 
All of this appeurs to us lo be fur-fetcheJ, indeed. 'Ve 
tl1i11k thnt it is much more loiric11l to sav that if Section 4570 
of tl1e Code nlre111ly prohibite;l the sale of ul'er ns a Malter of 
/111c, the11 it wns 1111 ubsnnlity to pnss tlw Act of El:oq, for 
tl1t•re is cert11i11!y nothing in it tu i11die11lc tl111t it wns passl'<l 
n~ n 1·~vcuuc llll':\snrc tu e11uh1e the lol·nlitil·~ to colh~t 111unev 
throu::h tl1e i111position of Hues. A~ni11, it' tlie General .A;-
H·111hlv hml i11kml,•,\ 111erclv to pcr111it thl! lue11!itic~ lo ndopt 
11 p:11·;tllt•l onli11a11ec lo 5cctlo11 4;,7u of the Coile, it cou\,J ha\·e 
dune :-.u iu so 111:u1y worlls, as it dill du iu tl11.._• .... ·nse of tlil.! pro-
!iihitio11 s\11lntc•, rcfl'l'n·•l to II\' tl1e trial .l11ile-1·. 
ls it llul 11111ch 111ore Ioi.:i1•11!. lo "1~· t 11at t'.1,• proviso wns 
l']a,•<'ll i11 !ht• i\d b,'l'nu;e uf the lrnlili11!.! of the court i11 t!1e 
l'irkc•\' llrull1t•rs 1·11s1• ! It will bt• r1•111c11il1er,•1\ !hut it was 
tlll•re 
0
la•'1l !hut wli:1t iM or i~ 11ot n 111•ee<Silv is u11e ot' fad 
lo be dl'll•n11i11 .. • .. l hy jnri1..•s who h·llt~t tlic l'u;111111111it~·'s upin· 
iu11 uf tl1l' 111urnl lilll<'ss t1111\ prnprid~· of !ht• net, 111111 that 
what 111ay hl• n lll'1..·1..·s"it~· i11 u11t1 pla~l' 111ay 11ut la! iH a11otltl'I". 
l111dt•r tl1is lio!tli11!{ n jnn· i11 1111110\'<•r l'u1111tv 111i~ht 
:!ll• say tlint 0 1ht• sa!,• ~1f l><•t•r 1s 110! 11 wurl; uf lll'<'<'~si1v, i11 
wl1id1 l'll"<' it wunlcl folluw that slll'i1 11 rn!,• wou!d lie 
1111lawf11! 1111dc•r Sl•t•liu11 .1:,;o uf till' Codi•. 011 tl1e olhl'r, tl11• 
j11ry 1111-.:ht say lh:1t it is 11 work of lll'l't'"'ity, iu wl1il'!a rnse 
li1l' "1k• wuul,t 11ut ht• nnlnwflll 1111cll'r tl1al ,,.,·tiu11. '~'lieu, if 
tl1at jnry 1li1! 11ul truly rellt•t•l ll1t• 1·u1111111111itv's opi11iu11 !hut 
lq1i11ioll l'U\lh\ lw r ... n .. ·c.:ll•d 1iy the :aloptiu11 uf n lv'-•;d onli;1111H"~' 
·In· llfl• lluanl uf ~llp<·rvi~or,;, 111:1l;i11~ till• ~:1h· 111d:1wf11! no. 
"'"""''~"of th1• lll'lio11 uf \lie jury. !11 oll1,•r worcls l':ll·i'1 lu-
rnli\\· i~ 11uw :.:i\'t'll twu upp11rt1111iti1•s lo <'Xfll'l'" 0\11<· rn111-
1111111it~"s opi11iu11 of the 111ornl litlll'" 1111<1 propridy of sl':l-
i11,,- ill'l'l' 011 S11111l11~', 011e thron,,-li its juri,•s :ind the oilier 
thro11c:!1 its 1\111.'· t•lt'l'tl•tl n•prl!sc11tntivc•, wh,•r1•11, it lm1l 01ily 
1111<• pruir lo the tms•n:.:l· of lhl' ,\ct of 1~J:\'i. 
111 this s11111c l'Olllll!dio11 \\'l' would Iii;.• tu 11111k,. 1111utl1er 
\ll'rlillt!lll ohsl'rv11tiu11. \Vhc11 tl1l' <'11\ir1• ,\l'l is rv111l, it will 
ht• M't'll th11l Ii~· llll' l'Xpn•ss tcnns \lfl•reof llfl• lul'11! 11 11tl:uri-
ti1•s url' gi\'l'll ll!e puwl'r, not only lo proliiliit th,· s:dc uf 1,.., ... 
h1•lw1•l'll the pcno1l from S11t11rcl11y 11i;:lit tu ~1011<!11~· 111orni11.:.:, 
1111\ 111so tu lix the "/1u11rs will1i11 suicl Jiaiocl cl11ri11y u•l1ici1 
1' Bu~· Court of Appeals of Virginia 
wine and beer, or either, 1nay lir .fold." It therefore follow~ 
that if the trial Judge's conclusion he sounil, then the Ocuernl 
Assembly is placi!d in the nh•unl position of nttcmpti11:.: tu 
c011fer upon the local authuriti<·~ the power to dC{'ln1·,. an 
net to be !llwful, which it, lht• Cit•11cr:1l Ass<>mbly, k11ows ;,.,. 
onlnwfu! under the gent'rnl lnw. 
21° "For th rcasona 11Lov,· nssii.:ne<l, it is rcspt-ctfull.1· 
submitted iliat the quc,,tiuu of whether or not tlw '"It· 
of beer on Sund11y by petitioul'r wns n work of nl'CCSJ!it~· w;1.• 
a question of fact for the jn~· 11111! that the court t•rr..•I i11 
holding tliat it wns une of lnw. 
ASSIGNMENT 01" ~;1moR ~o. 4. 
The court WRS re<JuestC"tl In :.:iw lo the ~ury on ~halt nt 
the petitioner nine 111strucliu11', all of wluch wt•re 1 cf11,, .. L 
'!'he first seven uf tl1~111 arc 11' fulluws: 
lustniction ~o. '.!: 
The Court instructs the ju1·~ that thL• purpow uf ti ... law 
iu prohibiting wurk fro111 t ... ·i1o·~ .!01"• 011 Sn11d11y i• to ;.:i1··· 
to the jrnlilic u rest fron1 it• "'"tn111nry l11hnr for tht· l1t·11 .. 1il 
of \Juth the morn\ 11nd pliysi<·nl uature of mnnkiml, 1111<1 1101 
for the purpose of c11fur1"i11;.: II"· 1 ... ·li,•fs or teul'ls of 1111.'· n· 
li!,oions cret'1.l or denumiuuti1111 (IL, l'· 1:!::!). 
Instruction No. 3: 
The Court inMlructs the• jury tloat tl1c liunh•n of proof i-
on the Commonw<'nlth lo (•stnl1li-li l"•v11111l n n•nsonnLlt• 1l1111li1 
thut the 1ll'fe1Hl1111l iu th<' 1111<•rati1111 ·.,f hi~ husinesx suit! 1111 
S11111l:iy hccr ns nlk:.:<'d lo li:in· J,.•1·11 ~olil in the i1nlid1111·11t. 
nn1l ll111t the 11thor uml h11si1u·-~ in "' 1loi11~ wt•re 11ot 11 1n11 k 
of 11eccssity. or chnrity, rn11l 11111:·~~ Iii,, t'ommo11w1•alth '"'' 
met this hunlt•n, they sl1u11ltl liud Ilic th•fomln11t ttol ~11ill.' 
(R, p. l:!U). 
Instruction No. 4: 
Tlte Court in~trucls thl' jun Ilia! if tl1c\· fiml fr11111 1l1o· 
cvillencc thnt the kecpin:.: 01n•tt .l1y lhl' 1lefrmln11t of his pl;w,· 
of ·l1usines.~ on ~nmlny, n11tl lht• 'ale therein of fh<' l1t•t•r a." 
nlle~ed in the i11dictment IC'111h·<I to promote the n·n~o11nl1lt• 
l"ccrention, und nccessnry et111n·ui1•111·c of the trnvcllini.t 1111'.ti,._ 
nncl thnt the premises wlll'rl' '1ti1l h11~i11csl\ wn~ tn111s11d•··l 
w~n:,kept in un orderly nnd qnil'I rnnnncr, nnd thnt Ilic ~··n~ 
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therein done was ·morally"fit anQ proper to be done on Sunday, 
then ther mav find that the work of conducting such fill-
22• ing stnllon for tho purposes outlined, 0 is necessary 
within the meaning of the stntute and they should find 
Ibo defemlaut not guilty (rt, p. 129). 
In~~ruction No. 5: 
Tho Court instructs ilio jury thst n work of necessitv ns 
meant by the Statute of Virginia, is not 11 physical allli nb-
solute necessity, but a morn! fitness or propriety of the work 
or lnbor or net done under tho circumstunccs of cuch pnr-
ticulcr case (H., p. 130). 
lust rurtiun No. G: 
Tl1t• Court instrurt" thl' jury thnt tl11~ qnc•,tion of whetlll·r 
th,• nrt of kt•1·pi11:.: lht• 1k•fc111l1111t 's pl:tre of lrnsi111'ss open 11n1l 
•l'lliur:- l1<'<·r 011 S11111l:tr w11s 11 work of H<'<'•'''ity witliiu 11,,. 
111,•1111111g of the !-itatnll', b n 11uestio11 of fud for Ilic jnry, 
1111d in t1,•t·iili11i.: tlmt qne•lion tl1c j1wy n111y i:ousitler the rnnll· 
111•r i11 whid1 th•• pn•111i~t'~ 11111! the bu~i11cs>1 co1111cclc1l then'-
with W•.•rt• rnn, th,• l'ff, ... ·t which the opt•11it1;:?; of lhl' pince 111111 
tl1t• ~111,. of l>l'<•r tl1t•n•fro111 hn~ 011 tht• 1:001! unkr 1111<1 rnornl 
\n•lfnn• of tht• 1·01111111111ity, 11111[ wht•llll•r ur 110! it ((·11tls tu 
the unlerly nntl 111urnl n'l"rcution of the public (It, 11. 1:lO). 
ln•tructiun Nu. i: 
Till• Court instrudK lht• jmv thnt ir tl1t·v lin1I frn111 1111• 
c1·itll'llN1 that the opt•niny: of th,• 1ll'ft·111lnnt ;s plnl"l· of b11si-
lll'·'·• mul th<' 1'nl1• tlll'rdrnm of li1•1•r on Snn1l11:·, i' n pnlili•· 
lll'l'••ssnry within the lllt'llllill;.:- of the Htntnh', lhl'n 111,· t\d,•n1l· 
11111 ~l1011ltl he fo11111l 1101 guilty (IL, p. J:ll ). 
I11structio11 No. 8: 
Tht' Court instrul't, tho jnry tlint tlll'r•• i• 110 liH·d ur un· v11r~·i111?: th•finition of tht• won\ "uccc•ssity", lint 1111 the otht•r 
hnnd, it i, nu l'lnsti1• 111111 n•lntivc word nntl 1111t• tl111t 111ust l1l' 
t•o11struC'1l in thl' li;.d1t of tht• r0111litio11~ muh•r wliil"h we lil'l• 
nt the \trt•st•11t, 11111l 11ot iu tho light of th1• I'"''• fur 11111ny thi11g, 
thut were co11sitlt•rt'1
0
l lnxuril's tl1l'.111 or e\'t'll lin1l nu 1•'(ist.•ni:c 
ut ull, nrc now con~u\crctl 11ccc~s1t1e.~ (lt, p. l:!I ). 
It is sub111ittc1l tltnt tho fort'i.toini.t i11"tnil"li11n<, 1111111bere1l 
from 2 to 8, inclu~ivc, stnte conectly the prinl"iples of luw 
16 S~p~~e Court of Appeals oI v 1rgWJ.d 
which nre applicable to the !nets in thu case and &houhl 
have been !{iven to the jur." 111,.!cr the authority •or thu 
23• cases of Pirkl'y BrotJ.rr$ \'. ('011uno11w,alt/1, u!l<l Jl'i/. 
' li<wu v. Commomvcalt/1 (.rnJ•nl}. 
The ue:i:t two in5tructions wloi.-11 wac offered by petitiou<'r 
nnJ were refused arc as follow": 
Iu11truction No. 11: 
The Court instructs ti.Jc jury lhal l>)· uu net of tho (ien-
ernl ~Sl!CmL!y of Vir:.riuill, pw•~, ... 1 nt tho 193-l Sellllion thi;n· 
was created the Alcoholic Bc\'t•r:.\.."' l 'outrol Bonrd with 
power to j,;,;ue to rctuilcni in ti"' Sl:itu of Virginia liccusc~ 
for the ~111! of lx•cr und wim·, :111ol purounut llwrcto ~,.j,1 
Board h11>1 proc~'<lcd tu i>P'lll' tu th" rd11ilcni iu Vir;:inia, 
i11clu1lin~ tl1l' tlefl'111lu11t, sm·l1 Ii·~·"''°" willwut 1111~· rl'slri1·· 
tion thcreiu ns to snk·s on S1111.l:I\·: furlli1•r !lint l1v u furll1t•r 
ucl of the G1•11<•ntl ,\,_,c111l1l.1· 1~;,;..,1 i11 1!1:·~..; th~ Bonni uf 
Supervisors of t11c sc\'t.•ral .. ·uuulil·s iu \'ir~inin Wl'l'c •:In· 
powered lo pas" unli1111111·1•s tu l'r,,J1il1il Ilic snle of wi11c• 1111d 
Le1:r on !';11111\a~·. wliicli nd 111·u1·i.l"l tli:it nuthiu~ thl'n·i11 
slouulcl he co1htru.-I 11s ull,•riu;.:, 11111<·111lin;..: or rc\K'nlin;..: s .. ". 
tion 4~70 of tl11· Co1k• (1:01111110111\· k11uw11 11~ tlic Su111IJ1\' lil11•• 
lnw}. · · 
Further 1111: C'ourt tells tl11• jury Ilia! il np]lelln< {nun 11 ... 
e~·i1knce tl111t.si11c1: flit• pn""H;..:•· .. r II"' Act of 19:\8 llJ'J•li«:i· 
!wn lins lx.·1•11 111:11lc lo the Bu:11·,\ uf Sup<>n·i•or" of l\1111un·r 
Cou11t~· lo pn~" 1111 onliuann• p1·uloiJ,iti11;..: the snlc of l11·er 1111.! 
wiutJ in ll11110\"t•r ('011111\· 011 ~1111•h\· li11l n•:rnnlh·s>' of il-
puwcr to 110 KO the 11 .. ,·1 .. ,\ of s11, ...... ~·i•ors n·fuSt••I 111 I"''·' 
Kll<:li onliualll"t' 1111d tlint th,·n· j, i11 ··~islt•nec• iu Jl111111\·1·r 
County 110 onli111111<'l' of si_1i<l llu:ird 11l1il'i1 prohiLib 1111· >al.-
of !Jeer aml wiut• 011 811111la~·s (II., I'· 1 ::I). 
Instrnclion No. 11-A: 
'fhc Court inH!rul'ls th" ji:r,· tloat 11111\,•r 1111· lnw~ uf \'ir-
ginin since the ycnr 1!l:l~, tl11· Bunrol of Supl'rvisur~ of 111111-
ovcr County hns h:11l th<.' a11ll1uri1.,· lo 111lopt nn or1li11:111n· 
(l'ffodivc 011tsi<lc of tl11• 'l'own of .\,111:11111) "Jll'Clficnlly ui:ik· 
i11;..: it unlawful to sell liecr 1111<1 wi111• i11 th" ('ounty, 11ltliu11:,:li 
the J>tntntc conferrin!!; thnt Jlll\,·1·r lltH•ll the Hoai«l of S1qwr-
vi1<or~ further provi1lcs 1 hat 11111 l1i11;.: lh1•rt•i11 1·011t11i111•I, 11ur 
nny onlin:incc 111lopt1•<l hy tht• llo:iril uf ISnpl!rvisor~ iu p11r. 
~111rn1:c !hereof, "hall he co11strn .. d as iu 1111v wav el1:111!!;i11;.: 
01· repe11li11:.~ the lnw g-c11c.·1·all~· kuown us tlH.' 0 ''~11iltl:tv 11 law, 
1111dcr•wl1ich tl1is prosecution is li:ul (J!., p. 133). · · 
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2.i• •rn the Pirkey case; .r~ .Burks said that ihi:qti~s· 
lion as to whether or not the work was "a work of neeeS· 
sih·" as co11templ:ited by the statute, should be submitted 
to ·a jnry "who nrc selected for their fitness nnd who will re· 
fleet the co!llmunity opinion". It was therefore essentinl 
11ut only thnt the court permit the introduction of evidence 
o( the uction of lliiLBonr<l of Supervisors but ulso thnt the 
court iustruct the jurv thnt the Boord of Supervisors of 
Hnnonr County had the power under !be statute to enact n 
local or<linoucc lo nllow or to prohibit the sale of beer ou 
.SuuJny, nud ulso thnt n petition hnd been filed with the Board 
i<cl'l;iug to prohibit Much snle and tho Bonn! hnd refused to 
tnke uction thereon. llnd thifl been done the jury would hnve 
hc'<.'n in u po~ition to l'Xercisc their 1lutics n~ the relk><!tors of 
llllhlic 01>inio11. 
'fhc nctiou of the court in giviu!{ the fi11<li11g iustruction 
nW\'e, pr<?wntc<l tliia. · 
:!J" • ASSIONMENT OP EH HOH NO. 5. 
At the trial of the cn•e, petitioner cnlle<l C. W. 'l'uylor, 
l'lerk uf tl11• Honn! of Super\'isors of 1!1111ovl'r Count~', us u 
wil111•'S in his h1•hnlf, hut th1• tour! n•fu~e,l lo llllmit his testi-
111u11\· ns l·\'itl1•111·l'. 'flio l'\'i1lenl'o thnt hL• would lw1·e "i1·l'11 
if 111; !inti li<'L'n nllow1•il to testify will be fo1111d i11 trn11.,eript 
uf 1·vi,k·11«1', pni.:1• 114 of H<'<.'onl, nud is ns follow~: 
"Q. :'>Ir. 'f11ylor, ~·au nrc now 1111<1 Wl'ru the Cl1•rk of th~ 
Bu11nl of ~11111•n·ison1 of 1111110\'l•r County 1111 .July 1, l!I.\ 1 t 
"4\. y l•"\. !'lt·. 
"q. Di,\ yun 11th•111l the llll'cli11l("~ of th1· llonrol of Hu per· 
vi:<urs 111•1,\ on July 1, 1!141 t 
"A. ,\ ...... ~ir. 
"(J. l'len'l' 'Inf•• whdlll'r or uot fill' qupsfion of till• nuop· 
lio11 of 1111 onli111111('e prohihitin~ !]10 1111Je of hr1•r ill llllllU\'CI 
('0111111· l'lllll1• hl•fon• the Bonn! for its l'o11si1:1•rntiun nt thnl 
t illlt'. . 
"A. It <lid. 
"(1. PlenK1• i;lnte whether or not then• Wl'l'l' d1•lei.:11tiu11t 
l11•f11rc• 1111· !lonnl iu hehnlf of nm! in opposition lo tl111t or· 
di11111u:e. 
"A. 'J'licr\! W(.1 re. 
"<l. l'lc•nsc :<l11tc whnt nr.tiou, if 1111y, w11s t11lw11 !iv tlu 
Bonni of Snp1•rvisors nftl'r the hc11ri11i.: 011 thnt 11111tlcr 01 
thnt 1l11v. 
''A. A resolution wns offl!red hy Mr. 'l'hompson prohibit 
ts ·Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
ing the aale of beer and wine in lLrnover County au Sullll;iy, 
which received no se<:ond aud wn~ losl 
"Q. I will ask.you if you will filt:' n Ct?rtified copy of tlw 
minutes to which you refc:r in the re<:ord. 
26° "'"A. Yea." 
We aubmit that this testu111111'· i~ rclc\·nnt nnd mnlc>rinl 11, 
tending to. ahow tht:' community" upiniun of the morn) tit11l'.""" 
and propnt:'ty of the net invuJ\·, ... I, nm\ Khould luwe hl ... ·11 a,1. 
u1iltL-<I in evidenc" ht-fore !Ill' jury, 1111d<'r the nuthu1·ih· .. r 
/'irkcy Brot!.u.< v. Corn111<1t11c ... 1/ll1, 1111d J/ussdl lh ll"i/li11.11.,· 
\", Cu1111110111aultl1, 611/)rll. 
CONCLl'Slll~. 
For the forel!oing 1't:'nsuns, IK'I ii io11l'r pru~·ri tlant " "'i I 
of error 11111\ s111icr;cJ1'<l.< 11111y 1 •. :ow;ink-.1 him; thnt tlo,· jud::· 
111cnt complnim ... \ of may 1,.. n·,·i""''d 111111 rc\'l·1·s,.,l; lli;il ;1 
new trial l>e nwanlc-.1 lti1u; 11111! 1 li;il 111• 11111~· hll\'l' hlll'i1 .,11.,.,. 
rt:'lief us he ni:w 1,._, enlillt'<\ lo 111ul<•r th,• law. 
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Your 1ictitiu11.er 11\•ers lh:1t h,· loa•, 011 lhL· lGth d11y of .11111 ... 
19~2, llcliwrl'<l u copy of thi~ pditiou to the llouurnhl1• 1·:. I'. 
::-li111pki11s, Jr., Cu111111011w1•11lll1'• Attorney for llnli"''••1 
County, nud !ht:' 11 llonll')' for 1111· l 'u111111<111w1•11h h in t 111· l 1 i,d 
L"Ourl, in Jll'rson; thnt this p••ti1i1111 will he fik'<I in 1111• tolli.~· 
of the clerk of this 1•ourl nl Hi .. 11111<11111; that 1·01111s1•l for 1•·1i. 
tioncr tlesirt:'~ lo slate• ornll." 11 ... r,•;1su11< fo1· n.•\'il•wi11~ 1 lw 
ju<l~111c11t co111pl11i111'\I of; 1111<1 lloat (K'liliu111•r nilopls tloi• 1•· 
ti lion n~ hi~ up1·11i11;: lincf. t-
fiCij!JL'Clfully ~11lo111illl~J, CO 
:\I. i:. I·'H,\Ncrnco, 
By Clilll1S"1. 
1:1·:11. K llAW, 
,\:-\Ill: I·:\\' J. EI.LIS. 
27° •QEORflE E. IlA W, 
'rnt\"el(•rli Tihl~., Hi1·l111111111I, Va., 
ANDHEW J. ELLIS, 
Lnw Rh\~ .• Riehmoml, \'a., 
Counsel for Pl!titiu111·r. 
\Ve, the umll'rsh.:ncd 11ttm·111•_,·s at lnw, prnctil'in;.:- iu 11 ... 
Snprt:'lnc Court of Appenls or \'ir'!i11i:1, 111111 whos(' r"~l'l'l'li\'l· 
nd1lrcsscs nrc ns 111Jov1•-stah•,J, du ""rtiry thut in our upi11i1111 
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?.L 0. Franci~_y. ·Oommonwealth 19 
the judgment compWned o! in- tLe foregoing petition ilNlr-
roneous and OD)!'ht to be reviewed and reversed by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginin. 
Reccive<l Junc·t6, 1942. 
GEO. E. HAW, 
ANDREW J. EI,LIS. 
M. B. WATTS. 
Writ of error awnnlrd. S1111crscdca& allowed. Bond $100.00. 
July 29-42. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
H1·c1•iv1•1\ July 2V, 1942. 
M. 13. W. 
RECORD 
VIROINIA: 
111 thu Cin:uil Court fur the County of l11111uvcr. 
1'11•11>1 hdor1.• the Cin:uit Court in :iml for th,• County of 
I 111110\·er. 
ll1• it r1•mt•111h1.•n't\ lhnt hL•n•luforc, to.wit: Scpll'mlicr l:itli, 
1!141-
E,Jn111n1\ \\'i11stu111 l"ur1•11111111 H. I'. Vn""• 11;1;.;h C11111plll'll, 
\\",.I. Cl11q11111111 nml ,J. I.. Oo1hli11, who hl'im; "'·un1 11 :-;l''"'i11l 
llrnnil .Jury, hc.•iu.~ l·lml'J,"l'<I b:v the Court rdin•1l to their roou1 
111ul nflcr i<ome time rl'1111·111.•1l into 1•ourt 1111<! rdurnc1l llol' 
followiui:- hill of imlichul'nt, tu-wit: 
Co111111011wcolth 
v. 
M. 0. Fruncisco 
INDICTMENT FOH A MI::lDEMEANOH. 
A Truo Ilill, 
(Si1.,'Tlt:'<l) EDMUND WINSTON, l•'or<'1111111. 
20 Supreme Court of Appe&U ot virguua 
Which Indictment i.s in the worJ~ and figures, following, 
to-wit: 
Commonwealth of Vir~nin, 
County of Hanover, Tcrwit: 
In the Circuit Court uf thL• '>lli<l County: 
The Oran<l Juror11 of the ('u111111011wealth of Viriduin, in 
nn<l for the b<xly of the ('-01111!_1· 11f11n•"'1i<l, nu<l now attcmli11i: 
the l!lli<l Court, upDI\ their onlh. 1•n•,,.•11t thnt M. O. Frnuci><et• 
ou tl1e ith da~· of Sl'ptembcr, in 1t11, yeur one thousn11<I nim· 
liuntlrcJ n11<\ forty-~:mc, in till' ><:ii1I County, <liil u11ln"·full.1· 
lnLor nt Li" trndc um\ cnllin::: 1111 ... rn j,... nnd except in huus1 .. 
hold aml oilier work of 11t'<'t"•ily :1111( chnrity, ":iid 8<'\'l'lith 
tb~· uf Scptcmllt.'r h<·i11::: a S11111lnv, in this, to-wil: 
pa~c 2 } 'l'liat t\1c "ni1l ~I. (l. Fr:111•·iN. .. 1 di1I h't'p opcu 111,.\ 
rnni11tni11 011 the s11i1I S11111\:I\' n hnsine"s for thL• "'ii" 
of beer ni11! 1li1I un ~aid 8111111:"·· ,-.·Ii l1<-er m.'llinst the 111•an· 
nnd <li:..'11ily of tlw Co111111011w.·all Ii 11f \'in.:inin. 
UpOll the c1·i<l1•11cL' of Chndi« \\'illi:1111•, l 'onw:iy Cn11tl111r111· 
nml Willinm .T. :\'ichol•. . 
"'it1wssc>11<wor11 in open C'u11r1 :0111\ •l'llt to thL• Orn111! .J11r~· 
And upon. nnolhl'r 1\:iy, tu-wit: I ldoher 2111\, l!lH." 
Cm11monwcnltl1 
''· M. 0. Frnncisco 
INDICT~IE~'l' FOH .\ '.llSDE?>mANOH. 
This duv cnmc the Atlorm·1· fur tlu· Cu111111011wcnlth nn1l tl11• 
nccu8cd, ~f. 0. Franeisl'o h111:imr "l'i'"lll'l'1l iu Court pur-11:1111 
to .~11111n10nM i~Rlll'll n.!!ni11"t l1i111. :11111 plL•nd not i:uilt1· to tl11• 
imlietrncnt, nml for l'l'nson'< app"arin!-! to th<.> Court the ra,1· 
is co11ti1111cd until th~ 17th <ln1· 11f I ktol•l'l', J!l41, nt JO o'l"lcll'k 
A. 1-l., wlwrcupon I he sni1\ M. Cl. l~r:1111·i-«o w11s n..:o~ni1.L•1I f11r 
his 11ppcarnnel' lwforc this ('0111"1 "" tlol' lith <lnv of Od11h1•r, 
1!141 .. nt 10 O'cln<'k A. M. · 
'l'hcronpo11 ChnrliL• ·wminrn-. ('uuwa\' <'nnthornc nm\ "'il-
limu .T. Nichols, witucsse~ for 1111• ('1111111ionwenlth, were rrro:!· 
uizc.l for their nppcnrnncu lll'fon· thi~ Court on the 17th 1lay 
of Octohcr 1~141, nt 10 O'clm·k ,\, ~I.. in the i;nm of Fif11· 
Dollnrs respectively. · 
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page 3 ~ And upon another day, to-wit: Octob~r 17th, 194:1. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
ht. O. Francisca 
INDICTMENT FOR A MISDEMEANOR. 
This <la~· came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and the 
accu~ed M. 0. FranciN.'o having appeared in Court pursnn.nt 
tu liid r(.'('ogniumce, and bciu~ represented by CounBcl, plead 
uot guilty to the indictm<mt, thereupon cnme n jury, to-wit: 
11. C. V11lc11tiuc, .Jos.-ph Jones, .Jr., l~dmum\ C. •rnylor, W. 
!ii. Alcxuudcr nn<l B. P. \Vood, who bciuy: 8worn the truth 
upon the pn·mise8 to Ppcok, hnving fully heurd the cvidoucc 
111111 bci11:.t instructl'tl liy the Conrt, retired to their room nml 
11fll>r sun1L• time returned into court ma! returuc1I the follnw-
in;:- vcnliet, to-wit: "\Ye tho jury fiutl the ncc11sc1l guilty ns 
cl1aq._'t.'tl iu the within imlictmcnt 111111 th his 11u11i~lomcnt ut 
u tin1· of ~.lXI." .Sig-UL'c.I, J. JI!. ,Jonl's, .Jr., l•'urc111an. 
,\1111 th .. jnry liri11).(' di"<'lmrµ:1•d, the dcfcn<lnnl by his Conn-
"''' 11101'1'<1 tl11· Court to B<•t nsi<lo Ilic venlict of the jury us 
l>('i11;: c·outrnry to the luw 111111 the 1•1·idc11C:L', n11i1 by 111istl1rcc-
ti1111 b,\' tht• l'c>urt; which motion the Co111"t tnkL•s Utulcr 1111-
,.i!"ll'lll<."nt. 
'l'loL·n•upon llol' 1<11i1l '.'.!. 0. l•'ra11riscu wns rcc:ug11iz1•d for l1i8 
11pp1·arn11L'C l11.•fore tloi~.l'ourt 011 the 17th 1l11y of Novl'ml>cr 
l~l.11, i11 the 111·1111111· of n11c llumln"I Dollurs (~lllO.llO) 111111 
1101 to 1h·p11rl tl1<·11L·~ witloont lt•11v1• of thi• Court. 
1'11'-:L' .J > :\111111111.111 1111utl1l'I' 1l11y, tu-wit: !1111rd1 lli1l1, l!H~. 
('11111111uUWl•lllth 
t'. 
".\l. <l. l•'rnnrisc:o 
I :\DH "l':'.!J.;N1' FOH :\ M J.SDE.\11-:.rnol!. 
'I'll(• rourl ha\'ini: 11111lurcl.1· conRhll'rl'1l the 111otion of th,, 
<ll'fo11dn11t to sl't li'id<• the vcnlirt of the jun in thi" l'llS1', ns 
l•L•i11g- 1·011trnry to the law n111l the cvitlrurn, '1111il l1y 111i"lin..:-
tio11 lov the Court; llll<l for n•asons st11tL•1l i11 writ in:: 111111 
l11•n'hy mn<lc 11 pnrl of the recor,\ in this cnsc, doth 01,-,•rrn\L• 
till• -suid 111otio11, lo whil'11 uctiuu of thl' c:onrt thL· <ll'f.,111l1111t 
l'XCl'ph•1I; WhL'l'l'llJlOll it i~ th{' j11dµ;111c11t of tlll' l'lllll'( thut the 
1tL'l"lt"1'1l M. <.l. Fn111cisco pny u lint' of $:J.OU nnil thL• ''"'ts of 
the prosecut10n. 
22 
r;·•, ,. ;~~~:·: 
Supre!Il4·Coart of .AppeAla of Virginia 
For reasons appearing to the Court execution do not issue 
in this case for .s~xty (GO) day~. 
Pagti 5 } Virginia : 
In the. Ci.ttuit Court of Hnuovcr County. 
The Commonwealth 
fl • 
.Y. O. Francisco 
OPINIO~ 01'' 1'11~ COURT. 
Tl.le RC(:Uwd wa~ in<liclt•1l fur Iii,• sale of bt.~r ou Su111lay. 
He plcnlfod not f;uilly. 011 Jij, !rial three wituc$l!~ int•"· 
duce<! hv the Co::1111ouwcnlll1 l1• ... tili1~l that lhc accns,.,1 ,...,1.i 
Leer at 0hi~ store iu l!anu,·,·r l '1111111\· 011 Sun,luy, Sepll'111io,·r 
7, l!JH. 'l'hi: 11N:llscd kstili1•l tli:d lot• ... ol1l !><.•er ut his pl;11·1· 
of lousiness ou that duY n111l llml Ill• thom.:ht llml Ill' hail a 
lnwful right to sell 1.JCcr 011 Suuda_,. ur1<l tl11it he 111nd,• a pr;ll'-
tice of so doin". ~{rs. Frnm·iH·11, Ilic wife of the 11cc11s1'tl, "''" 
testified thnt h('r husbi1111! ,;old !K't'r at lois pl:iCl' of J.11,i111·•-
011 the Su111lny in <1uc~tiuu. So di1I !-ilwri!T Sumpter l'ridd_,. 
wlio 'vns 1ircseut iu the i;tor,• wl11·11 till' ,;ales wt·rc 11111111· lu 
the wil11cssc1 who testific,I for tl>t' ( 'u1111110111n•altlo. Tiu· ,,, .. 
cuscd tcsti!il'<l thnt he sol1I fn1111 lifly to sixty (~ll-GO) ""''"' 
of beer pt•r week sn<l thnt frn111 1111c-fo11rth to om•-tl1inl 
(l/-l-1/3) of thnt nmouut wns ... 1,1 011 Sm11l11y. The :ll't'll""' 
testified thnt he kept hi~ 11tim· "I""' fur lousiness nl! St'\"l'I• 
( i) days of en•rv week. 
It nppcnr~ fr~m the cvi,h·11n• 111T,•rc1I by the :ll'CllSl'1l 111:11 
then: arc sixtv-onc liccnsl'l'S 11f !Ill' ,\kuho\i,• Tk\'l'rtl\!l' \ 'u11· 
trol Roanl wftli pince~ of l111>•i111'"" i11 llanover Co1111ty, a11.J 
!lint nt lens! ei!l;hty (Sll'fv) , ... ,. n'l1l11111, of these lil't'll'<'•'s "'" 
beer nnd wine, 01· lu .. •ef u)out', ou Su1ulay. A nmubl•r uf li~ 
CCllSCCS !cstili1'<l lli:1I llu·ir 1·11"t111I1l'l't\ th•111:1111h'll l····1 
pngc 6 ~ on ~11111lay 1111d 1111<· li, ... 11,l't' l<'slificll that 11111-111"-
slnte tourists 1101 1111k <lt'11111111ll'tl lil'l'f on S111ula\" ~ut complained hcc1111sc till'~· ,:0111.1 1101 Jlllrl'linse 1li•till1•;\ 
liquors from t ht:' lict•nsl'c. 
'rhe nccnscd offerNl to sl111w llo;ol tl1e Bonni of Supervisun· 
of llnnovcr Conntv, nlthom:h \11'1 ilio11l't\ ~o to <lo hY n111111·r1111s 
c_iti1.~11~ ?f the County lon.1! faii. .. 11 .. :1tlopt n Counl.v Onliu:~u<"' 
prol11lnt111~ !he i-alc of w111e 11111! 1 ..... ,. 1111 811n1lnv n~ 1111tlo11nz1•1l 
hy Chapter 12!l of the Acts of l!•::s. 'l'his c~iclencc w:1s l'X· 
eluded II!! \Jein~ irrclev11nt, to wl1id1 t>xccption was tuk<·n. 
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It was stipulated that the n0011Sed had a merchant's, resl~u­
rnnt, a tobacco nn<l 11 wine nncl beer license. All of these 
licenses nrc sepnrate license11. The merchnut's license (re-
tnil) is provided for by Section 188 of the True Code; ti.Jc 
rcstauraut license by Se<'tion 197 of the 'Tux Code; the to-
bacco license by Section !Wl of the Tax Code nn<l the wine 
nnd beer license b~· Section 4765 (18) of the Virginiu (lode 
of 193G. Each license nuthorizes thtl conclncting of nn en-
tirely scparnte.b11_si_J!c~!I which could not be luwfully conducted 
without such hccn~eo. 
The prosc>eution is bn~t'<l upon Section 4570 of the Code 
which reads ns follows: 
''If n person on n Sunilny be foullll lnborin~ ut any trndu 
or c11llin/;, or clllploy his npprcnticc~ or scrvnnts in labor or 
0!11t•r hn.,ine~s, l'Xccpt in houschohl or other work of necessity 
or t•l111rity, Joe i<h:ill h~ 1h•P11t•!1l !.!"1tilty of 11 111i-<lklll<'llnor nml 
upo11 <'0111·il'1iu11 1l11•rc•of ~lmll Ii!' tinc•1l 11ot !cs, !111111 live llollars 
for <'llc.'lr offen .... e. Evl'J',\' d:1.v nn~· persou or servnut 
IHl).:l' i f or llflfll"t'nli<'<' is so t•mploy<'il .,Jinll t•onstitulc n ilis-
ti11l'I 01Tt•ns1• 1111<1 llil' courl in which t>l" !lie jnstiec 
l1v whn111 1111\' j11d'-!11tt•11I of co11viclio11 is n•11.!<'rl'tl 11wv reqnirc 
of tl1,• pt•rsoi1 1<0 l'llllYictl'<I n l"l'<'t1'-!llirn11cl' iu 11 pc·1111fty of 11ot 
h•ss tli1111 t>n1• hm11ln'll or n1on• thnn tin• lltou,111111 <lollarn, wilh 
or without Sl'<'llrit~·, 1"011ditio111•1l tlont "'"li pl'rsun sl1111l be 
of!.."""' lwhnvior, llllll l'slll'l'inll~· to rcfrnin from 11 rc1ll'tition 
of ""''h uffcust', for n pcri0<! not l'~l"t't'diu~ lwelvc• months. 
'l'lois M'<'lion sl1all not apply to furnnc,•s, kilns, pl1111ts ntul 
nllll•r linsim•-.sl's of liko lan<l lllllt Illa\' he lll'l'l'%111"\' tu he 1·011· 
1l11l'lt'1\ nu Smulny, uor In lh1• ~ak• o.f .:11'11li1tc', or. 1111y mot111 
n•l1idl' rn,.1, or nnY motor oil or oil<. 
'l'l1e l'Xl'l'flli1111• j1ru\'i<h'tl for in Ila• st11ln"', wlii .. 11 wns lnst 
lllll<'lllll'1! iu l!rt'..', (Al•ls rn:::!, p. :»Hi) a1·1· 11~ si!."11ilil'll1tl us 
11n• !lot• proloihiliu11s l'Out11i11l'1l in llil' st11l11li', 1111.! it is np· 
p11n·11I from 1111· n•111li11~ of th1• 1rnnl, 11f 1111· st:ll11t 1· !\oat "" 
work or lntsitu.t""' uf n f\('>(~ulur nnf11rl.) 1...\xcept liouselioltl or 
ntlt1•r work ot~ m'<'<'~'ity or clo:orit~· 1111<! li1l' 'fll'<'iull 1· l'X<'l'fll<'il 
works 01· li11s1111•ss 11ut of llol''l' tlonr:1t•f<ors, "'"'" l:twfullv lie 
Jll'rformc1l or 1·111·.-j,.,1 on on Snmlnv 1ml<'ss Ilic·· :ll'<'llS<'ll ·foils 
within otll' of tl1,• l'Xl'Cptions providl'll for in St'l"lion 4;,71 of 
tlll' l\xk'. wl1irlo l:illt•r t'Xl'l'plinns nrc not npplil':il1k• l11•n'. 
'l'lll' C\'illt•net• showt•ll thnt whilt• tli,• lll'•'ll'"" li:id 11 rl'stnu· 
rnnt lict•usc thnt hll hntl 011lv two \11\oll's nnd s<'rv1•d univ sallll· 
wid1l's nnll thinks. lt llJIJll'lll"l'll tlont his primarv 1i·11sinl'S' 
wns th11t of 11 mcrchunt, 1111<1 he 1l'stilil•1\ Ii•.• 11lw:1y~ '"\.\ \1e•l'1 
for "off Jll'l'lllisl'" consumption on ¢-;111ulny. · 
2' Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Counsel for the 1w,·ns,.,.} requested the Court In 
page B ~ give the jury a ~cri''"" uf instrnctions, the l'ffwt 11f 
which woulu b:in• 1 .. .,..11 lu 1,·nw to the jury the 1111,.,. 
tion ns to whether tlw snl!! of 1 .. ,.r un 8umJn,• wns or wn" 1111t 
a work of uccC?ssitr. DC'f.•min·: tla,• "''le or"bei!r 011 :Sn111la_,. 
in the l.'OU!'SC of one'11 l"C',.!'Ulnr lo11•illl'"'' to 1'e plniuly 11 \'iul:a· 
tion of Section 45ill of the l 't"''" tl1t· l 'uurl rcfus..-<l ll1l'>'<' in-
structions nu<l in~tcnJ tlu.:11 ... ,f. i11•lr11rll-<l the jury 11s 111 tl1t· 
presmnjltiou of inu~ucc Ullll n·:1 ... •11al•ll' llou!.Jt, nn<l then :.:a\"" 
111!! followin!( in,truction: 
"Th<.> l'ourt instruct,; ti.,. jun tlia\ if the,· !.Jc\ien· fru111 
the evi<lt•uce lx·~·on<l n n·11 ... 111alot,. •l•n1lot !lint tl1t' ll~ll~l·•I. ~I. 
ll. Frnu~i><eo, lli,J la-ep upl'll a1ul 111ai11t;ai1111n 8untlay, tl11•.itl1 
uf Scp1<'111lx•r in lln11un·r l 'u1111t' ll 1011,inc'~ for tlic ,..,,1,. ul 
!><.-er uni\ lli1l 011 sni<l S1111d:1~· ·•·II 1.,·1-, lhl'.'" ~i.oul,1 fiu,I lii111 
i-:uilly uml tix hi~ p1111i•l111u·11t :ol 11 li11l' 1111t k•,s than l·'j,-,. 
(~:,.oo) Dullat><." ti"• l'!Twt uf "1,i,·l1 """' to l1ul,1 tloat a• a 
111nttcr of law tht:' ... alt· of 1 ...... ·r (,\ 11llt· iu tl1c n·gular 1·u11r .. ,· 
Uf }1iS lnt"illl""'\S UU ~l\lH\:l\' l·1111 .. lillllt·1\ a \'iu\ntio.U Uf Sl'1·li1111 
4!jj() cf tlw ('o<ll'. · 
llitl-ll1t• l'u11rt l'IT in ,.., liuloli11:'.: 
111 l'i,/:1·!) /fru .... \'. ('1111111101·11·· 1111/1. t:~" Yn. ;1:1, ';:!ti ( \~1·..:'.!) 
tlac Court ><aid: 
,, ••• Tlll'rl' nn· l':ll'>l" ... \\"lu•i-1· llu· 111ll' .... tiou is Ulll'. ur l:I\\ 
for llll' l'o11rt. \\'lo,·r1• ti"· ad i· l'l;oi11l.1· 11 \'i11l11ti1111 111" 11..-
~tntntl\ n:oc whl·•·t.· a t.·11ntn1dur, "i_ll1111tt l'llll'r~l'IH'Y, i~ run11i11·..:. 
n st ell JU ~llU\'l•l 011 R111nla~. ur 11, .. :wt i"" plai11ly lllll' 11( lll't'1·_ ... 
..-ity, ""' \\'lll'l'l' 111l' uw1wr lift ... Iii ... ,,, ioul t1f tla• dih·li; i11 ,·i1l1c..T 
c.·w.;e the '1lll'stiu11 is lllll' of la" 1'11r 1111• \ 'uurt. Hut if tl1i• ;11 l 
'"! OJlt• aJwul wJ1j1·l1 L1ir 111i111h ... 1 HH.'ll 111i':!,l1t n·:b111i 
1Hl1!e H} olJ}y tliffl'r :h to wl11·1lwr ur 1111\ iii"' n wu~·k of 111·,···~ 
:-:ity, tlil'll it i~ n qn,·-1 i111.• 11f fad fur the jury." 
"'h,•rc the 811pn·me Conrt or .\111•·al>< hn~ 1kdan•1l n ;.:i,,.11 
ad lo he a \0iolatiu11 of tl11· :-;1111.ta,· law 11ml 111>t 11 lll'<'''"'il\ 
110 fai1· 111i111l<'1l 111:111 11111\ <'1•rt::i11I_,: 1111 11i.'i 1iri11., l''ourl 111:i:, 
n•n,011nhh· <litfor :1s to wl ... tl1<·1· .,,. 11111 it is n work 111' ,.,.,.,., 
~ih·. Such nu ul"l i~ tiut u w11r~ 111' l1t•t·P:--:--iih· hnt H"' u 111all1·r 
or"lnw pl11i11t~· 11 \'iol11tio11 or l}1<• >t:ilnh•, , . 
1.11 l':llis \'. r111·i11.fJ/""· 1:!'.! \'a. S:!l, s:!.\ (1!1\i) t\1<· 111.,.11-•·ol 
wn~. th<' propril'lor .,fit n•><la11rn11t. I Ii· l11ul :1 lil'l'llSl' tu , ...... 
llll<'t s1wh h11si11C'ss 111111 al"' a li1·0·11"'•' tu '"II soft 1lri11ks. !·:11;, 
wa~ l·onvid1•.l for ,·iolati1111 ur a tuw11 or1li11:111<·e whi1·li 11 ... 
Cunrl of App,•nls ~nit! wa~ "s11l1,.l:a11ti:1ll.1· i11 tl1l' 11111.c:nnc: .. of 
Ilic Ad n111c111li11~ a111l rc-c11:wli11:~ :-;,.l'liou ::i9!l of the l'1i1\,."., 
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!\Ow Section 4.'>70 of Ilic Co<le, in th11t he In bored ut his trndl' 
or l'lllling or bC'lling l'Ol'a-<:olu OJI the Snbbntli day. . 
'l'he Court of Appcnls sni<l (122 Vu. 824): 
"On the merits of the r11se, we have no <lifficullv iu affirm-
ing- the jmh.'111Cllt. Ellis wns cnrn·ing on two well <lcfincd 
trndcs or c11lli1~11<ler 11epnrntc Jlcl'nscs. (1) Ho was con-
dnctiug 1111 enli11~ ho:i~c, or restuurnnt, tho exercise of which 
l111•im.,;s 011 tlie Snbbnth <lny, mlmittcdly, wns not a violation 
uf the onlinn11cc; nm! ('.!) Ho wns <'11!-.'llgcd in selling soft 
lld11k~ (iuclmlin:: NX'n-<:o\n) from a i;ouu fountuin, 17.e sale 
•if wliicli uu tl1t· Sa/1/intl1 clay is « p/ai11 t•iolntiota of IJ.e ordi-
.,,,.,,.,.. Sur\1 l><•l'l'r:t~l'S, tliou~h not spirituons or nlcoholic, 
l'111111ot he 1li'P''""Nl withont u license; nntl they constiluto 
11 1li-ti11rt l'lass from eotTt·c, tea 11111] other 1111-
l•:lgl' 10} li .. e11:--.·1\ 1lri11ks, whieh urc• cun11111111ly usl',\ nt meals 
with fo111l. Iii~ ntt,•111pt to j11'ti(" ll1e iufrnetion 
of th,• or,\in:llll'l' 011 th,• plen that he ,\i,t not serve coca-c11la 
nlone, lo11l 1111ly i11 l0 0lllll'<.0 liu11 wit Ii 111l'al', lum·lil's 111Hl 1iie when 
1·1111,•d fur 11~· 1·11sto111l'I'>', is n f1:1lp1dil1• 'ul_1!1•rfu.~1· 1111<! l'o11sti-
t11t1•., 110 11iofcn~'" ( '1 .. ·11-eula is 1111l witl1111 tli" l'lass of hev-
l01"ac_:1·~ , ... ,., ...... \ 1._,. th .. l'nlin~ l1011sl' Ill' n•st1111ranl lit'l'llSl!. Ir 
it Wl'l"l'1 11l1\'i1>11,oh· II Sl'pllr:ltl' li1·1•11st• wol'.J,J 1101 lie lll'l'l.'SSHI"\' 
tu 1111t11ori7l' its s:il1•. Elli• l'1111l,l 1111\ lawfulh· ,lisp••use soft 
.Jri11k•, l'\'1•11111111 W1'l'k-<ln\" witl11111t li<"''"'''; .,.,., 11l11i11l11 c1111/,/ 
1111/. tluJU.rJlt lin·11s1·,/, 11/.11 liis ndliurJ of sc•lliurJ -'"tt<'ii 1ln.11/.':.; pll 
t/ .. · ...... ·,,1i1111t11 dt1t/ ;,, 111111 tl"IUJ siJ er.~ to 1·s1 t1Ji1· linl1ifitr1 uucf,.,.. 
If,.. ,.,,fi11u1,.·o•." (lt11li1·.• '"PJ1li<•1l.) . 
'l'his is n 1\1'fi11it.• h11l.li11::: ll\' the hi:_:l1t•'t ( 'uurl 11f tlll• C11111-
1111111w,•11lth tl111t tli" sl'lti11:.: ui1 S1111d1l\' ur .s11fl drinks jllll"sll· 
11nt tu Ulll' 1:-o n.·~ular hnsiHl':->~ i"' n \'iul:\ti1111 of tlH· S111ubv 
11111". . 
111 //um/r·r \'. ('r1111t111111w1·11I//,, lll7 Vn. Si:!, siK-!1 ( l!lllS) ""'' 
111111_~,·r who \\'lls the 1·hi,•f slol'l;hohh-r of 11 1•orponali1111 op· 
1•r:it1u!! 11 tlrll.!! ~ton• 1111<1 lh1• ol11<·l'1·• of tlo,• dru!! co1111>111>)' 
sul1l tol11a·1·111 1'111!11 wnh•r, I'll'. 011 Sn111l:1\', lla11c'l'r was 1111ti-
li1•1l Ii~· tin• poli,•1• that 1111ll'~~ t11,• t•111111;am· "'''"'''\ vi11l11li11!! 
tl11· l";11111\m· law that it wu11t.\ lit• prn'<·1·11t.•1l. '!'lo" l'Ul11p; 11 1\' 
1·•·11.•t·.I >'l·llin~: ~lll'h m·ti,·ll's 011 S11111\a~·. ll1111;.-;1•r \h,•r1•upu;1 
11),111;111•11:a1·l1:1rt1•r fol' II l.\lll•i11J l•\uh or wliil'h hl', 11 sl111·k\rni&l<'1" 
i11 _his tlru~ l'UIHpany, nntl n t·h•rk i11 tliv .. ·11qi\u\'ll1l'lll ot' snt·li 
,·ni1111nu~· \\'l'rl• tlw i1u•orporntor~. · 
'l'lll'l'l1 \\'HS 110 i11ili:1tiou ft·c; no <hws :1ud OIH' )H't'Jlllll' H JlH'Ill· 
hl•r 11f lhl' 1•l11h h~· si:::11i11!! 1111 11ppli1·alio11. 'l'hc 
pa~t· 11 ~ 1lnw: l'Olll}lllll\' l1·n~1·1l th" 1·l11h 11 n•nr n>t1m in thl' 
hlore occ11pit•"I hy th,• drn!! t11111pn11y. 'l'lierenftl!1 
,":' 
26" Sopreme ·Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
on Stlildaya Han~r and hU eruplo,·~s solJ "tobac.:o, cii-.'lirs, 
ci~arettes, aoda water, etc." to th~ 11{)-callt'd members of th•· 
club, but not to the public l-'1.'llcrnlly. Any .member of !Ill' 
club could buy iu the open ~tort• of t11c <lrug company 1111 
Sunday the urticlcs abo\'C. men! iollt'll nml prncticnl!y no otln·r 
use was made of the ct>rtifil'alc of 1m•111bersltip in tltc ,-11111. 
The Cuniruouwealth institult'<I n IJ"" 1ntrr1111lo prot"l'l'tlim:. 
to annul the ch11rtcr of the i<0<·i11l duli. 'rhl! tri11l Court all· 
nulle<l thc charter nnd on writ of t•rrur tu the jud~'lllClll tin· 
Court of Appt•nls, after rc\'it·wi11~ the C\'i,tcnrc', ~ni<l, ( llli 
\' u. l'P· 875-~) : 
"Upou the fure;.:oiu~ fud.~, ii I••• plainly 11ppt•nrH to 11<li11il 
of discu~sion, thnt !hi! obtui11i11:: 11f lht• t·harlcr in q11t·~tiu11 
oml tltc prl'lcn1lt'\l or1-tnni111ti1111 uf 11 .-.iciul dub thcn.•u111l1·1 
wns fur tltc fr1111.!uk·11t puri••"'<' 11f ,, ... ·11ri11~ the pri\'ih·c:" uf 
h"lliu;; tobncl·o, ci~~ur:-0, ci!!al·l•llt·:-:. -..uc.b watl•r, a1ul otl11..•r l"'11fl 
drinks 011 ~nn1by-n pri,·il,•;.:1• wloi,·h au imli,·idu:1l t·otd1l ""' 
e:.:crcisc without i11('uq;i11~ llo1• fu1l\·it11rc pn.·s..·rilx.'ll in ~ .... 
tio11 :.lii!l of tltt' Coile, .>1111r11." 
Tht' Court further s.1id, (107 \'a. l'I'· S7!)~'l0): 
"\\'e nre 110! cullt'tl upon ht•n· t11 1h•d:1rc wlmt wonl,t 1111.I 
whnt would 110! be 1111 nlou"e of ii- 1·harh•r I"· u ~lll·iul 1·l11lo. "' 
tl111t CJUt'•tiou hn" to he dl'll'n11i111·1l 11111111 tl1~ fact• uf lhr par· 
ticnlnr en"~- In tht• cuse hefor,• 11s, i:s :1ln•111l~· ohst•n· .. t, tlw 
proof lenves 110 rno111 to 11011!1! tlwl 1111• 1·lt:1rler in 'illl"·'i"" 
wn,.; ohtnittt•d nnd wn~ Leiu~ \l ... l'tl :i~ a 111'.'l'l' 1nnl.;l~~shift to •'II· 
111Jlu the prncti1·11l owner n1ul prupri .. tur of the Ilnnt:•'r llrn:: 
Co. to 110, n111k•r t111· 1·111111; of ti"• d1arll•r, tlo.11 
png-c 12 f wl1ieh 1111individnal1·011l1l 1111! 110 :11111 e"""l''' p1111i-l1 
llll'lll. 11 
The dt'Cisio·n in JI1111.q1·r v. ('.,1J1111111Jw•·11ltl1, s1111nr, i" 11 
definite holdin).: thnt it is n \'iulati1111 of thl' ·Su1ul11~· law f11r 
one licc11st'<l tu sell tohac('O, <'i~1rs. 1·i~·ar:•lte•, n111l tiO<ln wnll·r 
to sc•ll the ~Hill(' on 81111cl1n·. II i, 111a11ift•st that wlll're tl11· 
Court of finnl resort h!i~ ~011sti-11"d a slalnll• 1111Ll d1'l·l:on·d 
!hut n g-ivcu n<'t or st'rics of 11<'1" 1·1111slitutes 11 viol11tio11 thl'n'· 
of. thnt n Rimilnr net neccs"nrih· i-< a ,·iulation of tlu• statuti·. 
11n1l-the <loin).: uf the net l"·i11!!. pr11\·,.,1 111· 1uh11itt .. <1, pn•:<,.11ls 
11 quc"tion of lnw for the ('011rl :1111! 1101 a queslion of fa..t 
for the jury. 
I11 /fa11.f/1~r v. Co111111011wP11lll1, s1111rn, it wn~ clcurly 11('1<1 thal 
the snte of tohacco, ci~nretlt-s, l'i•!ars, so1l11 water 11111\ otlwr 
•• :1 . 
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wft drinks by a nierch11nt on Sundav was A violation of the 
Sunday l11w. Ellis v. Covin,qlon, s111;ra, clearly holds that It 
is unlawful for ono engn~d in the selling of soft drinks to 
~ell the sume on Sundar. Tlu.i opinion~ in those cnses were 
written by judges of rcco101ized nbility nnd concurred in l.iy 
u <.:ourl compost'<! o!:_ some of tho ulile8t judges tlml l11w11 s11t 
upon the Court or::Appcnls. 'l'hc opinion in Jlc1119cr v. Com· 
11w11u:rn/tl1, supra, wns written by l'nrdwell, J. und concuncd 
in b" Keith, P. nud Buchnnnu, Hurri~on null Whittle, J. J. 
'J'he · opi11ion in Ellis , .• Cot•iugluri, .<11/'ra, wns written by 
\\'hitth', I'. 111111 concurrt'\l in hy Kelly, Sims, Prc11tis 1111'1 
Hurks, .l. J. 
'!'la• 1lt•cisium1 in tlil'Se cr.seij hn\'c UC\'cr been 11uc~tio11cd in 
tl1is Stull' 1111d nre in ll<'Conl with the ~n·nl wei~ht of nu-
tltotit,· . .'ilulr \'. J11111<0 .i, 81 8. C. )'.17, G:! S. E. :!14, .18 I..)(. A. 
• (:-.l. S.) lili,-1:!8 A. S. H. ~11r2, lli ,\1111. L'.ns. '277 
pngc 1:.1} (l!l08) dtt•1l will111p(lro\':d in J'irl.-.-y /lrns. "· Co111· 
wu1111•1·ulll1, 1:1~ Vn. il:!, 7:.!:! ( l!I:!:.!); .lfc .. 1.f,.,. '" 
('0111M•11111'<·11/tl1, 17:1 K~·- s:;, J!lll R \\'. liil, L. IL A. l'.117-C.: '.377 
(l!lli): J/r/\1·011·11 "· St11I•", !~Ii Ark.~:,~. l:.!1 S. \\'.:2nd. 1'.l 
{1 1 1::~1),u11,l.'il11li-\-. <",,·vlvgus,!l!IA. L.1!. (\'t.) 15·11, J;i-t(i.47 
( l '.1"!8). 
'l'loe• lnw wo11l,l sou11 l'l'llH' !11 ht• law nnel l1t'<'Olll<~ 111111rd1y 
if trinl l'u11rts ur juries were• nt Jil><·rty lo oli~n·vanl n11d sd 
111 111111;:lot tltt• 1h'<.·isi1111s of till' S11pn·111c Court of Appe11h 
that 11n· 1•l,·11rly in point. 
1\Ni1l,• fro111 tltis 011 priu('ipll', how 1·1111 it be• s11i<l thnt thl• 
~nle• uf l><•<•r 011 S11111by is 11 work of lll'<.'e"il\' or c11p:1t.J,. of 
h1·i11~ 111111le ~lh·h r 'J'lit• \'l'llllur of l1t'l'I" ('llllllol ''"'"" lli:d ih 
r-:alt.1 .un S\\11\\ny is lH!l'e"\,:\ry to 2".:l\'L' hitu~1,,·lf fro111 !"l'l'i1n1s ul· 
HnL·Xp1•t•IL-d h"~ or that its "al" 1111 ~1111<1:1y is 11t•n•s,;:1ry to 
s:11·,• tht• puhli,• from u1111'1111l <lisi•11111fon ur i11ro111·1·11ie•11<·10. 
••No onl•,'' t::nill the Snpn•111e l 'onrt of \'l•r111011l in ,\'faf1· 
"· ('111·11/01JV.<. ri!l ,\,!..I/. l.'1~1. l."1lli-i (1~1:!.'i), "li:ls ('\'l'J' 111111 
iht• tr11writy t11 l'lnim thnt lht• hut1·h1•r 11r ;:r"""" <'llll k1•e·p 
"\l<'n 111J1rk1•t 011 Su111lny ~imp!~· 1i,.,.,.,"'' ti"' artie·h•s in whil'\o 
tl11·~· <h•11l ,·u11s!it11tt• lll'<'l'><~arit•s. ALl111itti11,,. tl1:1t :1 n•:1so11:1l1l,• 
llt't'1•s~it\' for nil\' l't>llHllotlitv nrnv l'Xl'Use ·n salt• tlivn•ot' 1111 
~1111tl;1y~ notl1iu.~· ~hurt of !'l;t·h u;•c1•s.,.itv will PX1.·u~t.· it. 'l'u 
ltolil uth,•nvist' wo11hl he lo n•p1•11l, i11 1•lfrct, tht• express li111i-
tntiou i1npo~l'tl hv tli~ k·~i~lnhtl't.'." 
Hl1t•r i..; n "'JWl·io~ of nh•oliolic hl1 \'L\ra~1.'"\ 1111<1 alcolmlil· l1l'\'-
~rn~e~, inl'hulin~ hl1l'r, hnvl' llC\'l'I" lH.'l'll n·~nnh•tl ns n IH'L't's-
sit.'" At 1111.' most 11k11h11lil' lwv,•ri\'~1·" nrt• 11 per-
(ln);ll 14 f 111i~sihk• luxury, t'\'<'11 tho11~lo thl'." 111:iy he• in c11111-
mon use . 
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All hu been poinW out above, the accu&ed admitted thnt 
he engaged in the indiscrimiuntc ,;.:1le of beer to the ~nernl 
public 011 Sunday. ·Neither connuon fCll!!e nor aoanJ morality 
would or could regurd ~uch :a·rs us 11ecessary. J!c.Afu v. 
Co111mOJ1weallh, 17 Ky. 83, 190 S. W. 671, L. Il A. 1917-C 3ii 
(1917}; McKr.Otl:fl v. Stale, l!li Ark. -4!">4, 124 S. W. 2nd. l!l 
(193!1). 
'l'he decision!! in Pirkey Bros. , .. Cor1u1to•1cealth, 134 \'a. 
71J (192"1); l..ah!idt l1tH v. c.•.,,,...,ouu:talth, 134 Va. G!>U 
(l!l.?'2); nllJ Crook v. Co111uio111r~rr///,, Hi \'a. ti93 (19"!7) n1-c 
1111 cusc5 which iuvolvl'<l ucb nbout which fuir-1nin<lt'tl 1u<'ll 
111iid1t reu~u1111bly ,Jiffer 8ll tu \li'lll'llll'r ur not the act in q11es-
tio11 WllS 11 work uf ne<:essit~-. Th,• Court of Appc&ls hn1l 
nc,·cr <lcclarl'<l th:tt the ucts <·u111pl11i11<"<l of in thosl' ens•·~ 
were pluiu \'iulntiuns uf the S111ul;"· l.nw. They were net• 
nbout which ren~onuble 111e11 '"111.1 ,litfor in the nbscll\'c uf 
5nch a <ll"cisiou. 
'l'he cas,• 11t h.u is entirch· 1litT .. n·11t. Herc the nccusc,I, 11 
llll!n:hnnt, ,;u\J tu th" ;.:t•11er;d pufoli" ft1.·c·1· un Sundny. S11.-l1 
an Ill"! lllls l>ccu twice d,•d:irt ... 1 1 •• ,. ti." Conrt ul AJ>l"-'nl,; 111 
'"' n violation uf the :->u11,lav Law. JI.,,,,,,.,,._ Co11U11u111rr11lll1, 
lUi Va. X72, ~78-'J (l!l:IS); 111 ... l /:/Ii• ~ .. Cv1·i;i9to11, 1:!:.! \'a. 
i<:!l, 1'1:!4 (l!ll7). 
ll 11111h\, thcn•fon', Le cu11cl111l1•1l tlial th1• 11uestiu11 pn•s,•11l1·cl 
by the evidc·11cc l1e1·,. i~ 011e uf law fur t11t• C<iurt 11111\ nut a 
quc,tiun of fnct fur th<' jury, 111nl it i• so hel1\. 
'fl11,, ll{"<"U'<'1I n·qm·,lt•tl i11>'t nwt iu" :'\o. 11 wl1ich wn., 1·l'· 
ru.cd. 'l'lii.~ i11stn1rtion rc:ul,; a,; full11ws: 
"The C-0urt i11~trnd.• 1111· jurv thnt Lv 1111 11..t 
pui.:c 15} of the· (ll'11t•rnl AKsc•111\1\,· 11f \'irduiu pn~,;·,1 nt llw 
l!l~ Re•Hsiuu tlwn• was l'l'l·all'd 1111 Alcuhulil' JI,., .. 
crnge Co11trol Tlonr-.1 with pow1·r to i"ue to rctailc•rs in 1111· 
8tnte of Virgi11i11 licenses fur 11i,. salt• uf b<'er nml wine n111l 
p1nsuRnt thereto snill llonr1l J111, 111·11 .. 1•<-tlcd to is.-111• to lht• n•. 
tnilcrs in \'irginin, incl111lin)." t\11• 1h·f .. 111l1111t, snch liccn~c·s with-
out nnv restriction the•n:i11 ns 111 ""!"" un Rnndnv · f111·t li"1· 
that IJ~ n furtl1<•r ud of th,, l:1·111·1·nl AKscmhlv ·1;:iss<'1l i11 
1~138 the Honn\ of 8npcrvisurs uf the• ~everal ·counties i11 
Virginia WHc e•111powere•1l to pa"s 11rdi111111ccs to prohibit ti"' 
~ulc of winl' mul hce1· on ~11111lny, \d1i1,h net proviik11 that 
notltiuic tltcrciu sl1ouhl \)(.• <'1111slrt1l'1l as nltl'rin!!;, umc•mlin::: 
or n•pNl!inir Section .J:i70 of ll1t• I '•><h· (c:ommonlv known 1;s ~h" ~umlay hhw law). F11rtl1cr th•· I 'unrt tell~ tl.1e jun· tliat 
•t nppenn• fru111 the l1vi1lcncc that si11,·e the pa~sal('c (1f tli1· 
A.ct of J!l:IS npplicntion hm; hc'l'll 111111lc• to th" Ronni of S11p,·1·-
v1sors of Hnno\'cr County to l""" au onlinnncc 11rohibiti1u.: 
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the sale.of bee: and wine in Hlll!over Connty on Sunday,"bbt re~11rdless of its power to do ~o the Board of Supervisors . 
refused to pass such ordinance and that there is in existence 
in Huno\'er County 110 or<liunnce of said Hoard which pro-
hibits th5 salo of beer and wine on Sundays." 
The purpose of this instruction was to tell the jury that 
the Akoholio Beverage Control Board baa licensed the sale 
of beer nud wine on 8unday 11nd that the Board of Super-
vieurs h11d a~uie!!Ced in this by fuiling to exercise the powers 
cunferre<I on it by Chapter 129 of the ~ts of 1938. 
It is snid thnt the Alcoholic llc\'erogc Control Board has 
knowin1dy pcm1itted its liel•rtsecs (except in coun-pn~o 16} til's nnil cit1c•s whose l(O\'crni11~ ho<ly hn\'O nvnilcd tlll'111sel\'c~ of tit" provisions of Cl1npter 129 of the 
Acti1 of 193:-i) to sell wine mu\ l>e<•r un ~11111\ny. 
It is tnw tlmt the Alcoholic Hc,·crng-., C'o11trol Bonrd hns 
rnised nu objN~tiou 1o its lh"t'llSl•t•~ SC'f!ing- wi11e und heer on 
S11111l:1y L'Xl"l'Jlt iu those politic11l s11b-divi,io11s wl11"e ~u\•crn­
i11;.: ho1li1•s have c1111cte'tl onliunnrc•s pursuant tu t lie pro\·i-
sious of Cl111pl<!r l!.'!J of tl1c Acts of I !J3'i {:\,·rs I !J:lS, p. I !H ). 
I 11111 mlvi~, ... 1, howl'Yl'r, hy Hou. 0. Stnnl<'y Clarke, thl' 
Assist1111t Attorn..,v <lc1a•rul ns~i~nl'd tu the All'oholic Bl'\'· 
1•rn,_,,. Co11trol llo1;,.,1, th11t tl1t• lioanl l111s 11p1·1•r :111tl1orize<I 
or 11tt..,111ptc1l to :1uthori1.e u11y lit•,•nsc•c to sl'll wiue 111111 hel'r 
011 :->1111,\:iy. '!'lie rt·n~o11 for thi~ is J><-•rfoctly ubvious. ;-{o 
111l111i11istn1ti1·1· ll~Clit'I' or Ilic t'Xt'l'Uti1·l· brn1wh uf th1• "llY<'l"ll· 
111,•111 l""'''''''<l llil' ,;uthoritv to rcp1•nl or -.·t nt 1111u.:?lit 11111· 
'""itin• l!11ndrrll'nt of tl1c Ue111•rnl As,emhlv. · · 
\\'hill' th,• pow1•r to d,•lc•).:nlc lo 111l111i11istr;1tiv1• 11_,:,•11L"ics tht• 
1111thority t11111lopt rule~ 11n1I n•g:ulntiou~ h11vi11,~ th,• fore<' 111111 
1•iT1·1·t of law, tu ll lirnilcil l':'Cll'l1I, Sl'l'llJS lo !,,. r1>cocc11i1<'il i11 
this Stall', it hns lte\'l•r h1•c11 h1·hl 11111l1•r onr sysll'n1 of g-ov-
1•rn11:i•11t thnt tli1• powe•1· c1111 he• d1•l,·1•11tc1l tu 1111 nd111i11istra-
tiy,. n~e·nt•y of the• e'X<•cutive hr1111d1 of '-"11·1·n1111,•nt to n•t>t•iil 
•1r s11spcn1l th1• op;:r11tio11 ur po~itivc lnw. Slu/1• V. f.'ic·ld, 17 ~ro. ;i:!!I, !'i!J Am. l>t'<'. :r;;, (18.'i.'1). 
S1·<"1in11 40 of the ('onstitutiou dcrlnn•>1 thnt: 
"'l'hc l<>i..:islntivu powl'r of till' Rtnt" slinll I><> l'cslvil iu a 
G,•1wrnl Assc111hlv which shall eon~ist of n Senate 1111.J llnu~.., 
of Dcl<'g-ntes." · 
pn~e· 17 } Se•ctiou :l!I of the Constitntinn 1livi11l'H the powern' 
of g-ovcrurnl'ut into lhn•c hr111iel"'"• l<·.~i~lntive, 
executive nnd jllllicinl, nnd 1lcclnrc~ thnt, l'Xeept ns otl1erwise 
provitlc,I in the Constitution, that thcs.., thr"" depart111,•11t:; 
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of government 11 &hall be sept1rutc aud distinct, so that ueithe•r 
exercise the powen properly helo11gi11g to either of the otlll·rs, 
nor any person exerci,e the power of murc than one ur t h1·111 
at the aanic time." Tue pawer to make lav.·11 fur the· people of the Cu111111u11· 
wealth 15 \'estcl in the Oencral ,\~"'·1111.h· which in it~ """'"'' 
bly represents all of the p<'()pl•• or till' t~mmonweolth. •r1,;. 
lawll enacted by the Assembly 1h•ri,·e the•ir fon.•c fn1111 1 lu· 
fncl thol thev ttre tile will of tlu• who!.• p<.>-0plc c:qm·s,...,I 1.y 
their outhor[%c.J rcpn·~c11tnli\·,·s i11 the• funus pro,·i•h•I Ii_, 
the Constitution nm! 011 snJ.j,"·I~ or qm•,lioll't u11 wliil'li 111,. reprl'Sct1tntivc~ ha\·c be-en 1·11t rll'll'l tu net. A~ wn~ "''i'l i11 
Stnlc: v. Fir/ti, s11J1ra, (W A111. II<'<'. l'I'· :!ii-8): 
... • • Thi8 power, tl11t't n·:wlii11c: ,.,·cry citit<'U in .. n·ry 
rclntion ma\ intcre~t, is tu 1,.. n·:<:inl,-.1 'ns n ..:a·n'<l I r11,t. 
which is tu \)(! c!en.·ise<l 1,,. tl1n ... · In wloo111 it ha~ lt1.'t•11 ,.,, .. ,. 
111itlc'<l, n1a! l'l'<'l'~' citiz,•11 ),;,,:a ri'-:l•I tu ,!,•111:111,\ that llw ml.-
for hi~ co11<llld ~hall l.c 1•st:doli-l .. ·,I lov that l>0<h· i11 "l,i.-1: 
he, with lois other fdlo"'-<-"ili>c11•, lo:l\;C n»IL'<I llll' I""'''"' 
.... , 
It must, therefore, IK' CUlll'lll.l"\ lliat uot C\'l'll th.· l1<'1wi:d 
Assc111!1ly l'l111 ddc~ntc tu 1111~· ,.111.•r l""ly tl1<• l'oll'<'r tu 11·1 .. ·al 
n 11111' wliil'h it h:1s lnwfnlh· ,.,,,,..,,,\. lllnd;'s l'<•11•tit11tiu11:1l 
Low (:!11<1. Eal.) pp. :l:.!1-:1~:.!; ,..;,.,,,.,., ('U1111ly /f111rl: '" /,.1,,,f._ 
:!G Baril. (N. Y.) ;,9:) (I~). . 
:!ilorC'Ol'Cr, wh,•11 t Ii,. li·c:i,Jatin· ~rnnt uf I"'"''' 
pnp;c 18 f to tl1<• Alc-o!wlie 1:,.,,.-r;o;!l' -l'o11trol llnar1l j, ,., 
n111i11<-.l it will lo<' ,,.,." lhal Iii<• lll'111nal ''"'''",J,h· 
has not ntk111pt1·.! to co11f,•r ""ii ;111_1· •111·h powl'r. 'l'lw S1:oi-
uto which nuthori1.L'~ t!JL• J\oar.I tu 111:1!;.• l'l'!•lllnti1111• is :-;"-. 
lion 4Gi:-1 (~>) uf the Vir~i11i:o I ·,,.i,. uf l!J:;1i .. So far 11• ii j. 
upplicnlile it pruvi1lcs: 
"Tho Ronni mil\' from ti1111· lu ti11w 11111k<• s1wl1 n•:1so11alol•· 
rcgulntions, not i1ironsistr11t witl1 lhi' n<'I, 1111r lfri· !I""''"' 
lawH of tlrr S/a/1•, us the B11ai·1I ,i.all dl'<'111 lll'C<'s~ary to 1·111-r~ 
out the p111·110sC'>< 111111 pr11,·isi1111s ui' t liis nd 111111 to 111·,.,·,.111 
the illc~nl mnnnfnc!nr<', liollli11'-:, ··11/r·. clistrib11tio11 111111 t r:111--
portntiun of uleoliolic- hc.•\'1•n1~·· ... or a11~· oue or 111orc (1r :--111·l1 
illc~al net~, n1ul f1·01n tluu• (11 t i11H• :dlc'f". ·1·clpe:1I, or ;11J11•11i: 
suel1 rcµ;nlntion~, or n11y 11f tlu·111. ' • •" (ltnlics slll'l'li<"<L l 
It will be seen thnt Ilic 1111tliuril\' 11111h•r whi1•la !Ill' lloar.J 
pronm\µ;nte!I rcgnlnti<mH hm·i11~ ti,;. fur<'<' nllll e1f<>ct 111' l:iw 
p1:ol1ihit8 it from promnlgntin~ au~· such reµ:11lntio11 whi,;J, i~ 
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iDoonsiatent with the general lawa of the State which include 
Section 4570 of the Code. If tho Hoard had nttempted by 
reinilations or license to authorize: the sale of wine and beer, 
either or both, on Sunday, such regnlntion ·or license would 
bo in conflict with the statutory ~rnnt of power under which 
it is nu tho rited to act as wcll ns in conflict with Section Seven 
of the Constitutillll.JVhieh declares: 
••That all power of suspending lows, or the execution of 
Ltws, b\• any uuthority, without consent of the representatives 
of the people is injurious to their ri:;hts and ou~ht not to be 
exerdse'tl." 
If Chnpter 129 of tho Acts of 1!138 (Acts 1938, 
p.n~ 19 f p. 194) hnd contnin~ uothing moro limn the first 
two pnrnJ.?raphs fo11n1l in tlrnl net there would lie 
forco in tl1e co11tc11tion th11t this Art wn,; inte111le,l lo con-
ti.J,. in tl1!' Bonni< of S1qll'rvi~ors uf Ilic C011111i,·s und tloe 
<'ullneils of citi<·s 111111 town~ the• nuthorily to r,•<.:11late the snlc 
of wine nnd IJL•l'r on Snntlnv <'\'l'll to thl' cXll'llt of pcrmitti11:; 
''" unliu:111<'<' the s:tl,, th<•rcof 011 Sun.Ju~-, 1111d tl111t 1l1e Al-
.. ;,holi,• 11,.,.,.rn<.:<' Co11trol !loan! hnd 110 d11tiL0 < in the matter 
1111!,•ss s11d1 nn onlinnncC' \I'll< 11dupte1l. 
Th,• (l,•m•rnl :hs.•111bly, how<•\'<'r, did nut slop with the firnt 
two pnrn).:rnphs uf th!.' Ad. In thl' Inst pnrnµ:rnph thereof 
the~· 1'!111·,·,\ n prm·iso whi,·h l'l'tllls n~ fu!luw': 
"It i.• further pro\•itletl, howC'\'er, thnt 110 prol'i"iou herein 
contuinl'<l nor 1111\' onlinnnrl.' tlmt 11111~· lw pn<s<·•I in pnroll· 
1111<'<' tlll'n•of, .hnll he• «1111stn11•.t ns in nny wn~· alterin'..;, 11111<'1lll· 
i11~ or l"l'l"-'llliu~ ht.'t~tiou -~~>70 of tl1<' Cod1..• of \"ir'.-!,inia." 
It wonlil hnvl! hC'cn impo••ililc tu hnvo 1lrnw11 n proviso in 
lnore ""'<'<'pin~ 1111tl 111l indnsiv,• knn.~ to lll'<'11111plish th,· pnr· 
111>s.•s 11,,.,1 in th,• proviso fn11111l in Chapt1•r l'.."I llf ll1t• .\ct.' 
11f l!l:ls. It <•xpn•s<ly provith•s lhnt 1wthi11c: •·1111t11i11<•d in t11<· 
:\cl ilsl'lf nor in 1111y unli111111ee 111lupl<'d th1·rl't111d,•r ''sl1nll 
be ronstnH.•<l o.~ iu orry tl'flr/ nltrriu.<J, c1111cudiuq or n•JJ1•1i/11111 
S,•etio11 ~r,70 of till' Co,llJ of Vir!'i11i11." · 
If Sct•tion -t::iio of thu l '01le of Vir~ini11 1liil not pruhiliit 
one from l'lll!lll!inl! in tho s11ll! ·of wi1w 1111<! lll·i•r 011 Su11d111· 
pnrsnnnt In his lnllle or cnlling- tliero wo11!1I hnvc lll'en 11~ 
ll<•ce~sity fur th<• proviso. 
. Dnrin~ th<' conrs(' of the prohibition re~irne in 
pngc 20 ~ Virµ;inin (l!HG-l!l:l:l) the ll<•n••rnl Assellll•I\' Ill'· 
q11in•I\ thC' t•Xll'C'll!l'lv b111l lllll•it of 1•11;1cli11 .. : •l11t-
utes nllowinv; the political s11b.(livisio11s lo p11rnlll'I thl'~crillli-
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nal statut~ relating to the prol1ibition of the manufnctur<', 
sale and pcues5ion of anlent spirit~. Set' Sec. Z1 of Cl111pter 3~9 of the Acts of 1918 (Acts 1\.118 p. 59S); Section :r. o{ 
Chapter 407 of the .Acts of l!t.!-l (Act.a 19"24 pp. GOG-i); Chup· 
ter 112 Act.a of l!l'ZS (Acts l!r.!~:!0.'.!1); Chapter 3\.1-l Ad~ 
1930 (Acts 1930 pp. 830.1); Vin611in Code of l!r..?4 8l-ctiu11s 
..Wf> (34) and 4675 (35); Sc<"lio111< 4675 (3-l); 4675 (SJ); 1111.! 
-lul5 (Ji) of the Virginia C0<\l! u{ 1\.130. Onliuan~s 11tloplN pursuu11l to ~uch legislation were cn-
forct:<l in mnnv juri!<lictioni< i11,.k:1d of the Stale prohiLiti<111 
luw. Collius ·v. Jlotlford, 1:\4 \'n. ~\8 (19'.?"2); Ca1111ibrll \". 
/Ja11dlle, 13S Vs. 817 (19".!4); Y.im111rr111n11 \". Bedfurd, i:~ 
Vu. 787 (l\J"!'.!l; Jor<fa11 v. Suu//. /lo.,fo11, 139 Va. f':ig (l!l·.!tl 
1111d ffrooL-c v. TotNI of !'11low11r, H!l \'n. 4:!7 (l!l:!S). \11 
!lrya11 v. Comrno11u·rnltl1, l:!C \'11. 74!1 {19l~l) it .,.·us li<·hl tliat 
n prosecution unJ~r ~uch 1111 or.li111111cc wn• n bar to fllrllic•r 
prosffntion ll!H!«r the stat111L• fur tl1" 1<n111c net hy ,·irtll•' of 
8C'ctiu11 t'l of t!1~ ('011stit11tio11 which 1h-..·!:ln's that 110 111a11 
bhnll ••tx• put twii:c \n j~opanly fur tin.• :-:uu~ offl'lhL'," tl11· 
prohiLitiun Act hnvi11;:- prul1ihi1,~1 tlll· localities fru111 «\ad· 
i11g- unlinnnccs th:it 111·0\·i1l"t! a l<·s,,.r pl'11nlty thn11 tliat fj,.,l 
for ~irni!ar off en'"'~ 11111ll'r tlil' statuh•. 
Jlv tliis 11w1l10,I Scdion t:t~ of 1li,• l'o11stitutio11 S<'t:n·;.::1ti11c: 
11 ull fi11l'!i l"ulk"t_·tt•tl for utTL·11"1'"' t·o111111ittc..•tl n~ni11~t tiw ~tnh"' 
to till" Literary 1·'11111! \\"11' for all prn..ti«:tl jillrpo~c"• 1111l!i1i .. tl 
n11d lllllll\.' thuus111d.;, 11f tlull:lr:-' diverh•tl fru111 1 lh' 
pn~c '21 ~ L.ite1·nr~· ·F'nllll i11tu tlw lr\·a:-uril''"' of tl1e p1i!iti\·;il 
suh-<livi~iou' of tl11• l '01111111111\n•alth. 
It is n 11111tll'r of rn111111011 ~""''·t.-,lc'l' 111111 Chnptcr l:!~I .. r 
the Acts of 1\l:~q wa~ ~·11ad1«l l:tr~1·lv as the n·•1~lt of 1111· .. r. 
furls of pressure !!l"Ot1ps. 'l'hl' l : .. 11 ... ral Assemlih· was .. ,., .... 
fnl, howl'vcr, lo mnkc it d1•11r lli11t 11nthi11c: l'u11t:;i1ll'il in 11,.. 
t\ct or in nny Onli11:111C<! pas"<«\ in \1t1rst1a11ce th,•rl'of slio11hl 
be consitlcrcd 11 ns in nny wny nlll'ri11.~, n111cw.li11" or rl'pt•;1l· 
i11)! Section 4~70 of the Co.11'." ~ 
Of nec('ssil\", th<' \lem•rnl 1\ss,·11111\y m11st luwe co11dud,.,1 
that section 4570 of the ('01\i• pr11liil1ili•1l Ilic >nle of wi111• :111<1 
bC'cr on Snntlay n11tl thnt it "''"· II\· ( 'hnplcr 1:..~l of Ilic• ,\..t~ 
of 19:l8 111crcl~· l!iviu~· 111 tl11• )<1t·11lili1•s Ilic 1iuthoritv ltv ur-
din1111ce, lo pnrnllc•l the l'Xi«ti11!! ~tali• lnw in11·st1ai1t t;, llu· 
cvi\ Ryste1n which hns hccoun1 a part of unr lc.!..•.i··dntive t•11sl0111. 
'l'he ;renernl 111111 usual fu1wtio11 of a proviso i" to c~1"l111\,. 
whnt follows from the ~l·11e1·nl ~1:r+«111e11t or provisions wl1id1 
pn~cct1c» ii. As WO'\ Rllid h~· ci.; .. r .111.ticc ~lnrshall i11 ll'11•1-
m1111 v. Suutlwnl, 10 When!. 1, :111 ( l~:!~1); · 
1--
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"The proviso is generally· intended to restrain the enact-
ing Clause, 1rnd to except something which would otherwise 
have been within it, or iu some men~ure to modify the enact-
ing Cl11usc." 
The C'-0urt of Appeals in Commonwtnltli tv. Ford d al, 29 
OrntL Ci83, (1Si8) after quoting the foregoing definition of 
a proviso said: 
"Substuntially lLe same definition is ~\·en by Mr. Justice 
Hnlilwin in 15 Peters R. 4:!3: 'Tho Ot~icc of the proviso,' 
•11~-s lie', '!{e11crnlly i~ either to e:i:cept so1ncthini.: from the 
c•1111cti11~ rlnusc, lo restrain its )!•"ll<'rnlity, or to cx-
pu~e :!2 ~ clud,• s.11111• pos~il,lc f':t"Utlll1l uf 111i<i111,•rprclt1tion 
of it us l':tll-11tlint: lo c:t,<'s not i11tc11dct! lo L11! 
Lroui:ht within its \lltn-ic•w.' " 
'fo the s:lllll' e{foct nrc Jorda11 \". Soul/1 /loslou, 13~ Vu. &1S 
1:c>4;,c ( l!l:.!~); /,o!f,/ Corporntiv11 \". Commor111·,.Cllll1, l'.!G Vu. :\~l, 
(l!l\!I); .\'or.f11n- ,r l'. 7'raction Co.\'. ll'liitr, l l:l Vu. 10:!, Wli 
{ l!I\:.!) 1111<1 ll"at/1 \", Firr .·lt!iust111e11t ll11rn111, lCll \'u. t\-1\ 
~:,; ( l!l:tl). 
!11 /.1111il Corziornlion v. Cvmmu11u•re1ltli, suprn, the Court 
lll•l,\ thnt if there i,. n <"Olltlict hdwcel\ the bo,\v uf u stutute 
111111 u pru,·i~11, th<•n lh1• prn\"iso 11111st pr1•v11il "~ th,• Inter ex-
pr1•ssi1111 of th<• h•t:isl:ttiv._. i111<•11t. 
111 .\"or/ull; ,(· J'. 'J'r11ctiou Co. v. \11/1ilc-, -""!""• thl' l\>urt 
snid ( 11:1 \'n. 10<;); 
"'l'hc• ).:l"lll'ntl rule un1lo11hl<•1ll~· is thnt tl1e upprupriute of 
Ike of n pro\"iso i• to rcstrnin or 11101lify the <'11al'li11g clun.« 
ur pn't"l'tli11~: 111111\<•r, 111111 thnt n proviso lo 11 pnrtil"lllnr "'C 
lion 1lO<'S not 11pply to olh••r st'C\tuns. But if, fro111 th,• l'Oll 
tl'xt, 11111! u l"Ollll':trisou of nil the pro\"isi1111-. r1•l111i11c: tu tJ,, 
s:11111• sulikl'I 111atll•r, it is ch•11r thut it w:i,; i11IP1ldl'il to t<iv 
1111• provi"' 1111 t•lfod bcymul the phrase i111111 .. di.,t..ly pn•,., .. 1 
i11u: it, 01· a s1·opc heyo11<l th<• ~l'Ct1011 of wl1il"h it is 11 \Hirt, i 
will lie con~truc.•tl n~ ff.!strni11i11.1' or qunl!fyi11!.f JJJ"l'l't>ding !"Cl 
tiu11s n.•lntivc to tl1c snrnc ~ubjl'l'l 111ntll·r ot' tJ1p pro\'io...:u
1 
ll 
ns ln11t11111m111t lo thll <'l111clnw11t of u s••1111ra\,. ,,.,·tiu11 wit\ 
uni n•gnnl to its position nut! l"Olllledion. • • • '' 
'l'lw offit•e of tho 11roviso 111< UKcil in Cluq1k1· 1:!!) of the Ac 
of l!l:lB, wnH to mnke it clcnr tltut nothin~ cont11i11c1l in ti 
J4 Supreme Court' of Appeals o! Vuginia 
A.ct "ahould in anv wav be c:onstnicd ae altering, 
pag11 23} amending or repealing section 45i0 of the Code of 
Virginia." 
Yort>Over, the declared purpo!e of the proviso of Chapter 
129 of the Acts of 193S is strictlv in uceonl with the dcclnrt'<l 
policy of the Commonwealth ns· set forth in Se<:tiou 5, Sub-
aection titteenth of the Code v.·hich providc-:1: 
"Where the Council or authoritit·~ uf nny city or town1 or 
any corporation, board, or number uf t><'n<ond nrc authonietl 
to mnke ortlinnnct>s, by-laws, rult>:<, rv;.:ulntions, or onlers, it 
tiluill lxJ umlt'rstoo<l thnt the ~!lit' '"'"' •wl /,., inc..iusi.•frn/ 
11,-itl. the Constitution uml luws of Ilic Uuitl-<l Stnte5 or of thi• 
Stnte." (ltnlic; supp!ic<l.) 
To hold otherwise would be for t lo,• l'unrt by ju<licinl tlo-
cisiou to chn11~c or ultrr tlic luw us <'1"\rll"<I L,· the Ucncral 
Assembly. 'l'liis woul,! not be J"-'rt11i,,il.J,. c\'<'1'1 if the t '011n 
w~rc i11dinctl to ,Ju su. If tl1c lnw j, lu 1 .... cli:lll!:t'<l it 11111,t 
be 1lolle Lv lc~islntivc ennctmrut. "It j, th!' fo11~·tiun of th<• 
Courts to 'interpret the lnw, 111ul tlint uf ti"' IA•)'.i,lntllrl', wit!1· 
in Constitutionnl li111itR, to mnkl• or alt.-r tlu• !:"''·" ll'rl/< v. 
/ns11nu1r~ Ca., :!l~ :--:. C. 17~. llli A. I~ IL i::u, 134 (J!l:\S); 
1J11rl.11111 v. lV ootlsou, 155 \'u. ~i:i. !Ill ( l!J:l\I); O/sl•1111 v. 
Clir·ystal, 54 A. L.. rt. (~. J.) 1:?:!7, 1:?".!!1.::o ( 1~.!i); nm! :?;; 
It. C. L. !JC3, 'l'itlc Stntutes t'l'C. :!!~. 
I-
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It is, therefore, conclutll'l.1 thnt l 'li:q11<·r J :!ll of the Act~ of 
l!J:l'l hns 110 henrine; on this l"Unt ,. .. , ... ,."Y ,incl' it c"lprl.'~51)' 
provides thut no provision therein r1111lai1a·.! shnll be "con-
struct! ns in nny wnv :iltcrin~, llllll'n<lin.e: ur n•pcnlin;.: S!'Cliun t-
4570 of the Coile of Vir!!;inia." lh•ncc nm· ref,•r- -
page 24 ~ enco to the fnilnrl' of th;. 1:011nl of Supcr\'.isors to CO 
l-'> 
udopt n County onlin:int'<' 111111,•r 11ntho1·itv of - w 
Chapter 12~ of tho Acts of l!l:J~ was 1·li·arlv irrc!c•vant nllll ::i:: 
properly exchHled, mHl not 11 prop<'r s11hj,•,•i for 1111 instruc- >< 
tion to the jury. LU 
'1'11c motion to set nsi<lo the \'enlil'! uf till' jury is, I herd or,•, 
overruled, nm! jud~'ln1?11t will he 1•nh'r<·d on the vcnlict. 
LEO~ ~I. BAZILE, Jmli::e. 
J1111nnry l!J, l!J42. 
Y. G. Fra.ncllco v. 09..I!!monwea1ui ·: ,;.J~· 
William L'Niihob. 
pag-e 25} STENOGRAPHER'S TRA.N'SCRJPT. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Hanover County. 
C<immonwealth of Virginia 
l'. 
M. 0. FrancisCQ. 
October 17, l!JH. 
I<lcntifil'tl this 5th duy of May, 1942. 
LEON M. BAZILE, Judgt'. 
[lll\.!C ,'.!G } Virginia: 
Mny 5, 1942. 
In the Cin:uit Court of Hnnovcr County. 
Commouwt•nlth of Viq~·iniu 
t'. 
~I. ll. Frnn~is..•o. 
'l'rnnS('ript of testimony nnJ other incidents in the triul 
of thl' nbove-~t~·lc<l cn•e hefor<• 11011. Leon ~I. Bnrill', Jud~e 
uf said Cunrt, uni\ 11 jury, on the 17th 1lny of Octolo,•r, 1!1-11. 
Aplienrnnrcs: Edwnnl P. Simpkins, Jr., Esq., Cummon-
w<'nlt 1 's Alloniev. 
lll'or~l' E. Iln_;.·, E~q., Andrew J. Ellis, Esq., Gounod for 
thl· <lcf,•nd:rnt. 
pn:;o 2Glf_, ~ Iu1\e'.'(. 
pni;-c 27 } WILLIAM J. NICHOLS, 
a witness intro1\uccd on hehnlf of the Cummon-
wcn \tb, ~in\:: first duly sworn, tei;tifi~d ns follows: 
DIRECT J<~XAMINATION. 
Hy Mr. Simpkins: 
Q. Yon nre Mr. Willinm J. Nichols! 
A. Yes, sir. 
/'k ·,:Sap~m~ ·Court of .Appeale o! Virginia 
WJliam J. NitholJ. 
Q. Where do.you live, Mr. NicholsT 
A. I live at Tyler, the upper end of Hanover Connty. 
Q. How far (lo you live from ~Ir.~{. O. Francisco! 
A. 'l'hree miles, aCC1Jnlin;: tu my s1>N'<lometer on the cnr. 
Q. Does !l(r • .!.!. (.I. Francii;co li1·e in Hano,·er Couutyt 
A. Yes, air. Q. You are a special officer of Hanover County, as I un<lcr-
atand it f 
A. Yes, ftir. Q. What buaineu dou Mr. Prnucisco operate in lla1101·cr 
Countyf 
A. Well, it is ~neral merd1umlise, wines and be-er, 1<oft 
drinks. Q. General merchnndis<.', win,·, nllll what f 
A. Beer. 
Q. Becrf 
A. ,\nJ soft drinks of nil ki1111'. 
Q. Soft drinks, l'-•"'"linl', and oilt 
page 2S ~ A. Gnsoli1w 1111.I oil. 
(). C111\cr g-cm·rnl llll'rchnndise docs he H'll 
groceries T 
A. Yes, sir. (~. Does he handle dOllll! noliu11~, surh ns wnsh tut., 1111d 
things of that kint!T 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. Does he opcrnte a rc>lnura11t? 
A. :!\ol tu my k11owi11){. 1 lll'\'<'r ""cu him serving meal". 
Mr. Ellis: I submit, if Your llu11or pl<.'nse, thut nil of thal 
evi1lcnce us to the store id i111111all-rial. 
'!'he Court: '!'hi~ i~ i111111:11Prinl-
Mr. F:llis: In this cnse. 'l'lll'l'l' is nnother case in whid1 
thut is nrntcrinl. 
'J'he Court: Yes. 
Mr. Ellis: But in this pnrticular 1·nsc the imlictment char~l'~ 
thnt hC' muintnined n-
'l'hc Court: I will snstni11 th<• ul1j<'clion. 
_Mr. Simpkins: It shows the had;g-ro1111<l und circumstance~ 
under which the b<•cr wns Holt!. 
'l'hc Court: He is eutitk'<l tn Khow whut licenses hl' l111K 
nnd the business thnt he comlnl'IK UH n genernl Kroumlwork 
for whnt he hns lni<l the fouJHlaliou for. You cnn show ll1nt 
t-
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William'.1.·Nichola. 
he has a license to sell wine and beer-
page 29 ~ Mr. Simpkins: Yes, I will show that. 
Mr. Ellis: We will admit it. And also his li-
cense as a !tl'Ueral merchant. 
'l'he Court:"---C-ouldn 't you stipulate what licenses he has 7 
~Ir. Simpkins: We are perfectly willing lo stipulat" it. 
'l'lie Court: I think that wouh! be the simplest wny to do 
it. and then confine the evidence to the fncts. 
~Ir. Ellis: All rii;-ht. . It is ~tipuluted nnd ugrecJ by nnd 
bctwt'en the Attor11e1· for thc Co111monwealtl1 and counsel for 
the <lefrndnnt thnt tl;c defendant, ~!. O. r'rnncisco, i~ now, und 
wus on Sumluy, September 71h, 1911, nml fur 5ome time prior 
thereto, a duh· lireim•<l merrlrnnt in lhe l'ounti· of Hanover 
operating u ;tore loc:ite,\ within the sni1! L'ui°mty; thut he 
111$0 11ossesscJ n license to sell soft drinks, n !ict•nse to sell 
ci~nr,·tll'S, d;..:11r:1 1111<1 tulmt'co, 1111.J u lit'l'll.''' lo ~t·ll l>eer both 
011 prl•mises nlll\ ofT premises, JI license tu ,,.11 wi11e for co11-
tilll11ptiu11 off pr<.'mises, nnd JI licen~e tu uperntl.' n restunrant. 
lly Mr. Simpkins: 
• (~. ~ow, Mr. Nichols, t!iJ ~·on visit .\fr. !-'run· 
pngo 30 f cis"u's plnCl' on ~m11l11y, ~,·ptc111licr 71hT 
A. y,,,, sir. 
Q. Dot'M lit> Ofll'l'llll' ll r<.'staurunt r 
A. !\ut tu tuy knuwi1q.~. I lia\'l' Jll'\'l•r tH~l'U uny 111t•11l~ Herved 
in 1 lll' liui l1lim::. 
!) . ..\11y l11bles in lht'ro lo sen·<' llll'nlsT 
A. ~ot in tl•l' >1tOrt• room. 
l}. '!'hat is wl11•re lil• 1101•>1 l1is bl'Cr busin<•ss, isn't it I 
A. y,.,, sir. 
l~. Who 11·11s wnitin~ on till' tru1le thnt 11ft,•rno1111, thut Sun-
dn v tl1:1 t vou wt> re 1 lll're T 
;\. :\Ir.' Frn11cisco, from whut I Hnw. 
(}. ~Ir. l"rnnl'isl'oT llow 11111ny !ll'ople wen• th,•rcf 
A. I tlon 't l'l'lll<.'111bcr. 
(). Appro:'timnt<•ly T 
A. I don't n•111e111ll<'r. I snw 11 cnr ~ittin~ out there 1n 
front. 
By !hi) Court: 
Q. Were tlwrc mnny or ft.wt 
A. 'J'hl.'re was nbout two or thret•, us Wl•ll as I c:111 n•member. 
I don't know, to he positive J1bout it, but there wns nliuut 
two or tl11·l·c curs sit ling- in fro11t of the slure. 
·35 c;upreme· Colirt of .Appeals of Vtiginia 
William J. Nichol!. 
Q. Did you ubeerve Mr. Francisco make any sales of beer 
while you were there 1 Did you see him make any sales t 
A.. Yes, sir, I saw him sell some to ~Ir. Williams and Cnul--
thorne. -
Q. You saw him sell some to :\[r. Williams and Mr. Cnuc::i 
thorner How much did lie sell Mr. Williamst -
page 31 ~ A. Just one bolt le. ::I: 
Q. One bottle. llow much did he sell to ~I?:< 
LU Cauthornet 
A. One bottle. 
Q. '.Vus that beer consumed on the premises or was it token 
awayf 
A. It was taken awav. 
Q. Did you see I.Jim s~ll any for ron~umption on the prem-
ises 1 
A. No, sir, not that dny. 
Q. Not that clayf How )011~ di,) you stny theret 
A •• About five minutes, I suppo'L'. 
Q. A bout five minutes 1 
CROSS EXA~II~ATION. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Did .Mr. Williams nud ?\Ir. <.'1111t!1ornc go to .Mr. Frn:i-
cisco 's place with yon T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For what purpose did you tlm•e !;O there! 
A. 'l'o buy some beer. 
Q. For what purpose were ~·011 g-oiu~ to buy bcerT 
A. •ro bring to Court this t•vi1h•tll'e a~'.ainst Sunday scllin;:-.1--
Q. Did you three i\"O tO){L•th<'r for the purpose of ~uin.~ 
thcre in order to lay a fou111latio11 for this prosecutionT CO 
A. No, sir, we di<l not. I jnst w<•nt hy this mnn 's pince 11111!--
pickecl them up in my car mid L·arril'd them up there. ::I: 
Q. \Vell, then, ,·on ~fartl'd off with yourself?< 
pnge 32} picked up Mr. Willi:1111' nnd Mr. Cnuthornr, nllliLU 
went to !lfr. Fr:111ciscn '~ pince for the purpoxe ol" 
securing evidence on wl1iclt lo prn,t'e11le him for violntion of 
the Sunday lnw; is that ri;d1t I 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, nt whose direction 1lid mu do thist 
A. Wl•ll, I wns directed hy th,:Honorable Judge and th<• 
Commonwealth's Attorney to liri111t evidence in Court. Then• 
hnd been scvernl c01nplnint>1 fro111 different people. 
<....J 
w 
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M. <i. Fr&iici'~~2~c~·~ri~;;1ib>'· 
., 
· Williarn-J:Nichol!, 
Q. I didn't ask about complaints. I asked at whose direc· 
lion, Just answer my question. 
A. I nnswere<l correctly. 
Q. So the purpose of going ti.Jere was to attempt to entrap 
Mr. Frnncisco into what you considered a violation of the 
law; is that right T-
A. No, sir, I wasn't attempting to entrap him at all. Q. 'l'hat is what you did, wasn't itT 
A. Nu, sir, I don't consider that trapping. He just sells 
beer to anybody on Sundny over 21. I don't believe ho sells 
!o nnyonc under !?I, not to my knowing, . 
Q. How mnny lillin!( stntions 1111d stores in that section of 
Hnnovcr County do likewise on 8undny, sell beer on Sun-
davt _ 
~\. Not in my neighborhood. 'I'hat i~ the only plne-0 thn1. 
stays open nil duy on Sunday. 
page 33 ~ (~. How 1111111y more pine<'~ do you know of thn t 
st:iy 01w11 nil day 8umlny ! 
A. I couldn't tell yuu. 'rhL•re is some in the County, but 
mv business is-
·Q. How nbont Montpcliert 
A. l don't go over tlrnt wny but very little. 
Q. W,•11, yon know thnt there are pl:ices gc11crnlly nil over 
the Co•111t_v thnt do kl-<·p OJll'!I 011 S1111<111y 1111<1 do sell O<'<'r; 
thnt is u fuct, isn't it t 
A. So I h11vc hcanl snv. 
Q. You hnvc SN•n tlwrri, haven't youf 
,\. No, sir. I don't ~o by those plnces 011 81111,]ny. 
<J. Do you ever trnvL•l up m11l tlown the W11shi11.~to11 high-
wnvt 
,\. No, sir, not on Sundny, 
Q. Whnt do you do, stnv ut home 1111 1lny Sundny f 
. A. I i:;o to church nnd 8unduv sehool. ~lost of thL• time I-(l. But you do know thnt gt•i1ernlly throu~l1011t tl1e County 
beer is sol<l on 1')1111d11vr 
A. I know thnt is ti1e report. 
RE-DIRECT EXA!.rJNATION. 
By ~h-. Simpkins: 
Q. You hnd <liscussell, Mr. Nichols, I l>elil!ve, with the 
J mlge und with me here whnt yqu could do to bring- a pro~ccu, 
lion, Juul yon not 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
\.(0 ·;s~;t.em~ Co~t of Appeals of Virginia 
William J. Nicliols. 
page 34 } Q. And yon werc tohl that was what you liml 
to do if you desireu to bring a pros~utiou, to g;..,t-
evidence r 
A. Yes, sir. a:> 
Q. You operate a store yourself, don't you T 
A. 'Ve operate a grocerv 8torl'. ~ 
Q.·About how far from.Mr. I•'rnnciscoT LU 
A. About three milt•s, 11ro1111il three miles to the cast. 
Q. You urc a competitor, nrc you! 
A. Sirf 
Q. You are 11 com1~titor! 
·A; No, sir. Q. Not 11 competitor, within I lm•t• miles of him t 
A. ,\{y wife opcrates the :<!Ort' iu ht•r own nnme. I hnn•11 'I 
anything to do with it. 
Q. Well, your wife is 11 conlpl'litur of Mr. Frnncisco'sT 
A. No, sir, we tlon't con~id,·r it that wn~·· Thnt hns l11•t•11 
our home dowu there for nl.011! :!ti yc•ars, u Ion~ time lieforl' 
he cnme iuto Hnnover Cou11t1·. 
Q. \'. ou work in Hichmo11tl, 't10 ~·on uot, sirf 
A. Yes, .sir. 
Q. :\Ir. :\ichols, tlo you lim'P Ifie· bt>t•r thnt wns 1n1rchas .. 1l 
thnt <lavr 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you get that nml liri11)..: ii iu r 
A. I will. 
page 35} RE-CROSS EX,Dll'.'JATION. 
By Mr. Haw: . 
Q. Di1l you ~o in Mr. Frn1wisl'o's 11ouse that tlay ur 'ta~· 
on thl' outside? 
A. Stayed on the outsi1fo n11tl l11okt-1l throu1?h the wimlow. 
Q. \'-;taye1l on the outsid<' 1111<1 loukt•d lhrou~h the window! 
A. An1l watcht>tl the snle n1111lt'. 
Q. Why dicln 't yon gu int 
A. I li~urcd Iw wouhln 't wnnl to '('!I, kuowin~ tl1nt I wa' 
Rn officer. 
t). Ifo was licensed to sell, wi1'11 't hcT 
/\.. Sure. 
Q. An<l he nlwayi;o lin<l sol1l, lm•lu't hcT 
A." I don't know about thnl. I <11111 't drink beer am! I d1111 't 
buy it from unylJody. 
Q. Wh('n was the lust time yon were in Francisco':i plucc! 
A. ,It l111s been nbout u we('k n~o. 
w 
1--
a:l 
-
:I:: 
>< 
LU 
t...J 
,., ,. ' •• C' ,, ... ,.,.,~,, '·"' 
M.' a. ·Ft~.ri~is'Go:::v:·;ctirt~611~~)11t'ii'! :~'1' 
JViliiam-3;-Nichols. · 
Q. Before tl.Jis oocasion r · 
A. I don't know. I was in and out there real often, I have 
been, until I went to llicLmond to work. 
RE:DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Dy Mr. Simpkins: 
Q. Had yon observed sales of beer on any Sunday prior 
to thntf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You hadT 
page 36} A. Yes, ~ir. He stays open nll the time. 
Q. He stuys open 11!1 the timeT This wasn't 
uuythiug uuusunl. us far as you knew r 
RE-CROSS J.~XA~fINATION. 
Il\· .\fr. Hnw: 
·Q. Wus it Hold in your presence the other times T 
A. Yt•s, sir. Ifo wns sellini< it all the time. 
ll. When were you uppoi11te1l 1111 ol1icer1 
A. I <1011 't l'l'lllcmber. It hus11 't Leen so very long. I 
huvcu 't Ilic ilntt• here. I <1011 't remember the <late. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINA'l'ION. 
LJ~· .\Ir. ~impkins: 
Q. \Yill Y.ou g'O nml gel thut beer now !hut ~·uu lrnvef 
A. i L'S, ~Ir. 
Note: Witness pro1luces two bottles of beer. 
Q. Is this the beer that was 1mrcl111sd by Churlie Williums 
1md Couwnv C11utliornc t 
A. Yes, s
0
il'. 
Q. Was it turned over to youf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You hnve hntl it since thnt timet 
A. Y cs, sir. Oue Lott le of IIortou Leer uml one Lottie of 
0!11 Dutch beer. 
\Vitnt'Ss stood uside. 
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page 37 ~ CHARLIE WILLIAMS, 
a witness introdurt~l on beh11lf of tho Com111011-
wealtb, being first uuly 8\\'01'11, testified as follows; 
DIRECT KXA:\IINATION. 
By Mr. Simpkins: Q. You arc Charlie ,.,.illin111~ ! 
A. Yes, sir. . , . Q. Did you go to Ji[r. Frnul'I"'-"" s pince 1n the Reaver Dam 
district on ~un<lay, the itli u{ St•ptt·mbcr 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the pince of busim·~s 01~11 I 
A. Yos, sir. 
Q. Who wus there f 
A. All I saw was Mr. Frn11<·i~eo uni! his boy and 111yH·ll" 
nnd Cnuthorne. I stnyed therl! about live miuutl•s nml I 1·11111« 
on out. Q. Di<l you purchase 11nythi11.c: while• you weru thNc! 
A. Sirf Q. Diel you buy anything whill' you were theref 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. Whnt dicl you buy wheu you were theref 
A. I bought one bottle of ht•t•r. 'l'hnt is all I bought. 
Q. You bought one bottle of lll•t•r! 
_A. Yes, sir. 
page 38 } Q. Didn't buy 1111yt l1i11~ else f 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. What <lid you clo with tlwt ho tile of heer I 
A. I stnrtecl home with it, m" n1u\ :\Ir. Nichols, uncl "Ut in 
the car witu l1i111. " 
Q. And wlmt dicl you .do with that bottle of beer1 
A. I gnvc him the hcer. 
By the Court: 
Q. Whom did you buy tlw ln·1·r frn111 ! 
A. Sirf 
Q. Whom clicl you buy th•• 111••·1· fr11ll1 ! 
1\. I bought it from hlr. Frn·11ri,ro. 
Bv Mr. Simpkins: 
.Q, J\fr. JII. 0. Frnneisco r 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q~· How much <lit! you puy for it! 
I-
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M. G. Francil!co.v. ·Commonwealth 
Cha,.lie ·Williams. 
By the Court: 
Q. That gentleman thereT 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. SimpkW-r-
Q. How much-di(] you pay for it f 
A. SirT 
Q. How much did you pay for it! 
A. 'l'cn cents. 
43 
Q. Ten cent.!'. Hncl yon been accustomed to go-
pnge 39 ~ ing there on other dnys before thnt f 
A. Sure. 
Q. How long lrud you livecl in the community T 
A. I don't know. Ii1nvc bt•m living there for u good while. 
Q. 'l'cn yen rg f 
A. More th1111 that, I rrckon. 
Q. And how fnr do yon live from this store 1 
A. From his storeT 
Q. Yes. 
A. I supposl' nbout n milo um\ a hnlf. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Elli~: 
·Q. Your nmnc is Mr. 'VilliamsT 
A. Yes, sir. 
l~. Wl1cre tlo yon lh•e, Mr. Williams 1 
A. I Ii vc on J\I r .• John.son's place. 
l1. Whnt JolmsonT 
A. ,Joseph .Jolinson. 
l1. Jost•ph ,lol111~011T 
A. \'t•s, sir. Ile is in the courtroom. {1. You live on his plnccT 
1\. Y cs, sir. 
l1. Where docs JII r. Cuuthornc live f 
A. ;\Jr. C1111thome, he lives 011 Mr .. Johnson's pince. 
Q. 'l'he snme i\lr. Joe Johnson who is sitting in this court-
room f 
pngc 40} A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ho is the other witness in this c:isc, isu 't hcT 
A; I suppose so. 
Q, "'lio took you up there to Mr. Fn111cisco'sT 
1\. Mr. Nid1ols . 
. J. i\lr. NicholsT 
!\. YeR, sir. 
·-«: 
.l• i· .• ~.-..~ ",..·~ fL- . .-' ·· · • • 
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•Charlie •lYilliams. 
Q. I thought -you told us you met Mr. Nicbola after he 
came-after you came out of the store. 
A. No, Mr. Nichols carrbl me from Mr. Johnson's. 
Q; From whose houset 
A. Mr. Nichols carried me from Mr. Johnson's bousc. 
Q. Where Mr. Joe Jobnsoii livL>dt 
.A. Yes, sir. · · 
Q. You don't live in the &11m• house with Mr. John~on. du 
you1 
A. 'Vent from Mr. Johnson'" l1ouw to Mr. Francisco'"· 
Q. I suy, you dou 't live in ·thl• 1mm~ house, in J olmso11 's 
house thnt he lives in, do you! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. WbntT 
A. No, i<ir, I don't live in lhL' snme house. 
Q. Was Mr. Cnuthornc in ~Ir .• luc .Joh11son'11 house luu ll1at 
Su11dnvt 
1\, Y cs, sir. 
Q. Auu you cani•·d .\Ir. Cnuthornc from ~Ir .• Joi· 
11ngc 41 ~ Johnson's hou8e! 
A. No, Jllr. l'nuthol'llL' Wl\8 ut Mr. Jolin~un's. 
Q. When you !';Ot thcrct 
A. And I was !here, 1111,\ :\Ir. :\irl1ob wns there too. 
Q. How di<] ~·ou h"'t tlll'rt• ! 
A. ·we v;ot in the cnr-
Q. 'Vnit u minute. llow ,\i,l yun get from yonr hon"· lu 
Mr. Joe Johnson's hou~et 
A. I wnlketl. 
Q. How fnr is it 1 
A. F'rom 1uv house to Mr .• Juhuson 'st 
Q. Ye~. . . 
A. Well, ns ueur ns I cm1 pnl it, l reckon nhout two 111ik~. 
Q. llow for is it from ;\Lr. Canlhornc's house to Mr .. lo,· 
Jolmson 's 1 I-
A. I don't know. He will ha\'<• to nuswer thnt himsl'lr.-
Q. I will ask him thnt; yuu .1011 'l kuow thnl T CD 
A. No, sir. -
Q. Well, how did you hnppl'll to ;..:o to Mr. Joe ,Johns<;;:µ; 
house Snn<lny afternoon, this j111rt.i.,11lnr Sun<lny uftcrnoott, 
A. "'ell, I had hccn usually l!,'lllll!'; thcru 011 Sunllny.· . 
Q. Every Sumlny 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Up to his houset 
A. Ye~, sir, nntl i;onll'timcs in the week. 
pngc 42 ~ Q. In the Wct·k t 
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Charz?e-m11ic'icis: ·· · 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did anybody send for you this Sundayt A. Sirt 
Q. Did anybody send for you this Sundayf 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Well, can you explain how you and .Mr. Nichols and Mr. 
Caut11orne all happened to rncet in Mr. Joo Johnson's house this Sundnv afternoon T • 
A. Well,'! couldn't tell you that. I can't answer that ques. tion. · 
Q. You can 'tf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Who gavo you tho money to buy tho b<.>erT A. Mr. Nichols. 
Q. Mr. Nichol~T 
A. Yes, si1-. 
Q. Do ~·ou know where he got it 1 A. No, sir. 
Q. Ro, whcu you bougl1t tl10 beer, wns it your beer or Mr. Ni~hols' bet>rf 
A. I 1rnpposo it must hnvc been his beer. He 1,'flVo Ille the lllOIW)'. 
Q. Su tlieu you tlhln 't just givo lii1U tho bottle of beer after you hong-ht it T 
png-c 43 f A. No, sir. 
Q. l' 011 h11<1 bought beer down there in Mr. l•'run-l'isco '11 store before, h11d11 't you T 
J\. Yes, sir, lllnny 11 tiruo. 
<). 111nuy 11 time T 
A. Yt•s, sir. 
<J. You did11 't give it to Mr. Nid1ols when you bou~lit it Le for~ did vou 1 ' 
A. No, si;._ 
Q. llrnnk it, didn't you T 
A. Yes, sir. 
llv Ilic Court: 
·Q. Di1l :vou ever buy beer then• on Sununy beforet A. Sil'f 
Q. Di<! :vou ever uu:v hcer there on Sunduv before f A. Yes, sir, mnny u time. · Q. On SunduyT A: Yes, sir. 
to 
·s-dj,-· Court of Appu.11 of Virginia 
Conway Cauthorne. 
RE-DIBECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Simpkins: >< Q. When you bought it before, whom did you buy it fur I LU 
A. Who did I buy it fort l bou~ht it for myself. 
Q. You didn't gi>e it nwny, <lid youT 
A. No, sir. Q. Did you ever huy it for anybody elseT 
page 44 } A. Did I ever Lny it for anybody else I 
Q. Did you ever lmy it [or anybody else bcsiL!c~ 
this bottle you bom~bt for ~Ir. Nichol~ f 
A. No, sir. Wht'n I buy it, l 11lw11ys buy it for mysdf. 1--
Q. On Sunday you buy it iu a bottle and tnke the· 1,ottl..-
awny, don't youT co 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ever buy it there oil week <luys T ::i:: 
A. Yes, sir, sometimes. >< Q. You cnn driuk it there 011 Ilic premises on week Llay~ !LU 
A. Yes, sir. Q. But he won't let you <lrillk it there on the pn·miscs oil 
Su1idnyT · 
A. No, sir. 
Witne&s stood nsidc. 
page 45 } CONWAY <'A O'l'llORNE, 
n witness illlrmllll:l',1 011 hehnlf of the Cn111111011· 
wealth, being first Lluly sworn, tc>tifil'<l ns follows: 
DIIlECT EXA'.\llNATION. 
By Mr. Simpkins: Q. You urc J\!r. Couwny l'ai1thorncf 
A. Yes, sir. ~ Q. Do you know where ?llr. :\I. U. r'rnncisco't1 pince islil•a1 
L.: 
(...:> 
Beaver Dnm T c:O 
A. Yes, sir. - W 
Q. How for do you li\'c frn111 thercf :I: 
A. I reckon it is nbout thrt'L' miles n111l n hnlf; somL-l't1lll~ 
Jikc that. u.J 
- Q. Arc you nccustometl tu ~oin~ thereT 
A. Not much. Q. Did you go there 011 Sumlny, September 7thT 
A. Yes, sir. 
· M.:G. Franei'°o v.'"CQmin~nwe~lti( 
--
ConilxHJ.Ca11lhorne. 
Q. And did you see Mr. Francisco1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was the place of business open 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Being operated by him T 
A. Yes, sir. --
Q. Did you make anv pnrchnse thcreT 
47 
pnge 46 } A. I just went up th~rc to buy some beer. 
Q. Di<l you huvo uny conversution with him when 
you bought the beer T 
A. No, sir. I told him I wnntcd some beer nnd 11 bottle of 
Coen-Coln. He snys: All ritdit, yon wnnt one bottle 1" 
Q. Sny tlmt O\'er. I <lidn 't undl'rstund yon. 
A. I went in thL•re 111111 l tol1J him I wanted n bottle of Cocn-
Coln nm! u bottle of lll'er. Ile said: "Du you wnnt som1• 
inore Lcerf" 
Q. A ftcr you boul::ht the tir8t bot!IL• lie uskcJ you ,Jiil you 
wont some mornf 
.A. A~ke<l me di1l I wont 801110 mo1·e. 
Q. What di1l you tell him! 
J\. I told him, no, Mir, thnt wnH enou1,:h. 
ll. What 1liil you do with the bottle of beer you boughtf 
A. I gn\'C' it to !II r. Nichols. 
Q. \\'lio el~L· wns in thL• store nt the time, do you know T 
,\. !1!1-. Williams wns in there. 
lJ. ?II r. WillinJ11s wns in the rd Who elsef 
A. J\l r. l"rnnl'isl'o nm! mvself. 
(}. ,\ uyhod~· L•lsd · 
A. 'l'hnt is nil I seen. 
lJ. What time of dny wns it I 
A. 1t wus nroun1l nhont fonr. 
Q. 111 thl' nflernoonf 
)rng-c 47 ~ ,\. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINA'l'ION. 
By Mr. Ellis: 
Q. J\!r. Cauthorne, nfter you bought the bottle of hcL•r, 
didn't ?llr. Fnm1•iseo sny would you hnve somethin!!; else I 
A. No, sir, lw snys: ••Yon wnnt so1110 JJHHo IH'L1 rT'' 
Q.' Didn't you say, yes, you woulL\ tukl' n plug of tobacco! 
A,· No, sir. 
Q. Did you buy nuy tobuccoT 
A. No, sir. 
Q. WhntT 
'4g ·Supreme. Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Conway CautlitJme. 1--
A. No, sir, I-did not. Q. You didn't .buy any cl1ewin~ tobucco there that !la\'? co 
A. No, sir. -Q. Di<l anybody buy any l'licwiug tobacco while you wcn·:::C 
in there that <lnv1 >< A • .Mr. Butll•r bought 11 pi<'t"l' of chewing tobacco. LU 
Q. Saunders Butler, '\\hil<· you were in thcret 
A. Yes, sir. Q. How ol<l are you, Mr. ('11uthor11ef 
A. I•'ortv vears old. 
Q. Aml 0 where <lo you liw? 
A. I live nt Mr .• Johnso11 '~. Q. Ou whose property, ~Ir. ,Ju,cph J. Johnson'~t 
A. Yes, 5ir. 
page 48 ~ Q. 'l'hat ~~c11tll'tlla11 who is sittin~ in the ,·uurl-
room T 
A. Yes, sir. Q. How fa1· from ~Ir. Jm•q1h .I. .Joh11son',; housd 
A. I do11 't know, I n"t·ku11 :ilouut half n u1ile. I la:1\·1·11 '
1 
measure<\ it. Q:How fnr from !llr. l 'h:irh-~ \\'illinms't 
A. Cliarlic \Villi:rn1s r l ~1 ... 111.i ~:I\' :ilwnt II 111ilc. 
Q. Ami your holl'C' allll ~Ir. \\"illi;1111s' lious<J hu\11 nr" i11 
the sn111c directi11n from :-Ir. ,J11li11"111's house! 
A. \'t•s, .:-;ii·. ,._ Q. How ofk11 !lo you l!" hy ~Ir .. Johnson's on Sunday afil"1""' 
noon f · a::J 
A. I hnve been l!oiuµ; np tl1l'l'l' nhout every Su111lay rur+ 
don't know how Ion~. :::C 
ll. What ,\o yon 1\0 for a Ji,·in~! >< 
A. l form. · UJ 
Q. Farm 011 Mr. Jolm~on's fann ! 
A. Ye", sir. Q. Where clicl you l!L't till' 11111nl'y tu buy this beer! 
A. I !.(Ot it in my pol'k<•t. 
(~. You linve ~ot it 11ow t 
A. 'l'he mouev 1 
Q. Y1•s. -
A. I hnve got enough to ;.::"I 111101 hl'r bl'er. 
_ Q. I said, wherl' 1li1l you ;.:"I the 111011cy with whid1 ,·011 
bou~ht the hrcr! 
pri!,(C 49 ~ A. I workc<l for it. 
ll. \Vns it your 11101w\'? 
A. Y cs, sir, it was m)• mun<'Y. · 
Q. Mr. Niehols tlill11't ~in• you the money! 
~ 
w 
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A. No, ·sir. 
Q. But you took what you got for the money nnd gnve it 
to ~[r. Nichols! 
A. Y cs, I told him if he wanted a bottle of beer I would 
give him n bottle-of beer. 
Q. You did f Hnd you ever bought any beer there at Mr. 
Fruncisco 's before r 
A. I hnve bOU!(ht some of it before, but that was the first 
time I ever bou\:"lit any on Snn<lny. 
Q. When yon bought it before, clid you give it awayt 
A. I thi11k I drnnk it. 
Q. You thi11k ~·on drnnk itT When you purcl111se<l some-
thi11g like tlint you <lrnnk it f 
A. I 11011 't dri11k hecr much. 
Q. Pk•nse tell the jur~· whcthor or not somebody else sup-
plit·<l you or fnrnish<•il you with the money with which to 
11111ke this purclmsc. 
i\. Nu ~ir. l\uliudv didn't \:"iVe me 110 moncv to buv no 
beer. ' · .. · · 
l/. Who took yon down there to the storer 
i\. :\lr. Nil'hol~ t•nrrie1l 111r up there. 
l/. Did you SL'e nnyhoily when they gnve Mr. 
pa~c f10 f Willin111s t[i,. monuy to lmy the bccr1 
A. l ili1l11 't ~N· him, 110, sir. 
Q. WJ1,•11 ~·ou ll'fr Mr .• Jul111son 's, hef'orl' you left ]If r .. Jol111-
"u11 '8 hons!', ili1~ you all t:dk nbout g-ui111! iluw11 ther,• fur the 
pnq1osl' of g-L•tt111;.:: hccrt 
A. No, sit·. 
l/. l>it\11 't sny n11ythi11;.: i11 tho world uliunt it f 
A. No, sir. 
(/. Wlwn yon. left the ynnl, clid yon nil three t.•11\'e together, 
von 11111! ~Ir. Nwhuls 111111 i\lr. Chnrlie \\'illi:unsf 
·-. A. No, ~ir. 
lJ. Y 011 nil left scpnrntclyt 
i\ . .Ille 1111'1 }.Ir. Nichols went on down tl1e rn111l, 1111<1 Mr. 
\Villin111s wns nt ho111e. 
ll. 'Ill r. Willi111ns wns ut homcT 
A. Yes, Hir. 
(/, llnd yon S<!cll Mr. Williums up there nl Mr .• Jolmson'M 
house that nfternoon T 
A. 'Until we come hnek, no, Hir. 
(J .. Yon di1ln't ~ee l1i111 theref Why di1l you µ;u liy 1'1r. Wil-
!illlns' hous,•T 
A. I do11 't know why ~h·. Nil'hol.1 wnntc<l to go hy there. I 
never-
Corucay Caull1orne. 
Q. Why did.you get in the cnr with Mr. Nichols to lcnw 
. Mr. Johnson's bonseT . pal\'tl 51 ~ A. !l{r. :->ichols i<:iid: "Come ou and go w1tl1 
me anu riue about suu1c." l didn't know wlinl 
they wanted to do. . Q. When you left Mr. John~ou'i; l1ouse you ~ent to rill<' 
about and yon didn't know where you were ~mg or wli:it 
you were going to do1 
A. l didn't know where he wu~ b'Oing. Q. Well, then, you knew wh<•u you got to Mr. Willinm>'' 
house, dicln 't vou T 
.'\.. lfo saiu ~ "Mr. "'illinms, cou1e on and go with 111<·.'· 
Mr. Willinms said: ·•All ri~l1t." Q. Where was !l{r. Willi11111s wh<•n you got thcrc1 
A. He wns nt home, sittiu'-': in Ilic yunl. 
Q. Diun 't suy whnt fur, ditl lid . A. Mr. Nichol~ di1ln't tl'll lii111; 1 uever lwnrJ I.inn. ~Ir. 
\Villinms was there; he 11111> '"""~ hcnnl it. 
. ll. So nil three of yon j11.-i ;:111 iu lu gu riding nhuut 1 \\" ,.11, 
wl1ere did you goo from therd 
A. Went bv Mr. Nichols'. 
ll. By ~{r .. Nichols' hon,cl 
,\. \\'cut liv :li!r. ~iclwl~ '. 
II--
co 
-
-~ 
1.U 
Q. Alll\-wcnt struig-ht to !II r. Frnucisco'g 1 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Did yon hnve to ride nhonl lo get there, or 1li1l you 1--
take the strniglit roml ullll ~" 011 until vou i.:ot thcrc1 
A. 1l wns a st rai~ht rom\, uhout straight.. c:i 
page 52 ~ Q. Ilow fnr £ro111 lh1•n• \\'llK it! 
A. Fron1 where ~Ir. 011'illia111s !ivesT :::c: 
Q. YeR. >< 
A. I reckon about a mile 111111 11 h11H. LU Q. Yon 1li1ln't know wlmt vo11 wl'nt hv !i[r. Frnncisco'R {nr~ 
A. I went up tl1cre to hny s111111• ill'l'; .. Q. I tlion~ht yun didn't J;1111w wlil'rc you were goin~ wl11•1, 
yon got in t\1c corf A. Well, I hnd nn iden when• 111· wns ~oing. 
Q. Where did you !!:l't tl111t hh-a from! 
A. Don't we nll l111Vl' ii\ens ! ()1111't wcT 
A. Yes. Smm• people have idl'as without nny ba~is, 111111 
Rome hnve some bnsis or n•ason f11r their i1lca. 'V\1nt wus llu· 
rel\SOH you !1111! uny icle11 you w<·rc i.:i1illl!; to Fmnci,;co's! 
A. 'Vell, you ~o 1111 nnd d11wn l!1l' roa1\ nm\ see uuto111ohik< 
just stop to i;ct u clrink of beer ,,,. ~et n drink of Coca-Coln. 
I clon'tthink thut is-
J, 
w 
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Conway Caut11orne. 
Q. You drink beer, don't yout 
A. I don't drink enough to Jiurt me. 
Q. What I uskcd you was, how did you get the idea that 
you wer!l going by Mr. FranciEc~'sf 
A. Well, everybody has some idea sometimes. 
Q. Well, did you Lave any other ideas that Sunday after-
noon T 
A. Sir! 
Q. Did you have any other idea that Snnday nf-
pni;:c 53 } tcrnoon but that onef 
- A. That is the onlv one I had that I remember. 
I thought it ought to be broke tip . 
Q. You wauted to break it upf 
A. I wantl"<l to break Uf> such doings 011 Snndny. 
Q. Isn't thnt the rcuson you went theref 
A. That is the reason I went up there. 
Q. 'l'lien ~·on kuew you were goi11,; lheref 
A. I hnd 1111 i1len we wu~ ~'Oill!!; up tlwre. You get in 1lll 
nulonwl>ilc 111111 you tl1i11k ~·on ure ~ui11g to Richmond. You 
mny die Lcfon• you get to Hicl1111ond. You can't tL•ll wlwt you 
11n• goiug: to do tlit•se dnys. 
Q. ~[ r. Cnulhon1l', diiln 't you know when you left Mr. Wil-
li11111s' thnt tlie purpos<' of your goinl(' up thel'l' with Mr. 
Willinms 11111\ Mt·. Nichols wns to hnv beer s11 tlint it 1•011!d 
lie bron;:-l1t into llti~ eourtruom und "you could testify that 
you hou~ht the lieer fro111 Mr. l•'runeisco on 11 S11n1l11yf lsu 't 
thnt tlw n•n.~1111 you wc11t up thcret 
A. I Wl'nt up then• to try nud hrenk it up if I l'Olll(l. 
<l. ls11 'I 1l111t !lit• rc11-;v11 you we11t up then•, tu buy hcer 011 
11 S1111tlny so th11t you could hrinl!; it down her<• lo the 1•om·l 
hou,;c ur tnru it ovt•1· to Mr. Nichols to lin Lromd1t (l11w11 
!il'rc so thnt you could tell this jnry thnt you we11t i11 lh••re 
on n Snn1lnv nml homdit ii f 
· A. Yt·~. sir. 
1m;:-e :i4 } Q. 'l'lint i~ tlie rl'llNon, isn't itf 
· i\. Y l'~, sir. 
Q. Why 1lid11't you tell tho jury that to sturt with! 
Witness Mtood nside. 
:"II r. 8impkin11: Tl111t is tilt:' Commonwt:'nlth 's ease. 
'r'lll' Con rt: Hnn' \'on nuv further cvid1•111~\'T 
~1 r. Rimpkins: No·, 8ir, thnt is nil. 
s2. Soprerile Court of Appe.ala of Vuginia 1--
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· a witnes11 introduct.'tl on behalf of the defcmluui... 
being first duly sworn, te~tified 11s foilows: ::c: (....) ::>< 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. U.1 
Bv Mr. Haw: 
• Q. You arc Mr. I. 0. Keeton! 
A. Yes, sir. Q. What i11 vour busiue .. s, ~Ir. Keeton T 
A. I operut~ the Wigwu111 un No. 1 Highway. 
Q. Ii; that a place wlit•rc they lmvc duncingT . 
A. Yes, we have nu ord1est rn tu dunce. Hestauruul, culll· 
plete restaurnnt. 
Q. BestaurnntT 
A. Yes, sir. (,!. Ami huve you nu A. II. l '. lii·cnso for the on nllll oi1 
prembcs sale of heer1 A. Yes, sir, I hnvc un 011 1111<1 o1T with beer uinl on wilh 
wine. Q. Y.,Slll_!lrc ou the Wnsliim:lu11 !ti. .. hwny in llanov~ 
~es, ~nr. Q. How munv rcstu11ru11ts 111ul lilliu;: stations arc th1·rc 111 
our knowlcdg~ that 1111\"1• 11 IH.•t•r liccuscT --------
~Ir. Simpkins: Ju~t um· 111i1111tt•. Is thut the end of y1111r 
question r ~lr. Ellis: \\·'· 
pugt> 56 } ~! r. Si111pkins: If Your Honor pknse, I ultj .. d 
to thut line of 1·:rn111i1111tio11. 'l'bo qul'slio11 is 1101 
who else is violntin~ the law, if !hr luw is hein~ vi11lul1·.l. 
'l'i1c question is whell11•r or 1101 this s:ilc W!lll 111udc 1111 :-\1111· 
dny, nml lhll Co111mo11wc11llh l:1kl's the position tl111t 11x a 111al-
ter of lnw it is nut a 111•1·•·,,.·11\', 1111<1 nu evidence nlull!.: that 
line is mlmis~ible, nml, 1.!V•"" if it lie• 11111tcriul before tl11· jury, 
tlmt tlmt line of evit!cn~c "" lo whnt othl'r people un• d11i11::; 
is still not udmis~iblc. Mr. llnw: Your Ilonor, lhis qn1•,;tio11 of whetlll'r or 11111 
something is n neccRsit~ willaiu the 1\cfinition of ue1·1•,sily is 
pnrtinl. 'fht> qncstiou whic·la ~I 1·. Hi111pki11s refcn"l•tl !11 i11 
his opening stnll'llll'llt is t 1 ... q11l'sti1111 us to whnt is 1·011si1l-
ercd n necessity i11 lh1• •·ot111111111ity in which this thiuc: "1s 
1\onc, thut is, the Couuty i11 I his l'nrt"1culnr cn~c. :11111 ii i11-volve~ more than siu1plv thl' qm·slion of whether or 1101 it 
is something that the st;11 ulc docs not provitle for, II l11kt·s 
t--
'° 
::x:: 
>< 
LL.I i 
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in a great many other considerations; what people in the 
community consider; that is the best evidence. 
....-- ..... 
page 57 f The Coin t. If I ctl'!lclude that it is not a neces· 
sity 11& a matter of law, I can control it with an 
instruction to the jury. I think I will ndrnit it in evidr.nce. 
Mr. Simpkins: You think you will admit in evidence whut 
other people have licelll!es, and so forth T 
The Court: I think I will admit in evidence, if they want 
to show it, that other people sell beer on Sunduy. 
Mr. Simpkins: \\'ell, it is common knowledge anyway, l 
think. llut I try to keep tho record straight. 
The Court: Yes. Of course the question that we nro go-
ing to hnve to rench when it comes to the li11nlity of this c11se 
is whether the ~ult• of bt>er on Suml11y is ll. lll'Cessity-
:\!r. llnw: In thi~ communitv. 
'l'lie Court :-or not 11 11ecessi.ty as n nuitter of law. 
Mr. llnw: Aud undl.'r these prt>sent comlitious. 
'l'he l'ourt: Yes. 
?.Ir. llnw: You 11rc i..roing lo let it int 
'!'he Court: I think I will lPt it in. 
?.Ir. Si111pki11s: All ri~ht, 8ir. 
'l'ho Con rt: I don't wunt lo prejudice this rcconl rc11;11nl-
lcss of whnt conclusio11 I n1uv rcnch ultimntl'lv us 
Jl"~'' 58 f lo wh..ther ii is uot u nccPssity us a 111nttei· cf 
lnw. 
l'\ott•: Lnst question l't•pculed, ns follows: 
"'Q. How n11111~· reslnumnts nnJ lilli111' i;tntions nre there 
lo your knuwled.i:-c thnt hnvc n I.Jeer licenseT" 
;\, That would bo hard for me lo nnswcr, hccnuso I don 'I 
kllOW. I imugiJll' tllel'l' WOUid be 25 Or ;!() in the C<Juutv Oil 
1\o. l llighwny. · 
?.Ir. Bilis: :Mr. Tm·mn· is he1·c. lie could ~ive you tlmt 
l"Xnd informntiou. 
A. I coulJn 't do it. 
t-
;:.s,:E·~: Supfoini{Court or Appeals of Virginia cc 
I. 0. K f('!Oll. 
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1i'!Y Mr. Haw: · >< Q. That is, according to your 1•sli11111te, 25 or 301 l.J..J 
A. Yes, I would imagine it would be tbnt much. 
Q. Do you know whether ur uot these licensees, filling ~ta-
tions and stores along the hil.!;hway, generally looke<l upou 
for the sale of beer, sell b<.>er 1111 Humluy T 
A. Yes, sir, I think the mnjority of them sell beer nu<l wim· 
Q. Yes: Well, now, do you operate a filling station ut your on Sun<luv. 
pince ulsot 
A. No, sir, no gas solcl. 
Q. You operate u restauruul ! 
A. Yes, sir. page 59 ~ Q. Anu nlso, l 111uh•rst1111<l, you huvc II 1l:11w1· 
hull, nm\ restnunll!l ! 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, the people thnt 1·01111• 111 yonr pince: how 1\11 llwy 
truvcl onliuurilv1 A. \Vh~·, onr ·day business is practically 100 per ct•11\ \11111 .. 
ist. Q. i>ructic11lly 100 per cl'11I l1111rist f 
A. YcH, just 1-(0in~ thro11~h th•• l'uuuty. 
t}. Driviug nutomobilcs 1 
A. Ye~, from north and s11nl Ii. Q. Aml the other p1•opl1• that 1·11111e there nt uit1;h1 an·-~ 
A. Nim•ty-uine per ct•nt Hi .. 1111101111 people. 
Q. Hirlnnouc.1 p1•ople 1 
A. Yes, sir. Q. And how do they ruu11· 11111 \111·r~· ! Jlow <lo thev Iran·!! 
A. Drive out iu nntomohilcs. • 
Q. 1 n automohiles ! 
A. Yes, sir. l~. 'l'he tourists nnd your .'-!:1•111•r:d 1·11~to11wrs out~hh• 111+-ni1· 
tourist trndc, I uu1lcrst11111l, all tran•l hy automohill'! -
A. 'L'.11ev ull come hv 1111t011111l1ih·. cc Q. ·w,·Jl, 11ow, is it 'tlll' 1·11--111111 111' th,• !.(encrnl p11hli1·,,-•·· 
tonriHt trmlc us w1•ll as y1111r 111111'1' l'11sto111ers, to !111\' ~r 
on Humlav 11~ well us on 11t l1<•r .ta\'~! · • . l.J..J 
Mr. Simpkins: J11sl a 111i1111t .. -
prigo liO ~ Q. l will d11111'-!:•' l liat '111eslio11. 
Mr . .Simpkins: Go nlw;ul, ii' yo11 nrc ii;oill!.( tu t\11111!.(l' ii. 
c....:> 
c....:> 
M. G. Franci&co...L..C~~onwealth 
1.-0:Koetoti. 
:15:>·:·" 
Q. What jier cent, we will say, of the tourist trade, as well 
as the general public who come to your place on Sunday, call 
for beert 
Mr. Simpkins: Just one minute again.-
Mr. Ellis: How-many people come to his place 1 1'1ftv 
per cent would be large, but it might be n small number. • 
'I'hc Court: I think it is sufficient to show thnt people 
usk for beer nntl thev sell beer. 
Mr. Simpkins: ·It" should first be shown how many cl1~to-
11wrs there nrc. 
Mr. Ellis: You cau do thnt on cros~ cxuminution. 
By Mr. Haw: 
Q. Abo11t how many i1eoplc <lo you hnve ut your pince on 
1111 avernt1;e S1111day 1 
A. S1111lluv 1 
Q. !-i1111tlay. 
A. S11111lny i-i 11 little better nverugc thnn we1•k tluys. 
l~. ,J nst liuw 111n11y people wouhl you sny 1 
A. Iuel11di11g the wine 111ul 11le trmle ! 
Q. Yes, those 1·omin!.( 011 S11111lay. 
A. I i11111)!i11e we hnvc :mo people on u Sumlny; n111ybu 
Ill Ore. 
JH1t1;e lil ~ Q. What pcn•t•ntn!.(e of those :mo people fl1at 
eo111c to your plni·c, thnt come to your plnc1! as 
tourists, n1111 nlso as pcrsons that co111c tlicre for s11ppc1· nt 
11ig-ht from Ilic loeality, de11111ml hc1•r or wine on Snmlny wl!ea 
lhev nre lhercf 
1\. Well, 1 lmvc 11cvcr fiJ,tnretl it out, hut-
i\l r. Simpkin>!: J11st confine it to beer, if Your llonor 
Jtl<·asc. 
'l'h1• Court: .Just confine it strictly to hecr. 
Q. Yt•s. 
1\. I will ~n~· h11lf of tl1t•111 will n~k for bc1•r 1111 a S11111lny, 
111111 tlint is lenving wine out. 
Q. 111 ~·011r l'Xpcril•nre a~ 11 kCt'\J<!r of l't'sl11nrn11\n-TI uw 
1011!{ have )·on lll't'll k1•t•\li11~ a reslnnmnl Y 
A .. Fou1· vf!nr:-;. 
lJ. 'In yOlir l'X)ll'ril'111•c of fo11r years, your l'Xp1•ril'lll'<' with 
tlll' trnvcliu!\' pnulic thnt come lo your pince-
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The Court: Now, you ha,·c !:ot him on direct examinatiuu. 
That is b'()ing to be lea<lin~. ~ 
LU 
Q. Cut out that queKlion. \\'hat is your experieucc wilh 
respi;ct tu the demau<l for lic«r hy the travcliug pu!Jlic wilh 
relation, ~ay, to their mculs, 1111,1 so fort~, that they tnkc al 
your place I )\T]wt L-1 that c~Jll'l'il'UCe with reference tu till' 
trave\iug publict 
:Mr. Simpkins: If you lm\'C 1k'('iclcd he cnn go into lh:;t 
type u{ thing I will just 11top objectiug. 
Jl!l!{e 62 ~ 'l'lie Court: 1 tltiuk l will let him show thut. ll 
il' ultimntdy i.:uiuc: lo 1·0111e tu a question of luw 
ns to whether this thi11)! is 11 "'"''•ssity ur not. 
Mr. Ellis: I would like tu l1t• lll'ard !Jefore Urn Court ulti· 
matelv conchllles that it is u 'l"'·stiuu uf law. It cu1111·~ !11 
11 quc~tion of whether or 1101-
'l'hc Court: \\'hctlll'r 11r 1101 it i~ n question uf law ur 
whether it is u 11m·stiu11 tltat 1111' jnry must l\etermilll·, whl'll11.,· 
it is .u necessity or 1101. :\uw, I du uot expl'<'t to 1h•1·id1·-I 
have ~.-ot some i1kns nhout tl11· thi11)!, \mt l tlu nut CXl''"'I to 
dcci1le the mutter uutil \'Ull ;.:1•11tli·1m·11\111\'C11 cl11111cc tu ar,:111· 
the matter, if it is ~uiu:c: 111 1,.. " 1p1esliu11 for tli1• jury tu d1·· 
termine. 
Mr. Haw: They shuul<I li11d 1111· facts. 
.:llr. Si111pki11s: Your ll111111r, l11L'll tlmt dues 110! l1·l 11,,. 
barn down for unvthi1l" ! 
'l'he Court: It. 1101·;· 1111\, ln:I th1•\' hnve 11 ri~ht to i11t r11· 
duce evicleuce to ~how what 1111· l'll;Hlitions un: hcfun· 1111·,· ~tn rtecl the husi nl'ss 11111\ si 111·1• I Ill· li11si ucss ]ms been "I u•ra 11'• i. 
I thiuk you ou~ht tu i·1111li1ll' it to what tl1e 1·01111iti1111s w1·r1· 
before :1111\ wlial th<• 1·1111.litiuu:< l1m·1• h1'l'll si111·e :doll" II•" 
-line imlic·:11l•1l i11 till• J.ala•sitlc Inn ca:c. \'1~ 1 :i:I 
p11ge 63 ~ urc tryin).( tu liri11.e: lhi:< within thnt cnse a11.\ ti••· 
Pirk1•y '"1S<' 11\:'11. \\'1•11, tltc l'irkcy l'llSt', y1111 1·:111 
hring ~·ourselves within whal lh1· l 'our! of Appeals "aid, 11111 
what the l.'vi1lcm:c-
lll 1·. l<:Jlis: 'J'lierc wnsu '1 a11y .,,·i,\c11c1• in that. 
'J'hc Court: There wns-il wa" 011 :111 11gree1l ~t11k1111·1<l 111' 
f11cls. 
By Mr. Huw: Q. Cut out !hut Inst lllll'~I i1111. ~1 r. Keeton, do you 1i11.I i !1 
your restuurnnt. hu'liness that 1u·1.,:011s cnll fur \Jeer ns ut'11•,1, 
.wo- will suy, us they call for i1·1·tl teat 
I-
c:o 
::t:: 
.>< 
UJ 
L.:I 
~I 
M. 'G. Francisco. .Y. Commonwealth 
I. 0. KeetOfl. 
.A. For iced tea, yes, sir. 
Q. You say as much. as they call for iced tea f 
A. 'l'J1ey will, yes, sir. 
57 
Q. Do they drink it with their meals at your place as 11 
part of their mealsf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ruther than u beverage f 
A. Ye.~, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINA'I'ION. 
By Mr. Simpkins: 
Q. So, Mr. Keeton, your conclusion is thut fifty per cent 
of the people thnt eut·me11h1 ut your pince drink !Jeer with 
the meals f 
pug-c G4 ~ A. Ye~, sir. 'l.'hut is, ns nenr as I cnn estimute 
it. 
Q. As clo~e ns you cnn get to itf 
A. I 1·011111 brinl{ records to show it, for thut matter, as to 
whnt it woul1l hl'. 
Q. Whnt per cent of the people that come there that do 
not cut men ls drink it T 
A. W<•ll, now, for hecr um\ wine, if yon will nllow me to 
11nswe:- the question-
llr r. Ii:Jw: .Tu~t beer. .Just confiue yourself to beer . 
A. What percl•ntn~f 
Mr. F:llis: II' Your Honor plc>nst•, I submit tl111t !lie qnc.~· 
tion with re><JlL'<'I to wine i~ revl.'!nnt; just n tlrink of the same 
<'hnrnl'fl'l'. Tf, for l'Xnmpll', we Wl'r1• 1ll•alin!! with thl' otl11•r 
i11dil'!ml'11!, on the q1wstion of Rl•lling C1>t'n.Coln, Pepsi-Cola 
is on the snme hnsis ns Coi•n-Coln. 
'l'hr <'our!: Yci<, T think tl111t is on the snme hnsis. 
:'<Ir. llnw: Bl'er mu\ wine. 
A. J w11ul1l i<ny 75 per Cl.'ut of the peopln tlmt come to my 
plnrl' 1lri11k beer 11ncl wine. 
M 1'. l<:llis: Beer or wine, onct 
A. Yes, 1<ir. 
Q. Whnt per rent of them thnt come thnt do not ent menlst 
lH tl1ut whnt ~·011 menu! 
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A. I say, all of tlll'm. ~fovcuty-five per <·eut •.L. 
pnge 65 ~ everyone will driuk f~·1·r or wine. :z: U 
Q. What per tt·nt 11f the :lOO people that t·111~ 
there on Sunday buy ll<:cr or wi111· tu take uwuy with tht•1&.LJ 
A. Very little. In fnct, W<' 111111°1 have off-111·t'miscs winl'. 
Q. You tlou't have otf-)11'1'111i,1•s winct \.'on hnve 1111 •ill· 
premises ~t·r license, tho11;d1 ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Autl very fl!w people liuy IK·l'l' nuil take it away with 
themf 
A. Very few. 
Q. Antl ~·our <"onclu8iou, fr11111 y1111r tc><ti111ony, i• thnl ),.:,.,-: 
nud wine ure served aloug will1 llll'a!s, UM 11 purl of the llll'als. 
usually t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But you know nothing- al11111t l111yi11g- it to take off pr1·111-
isesf 
A. Yes, I ha\'e off pren1is""' '''"''" Q. _But you tlon 't sel! hut 1· .. r." li!llt• of !lint! 
1\. ·Vt'I)' little. 
:\Ir. Haw: They only 1!11 I h:i I 1'111· t 111~ pnrpost• uf t·1·id1'lh·1·. 
Q. You operntc tht· \\'kw:1111, whil"\1 is po11ul:1rh·. 1·1111<-d a 
ni~ht cluh f · · · 
A. \\'<"II, yes, nig-hl clulo 111111 n·st1111nmt, we will sa~" 
CJ. Atul you hnl'c tlnm•<•s ll11•r1• 1111 Halur<lny uig-ht ! 
A. We Jmvc 1l:1111·t•s llll'n· 'i' 11i• . .d11s 11 \\'eek. 
Q. ,'iix nii:hts 11 "'"''" ! 
puge (j(j ~ i\. Y cs, sir. 
l.). J11elutli11i:- S:il11nla.'' 11ig-hl ! 
A. Yes,.>1ir. 
Q. Allll whnt. ti1m· <lo r1111 1·!11~1· 1111 H:itunlny 11i.t(l1l !I--
A. \Vt• 1•losc at twelve now. -
~T~w! ~ 
A. Ju fnd. WO .. top till' t!1111<·1'" al {\\'Pl\'('. - w 
ll. \\'hnt ti1110 110 vuu t<l111• s1•lli11!.!: lll'l'I' 011 Hnlunla,~··hl ! 
A. 'l'wl!l\'e o'dod;. ·>c-
l~. \\1h:it tit111J 110 vou i<tarl 1111 Su111!ny 111orni11:.i; ! LU 
- A. \Ve 11011 't op1•1; 1111fil 1•l1·1·,.11-ll1irh·". · 
.Q. You :<tart Sl·lli111~ tlw11! · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A 11<1 8u111l11y is your lii·~~i·sl da~· t 
.. A. No, ><i1". 
'Q. ~nhmlny is your hi:,og>t'"I 1lay I 
M. G. Francisco v~Commonwealth 
I. 0. Keeton, 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Sunday is next f 
A. No, sir, Friday. 
Q. Suturclay, Friday nnd Sundayf 
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A. Yes, sir. --
Q. So that stopp1n!l' t11e sale of beer in Hanover County on 
Sunday would mutennlly reduce your profits, would11't it? 
A. I would Jose 75 per cent of my tourist lmsiness. 
Q. If we stopped it r 
J>nt(c li7 ~ A. Yes, sir, my menl business. 
Q. And thut is cliieHy why you nre down hC're to<lny, looking uftcr your lmsiut>~s f 
A. Looking nfte1· my ,!>usiness. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATlON. 
Jh- !II r. Haw: 
·q. 'J'o wliat extent do you S<'ll beer nnd wi11e without men!,.; t 
l 111e;1u, what pen·t'11!age of the people tlint comv there wl10 1)0 1101 l'lll llll\'tl1i11g-f 
A. Wl'l!, 01;r uiilit Lusiness, there 111·c very fow 111t•nls; we 
sl'r\'c 11 frw ~a111lwit•lit·~; \'cry few di1111ers nre servt•tl at ui!{ht. 
'l'lw 111njurity uf lht•111 tlriuk lll'cr 111a] wine. Q. J\I 11ight f 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
<l. ]Jo tllt'y usunlly liny sn11,Jwh·l1l's 11!1111g- witl1 it, 111· so111l'-tlii11g like tlmtt 
;\. 0!1, Y<'s, lh<•y huy smalwid1t'S 11lo11g with it. (). Hut lht•y don't ent full 11wnlsl 
J\. '\'e st•rvc th,•111, hnt \'1'ry few nre onk•red. 
Q. But during- the tlayti111e, the tourist trn,lt•- t 1\. J,. 111enls. 
·s). l'radil'lllly nil tl1c lict·r 1111<1 wine !lint is ,old is with l11l•11ls, I u111ler~tnu1] f 
i\. Yes. Of course we se1'\'c sn11tlwid11.>1:1 if 1!1"'' ask for t lit•111. . 
Q. I 1111clcrst1111t1 from you-r tlon 't n1l•11n 1 .. /l•11d 
pngc r.s ~ tlrn witncss-thnt lht> llllljllrity or the lil'l'I' lf1111 i.~ 
st•n•ctl with 111t•uls is ns n )lart of Ilic 111t•nl nnd 1111( ns 11 hevt•rnorct 
A. "'cll, h1 .~OlllL' cnst's it is served ns 11 lx!Vt'rn;,:l• ol}' the counte>r. 
Q. Jr they usk for itt 
1\. If lf1t•y nsk for it i1y1tt>11tl of milk or 1<011w ten-cent tll'ink, 
we will nllow hc<'r 01· wme. 
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Q. Ju other words, it is iscrn"l n~ :1 food, as a part of the ::t: ~~, x 
A. Yes, sir. LU 
Q. At your plucef 
A. Yes, sir. · 
RE·CROSS ~:xAmNATION. 
By Mr. Simpkins: Q. Now, bn't it true nhm, Mr. '''"•tun, tlrnt tl1e 75 per "'·11t 
of the people thnt come tlll'n' i11 the cvcniug nml dou 'I huy 
mcnls but buy bl'cr 11rc I""'""' who arc there nttenllillo..: a 
<lance nu<l sittin2: nt tnhlcs ! A. They hny it-1 wuulil ~11y half of the tll'op\e will ,.al 
wmhvichc!! nt ni~ht. 
<l. With the h~·crT 
A. Yes. si1·. Q. And those peopk that ,-.,11 arc spl'nkin·~ uf nn• 11t1'·1,.l-i11~ 11 d1111cc nt your plneet · · 
A. Yl'~, ~ir. pngc G9 f Q. l'rnctic11lly 11 1,11111\rt••l per cent of th,•111, an·11 '1 
thcvt t--A. W<•ll, ye~. nt uio..:ht. 
Q. All of thl'111t A. Yes-uot nil of tlll'll'- \\'1• h;i\"<' tourists thnt ~'"" al 
niu·ht. 0::) w t/. Hnv<' 11 ft•\\' tourists stu:• al ui:..:hl ! 
J\. Ye8, Hir. Q. Hut 11rnrticnll~· nil 111" 1111·111 11tll•11tl the ,\nucl't 
A. I wonhl sny !lO pl'r '""111 .. r 1111·111. 
Q. Hnt yon ,Jon't h:\\'l' ,\;1111·i11•! "" ~umlnyt 
A. 1\o, t-:ir. 
'Vitncss ,;tom\ 11~i•ll" 
=c: 
>< 
UJ 
(....) 
pn~c 70 ~ M. n. 1"1L\:'\l'IHCO, 
the dcfl>111la11t, i11I r"'h""''' 11>< n witucs:< 011 hi, "''"" • • • 
hchulf, beiuµ: first 1\11!~· sw11r11, l<•sli lit•ll 11s follows: 
DIREC"r 1·::\ :\ ~11 ~ ATION. 
Hv Mr. Ellis: 
· Q. Your unmc is M. ll. l•'rn111·i·"·•>, and you nrc tlll' 1h·1""11d-
11nt iu this prosecution, lll'l' ~·1111 nut! 
M. G. FranciEco v. Corqmonwealth ~1 
!if. G. Francisco. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is this M1·s. Frnucisco who ~its hen• by me, your wifef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you and Mrs. Francisco livef 
A. Near Beaver Dam. 
Q. In Hanover County! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you operate n. store nt tbut plaecf 
A. Yes, sit·. 
ll. Is thnt nt your homef 
A. V crv close to my home. 
ll. You' <lo not reside in the snme buil<lingt-
A. No, sir. 
<1. -'Phnt your store is opcrntc<l int 
A. No. sir. 
<l. Do vuu huvc n merchant's licenset 
• A. Yc8, Hir. 
i'H1'l' il f Q. Do yon linvc 11 license to sell wine uuJ lw<'d 
A. Yes, sir. 
111". Hi111pkins: It hns ull heeu stipnl111l'<l. 
tll r. Ellis: Lil'l'll'cs nil stipulnt.ed. Cut thut question out. 
Q. llow long- hnve yon l>ecn eng-n!.:'Cl\ in the 8cvcrul !Jusi-
lll's'''" in that l'o1111111111ity, Mr. Frnnciscut 
A. Ahuut ten Years. 
<~. Do you n~·all the Sumlny, Scptl'mlier 7th, when Mr. 
\\"illi11111s uml ML Cnuthorne cnd1 11111<\c the p11rcln1sc uf n 
hot I It• of '""'r nt yum· plncet 
A. l <lo. 
l~. Who 11111<\t• the ,;nlet 
;\, l 1lill. 
l,1. \\'!mt pun·hnses ,\it\ Mr. C1111thornc mnkc i11 there thnt 
.Jay! 
;\, lll•er, l'hl•wi11~ tolua•l•o, nm\ I hdie\'C n hollle of Col'll· 
<'11111. 
l/. Do you ret•nll till' order in which he made those pur-
d111s''" I 
A. y, .. ~, I do. I thiuk he cnllel\ for n hottlc of Lccr-nt 
h•nst, I kuow he called for 11 hotllc of beer, mill I think 11 
holtll• of Coen-Cola for 11 l'11ihl. 
l~. A1Hl whnt dill you llot 
,\, 1 11skr1l hi111 if thero wus so111clhi11~ ch:c, 1111,] he suiJ 
~-,.,,, Ill' w1111t,•d 11 pin!( of chcwinµ- to!Jncco. 
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Q. 'Vas Mrs. r'rnul'i~co iu your 11laco of busiues.~-
page 72 ~ during that .d11y t .::X:: 
A. Yes, 511'. >< Q. Was the Sheriff of lla111J\'l'I' Gouuty in your p\11l'C af.U 
any timo during that dayt 
A. Yes, sir, he was there ul the time. 
Q. He was there nt the ti11ll' this liuppened 1 
A. Y cs, sir-whut 1 ~l· He wns there nt the ti111l' thi~ hnppeued f 
1\. Y Cli, sir. Q. ln what muuner wnH your pl;1ce c0111lucted then.! 1111 I 111• 
f;;u11d11v with 1·cspL>et to onh•rlilll·s~ or dison\cr1 . 
A. \Veil, it was Vl'l'Y onh·rly. Wl· 1111'1 n ri~d1t big: cr11wil iu 
thern ut thl! time, but every I hi11:~ "·;1s very onlcrly. 
Q. Did you on that C';u11d:1.1· ,.,.11 hccr for co11sumpti1111 1111 
the premises 1 A. No, I lli<l not. I i;ol<l ii 1'11r l'onsmuption off thl• pr .. 111 
ises. Q._ You have n right 11111kr your \iccnMe to sell il fur""". 
1m111ptio11 oil premises, do11 'I y11111 
A. Yes, I <lo, hut our plnl'<' is ·smu\l und 1don't1111\'1• 1·1·1·y 
much help, nllll that is why I ,•au hamlle it better tu wait 1111 
customer>< that come in 1111tl kl th,•111 tuke their beer h11111<" 
Q. Do you :;ell it for ('1111s11111pti1111 on premises l\uri11~ 1 lu· 
week llays 1 · >I--
A. Yes, I do. 
page 73 ~ Q. 1 l:tvc you ''""r 1u:u\e it n prnclice to '"II ~ 
for consnmpl ion 1111 pl'l·t11ises on S1111\lt1y ! :::c:: 
>< 
UJ 
A. Not for four """r". 
Q. You cli1l four ~vear>< "~" ~ 
A. Yes, ~ir. (~. You. lli.scontinncd tl1al pradi"" four yc11r11 ag-o t 
A. Ye~. sir. 
Q. Whyt A. \\/ell, the hcst wu~·-1111• 1111,.itll'S>' wns lnr .. er 111111 I ""uld 
wnit ou more custonll'rs liy. ,.,.1li11~ it off pr~111i'sl'S 011 ~n11-
clnv. Q. Do you sell sandwi .. 111"' ~ 
A. Yell, 1:1ir. 
. Q. Do yon have nny taliks 11r <·hair~ in your plm·c of l111,-i-
11css 1 
· A. Yes, sir. Q· '.rhe A. B. C. Board l'l'lJUircs you to huve tuhks n111l 
.. i;\uurs T 
'-
u 
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A. They do where you have an on-promises license. We 
bnve hnd an on-premises license for ovel' four yenrR. 
Q. Do you sell gns and oil t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Soft drinkst--
A. Yes, sir. --
Q. In other words, you do not keep your storn open jugt 
for tlie sale of beer! 
A. No, sir. 
pnge 74 ~ Q. 'l'hnt is not your sole Lushietis 1 
A. 'l'hat is right. 
Q. Tho 8nle of beer is one of the things thnt you do in 
opcruting yo11r :.:-usoline nu<l filliug station business t 
A. 'l'hnt is right. -=: 
Q. You sell soft driuh, cigurettcs, nnd tobucco, 1111d thi11gs 
of 111111 killll 011 :-5ulllluvf 
A. Yes, ~ir. · 
tJ. ls thut whnt your custo111crs dl•1111111d 011 that 1luy 1 
A. Yl's, sir. 'l'luit is what the public culls for. 
(~. Aml ~·ou i;upply the trmleT 
A. Yes, sir. 
t~. You don't nm n ~cuernl 111erch11mlise storn on Sunlla)', 
llO \'OU 1 
l\. ~o, tiir. 
ll. You llo 011 wcl'k 1.lnys t 
A. Y <'ll, ~it·. 
(l. llow !uni.: llid the Shl•riff remnin nt yonr place of bnsi-
11ess 011 this purliculnl' 8m1llnv f 
A. l'o~~ihlv 1111 hour. · 
\l. Di1l yo1i 111ake auy sales of hl•er or wi11c while lhe Sl1eriff 
was therc1 
A. y,.s, I 0111 sure I llid. 
ll. 1111~ the SltC"rifT liecn to your pince of hn,i111•ss on an\' 
other Sumlnys nny time ncnr ti tis Su111lay 1 -
pn~e 7G f A. \Vl'll, he hns been there m1111cro11s tiuies. 11" 
hns bcc11 llll'rc very frequently. 
CHOSS EXAMINATION. 
Hy Mr. Sim11ki11s: 
Q." l\fr. l•'rnnci~l'o, you 11tnte that the luw requires that \'011 
lmvc tnhll'S 1111<1 chnin1 nml serve :mmlwiches, or the A. B: C. 
Bonnl; which liill you snyt 
A. 'l'he A. B. C. Bonnl. 
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Q. You don't 1lave any tnblc~ un<l' clinirs for serving 1mn<l· 
Wiches, though, do you T 
A. Yes, I do. Q. Who told you vou ha<l to hn\'c tnbles and chairs to :;cn·c 
sandwiches T · · • 
A. The A. B. C. Board. 
Q. Who with the A. R. C. UoarJf 
A. \\'ell, Senator :Miller ii; Chnirmnu. Q. '!'hut was when ~·ou n'<'l·i\"c1l your li~-en8e originully! 
A. Yes, sir. Q. An<l thnt was how mnny y<'111·s nbro1 
A. Possibly four yenrs ngo. Q. Four year~ 11go r Tiley han·n 't tolu you since thut time, 
though, have they f 
A. No, thev linve not. Q. Do yo11°lrnve nctnnl tulih·-< tu serve imllllwiches i11 yu11r 
plnce1 A. Yes, sir, I ,\11. 
page 7G ~ Q. Iu thL· 1n11i11 p:irl uf tl1c i;torc when.! you M'l'\"l' 
beerf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How mnnv T 
. J--
.a 
.:x: 
>< 
LU 
A. 'J'wo tnhl~s ullll six ehair,:. 
Q. 'l'wo tnblL•sT How lnr~'.<' 11n• the tnlilesT 
A. Oh, I think tlll'y :HL~l .!011 't ha\'C the tlin1cnsio11,:, hut 
I think thcv nre nhout us Ian:•· as Ilic table ri~ht there. 
Q. Just "sittin~ over n;::1i1.1•t lh" wall i;o1m·when', un•n'I 
theyT A. 'Vell, they sit to \he wall. hut what I u1enu, tlit•rl' an· 
three seats to it. 
Q. 'J'hrL•e "cnts to it T A. Aull if we n••••tl to pull th<'lll out, why, we c1111 do it 1111.i 
muke n sent for :mother Jll'l":'Oll. Q. 'l'he chnirs 11re not at tho:'<' talik•><, nre thcyT 
A. Yes, they urc. 11--Q. Aren't the chnirs sitli11~ uroullll the store thut ~u~ 
mcrn g'enernlly sit in T llO A. WL·ll, some of them 111iµ:ht Ill'. Customers mny tuke lill!W 
~- ~ Q. You don't contend th11t y1111 an• opcrnting II i·cstu11r~ 
do yon t LLl 
· A. Yes, I do. Q. Whnt mcal8 do you ~•·n'l' ! 
A. \Ve serve snndwichcs um! 111.'CI'. 
Q. ·what ~nndwiclic~ do yon serve T 
w 
w 
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A. Well, sandwich meat and cheese. 
page 77 ~ Q. Snndwi_ch meat a~d cheeseT . • 
A~ S1mdw1ch meat and cheese sandwiches, 
Q. And those are two of the ments that you sell in your 
grocerv business T 
A. "\Veil, I do sell some in my grocery business, too. 
Q. You don't operate this sa!1dwich business in any way 
sepnrnte from vour grocerv busmess T 
A. Oh, yes, i do. "\Ve mi\}ce sandwiches to serve people. 
Q. How much do you clmrge for them T 
A. "'e charge ten cents for a snmlwich. 
Q. You onlv nmke two kinds, Rnndwich mcnt und chcesef 
A. Well, we hnve different kind~ of' meut ut different times. 
Q. You don't serve cofTcl! f 
A. No, we don't. 
Q. llon 't i<ervl' iced ten T 
,\. No, 011\y soft drinks nnd beer. 
l}. Only i;oi't 1lri11ks 111111 beer, nml sn1alwiches, cheese nml 
tlitTl!n•11t rn111lwich llll'ats you l111ppe11 to lmve!-
i\. Yl)S, sir. 
Q. -111 your store lmsi1wssT Now, isn't it true ulso tlmt 
thL• 1'11111lwil'hcs-'l'hat on Su111l11y~, tl111t. yon clni111 thnt you 
hm·•· been sL•lling fur off prl'mises co11su111ptio11, thnt the pco· 
pk• l1m'L' l1l'1•11 hu~·ing tho bt•er 111111 Inking it rigl1t outside on 
~·our 111·,•1nisl's, nml wine nlso, 111111 openin;: it uni! drinkin~ 
it ont thl'l'l' 11111! romiug on h11ck iu 11ntl getting 
]Hlg•• 7tl f some n1ore ! 
,\, Not to mv k11owl••11!.(',., Thcv tell me thut 
tl1•·~· take ii lw111•· or tukc it on thl'ir picnic or' whl'rcvcr they 
"0 ~ (). W1•1l, on 8111111a~·s there, priur to 8eptembcr 7th, wercu 't 
tl1,•1·,. 11 lot of J>1•opl,• nro1111<1 the plure there, in the run1l, lllhl 
in !Ill' pla<'<', that woul,1 !'ive L'Viih•nce of lmvin~ heen 1lrink· 
ill!! hl'l1 1"! 
·A. Not to 111y knowlt>tl~e. 
(l. Not. to your knowlctl"cT 
A. No. ~ir. I nm i11Hi1lc of tllL' buihlin!(', n111l th!'rc lins bt•cn 
11 spL't•ial offit•er nr011111l there sinrt• the mi1l11le of the s11111-
1111•1" 1111il I linvC' not h<•:ll'1] nn~· t•omplnint or :111y urrcst he. 
in)!" 111111le. I wuulil ju<l~e thnt the~· were not <lrinl•iug- it nrou11d 
th1•re. 
Q. Who is the spC't•iul ofiircrf 
A. Mr. Nichols. 
ll. And us fur m1 yon know, you Nell it in~i,\e, nllll tlicy 
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take it outside of the door, 111111 wl1ether they driuk it uul 
there und come back for i;Olllt' 11111rc, you don't know! 
A. I know they don't driuk ii :1rou1Hl my premiscti. 1 u111 
c::i 
::c 
>< 
LU po!<itive of that, bccauF.C I ,]011 't allow them to. 
Q. On Suuduys T 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know why tlu~ :-;ht•ri!T wus up there thnl 1lay, 
Mr. Frnnciscof 
pn)!e 7!l ~ A. Y cs, l thiuk ""· 
Q. Whyf 
A. I think he came tu!'''' n ,.,.ft 1lri11k fur his wife. 
Q. Why did )JC? ~tny nboul nu hour? 
A. 'Vl'll, hl' wns just-I "•li'I'""'" 1111.'t some frien1b, 11111! 
wu~ tulkiu:;; I don't know. Q. Who wt're the fric111ls 111· 111l't ! 
A. 'l'l1t•rc wt're right 111illl\" l'''"l'lc there. I ,]uu 't ku•n· 
juHt-1 ,1011 't l:uow. · 
ll. Hi).(ht nuniy people lht·n· al lht• time! 
A. Yes, Mir. 
RE-DIREC'l' K:\A~llNATION. 
llv Mr. Ellis: 
·Q. ?i!r. Frnncisco, wh11I nwull" 11r rl'fri~cratiuu do you lia\·1· 
for vo11 bccr1 · A: I h11ve 11 Kclviuntor.-
Q. El•!Ct rid 
A. W11lcr coolt'r. 
Q. Jo:lcdrknlly opt·rat<·il ! 
,\. Y cs, sir, :111tl then l ha\'l' a ilry rcfrii.:t•rntiuu \,ox 1'11'"-
menls, nnd so forth. · Q. Is thnt elc<•tricnlly 0111•r:1l1·.I abo ! 
A. Ye~. " Q. All of your n•frk1•rnl iuu i" 1•it-d rit•:illy opcrutctl ! 
A. Ye~, sir, 1•k..t rir:1ll.'" 
page SO~ Q. !.lo~! of your 1·11,.l11Hlt'I'~ nml Jl<'OJ>lt• in 
vi1•inity tlo 110! lm,·1· ri•l"ri~cl'lllion, tlo tht•y ! 
A. Very few. 
~[r. Simpkin~, "'nit n 111iu11k-
A. Some of tht'm •lo u111l ""'"'' or lhc111 tlo not. 
:Mr. Sin1pki111;: .Tu~t n n1i1111\l'. Ohjcction. Whnt 
pm:tiosc of thnt line1 
CC> 
::c 
><: 
lliaLLJ 
is t 111 
~ 
(..J 
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The Court: That question is leading, Mr. Ellis. 
Mr. Ellis: Of course it was lending. It wasn't on uny 
materinl point. I admit it was leacliug. 
Q. I will ask yOtP.-What iR the nature of the commuuitv in 
wliich you live wifllrilference to being rum) or urbun T • 
A. Well, we have electric light through on the muin high-
way, but the people that live off from the nmiu highwuv don •t 
huve it, with the exception of a very fow that liuve ·built n 
private line, which is ri~ht expensive, you know; to get n pri-
vute line. 
Q. What would you sny would he the situntiun with respect 
lo th& 11111jority, us to whctlit>r tlmy li:ive or do uot hnvc it 1 
A. I ,,·onhl snv that tlicv do not luwe refri~erntion. 
(). Is il'e tlelivcretl iu 111;1t comimmity, tlmt ·Joc11lity ! 
A. No. it is not. 
ll- If they t.1011 't lmve refrigerntion for beer, they don't 
linve it for nnytl1ing else, ,Jo tlu•y, Mr. f.'ruuciseol 
~Ir. Simpkins: I tlliuk tlint is n conclusion. 
Willwss sto0<l 11sitle. 
Jllll'c 81 } MR~. M. 0. l~HANCISCO, 
n witn<'s~ introilnct•tl on behnlf of thl• ,Jefc11<11111t, 
l1t•i11g lirst 1l11ly sworn, lt•slilie,J ns follows: 
DIHF.CT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Elli~: 
Q. Yon m·e Mrs. :ill. O. 1',rnnciscof 
A. Yes, sir. 
l.J. llow far i:< your laomt• place, whcrt! you n•,i.J,•, from ll1e 
hniltlin.!!" iu which yonr hushnnd opernlf':< l1is store or rt•sta11-
rn11t or tillin!!" slntion T 
,\. It is not ns far 11~ thnt buildin~ out then'. Ahout hnlf 
nl! fnr, perhnps. 
Q. About lmlf ns flld 
A. Somel11in!!" like !hut. It is 11ln10Ht nt the e111J of Ilic vnrd. 
.lust n little liJ;ncc, till! yard i:i nbont lu1lf Ilic tlist:lli<'c; 11nd 
thPn llit•re is much more--
Q. But iu Ilic snmc ynnlT 
A. Yes, >1ir, in t ht• 1<11111e ynnl. 
ll. It is 011 the l'Ond thnt lcmlR from Denver Dam lo 'l'ylt•rs, 
is it not f 
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A. Yes, sir. = W Q. In the upper eu<l uf 11111111\'er Countyt >< 
A. Yes, sir. LU Q. How mnny p\~•pll' (•omposc your fm!1ily ! . 
pnitc 82 } A. My family! I have two aunts that hVl' w1I h 
me, nud I hnvc l0kht l'11ihlrcn. My ohlcsl ""11 is 
uol 11onll', but tl1c re.it uf th1•111 I han• there. Q. \Veil, whc11 you 1111s\H'l' 111y q1ll'stio11t<, you 11<l<lrci<s y1111r 
rcmnrks to the jur~·· They 11n· lh1• olll's thut huve got to lll'ar 
you. 
A. Yes, sir. l/. Look nt th1•m. How 11i:111y of the cl1ililren live i11 tlll' 
hoinc there next to tlll' slun· ~ A. Thev 1111 li\'l• in till' h111111', 11111 ll1l' ohle~t \Joy is i11 l•'l11rid•1 
ul the time. But it i~ 1:i).:ht ..l1ililn·11 i11 nil. 
O. \\'hat nn• th1• 11!!CS of 1111·111 ~ 
,\. \\'ell, 111~· ""II i~ :!:!, I hal is ll1e one in Florida. '!'In• old-
est i;irl is 18. H!ie is awa_,. at s.-h1111l ri!!ht now, hut i<ln• Ii\'•'' 
there. A111l thL• lll'Xt i,:irl is Iii. 'l'lll'll I ha\'L' 11 hoy 1-t, a lio~ 
1:!, o...irirl 10, n t:irl six, :111<1 f1111r. Q. Au<l thnl f11111ily, i11,.!11di11!! ,n111r two :11rnls, n·sid1· 11 ... .-.· 
near the stur1· 111111 111:1k<· I l11•i r l10111l' th,•re ! 
A. Ye>1, sir. 
ll. An• Ill<'~· lhcrc 011 ~11111J:i,·s! 
A. YC'8, sir. ll. Do you nssi~t ~·e1111· l111,l•:111el i11 the 11p1•r:ili1111 111' 11 .. -
storl' T 
A. Yes, sir. ll. \Ven• vou iu his stun• or lilli11!! "lnli1111 or n•sl1111ra11l "" 
this partil·nla r ~111111:"· · 1111 whid1 ~Ir. l '1111t hor111·l--
Jlllge 83} 1111el i\!r. Willi:1111s 111:1;\,. tlll'>'l' p11rd111s1•s! -
;\. I was i11 1111'1'1' :• µ,1111<1 portio11 of Ill<' :ifli'r·c::i ~00. . ~ 
Q. Do you re1·111l whethe•r ~·e111 Wl'l"l' tlwre wlai>n llu•y 111:""°>< 
tlw 1n11·ch11"e~ or not! _ u..J A. \Yell, they 1li1l11 't niake· the• pur1·hn><cs fro111 1111', 1.111 I 
think 1 w:i>< in the sl<H'l' or was walki11){ tlll'OU!!h llll' stun• a' 
they cm11e in; l h:we a f11i11t n·e·11lh•\0 ti1111 of 11ccin){ tl1l'111, J.1;t 
tl1l'Y 1li1l11't mnkc :my i111prc·,,i .. 11 011 Ill<' whntsm•\'(•r; l.111 I 
h:11l lwe11 wnrkinu: in thl'l'l' fur 11 1·1111ple of l1nnr><. 
_Q. Tn what n1a1111cr wns the• stun• licin!! \0 0111h1\'h•1l :11111 th•· 
erow1l eonilnrti11.u: it><!-'lf 011 this Hnnelll\' nfternoon ! 
A. \\'C'll, I \li1ln't 11cc nn,·thi11" 1liso;·dl'rl\' l'rolll 1111,·li111I\'. 
It wns nll ril!:l1t. · ~ · · · 
Q. Do you recall sct•ing th1• Hh\•rilTt 
j 
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A. Yes, sir, I recall. I think I sold the Sheriff o soft 
drink. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Simpkinc..-
0Q. Mrs. Frnncis('o, you sold \Jeer to some other people that 
Sunday, if you di<ln 't sell it to these two, didn't yon 7 
A. I nm 1rnre I must hnvc, in thnt length of time. I can't 
rccnll 8l'lling beer, but-
Q. You sell more beer on Suu<lny thun you do anything 
else, don't you 1 
A. We sell a good den! of soft <lrinks nnd ice cream. 
Q. Just nbout how mnch hccr \lo you sell 011 
!JU!!c 84 } Sunday T 
A. Well, I wouldn't know, bccun8c I <lon't stay 
in there 111! \lay on Sundny, n\Jout whnt we sell un Sunday. 
\\\• tlon 't open nny, never lousl'n a top. (l. A ntl yon \lun 't know how much you sell on 8unduyt 
A. I \lo uot. 
RE-l>JHEC'l' EXAMINA'l'ION. 
13\' j\(r. 1':1lis: 
·Q. llow ilo yon pm·k itf Yon \lo pnck itT 
J\. 'l'lil'.V 111·,• in ha!!:s, paper hnu:s, jnHt a hottlc like tlmt, 01· 
two hotth•s, \\'(!put tlll'lll in 11 p:qll'r Im_!!;. llnt it' we were sdl-
i111~ a iloz,•n IJOttl1•s, we wouhl pnt th1•111 i11 a paper box. 
\\'it m•ss stoo1l :1si1le. 
p;u:c 8:i ~ l\I. 0. FBANCISCO, 
1111' 1h•f1•111lant, heill\; n•calll•1I lo the st11111I, testi-
liC'1I furtl11•r ns full ow~: 
CHOSS EXAMINA'J'JON. 
n~· l\l r. Simpkin~: 
Q. Mr. Frnncist•o, l1ow rnurh be~r 110 yon nonnully sell i11 
a \l'e(•k T 
A. l'ossihlv 50 or C.O cnst•s. 
Q. J•'iftv o'r sixty cases, 111111 nLont how 11111l'h of tlmt is 
sold on :';11111lnvs! 
A. I have 11e
0
Vl'r mmlL' n t11l111l11tio11 of it. It would he huril 
for me tu KllY ri!!ht ufT-hnnde\l. 
Q. 0111•-thi nl of it ''iumlnyt Woult!n 't you my onc-thinlf 
J\. l'ossihly so. 
(l. l'ossihly n third! 
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C:l 
::r= 
You think betwcc11 .>c:: 
W,J 
A. A third might be n little too hi~h. 
Q. A third might be a little loo high l 
11 fourth and a third T 
A. Possibly so. Q. You sold other bcl!r u11 thi~ Hun<lay; tbi~ wus 11 uonual 
Sunday we arc tnlking ubout lwrc ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: Q. Well, now, Mr. Pn111"i;.co, you hnve been s1•ll 
page SG ~ ing bec1· there ou S11111lay 11mlcr the bclil!f tl111t y111 
hnd 11 right to sl'll it 1111 Su1ul11y, huvcn't you! 
A. I have. 
By Mr. Silllpkins: . • , Q. 'rhcrt· is onc 11101'1! lJll<'~111111 l lia\'l': "lou llou t .111 au,· 
business. Mr. Frnncisco, of n11y .... 11s<'quc11ce nt 1111 witlt 11111r· 
ists, do you T A. ~clli11g 111cul~ to tuuri~t~ ! ~ 11, we don 'I. \\'l• d1111 'I 
have 1t1n11v tourist~ uu th11t ru:11l. Q. Yu11°llo11't lu\\'c n11111y to11ri~1s 11n thnt ron11t 
A. No, sir. lJ. l'racticnlly t1ll of your 1111-illl'"~ is of n locnl untur" ! 
A. \'cs, tl111 t is right. 
HE-DJRElMI' l·:~.\\ll~A'flON. II-
By Mr. Ellis: Q. Huve yon l'Vt•r umlcrtuk<'ll 111 t'lllll'l'lll nny of thl'Sl' .a:h>s 
from the Shl'riff or 0!111!1' polil'•' ullin•rs of the County~" W 
visited your sto1·cf · ::::C:: 
1\. No, I Jinvl' not. I hn\'<' sold !11 11llil'l'l'S 011 Sunday.><: lU.J 
Mr. Si111pkins: No ro111<-11li1111 :111111~ thnl line nl all. 
A. I hnvc sold lo 11 .Jnll_~<' 1111 :->1111.l:i~-. 
The Court: Not this 11111'. 
.J\.. I <licln 't Rn~· wl1h·h om·, 11111 l hn\'C sold ton Circuit I '11nrl 
.Tu1l~(} on n Sundny. l\!r. Hnw: 'VI! woul1l likl' 111 1;11 .. w where you huy yonr". 
The Court: .l nst a 111i11ulc. I do not llll'llll 1•• 
c... 
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pnge 87 } reflect on Mr. Frnncisco 11t nil, but I do not think 
I hnvc ever been to his place. 
llfr. Haw: He Ji<ln 't sny thnt. 
Q. You <li<ln 't menuJhnt this J mlg-c- ! 
A. No, I i;,ertainly did not. It WM' 11 cli/fcrc11t Judge. But 
I huvc dold to n Circuit Judge. 
Q. You hm·e sold to 11 Circuit Judge, but not this one t 
A. Yes. 
Q. We won't nRk you to mention his nnmc, who he is. 
Mr. Hnw: It is perfoctly legal tu drink it on n Sundny or 
nny otlil'r tlny. 
Wif11l's~ ~10011 nsi1k 
pai;e SS } R. 1'. 'l'lJH Nim, 
11 wit11l'ss i11tr0tlm0l•1l on li1•hnlf of tl1l' ,Jefc111ln11l, 
l11•i11g- fir~t dnl~· sworn, t1•stifh·d ns follow~: 
DmEC'r l~XAmNATJON. 
lh· :\Ir. Elli~: 
·I). \\'iii , . .,n pl1•a"" slntc to the jury your 1111111" mid oel'11-
p11ti1111, ~Ir. 'l'11nwr1 
,\. H. I\. '1'111'11<'1'. J\. ll. C. lllsfll'dor, for tli,• Virt:i11i11 ,\l-
<'Ol111li<' 111•\'1'1'111.!;<' Control Bounl, nil'1111101111. 
(,>. fu llw dis<'har~l' of yo111' d11(ips, is H11novcr (!on11ty " 
part of ~·1111r f1•rritor~·f 
,\.It is, Yl'N, t<ir. 
ll. ( ':111 yon f!'ll the ~t·ntlrnll'n of the jnr.v l111w 1u:rny l""'J>l1· 
1111\'l' Jj!'l'llS!'S tu lliSpCllSC !Jl'l'I' i11 IlnllOV!'I' ( 'Ollllf~· ! 
,\, 'l'hl'rt' nn• (il li<'l'llSl'll l'st11hlisl111a•11ls iu llm111\'l'r Co1111!\'. 
Q. Ts it n pnrt of ~·011r h11si11ess to visit nll !hos" (ii li-
l'l'll<l'!'S mul Sl'!l wl1Pilll'I' or 1101 llu•v 11rc r111111i1w in n11 or-
1h•rl1· 111111 prO]Jl•r nt:llllll'rf • " 
A. 'J'h11t is 011e of 111.1· 1l11fil'H, Yl'"• sir. 
Q. 'J'li:it is lllll' of ~·011r d11tit•sf 'J'hnt is your 111:1i11 <1111.1·, 
is11 't if ! 
,\. 0111• of \111• mnin 1luth·~, y1•s, ~ir. 
Q. ,\11<1 ~·1111 1111\'<' lit'l'll 11i'l0h11n!inc: t1111t 1l11h· a11d 1·isiti11_<~ 
. thrB!' 11ln1•••s in Tl:111111°l'r Conntv fur how 1011'-'. ! 
pal,!;<' ~!) ~ A. Ri111•1• .Tn1111nrv, l!l:!!J. · 
(). llnvl• ~·on 111111 oc1·11siou to \'isi( :\Ir. l•'r1111-
l'isco'11 llnrin~ tl1at timt't 
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A. I have. · 
f--
cc 
Q. Do you know how 11m11)' uf those licensees dispcll'c i:,r 
sell beer on Sundav! A. I have not ui11de my ol"'l'l"\'Utious throug\1011t tlll' l'll· 
tire Count~· of tl1e licensl,.\ l•stahlislnnents on Sumluys, l111f 
uf my ow11 kuowledg-e, upproxi111atdy 80 per ceut uf tlil· til 
::t: 
:>c 
4J 
iu the County nre ~el\in){ 011 S11111\11y. Q. An1l vuu don't know wlll·tlll'I' the other twent\· an· or 
uot, is thut itt · 
A. I 110 not, uo, ~ir. Q. So, us l undcrstn111l it, you kucow thnt 80 1~r ccut or th·· 
Gl nre se\li11~ 011 Sumluy, mul liuw 111nny more, you t1011°f 
kuow! 
A. I do nut. 
cnoss 1·:X.\ \tt~A'L'lON. 
By Mr. Si111pki11M: Q. !low du yuu hupjll'll tu 1;111111· lliat tliosc 811 (><.'!' n·11t ar•· 
liellini.:. ~Ir. 'l'urnl'r! Y11111l1111'l work 011Sumluy,1\11 _,·1111 ! 
,\. Oc1:11siu11111l'· I 1lo work 1111 S1111d:n·. I 1\1111 'I 1111 S1111.l:I\ 
in tuc re111otc• sc·~tin11s ulos1·r1·<' 1111· .. .-1:1iilislu111•11f~, 11111 1111 ti;, .. 
111ui11 thoroiu;lifarcs- · (). Have you 1•isiktl t;O p•·r 11·111 of tlll'lll 011 Su111\11y ! 
,\. l lt:l\'l', yt•:->, ..:i r. 
pugc !JO~ Q. ,\11,\ ~·011 say th:il ~ll per 1•c11t of tln·111 "" 
so111e S11111\ays \nJ\·•· '""' loc.:r ! 'l'hat is w\1al" .'"" t--
nieau T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stood 11sit!e. 
page 91} MH8. ~l.\ HY 1:. \\'INN, 
11 wituc"~ i11tr11tl111·"il 1111 lll·bnlf of 
being first 1luly sworn, lt'."lifi,.,f 11~ f11illlW~: 
nm1W'l' .1·: '\.\\II:'.\ ,vrmN. 
co 
:I: 
><: 
tlil' 1\d .. •1ul:111ll.U 
Q. Mr!i. \\'inn, wlll.'re llu ~·1111 tin·! 
A. I live on the \Vnshi11;..d•111 I li~\1w11~·. just 01•t•r Iii•· li11;· 
in Hnnu1·er <.:ouuty. 
- Q. \Vlrnt husilll•ss do you op<'ral<- tl1cret 
· 1\. I opcralc a place call1·tl tin• 1Ji11er. .Just n-w .. 11. l 
µ:ucss it woultl Le cl:1sscd mun• :1s a ui).:ht club 111111 n·~taurn11l 
us nuy other type of !Jut;iucss. 
LI'> 
w 
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Q. How big u place have you there from the standpoint of 
the people you cnn seat there in the restaurant 1 
A. 'l'he main part of the building is about 32 feet square. 
Q. Auel what licenses do yon hnvet 
A. I huve n .ru=nntile liceuse, tobacco license, soft drink 
licenHc, restuurnut liel!nse, 1rn A. B. C. license for beer au<l 
wiuu both on premises nn<l. off for both of those. 
Q. How long have you been operating there! 
A. About two vea1-s 111111 a half. 
Q. About how iunuy customers <l.o you lmve ou nn averngu 
Sumlay r 
A. Wt·ll, Sumlay is my thir<l largest dny in the week. 
wonlcl uot be able tu till,Y just c>xnctly l1ow muny 
pni-:c !l2} cu~tomers 1-would huvc. It .vnric~ throu~ho~t tht) 
ye11r. The luq~est SC'nson 1.~ from nLout buster 
until the licnrli sensou is over. '!'lien tlic second largest sen· 
~011 is in the fall 111111 winier. 
Q. { \Jllld you g-i1·e me mi iill•11 of tlw 11m111Jcr of pcoplu you 
l;l'l'\'C 11 thy tl1eref 
,\, On ·Su111l11y or :my otl1<'r <lnyr 
t). 011 :-;1111t\11y, on 11 hus.v Suml:1.1', we will sa.1•. 
;\, \\\•\\, 011 a husy Hnmln)', prolmhly 11lio11t :?GO, sornethi11~ 
like that. 
q. ~u11·, wliat pl•r <'1'111 of' tl1c pl!r:<1'11s wl10 <'0111c to your 
plal'l• 1111 R111ulay nrc tourists, 11111! wh11t pl'r<'l'lllllge urc local 
J•l•upll· wlio l'llllll' tlil•re from ni .. 1111101111 or otl1enrisc for 
1111111sl•n11•11t mu\ n•fn,~lnncut 1 
,\. 'l'l1nt is just 11 li1:le ilillil·ult to sny. 'l'lmt \'lll'ies 1ds11. 
q. I just w1111I yon lo g-ivt• 1111 l'slimnte, ns m•;ir us 1·011 run 
g-ct to if. • 
A. l will sa1· nhout 011c-thirtl of' th" pt•ople tl111t Wt• serve 
1r1111l1l ht• tourists, in most senso11s. ~0111l•fi111l's it is gre:1ter 
th:111 tl111t. 
tl. Yun Sl'l'\'C llll'nls tooT 
:\. Yt•s, ~ii·. 
Q. \\'1111! !'l'l'l'Clllllc;c of the persons who come to your place 
011 S11111l11.1· 111111eut111('11!11 then• 01·.It•r hel'l' with their 111eah: 
,\. l IJCl'l'I' llw11d1t of it iu tl1l' sl'llSl' of pt,,.l'<'ll!ll!.';"e hl'l'ore. 
Quill• 11 1111111hcr of' pcopf<' dri11k lo!'er with their 
)la!.';"c !l:l ~ 1J1!'11l.~, or <lr·ink l"-'"r jui;f licforL• I lit• 111Pal. A µ:110'1 
1111111y of Ill)' 1·11sfo1111•rs 1lri11k a !!lax~ of ioL'l'I' wl1ile 
t\11•y 11n• w:1ili11g for :11111•111 to lie st'l'l'l'tl. l w11tdd11't Joe nlde 
!11 ><11~· .inst l'Xm·tl.1• !ltt• pen'l'lll11;.:<', Im! it i~ 11 ~oot! 11umbe1· 
of )ll'ople. · 
Q. Do 11 ){ll01l 111m1y COill<' there 11lso who tlo 110! i;:et uny 
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1neals but just get a bottle of ln•cr or n :;lass of beerT 
A. \Veil, a great mnny pcoplL• 1!0 l.'OllH! there and just )!<'i 
I-
CCI 
a bottle of bl'cr or 11 snntlwi•·h nm\ u bottle of hel'r; ~"""' 
times just n bottle of beer. Q. And docs that same apply 111 wi11l! f Is wi1w <lrnuk wil h ::r:: ><: 
or without meals generally t A. \\\• st•ll wine un<I l1t.>el' J,.,1h. :\ few people like it wilh 
UJ 
111e11ls 1111tl u few people lik•· it without. \Ve sell n i.:rcnl 1hoal 
111ore Leer tlwu wc du wi11l'. Q. l'lL'n~c stall' wh<'lhcr or 11111 the p.cuentl puLlit', lrnn·I· 
in)! pnhlic, usual!~· 1le1111111tls lK'<'r when they co111e to y1111r 
pince! A. Ye~, very pusiti\'L•ly sn. Y1·s. Ju fnct, I sell 1lrnft 1 ... ,.,. 
out there on the hh:liw11.\', 1111tl that is 11 little unusual, tu 1,.. 
outsi1le of n cib'. Q. ,\ml you s;1y tlwt 11ppli1·' tu ""' ~,·neral truwlin).:" p11lili1 
who patrouin• your ph1<·c ! 
A. y, .. ;, sir, I will sa~· 1h·li11i\L'ly so. 
cno.c;;s t·!:'\ .\ ~11 :-1 A'l'IllN. 
By Mr. Hi111pkins: Q. You said 11l11111t 11111•-thinl of the lll'llph· ll1;it pn~c !l-l ~ l'Ollll! on fiuuday W<'r<' 1<111rists. ~lost of the 111 lll'r 
two-thinls ar .. f.-11111 lli1·h1110111l, 11n•11't tlwy! 
A. I have quile 11 lilllt• Iowa! lr:i.lt• fro111 ll111111n•r, 11111 l 
l111ve nl'Vel' trh·il to fo.:11n· il 11111 iu p1•r<'l•nt11!.!;l'H, Mr. fii111pki11,. 
f jnst t!oll'j kllOW hOW to llll~Wt'I" that t(lll'Hliun i11 \'l'l'l'l'lll:t'.!l'Sl--
nu\ I llO hnvt• qnitc II littll' 11f 11:1110\'t•r 1'l'1)pll', 111111 p1·11p1':--
who fonnerh• live1l in l1:11111\·1·r who 1111w livl' 1low11 l11•tw1•1·1F'3 
my plare llll<i nid1111lllhl i11 11 .. 11ri<·o ( '1111111)'. lint n ;.:n·at 1111111\-
of 111y l'll~tm111·rs nrc fr11111 Hieh11111111l. '::c: Q. A ma.iorit~· of llw111 11ll11•r 111:111 tourists, 11 11111.iorily o~ 
the n•11111i1Hh•r are from Hi1·l11111111tl ! 
A. A prl'lty g:ollll pnrt. n•s. 1 \\'1111!11 not like to H:IY 11 111a· 
jority. A )!;rcnt man~· ot' 1111·111 :11·1•. I would not lik1• 111 H:ly 
11 majority. T hm·e nt>\"<'r 1111111:.:ht to li.g:nn• it just t>Xndly. 
Q. Yon sl•ll \'l'l'V littl1• lw•·r 1111 S11111l:I\' for oli-pn•miHl'~ 1•u11· 
sm11ption, clon't \·on! · 
_A. I sell ouly ,; s111111l 1111:111lil\' ut' !ll·Pr !'or otT-pn•111is1·~ 1·1111-
~mnption nt any tii111•. O.. Yon nr1• rcall\· in th•• n·,t:111rn11t or ni«ht l'lnh ur da111·•· 
hnll hnsim•RsT · ,. 
,\, 1110 hav<.' n floor 11p1111 whi<·h l'''"Jlle 1·:1n 1l1111re. 1 tl1111 '1 
(..) 
L 
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operate an organized dance, if you want to pp.t it that wuy. 
People come to my place and spend the even111g fur recren-
tion plll·poses, an<l thcv <lo dance. 
page 95 ~ Q. Most of the winc' nnd beer that you sell ut 
yonr pince is in conncctio11 with either n customer 
that is duneing or witlrmeals. isn't that truef 
A. Would y'ou rcpeat that; Mr. Simpkinsf 
Q. Most of the cnstomcrs tl1at purdmse beer 01· wine al 
your pince purl'll8till it in eonm•ction with u Jllenl which they 
hnve CXJK>etcd to purchase or iu co1111cctio11 with 11n evei1i11g 
of dancing- or 11 short time of dunciugf 
A. Yes; sir. 
Q. As n )J11rt of their recr1•ntion 1 
;\. Y<.'s, i;ir, I would sny so. 
<). Ahout whnt Jl<.'l'ccnt:1~e of the l1t•cr tl111t you st•ll is tiulJ 
Oil 811111)11\'f 
,\. \\\·!·!, 11! the prc,c11t ti111t> hu~i11ess is quit ... 1lnll, fruw 
~lo11day lhrou:~h 'J'l1111·s1lny, 1111<1 l~ri1lny, ~11\nnlay au<] S1111-
1l:1v Ill\• 1111• lar:.:1•st dnvs uf the Wl'l'k. In fuel, vou coul<ln 't 
opc·rnte at all 1111lc•ss ~·on l111d those tl1ree d:iy~. Satnrda~· 
i, th,• lnr;.:1••! <In~·. l•'riila~· is the m•xt large:.;t, a11d S1111day 
is 1l1t• lhirtl lan.:l•sl. 
(/. Tl1t•11 woui1l \'OU snv ovt•r l1ali of vonr lmsi111.•ss is du11'' 
i11 I hos., !11n•t• dav's 1 • • 
,\. I would sa,; lhn•e.fourlhs of it wus tlom• i11 tl1Use tl1r''" 
1lnvs. · 
l/. 'l'lll"<'<'·fuudl'" of it is dout• i11 tl10sc tl1n•e days 1 
A. At 111" prcsi•ut ti1m·. 'I'l111t !ins 11ot idwnys 
png-c !!Ii} heen trill', hut it is 111 tl1e 111·ese11t 1110111e11t. 
(/. ,\1111 11ho11l 011e.fonrth of ll1t• ll1r,•e davs ;s 
done on 81111.lay, I \'l'l'st1111t•f · 
,\. ! 11111 110! 11 vcr~· ~uotl 11111tli,•111ntit·ia11, lint I will 11gr1•,, 
Ilia\ that is nliout ri:.d1t. 
\l. ,\1111 ."""•of 1·11111·s<', Ill'<' tlow11 hcrl', ns Mr. l\t•l'to11 trv-
in!! to snve vonr fin111lav husim•ss 1 ' · 
A. No, si1:, I 1lid11 't li1we 1111v idt•n 11111! I \1·1111ld be l':ille1I 
ns a wit1wss whr11 1 t'llllW tlowu' h,•r<.'. I t•:11ne 1low11 l1t•1•1111sc I 
was i11t1•n•sll•1l in tl1c entire suh.it-l't-maltL'r fro111 tl1e st1111d-
J1oi11t of 111<! fnd tlrat I nm opt•ratill!!, t1111t l11rsi11ess, 1111d I 
ea111e lll'n• lo the trial in thi:'I Court merely ns 11 ~p1·l'l11tor. l 
wus nslw1I if J wonltl hl' 11 witnt•s.s nut! I l'OllSl'llfl•d 0111 tlrcrt•. 
<l. But yon urc i11t<.'n•stc<l i11 the 1111kmlll• f 
J\, or course I 11111 i11teresll·1l in tlio Ullll'o111c. 
Witnl'ss stood nsitle. 
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a witness intrO\llll·(•d oil lwhalf of the dcfomlat~ 
being first duly sworu, tc~tifh'tl as follows: _ 
DIRECT EXAmNATION. ~ w 
Lu 
By Mr. Elli.s: 
Q. Wlmt I'! your nnmcT 
A. Hohert Stone. 
Q. You live iu the toll'll uf Ash laud! 
A. Ye~. sir. 
Q. Do yon opcrntc o fillin).!; ,1atiu11, lunch room, beer parlor I 
. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Whl'ref 
A .• J 11st ont~i<le of !ht• 1·r1rp11r:ih· limits of Ashland, al (I,,. 
iutL•r:wl'!iun of Route :l:J and \11. I lliµ:liwny. 
Q. '!'lint is 011 the 1·11rnt·r ut' \11. 1 11 iµ:liwnr anti I 1:11111,.,.,. 
Court llousc Tiontl! 
J\. 'l'liat i~ ri!.d1t, yes, sir. 
Q. '\'!1111 is tl•l' 11n111<' uf yu111· pl;u•t• of husillc~st 
A. College Rhoppt>. 
Q. flow 1011µ: ha1'l' you l1t·1•11 111••:r:iti11µ: tlmt 11lncc ! 
J\. T liav(• ht•ell tht•n• 11 litlt.• 11wr three 1•t>11rs. 
Q. \'011 n111 a tilliuµ: st11ti1111 in 1·111111t'l·lio;1 with itt--
1\. ).' t'S, ~j J". 
IJlll!;C !l8 ~ 
Q. I?c•tanr1111t ! 
J\. YI'~, si 1·. 
ll. J ,\lllCfi l'OUlll ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Sc•ll soft tlri11ks! 
A. \\•s, ~ir. 
ll. \Viue- ant! hcert 
i\. \'cs, si I'. 
CD 
:I:: 
>c 
U,J 
(..) 
<l· Do you sell tho.<t• 11rti"1•··' 1111 S11111la~· ! 
;\. Y(•s, sir. 
Q. Doesn't the RlwritT pas" tlll'1·" "''"r~· time he roull's J'r11111 
his htllllC to H11110\'l'r Court l l1111s1., r,~· that COl'ller! .•••• 
A. Jr hi' co111cs from Tln11on·r l'1111rl llousc lie collll'S right 
close tu it, yes, ,ir. 
Q. J\1al Stnte n111lor Vl'hi1·!" 1111li1·" 11fli,•t•r>i that pntrnl that 
roa1l park ri.!{ht tht•re, out th,•n• iu frout of your pine<· 111' 
lm~int·~s, 11011't they! · 
J\. Yes, sir. 
Q. Snnclny.~ uml other <la)'"! 
1\. YL·~. sir. 
Q., And there nre n good 1111111lll·r of Stnte police otlj1·l'rs 
M. G.· Francieco .v:~C~mmonwealth 
..._ 
·1_77· 
Robert· Stone. ' ,, 
who patrol that W11shington No. 1 Highway fro1n Richmond 
to Ashland, aren't there f 
A. Y cs, sir, thero are quite 11 few there, 
Q. Sometimes two or three of them are sitting out tl1ere at 
once, ar.cn!t. t11eyT 
pnge 99 ~ A. Yes, sir, sometimes. Sometimes we have 
more than tl111t. 
Q. You serve both locnl and tourist tradef 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What per cent of your business is locnl lra1le, Mr. Sto1wT 
A. I would sn:v 11pproximntely ninety per cent of my busi-1ic.~s is loc1il trmle. 
Q. Prncticully 111! of it f 
A. Yes, sir. -
0. Whnt is the lnr:rcst dny on which vou do businessT 
.1\. Safnnluy i~ 1u~~ Jnr1-{esf day. · 
l~. ;\ JJ.J I ht• lll'X t 1111)' 1 
J\. Sl1111lnv. 
l!. ~111ula~-. Ant] is your locnl tnul(• nm] traveling tru1Je 
Oil ,-;n11da~· i!l>out ill !ht• s:rnll' proportinlls ns nt. otl1er tinH!8 ! 
About uim·tr (l('l' l'l'llt of tile 8nllday hnsi11('S~ is locn! trade 11lso ~ 
,\, No, 1111t 011 Rnlldn~-. "~" h111•1• •111itc u few tou1·ists that 
nn• sto1>,iin!{ throu~h. pcoplt• tl1nt nrl' frnveliug fhru11g-li. 
Q. \\'li:it (l<'r <'1•11t of ~·our 811111111~· ln1si11L•ss wo11J,] yon say 
\\"llS lnt•td 1111 . ..;.jlll"SS t 
:\. T wunld snv it woultl h1• nhout t•i1d1ty pt•1· 1·ellt, tlrag-J.!;1'll 
dow11 a litllt• l1it. ill'<'Hllse we h11vp 1111itc 11 few soldiern that 
11n• stoppi11!{ i11 tl1t•1·1', that we c1Jnltl11 'l sny wns loc:I) trnde. I ha1·1· ol ill·1·s llll S111Hln1'. 
Q. w .. 11, how mnn~· of ~·our c11sto111ern ill the 
nag,• JOO~ 1•on1·s•• of n .~11111ln;v who <'nil for n drink to he 
· s1•1'Vl'tl n1·1· sold heer irnd wi1wf 1\'lint percentng-e of lhl'111 f 
1\. \\'<'II, n.~ to that, I wo11l1l hah• lo say, bt•c1111se I don't 
"'""'" r (':Ill tdl ~·011 this: 'Pl1at I will Sl'lJ as 111:\11\' ltt•er~ llS 1 \\'ill :<oft 1lri11l;s. · 
0. <Jn S11111l:i1•f 
A. Yt•s. sir. 
<~. \\'<'II, 11ow, nre those lll'Crs 11suall.1• s<•rvt'<l sillglv or with 11 rue11I ! 
1\. \\',. s1•1J 11nite 11 fow with n llll'nl or witli s:111dwicht•s, 
l>nl t11., cr!'nlt>st mnioritv of mi11t• Ill'!' ~old with a ha" of 
potnto <'hip•, 01· ern,:kers; OJ' so111!'fhin~ like that. ~ 
Q. Likl' ~·011 lnkc a soft drink lil'Yl'l'll!.!'ef 
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Robert Stuue. 
A. Yeti, sir, the same vmy. 
Q. And the trade <lenl!ln<ls tlmt ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EX.Ull~A'l'!ON. 
Hy .Ml'. Simpkins: Q. Mr. Stone, a grcnt 11u111lier uf .''olll' .. ustonwr:; arc ""l 
lcg-e st11t!e11ts, nrcn 't tliey 1 
A. Very g-ood colle!(l' stUUl'llt trail<·, yes, ~ir. 
(.,!. Yon enter tu tile collcl-:<' ,-t111h•11ts, am! that is wliy .ruu 
mil your plnrc the "t.'ollt·g-l' Sl1111•l"'" ! 
A. Ye~. ~ir. Q. AIHrnl what t"'""'·11t;ig-1• of yuur' l111si11cs>< i~ 
pa;..;e 101 } with l'{)llcg-c hoys! Ha111l11lph-~luco11 Culll'!(l', lhal 
is wlint I a111 speaking- ut', 
A. Hi;..;l1t oll-lianll, l ('Ullhl11't ""Y· 
lJ. ~lust of tl111sl! hoys al'l' 1111.t,•r :!I, 11rcn't tlicyl 
"\. Wl• h:ive quite n few tlial an• ""l'I' :!l. 
lJ. A!1d of course yon tluu'I -.·II lu those uutlcr :!I .a".' 
1.ieerf · A. Not if I kuuw it. l nsk 1!,.•t11.tu pro\'l! tu 111e Iha!' 1!11'.' 
are over :!l. lJ. Ir n ;..;ronp of llll'll, ('11!11°'-!;•' ~111d1·nts, l'Ollle in, "Wt' will 
~n~· fiVl' or si~, om• or two of 1111·111 t11i.~lil he o\•t•r :!I 1111.I t lin" 
or fonr under :!Ir 
A. ~0111ctir11cs t11l•\' u1j~ltl In•, of 1·11ur:-:e. 
Q. 'J'!mt. j..; the its1\nl t\1:-\lu1n, l lial l1uy:-\ l'Ulllc iu iu ~ru111h ~ 
That is tilt• usual wa~· ll"'Y """"" .' S1111ll' <'OHIL' to 1H1n·lia»· 
fo111\, so111ti kind uf a sa111\wi1·h ~ 
A. Yes, sir. (~. A1ul tl1osL' that ca1111ol 1rt11-.·!1:i"•' '"'"" 11,rnalh· p11rl'l1a:'l' 
soft <lri11ks t _ · 
A. Y <'"• sir. <J. ,\liout what 111·n·l'l1tw: .. 111' ,-,,t11· 1,u,.i11css,· won\,] yu11 '"·'. 
is 01T-pn·111ist•s l111silll•ss l · 
,\.'\'hat i~ Surnlay, ,\'111\ :tr" ~till l:tlki11.!! 11liu11t! 
lJ. I alll talkit1!! aliout ),..,.,., 1111\\, a11d wine. 
i\. A \'Cl')' stt1:tll l'l'l'l'l'tila:~··· Q. ,\ \'er~· :'t11all I'""' 1•11ta!!;<'! !\lust 111' \11111· 
JIH)..:C HI:! f l111'in1•ss on Sunday ;, 1111 11n·111is,•s, wit It tl1t• · "•11-
in~ of sn1ulwit·l1t•..;. 11r potuto (:'hips or l'lw1• .... 1• 
crat·l:l•r8 nut! thi11!!;s of lli:tl kiutl .' 
A. Yes, sir. · · 
~ 
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M. G. Francisco v.·Commonwealth 
11!. G. FranCisco. 
Q. You run 11 so<l~ fountain too there, do you 1 
A. No, sir, I hnve no so<lu fountnin, 
Q. You hnve no soda fountain 1 
A. I have bottled drinks. 
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Q. All bottled 1 .And you lmve beeu 1·u1111ing it there how 
_long! --
A. A little over three venrs. 
l/. 'Vere you running the liuoiu<•ss there ut tlw tinw lite 
Stnte A. n. c. Bonni pnt in n I.Jeer bnn Oil Sunday for uinety 
davsr 
~\. No, 8ii·. 
Q. You were not rnuuing it nt tlwt tirnet 
A. No, air. 
(/. Di,\ you know 1111ythi111,: ubout it f 
A. No, sir. 
<!. ]lo yon !mow whether tl111t wns done or not t Were you 
1·u11niu .. · n lnisint.·-~s io;o1newl1<.?J't.) l"'1~~f 
,\. N~, ~11·. 
ll. \'on \\"l•rn nut ! 
i\. -Nu, sir. 
\\'itue~s ~tou,J u~hho.. 
pa~,. 1u:1} lll. <J. FIL\Ncrnco, 
the 1ll'f<•11,Jant, l1ci11'1: rel':tllc1l tu lhl' sl:tutl, lL·~ti­
lit·1l fnrther us follows: 
Dllmc'!' l·:XAi\lINNl'IUN. 
Jh tl1l' Conrt: 
·l~. ~It·. l•'rnncisro, I w11ul1l lila• lo 11sk yu11 lllll' •it1t•sti1111_ 
])., y1111 11p,•1·alc your store 1111,1 h11si11l'ss 011 Satunla_v ! 
A: \'cs, 1 tlo. 
i\l r. 8ii11pki11s: lfo stntcd tl111t he opernf<'<i l'\'ery dav tit 
lltl' \\'l'l'I;, I tliiuk. J triccl to CO\'Cr the qtlllstiu11, .J11dg1·. 
Witness stout! nsi1le. 
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f-
page 10-l ~ F. R. H:\ l\:ER, 
a witne~s introtlu.,<'d ou behalf of the dcfemlunl, ~ 
being first duly sworn, tcsti!h·,l as follows: ;; 
DIRECT t~X,UIINATION. ~ 
Bv Mr. Haw: 
-Q. Whnt nrc your initinls ! 
A. F. It Q. I•'. IL, untl where du ~·uu fi\'l', Mr. Bukert 
A- In Meehnnicsvilll!. 
Q. Do yon lin\'C your ho1111• lh"rl'! 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. \Vhnt lmsiill'l<S nn• yon 1•11!.:;l!_!l'<l in T 
A. Filli11!.: st11tio11 outl 11111..!1 ruo111. 'l'wo scparntl! pla1·'''· 
Q. Filliu~ station 11111\ h111,·li 1·1111111! Hnve you n wi1ll' :11111 
bcc1· license ut ,•ilher 011c or ln1tli 11f tlll'sc J!lacl'sf 
A. T have 11 wi11,• aml IK·1·1·, "" :11111 off, nt the lunch roo111. 
Q. Yot1 llll\'l•ll'I hi ~"<1111' lilliu!.: stati11111 
A. No, I hnven't at till' lilli11·~ statio11. 
Q. \Vhat is your tr:uJ,. 1·11111J""''.J ol'; p11n•ly locnl, or parll> 
touristt 
A. w,.Jl, we \111\'c-I n•1·k1111 wlial you wonl1I cull "utlwr 
conntY" tn11lc. I 1111\'l' 11 Jul of lr:11l1• fro111 till• l'\orllll'rll ~ .. ..i, 
111111 :1° lot of tr:ule frou1 Hi1·l111111•11l, 11111\ tlic11 hm'l' ric:l1l 11111.-11 
local tra1\l'. 
pn!',C 105} (~. A g:1H11l 111a11y l"'"l'I<' iu tlw cuum11111il." 1h-al 
tllt'l'l' :1t .'·our J1la1·1· ! 
A. Yes, ~ir. 
Q. Do ,·on opernfo 011 ~1111da~· ! I--
A. Yes, sir. _ 
Q. l>u yon ~ell beer ou ~11111!:1." ! 
t....l 
J\. Y cs, si 1·. c::i 
Q. Wlint is tlw 1ll•111u11tl of 1111• lrnn·li11~ Jlnblic and 1111• i"''!::i:: U 
pie J:?:l'Hernlly who t·o111e tu Y""." r1•:-:tn11rnnt u11 S11111la~· i11 I•>< 
g"nr1l lo heer! Do the~· e:q ... l'I 1! ur d1111 't they t•x111·1·I ii! 
A. They exped hl't>I', 11111] 1\·111il1l Ii\• \'l'r~· 11111eh i\isapp11i11t.·h'4 
if they 1·oullln't g-el it. A lut .,f l"'"Pk• rith, aron1ul "" :->1111-
tla l's. 'rhev work e\'<'I'\' 1 l:"· i 11 I I 1<• "'''''!: a nil tl ri 1°1• 11 ru1111.J 
on.Sumlay 'awl Htop to ~l'I 11 l1nlll" of l1e1•1· a111l so111Pthi11·~ lo 
(•nl, n s:1111lwi1·h. \\\• ~l'l'\'l' a 111! 111' l1111l'hes a111l sa111lwi .. l11·~. 
Awl thev u·o uht!Utl. Ou ran· rn·,·asio11s l ever st~l' ntl\'h<Hh 
nmler tl;e tnf1nenet• of 111"<1iiol llmt 1lri11ks on S11111la\', · · 
Q. How close 1lo ~·on opL•rali- tu the Trinl .Jnslic:, I 'uurt 
where it !!c11ernllv sit~t 
M. G. Franci&co .. _v_,_ Commonwealth 
F. R. Baker. 
A. Wei~ it is praeticnlly up over me. 
Q. He is practically over your head, isn't heT 
A. Yes, sir. 
81 
Q. Are the County officers, police officers, 11nd Sheriff there 
frequentlyT 
page 106 ~ A. Yes, sir, renl often. 
Q. Are they !here 011 Sundnyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Comrnonwenltb's .Attorney, I believe, lives very 
close to you T 
A. He comes to sec me too. 
Q. Is he one of your customers T 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has any objection been mndc dow11 there lo your op-
ern ting on Sundny f 
A. 1 lmve ll!'\'cr lienrtl of oue. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
ll,,. 111 r. !'-li1upkins; 
Q. Mr. Bnlwr, yon run n !{ellL•ral lunch roo111, ~~l'nernl restnn-
nlllt r 
A. Yes, sir. 
(,I. A11\l 111ostl,• vonr lil•er 111111 wi11e i~ st'l'\'l'1l i11 Iii" rest11u-
l'l111t will1 t•itlit·r'11 's:1111lwi1•h or h111 .. 1i, or 11 liag of potato el1ips 
or 1·l1<•1·s<• t'l'al'la•r, 111· s0111ething like llmt 1 
i\. \\·s, q11it .. 11 bit of it. -
(). A11t! ~·011 t!o a Jarge t•nrh H•rvice l111si11es~ loo, dun'! you 1 
Ou ~1111da~·s a111l other tlay,,;f 
A. y, .. ,, sir. 
(l. :-;,•rviH!.: s11111lwil'lll's 111 the e11rh with drinks, Goc11-Cul11 
:rn1l pop uni! ,,o forthr 
1'11.!.:L' llli f A. y l'S. 
Q. Yun sell Vt•ry littJ,. beer, <1011 't yo11, !\fr. 
ll11k1•r, for off-pn·rnis<•s co11su111ptio11, pnrticu!nrlv on Snn-da "1 · 
;\. J 1lo not in wi111l•r tiuw, lmt in the :-nm1111er ti111c I sell 
11 lot of it off premises for lisl1i11g pnrtiL•s, pic11ics, 11111] things 
lik1• that. Most of that i~ on S11111l11v. 
(,). ~10,1 of thnt is on fl11n1lnvt · 
A. Y1·s. . 
(J. lllost of thnt is ho11ght enrl.v 81111d11y 1110rni11g to l11k,• 
1lown lo !ht• rivL•rs 111111 plncei; like thnl'I 
1\. 'J'l1:1 t is rig-ht. 
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Frank Biwllry. 
Q. Isn't most of your bui<iill'"~• 1·1•rtai11I>• over hnlf of yo111 
business, Riehmond bu~incs~, p1q1plt• 1·01111nv: out frmn l:i1·l1· 
mond thnt eonrn to get drink" 11r Coca-Coln and c:it :1 rt .. 1· 
1la11ccs1 1111d thinirs of tl111t ki111l ! A. \Veil, I would11 't sny that. I \\'llUld HllY nrou111l -!ll 111·1· 
ceut wn~ Rich111mul lmsiuess. Q. Aud over hnlf of it is Hi1·h111111ul aml touri~t, isu 't it! 
A. Yes. tl. Very little of it is loc:d, 1·.,1111'arati1·cly! 
A. It i>< more Rich111u1ul a1lll l11nri'I tlu111 it i" [01·nl, ~-,.,, 
Cl. More Hid11nou1l anti touri"t. \'011 say then• hnn· 1,, ... 1 
uo complniuts nhout your l111"i11•""" 011 Rn111lar. Yon 11wa1 
there ha1·c ht•C'll 110 cm11plai11t" "'"'"' yum· li11si111•ss ns to '"iu1 
hnsin1•ss Oil Sm11l:I\·, .!1111 'f \'Oii r 
pngc 108 ~ A. Ye~, thal is 1i'!l1I. · Q. You du l;1111w tli:1t tlll'l'l' have !il'l'll a (111 .. r 
1ll•k•:.cntio11s nuil p1•tili11ns allll "" 1'11rlh to tlm Bu;tl'll or S1q11'I" 
visors hy parti1•11lar ).:'r1111ps 111' 1w11pl1• askiu): that the sat.· .. r 
l:ccr h1• stupp1•1l 011 f;11111lay1 d1111 'I you! 
•\ Ye" sir l): {;,;;;lo 0lmow that! 
A. 'l'hnt il" µ;cucrall.'' l;uo\\'11, 
J!E-DIREC'I' l•~:'\.\\11:\ATIO~. 
Bv Mr. Hnw: 
I-
cc 
::c 
>c 
I.LI 
. Q. Arnl yon 1lo !mow, ~Ir. l::1l;i_•1", ,;illl'l' he has h•1l ~·1111 1111 
th11t suhjel'I, tlwt the Hoar1l 111' S1q"'n·isors, at•ti11).: i11 tl,..ir 
onidal 1·:1parity1 11\lll with authority to h:lll herr on f'1111d:1~· . ._ 
have rC'fu~1·1l to 110 ~o; is t lo:il 1· .. r1H·I ! 
co 
t 
f 
A. Ye~, ~ir, just 11 frw)11011tli" :1'-(11. 
\\'it11e~>1 stood :1~itl1•. ::c 
: (..) 
pngc lO!l ~ FHA:\!\ l\J:.\Dl.l·W. ~ 
I\ witJte's i11frlllli11•1•d 1111 l11•half of tJ1e 1Jt.t\•11il:111I, 
heing tirl<t tlulx ~worn, lt->'t ifi,.d. :1' 1'11ilo\1's: 
nnrF.C'l' W\.\ \I I\: .\'l'lON. 
Hv:Mr. Haw: 
·Q: 111 r. Hrnill1•y, :in· ~·1111 l·'ra11l: llrmlley ! 
A. YeHJ ~i.r. Q. Wh1'1'C' 1lo ynu !ivt•, )Ir. llradh·y ! 
.A .• .At Ellcrso11. 
M. G. Francisco v. Commonwenlth 
Fra11k Bradley. 
Q. WJint is your busin<.'ssf 
A. It is hard to tl'll you. 
Q. Fertilizer business T 
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A. l•'ertilizer lm~i11ess, gas 1111d oil, 11nd tourist Lusiness, 
service stntion. --
Q. How m:rny scrviee st11tions, :\fr. Br!l(lley, do you own 
yourselff 
A. Own or opern te T 
Q. I mcnn how numy <lo you own T 
A. I owu nine. 
Q. And how mnny do you op<.'rntef 
A. "'ell, four. 
Q. I~our. Antl lu1vc 1111 of tl1osc servic<! stations !lint you 
01\·11 or operate, have thl')' nil h1•c1· li1·p11~cs 1 or ,inst part 
of them 1 -
A. 'l'lie four that I op .. ratu l111vc IJ1•1•r liccnsl's, 
pa~1· 110 l Q. When• a re 1111',\'f 
1\. f 1111• is u1.•11r A:<hlantl, with hotl'l t rntl1!; 01w 
is Iksto\'1•r, 1111 tli1• \\'a~l1i11".do11 Hig-hwny, 1111tl 011e at J-:ller-
so11, nutl c111p 011 No.:! lligl1wny. (r Allot' tl1osc 1·X<'l'pt tlw 1111c nt Ellerson are 111urc or l1·s.s 
tourist pr11po~ili1111s 1 an•u't. tlu·~·t 
,\, Yt•s, sir. 
ll. ls th• om• at l~llc•rson yon1· sturef 
.A. Yl'~, sir, the uwiu ontee. 
(}. 'Vith r1"l'<•n·n1•1• In y11111· Elll.'1".•011 store, for i11sl:111e,•, t:1h• 
tJ111t for thl' pnl'JlllSl~ 
;\, 11 is opt•l':llt•<I 11 Jittl1• 1liff1'l'l'lltly. 
ll. "'li:it l:i11d of l1~•t•r lin•llst•s h:we yon tl1cr1•! 
,\, nu :111,1 off. 
l/. 011 :11111 oil'. ls yonr tn1tl<' tht•rc any tomi>"t or pr:1<·-
ti1·:d]y :di !oral! 
i\:.· Prncticnlh· :11l loc111. 
l/.'Do yon 01;cr:1fe tht'l't• on Snmlny1 
A. Y l'", ~ir. 
l/. ,\11<! tl11• persons tl1;1t :.:o np there on S1111tl:1~', do tl1('~· 
lllll>'lh· Jiu.\' for co11~11111plion off pn•1uisl's or 1111 flrt•111is1•s ! 
,\, \[11,ll.\•, 11i11;,ty-11i11t' JH'r 1•t•11t, 011 pre111ist•s. 
(/. Ou 11n•111ise5 ! 
TI\' the Court: 
· . Q. 'I'hnt is :it Ellcrso1i ! 
png-1• JJ J. f A. Ye~. 
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Frau/; Bradley. 
,__ 
u:::i 
By Mr. Haw: . _ 
Q. Will you please sti1tc whnl i8 the nttitudc of tho puhli~ 
townr<ls the necessity of !{l•lli11)! hl•er on Sun<layt >c:: 
Mr. Simpkins: Wuit n 111i11nlc. Not whnt uttitmk• th~ 
public !ms. · 
'rhc Court: Whnt is tlll' 1k•111:111.I for itt 
Q. Puniou me. "'hnt is the nttitn<lc of your cu,;lo1111"r:< 
whu collll• tl1crl! to yonr pln1·1• 1111 Hnmlay in re;..runl lo lll'<'I' ! 
A. 'Vt·ll, they <lcnm111l IK'cl'. If the,\' 11011'1 g-ct it thl'l'l' 1111·." 
go so111cwhcrc clsl' u1al t:;l'I ii, ,,,.,.r tlm Henrico line. It' ll'l' 
<lon 't keep open they .~u tu I l1·11ril'll :iml l!cl it. 
Q. You hm•e beer liec11"''" yon :<ay, for you1· other pla''"·' 
toof 
A. Thnl is right. 
Q. Wiant is Ilic ntlitn,h· 111' ti"' tuna·ist lrmlc tlant patrn11izo·>' 
your tourist ho111e,; :11111 lilliaa'! "laliu11s in rl·~:anl to lh1• ,..;iii• 
uf hcer 011 Snllll:I\' ! 
A. 'l'lac :1ttitnd1; i,; \'l'I'\' :<ln111~ t11w:anls it. 'rhe,· rai.-1• a 
fuss because \\'1• 11011 'I la:a
0
v1· liqaa;,,., · 
Bv thl! Court: 
·Q. ReC'anse you nl'l~ uut :u1 .\. IL l '. ~toret 
A. Yc.s, :.;ir. 'J'lu•,\' :-;;i_\. 1 lu·.,· 1n·,·pr :-:.aw sud1 a St:itt•. t--
CROSS J·:X.\\11:\\'r!ON. al 
By Mr. Simpki11s: :c. 
Q. Mr. Rr:ulli'.'" jn,;t n11c queslio11. ~Ir. ll:I>< 
pu!!;e 112 ~ nskl'il you :ahuul lla1· altit111h• of people llaal 1·a11£.J 
to !lat' pll1!'1• 1'111' (11°1'1', flt' l'Olll'Sl' tlat•y \\':till lw1•l 
if thev e11nw llaL•re foa· it! 
A. Sure. 
Witness stood nsitlc. 
l\!r. Ilnw (To l\!r. ('. W. 'l':aylor): Will you pr0<l111·1· 1111• 
Supervisors' records! 
Mr. Si111pki11s: lf Yu11r ll111111r pl1•:a><L', T w1111t lo 1·1•11<'W 
my ohjl'l'liou. I tlaiuk tla:al I ill' :-ill(ll'l'\0 isors wcrn 1111t 1h~·id­
i11)! ut nil whether ur uol (11 .. .-1· was :a llc(·cssily. 'l'la:al is 1111· 
only 11uestion hcfore thi., jury, wlwth1•r it is 11 uecl's.-ity. II' 
it is not 11 neecssit:v miller nil lhe 1•vi1lc11ce here, it is tlll'ir 
tluty, if it gels lo thnt <111ty, to l'Ollvid. 
w 
w 
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C. rlV. Taylor. 
·fhe Court: That is correct. 
e: Here followed argument. 
Note: Jurv retires from courtroom. 
--= ---Note: -
11rt :---mm going to exclude the net ion of the Donni 
of Supervisors on these petitions, nnd I wilt strike 
puge 113 ~ ont from the reconl 1111y refercncl' to may peti-
tions having been pre~L·ntod to the Board. 
Mr. Ellis: 'l'o whieh nctio11 ot' the Court in refusing to 
niluait lhL• cviilellL'l' of the nl'liou taken by the Board of Super-
visors, 1·ounst•l for the defe11<l1111t excepts, fur the reaso11s assi~1ll'tl, 11muely, tlaat it is ntlanissihlc us evitlc11<0e .!\'oing to 
sl1ow !ht• l'Ullllllllllil,\• opinio11 of lhc l'Ollllllllllity i11 which this 
nl'! is 11llL•g1•1l to hn\'t• lnkt•n plat'<•. 
l woulil like to gt•l Mr. 'l'n~•lor's tcsli111ony i11to the record, Your llonor. 
~Ir. Si1npki11-;: Now, liar~ Co111n101l\\'cnlth th•sires lo object 
lo t lais on naaothl'r .~1·01rn1l, thnt Ila• reL"onl of the Bonni of ~ll(rervi~ors, I l111\'i11)~ "''<'IL it 1111\I the 11tlacr si<l<' havin!! sec11 
it, do1•s not show 1111v 111·tio11 nt all liv Ila<' lloanl. It lllllrelv 
slaows a 111otio11 :rn,J ilae t'nilnrc of n s0ec11111l, wlaiela co11l1l sl1ow 
110 action or t':iilnre lo nd on anything prop1•rly hl'fore ti,~ 
lloanl 111' Rn11l'rvi~o1"'· 
'!'Ill' l'unrt
0
: All a·iglat, put it in. 
Pa!\'l' 11-1 f C. W. 'l'A YI.on, 
a wit111•ss inlrotllll'e1] 1111 lwhnlf of !lac 1lcfo1al1111t, 
11t•iu!\' fia·st 1l11h· sworn, lcstifictl fur the n•curd i11 lhl' ah.-wnel' 
11!' Ilic .inn· ;as' follow.,·: 
DIHECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv :\fr. Elli~: 
·o. ~Ir. 'l'aylor, you :are now 111111 wL•rc the Ck•a·k 111' tlac Bonr1l 
of ~lllll'l'Visors of Il1111ovcr C'11u11t.v 011 .lnly hi, J~ql '! 
.A. YPs, sir. 
Q. ])j,] ~·ou nttcnd lhl' mr.ctin)!~ of the gourd of S11pcr-\'i~u1·s l11•l1l 011 ,July ls!, 1941 ! 
........ 
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C. W. Taylor. 
A. Yes, sir. Q. Please state whether or uot the question of the 11<lup-
tion of 11n or<linance prohibitiu~ thl! ~nlc of beer in Hnnov"r 
Countv came before the Hoanl f<ir its consideration nt l11:1t 
time.· 
A. It ditl. Q. Plcu~c stnte whctlicr or 1101 tlwrc were tlclc~utious ht•-
fore the Board in bchnlf of 11m\ in opposition tu thnt 11rtli-
1111ncc f 
A. 'rhcrc were. Q. Please stntc what nctiou, if auy, wns tnken by thll Board 
of Supervisors nfter the !tcari11!!' t111 thnt n111tle1· on that 
dnv. 
· A. A rr.~oluti1111 w:i' ulfon'il by Mr. Tlw111pst11t pa~c 115 } 11rohihiti11~ tilt' siilt· 111' lil't'l' um\ wine in Ilnnov<'I' 
County 011 Sumln~·, wliil'h received 110 seco11tl a111i 
wns lost. Q. I will ask you if yon will lilt• a <"crti!icd copy of ti"' 
miuntes to which yon refer in liil' n"<'11nl. 
A. Y!}s. 
Mr. Sil\lpkins: I umlerst1111tl tliat tl1e Court h:is ruktl uul 
nil thnt cvi<lencc. 
The Co mt: Yes. 
Note: }fore followed nn~11111t•11l. 
The Court: Pro<lnee that n•1·11rtl n11,\ put it 
not for the jury. 
Note: Ifore follow1·d t't-<·,.,s 1'11r 11111,·!1. 
in the n•c11nl. 
1--, 
ll:O 
--I 
l\!r. Ellis:· If Your JT011or l'l<·:i"" l oli.i<'cl to lli<' t'l'"'s :::C::, 
cxmninnlion of the wil11<'~s :11111 i•xt·t•pt to the m·tion of tl11· >< 
Conl't i11 pennitti11~ hi111 to ln· •.·r11"s t•x:1111inetl for th<' J't•:J'"li l.&.J 
that I suhmit that wl1t•ll !ht• ('1111rl has olll'C rnletl th:1l 1111· 
evitlence tlint the wil1a•ss "·11111.t tl'sti1\· l<l in l'l1ief i:< i11:1tl-
missihle i11 the 1•asl', thl'n ii \\'11111<1 '"' ;,;qiroper lo pt'r111it tii111 
to lie cross exnn1illl'<l :1ho11t a 1n:1t 1<'1· whi<'li the Court ltas 
nln•n<lv ruled out of the 1·11~'" !ITr. ·SiJ11pkin~: It' Your H111111r 11h•n-<<', ('OUllsl'I for th•• ( '<1111-
monwenlth 1]e;;ireR to sllott• tloal lll' thin);>! thut 1111 of (\It' 
C\'i<lem•e of whnt hap]><'ll<'<l loc•ftol't• !lot• Bo11nl of Supervisors 
is inelr.vant nn<l iiumnkri:d n11tl is 110\ 1woper evi,\ene<' 1111-
..._ 
....... 
CCI 
·.:C '-' 
~ 
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C. :lV. Taylor. 
<lcr the stutute which w11 J111vc discussed; but for 
,iage 116 ~ the purpose of the rerord, if the evidence is ul-
lowe<l iu as to what 11ction the Bonrcl of Supe1·-
viRors took, in order thnt the mutter to b<.> tnken up muy be 
11 true picture of tl~ntirc aetion by the Bonni of Super-
visors, we think yo1l0ilg'ht to let ns huve the custuuwry crotis 
exnminntion of Mr. 'l'uylor. 
'!'he Court: I am going to permit you to <lo it for tlw 
rcnson thnt, while the e\'iclence is in my opinion innilmissible, 
I do not think that any pnrt of it ought to Le permitte1l tu 
~o up unless the whole of it goes up, 11nd for that re11sou I 
will let yon cro~s examine him nm\ dev.,lop the whole trnn.-;-
11ction. 
Note: Ilere followed nrgnnwnt. 
CHOSS EXAMINATION. 
lh• !llr. 8i11111ki11s: 
-Q. ~Ir. 'l':;vlor, u~ Ck'rk of the Board of Supervisors 011 
tl1<• on·nsi1111 nliuut whirh yon have .inst hec11 e~n111i111 .. l, 11t 
wl1icli ti111e a motio11 was nuule reg·11nli111: tll!~ ln•t•r lmll, was it 
~·our d111_,. lo l'l'l'l'ive petitions fro111 t•itize11s of tl1e Co1111ty 
\\'ilh ref\q·e11e!! to thL' lol'<'I' h:iu, 1111d did ~'<lit oliserve the t!is-
•·11ssio11 lh11t took pllll'L' 111111 lhl' t!ell'~'.atiu11 wl1il'l1 appL'lll'l'tl 
h,•fon• tl1<0 1J1 for :111,l 11!!'11i11st 111<' ba1111i11g of l>t·••o· t111 :-11111.!11.1·1 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Do you 1111\'e th1• petitions that •·11111e to I 11,. 
p11ge 117} Boan! nskiu~ thnt hecr Oil finmlay he lm1111ell I 
A. I hnve. 
Q. Ahont how umny of thosL' lll'litions <lo ~·on havet 
A. I lml'l' :di tl111t ll'L'l'c Iii<•<!. You w1111t to k11ow tl1e nu111-
l1cr·-.th11t we1·c file<! I 
Q; Approxi11111kly, yl's, ~ir, tlw n11111IJl•r. 
Bv the Court: 
. Q. JI tlW 111:1 ny Wl'l'C filL•llf 
.\. 1 haVl' th<•m here. I think then• wure 11l1v11t 1 .. 11. Ni1ll' 
01' t!'11. 
Q. Nine or teu 1 A I'<' !hos" petition" 11!1 in t'nvor of t lio· 
!urn, nr'.w<•re some of lhl'lll nskin!!; lh:1t the lin11 "Ii S1111tl.1~ 
1 ... ,.,. not be pin red t 
A. 'l'iil'l'e werl' 1w written pl•titioJJR rc<111csti11g- th:it it J,., 
not bn11ne<l. 
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C . .JI'. 'J'aylor. 
Q. All the petitions, then, ""'l"l' iu fu\'Ul' of the Sunday hL'L'r 
ban T 
A. Yes, sir. 
llv }.[!'.Simpkins: "Q. Do yon kno\\' nhuut how 1111111~· 1)(!<lrlo appenre1l lu•lun· 
the Bonrd on the t.lutl' thnl ll1i' :ll'lio11, which you hn\'l' tt·,.;li-
lit>tl to in rc~ponsc tu :\Ir. Jo:lli,'s 11m•stio11~, to<•k pliw1•! 
A. I would ~'Y t\icl'c wcri· nl h-11~1 fifty, mid thL'l'l' 111i;:hl, 
huve hceu as m1111y ns /j )l•'"l'I•· pn·"1.'llt. Q. Did people ~peak on l111th' ,.;i1h•..: of the issllC', both for 1111· 
h:111 111111 a~nin't 1111· !1:111 ! 
page 118 ~ A. Yl''· Q. l'o11l1l you fr11111 ~-.,ur oh~L·rvation for111 :1 
conclusion ns lo how !111• 11pi11i1111 111" those prcsl•Ut \\':I'~ \\'a>' 
it nhoul c\'l'lllv 1li\'i1kd, ur 11l l11•r\\·i>'<' ! A. Amo11;.: ii""'" pn·sl'lll, I w1111l1l sa~· that it is )""'ii.I·· 
tl111t thl'n~ w1•re 111orl' opt""i11;.: t 111' ha11 thau w1•n' i11 r,".,,,. 
of it, !111!, as yon kno\\', till' writl1·11 p1·titi1111s were fil1•11. Thal 
wouhl 11\Tcl'l it, proh:1hly, :111yth"111•-!: of that !'01'1. Q. Yc·s. ?-lost of t!i1• l"'"l'!t· tl1:il ><pola• in fn\'ur of tlu· !0;111. 
I helic\'L', \\'L'l'L' 111i11istl'rs n·pl"l'""11ti11:~ 1·l111n·h ron)!"l'l')!°:tl inll': 
A. I think so, y1•s. 'l'lll'y 1·1•rt:1i11I_,. pr<'1lo111i11:1t1·11. 
ll. A111\ 111ost of the 1u·opl" tli:d "l'"kt• :1~:1i11sl 1111' ha11 \\., ... ,. 
}iCPllSCCS t 
Mr. Ilnw: An• yon 1•~:1111i11i11:~ till' wit11c,.;s, or-? 'l~he l'ourl: lie l'llll IL•:11l loi111 "" 1·ro~s l'x:1111i11ntion. 
Ml'. Si111pki11s: 111• is 11111 "" olin·1·t 1•x:1111i11:1tio11. 
'J'he Court: No, yon 11111 hi111 1111. 
Bv the Con rt: 
·q. "'ho WC'l'l' the• l"'"l'I'· tli:1I \"Pll h:l\'e st11IP1l! Yon ha\'1• 
stnlCL\ uhont the p1•oplL• tl1:il spul:1• in fa\'OI' of th1• t.:111. \\'1111 
WC'I'<' the Jll'OJlll' ,,·ho a\•l'"ar"d ,,,. •11111:1• n!!;ainsl th<• l11•1•r 1>:111 
011S11111lny,11ot hy n:11111', lout. li.1 1·la"ilil·:1ti11n! 
A. [ wonltl ~a\' th•• g;n•alo·r 1111111l11•r of tli1•111 Wl'l'l' l"·1•r 1k:d 
l'l'S.' ;\. H. ( '. lin•11~1·1·"· 
paµl' l lfl} Q. Do y<•ll !;111111· l1u\\' n1:111~- 11a11ws WL'r~ ~i·-!lll"d 
to t lio~l' pl'l it iu11:-: ~ 
A. No, ~ir. Q. (';m ;.·on :1pproxh11n\<' 1111· 11n111l11•r ! 
A. Ahout one 11to11s11111l. 
....... 
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:llfr. Haw: Out of tweuty-fivt> thousand. 
The Court: All right. Now, I um going to strike it all 
out. I nm not goin!! lo pennit any of it to come in, and I 
will tell the jury to <li~regnnl your question. 
Note: Jury ~·ns to the courtroom. 
The Court: OC'ntlt>lllen of the jnry, when Mr. Tnylor wns 
under cross examination Mr. Simpki11~, the Commonwealth's 
.Attorney, n<>kecl 11i111 sonwt\Jing nhout certain petitions l111v-
i11;; heen tiled with the Bonl'<l of Supervisors. Y 011 will dis-
rc~unl thnl evicl1•1ire, 1111<\ you will tlisre~nr<l nil the remnrks 
made uhont the Boanl of Snperviso!'s. 'l'lieir uction or fuilnre 
to net 1111" nothing- to do with this case, nnd you will not rc-
g;nn\ nuythinK thnt has heeu sai<l about the Bonn\ of S11pur-
\'i~o1·:-; in tl1e innftl'r. ~Ir. ll11w: \\'c l'Xe!')ll tu the ('ourl 's rnling- nntl instruc-
tio1is to tl1l! jnr.'' i11 tl111t re~anl, for the reasons nlrendy 11s-
si!!111•d in unr ohjcdions ns licrctoforc l'l'{'oril<•<l. 
'l'h" ('on rt: ll11 ~·011 w:111t to C'X<'l'pt to my strikin~ out your 
l'ro!"-.; l'Xa111i11ntiou t ~l r. Si111pki11s: No, sir, I don't wnnt to except. 
pnJ.<L' l~IJ f 'J'ht• ( '1111rt: All ri~ht. I will let everybud~· 
lOXL't•pf j[' fht•y \\'llllt lo. 
N'ote: !II r. (', \\". 'l'n~·lor st om\ 11si1le. 
Sll?llTER. PHIDDY. 
II \l'iln1•ss i11lro1)lll'l'd Oil lll•lmlf llf fh<• l\l'fen1}:11lt, lil'illg" first 
tl11ly sworn, f!'~fifiL•<l as follow~: 
DIHF.CT F!XAUTNATim~. 
Ill· Mr. Ellis: 
·Q. Yon :in' !llr. Sn1111l•r Pritl1l_v, nn<l ~·on nrc 11ow 1111d wer<• 
in tll!' 111111ith ol' St•plc•1111itH' last 8h1•riff of !1111111\'<'I' Cu1111tv! 
A. Yt•:-:., si1·. . 
I!. Diil ,·011 hn\'e Ol'<'nsion lo 11<• i11 Mr. Frn1wio:eo 's stun> or 
Jilli11g- station on R11111l11~·. 8cpfl'111lil'I' 7th, l!l41 t 
:\. I 1!011 't l'l'lll<'lllhL'I' the t'.~11(·( 1lnll', hnt T wns there 011 
qnif P n nmt1hC'r of' 811mln~·s. 
</. Do yon l'l'l'all sl'l'ill)!" "Mr. Cnuthorm• or M1·. Williums 
1•0111<• in nntl 1111r1·l1:1se 11 hotlle of hl'l'l' on 1111\' Sn11dny that 
Yllll \\'l'l'l' !11C'rc T . . 
. A. Yes, sir. 
"9o· Supreme Court of Appenls of Virginia 
Sumter Pritltl!/· 
Q. How long were yon then.• on thc Sunday that they mnil<· 
the purchase of beer1 A. I hnd been there twice tlwt :ifh'rnoon. In fnct, I di<ln'I 
stop, I slowed up and went h~·. 1n•11t llll the rond uml ca111<' 
back nnd I stnvetl tl11•n• ahont nn hour. 
pagu 121 } Q. In whnt in:u1111•r wns thc 11lnce of lm~im•ss 
being condnckd with r"~l'L'd to orderliness 01· 
behnviorf A. It wnR quiet. I dicln 't S<''' a11ytl1ini: wronv;. 
Q. Did he mnke 1111v s:1ll's of h<'t'I" or wine to olh!!rK whih· 
von were there! · 
· A. I bon.l'.ht two Cocn-('olns frn111 him nml 11 box of i•·" 
crenm. Q. On other ocrnsions when you w<•re there on Sumlay~; 
hn<l yon sern him ninkc nnv ~al<'" 11f wine or hccrf 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXA)IJNA'l'JON. 
Bv Mr. Simpkins: 
· Q. How di1l yon hnppell tu lot• ,-i~iti11~ l\[r. F1·n11riS<'o 1111 
two ocC'nsious on thnt Sumln~·? A. l went hy, WL'llt in l.01tisa t '11u11t~", ju~! m·l'I" flit• !iJI<', I•• 
sec n party, nnd when I ea111<' 11:11·1; I stopped liy ?tlr. F'n111 
. ' CISCO R. Q. You ~tuppe<l on the w11_,. lip~ 
I--
cc 
.::x= 
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UJ 
A. I didn't st on on the wa~· up. Q. Yon ~nid yoi1 visite1l hi111 1111 two 11t•c-11sio11s ! I--
A. I snicl I ~1owe1l up wlll'11 I ""·Ill hn T 1li1l11 't slop. _ 
Q. Yon didn't "'"P· hnt ~-nu ,1111'!"''1 wh<•n yon cnm<' 11:1..I; ! a:i 
A. T stoppNl wh<•ll I 1•:i111<' l1:u·I;. _ 
Q. Yon just stopped in t lu•n• as you woultl ;;lop i11 :111~· ::c 
other placl'1 . >< 
A. Y<'~. Sil'. u.J 
pn!!;e 122} Q. Di1l11't stop f111· a11y purpose olhl•r tli:111 111 
huv th<• (~orn-C'ol:t ! 
A. "'ell, T ,;•ns rhlill!.! aro1111d; 1lri\"it1~ thro11v;h th1• C1111uty. 
I stop nrn· ti111e nt 1111~· pl:H'L' tu ,.,.,. iJ' 1•\'l'l",vlhing is qui<'I, a11tl 
no clrn111:s ri11in!!' 11rou1ul. Q. •r11en you 1li<l slop m11h•r ~·1111r duth•s n~ Sheriff tu~····· if 
cvt)1·ytltin.~ wn~ orderly! A. \Vell, I do 111o~t ('\·1·r~·wl11·n· I !!" nlong, in litw or 1luly. 
O. H1ul ~·ou hail :u1y n•pwsl 1,,. anyone to stop there! 
A. No, sir. 
ul 
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Q. Or to observe that pince for 01·dediness or disorder 
liness on Sundnys T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had none at nil from anyoneT 
A. No, sir • 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Simpkins: Thnt is aJI, if Your Honor plense: 
Note: At this point the Conrt took up considernHon of 
~~ ? -·---------
!JU6'1! 123 ~ Note: Here followed extended argument 011 i11-
~trnctions. · 
Mr. Ellis:~el for !ht•Cleft•11t!1111t exc<•pts to the lll'-
tiu11 of the Court in refnsiui.:- to g-ivl' lu~truclions Nus. :!, :~. 
4, ;,, (i, 7 anti 8 olfored h~· hi111, for the reuson th11t 1111• ques-
tio11 or Wlll'till'r 01' not Ilic snll! of b,•t•r Oil Sundav 1J11<le1· till! 
pa rt icnla r l'i rc·n111-<tn ll<'l'S me11 t ioned in this t'nsd is 11 qne.;-
t ion of fact fur tlw jnry, nllll thnt the giving of the i11strne-
ti1111~ is antliori;wd 11111ler tltl' tleci~ious o( tlte ('ourt, th" 811-
pn•111e Court of A pp1•nls, in tl1c c•.nsc>s of Pirkt'.•I 1·. Co1111111w-
ll't'<1illt mul /.11/;1-.,id,, /1111 v. r.0111111011wrnltl1, hoth rl'porll'cl in 
J:!4 Virl!:inin. 
N'ow,'Jwn• nrl' 11 111ul 11 (n) we nre :.roin1~ to n~k !'or. 
\'1111 i·efn,c lh<·111, do you, ,JtHl~eT 
'1'11,• C'onrt: Y<"s. xir. 
~!1·. ll11w: ('0111isc>I for th1• def<•1ul1111t <'X<'<•pts lo tlu• .,, .. 
tiu11 of tl11• Court i11 l'l'fusin•r Tnstrn<'lious 11 :111<] 11 (:t) :t' 
off,•t'<'<l ou lrl'half of tl1e d1•f<'llll:111t for the n•n.,1111 tl111t it ;,, 
Jll'llJll'I' that tl1t• jurv lie JH'nnitl<•d to p:tss 11pu11 tl1e qll<'S· 
tiu11 ns lo ll'hl'lher or 1111! the s11l1• of hc>1•r 011 Su11t!11v !iv tl11• 
1k•J'p11d1111t, 1111<1l'r the• 1·i1'1•1J111st11m•es 11111! c·o11ditio11s 1;s sl1ow" 
I"· t 1,,. "'•i1h•11<'l', i11 the; C'ountv of Jl:111ovrr w11s lawful dtt<· 
lo tl1t• f11<"1 that the J\C't of Asspmhlv of fo:1~ 1111t!1•r ,:·hil'I• 
the 1\IC'oholic· l\rv1•J':J!(<' Contrnl Bonni w:is et'l•:ttl'd pc•rniitt .. d 
tl1l' isstJJlllt•l' to rl'lnill'rs of the ~t:ilt• or Virc:-iui:t 
pnge 124 ~of lirensl's for !hr sail• of lll'f!I' lllll] \\'i1w witl1011tf 
nn~· n•.stri<·!iou wl~tlso1•vpr Its to tit<' s:ill' of 11, .. 
wr~J)\iJll!P OU Sn.JJ.!.!ny. 
Note :•1•11c jiiry 1't'tur1H'i1 to the Courtrno111. 
92 s~i)~eme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
Tile Court: Gentlemen of the jury, tile accu9ed in thi~ 
case is presumed to be innoce11t nutil hi9 ~uilt is establishc1l 
by one reasonable lloulJt, 111111 tl1l' Lnnlen of proof rests upon 
the Commonwenlth to prov<• that thi~ gentlemnn sol<l l1l•cr 
on Sumluy; Now, if you hl•lil•\'l' from the evidence IJC~·11111l 
rensonn\Jle doubt thnt he did s<•ll IK'cr 011 Sunday, then I ~in· 
you this instruction: 
Note: At this point till' ( 11111rt rend to the jury Iu~tnH·· 
tion No. 1. 
Note: Following n diS<'nssiuu with couni;cl, the ('onrt a.t-
Jresscd the jury us follows: 
I The Comt: Thnt is whnt 111<• inslrnction tells you )!'l'ltth•-
inen, that the on!~· question i11n1h·,•.J is, do you bclie\'t• fr11111 
/the evidence bevornl n l'""""11:1h!,. 1lo11\1t that ~Ir. l~r:11wi,.;,·11 
!sold lll'cr on Sui1tla,·T Now, ir , ... 11 l"•\i,•\'C from th<' ""id .. 11<·1• 
1cvo11d u n•usoH:tlil~' 1l1111l1t tli;1t.!11• sold l1<?l'I' 011 S1111<l:iv, 1lw11 
, ,;u musl ti1<1l !1i111 •J;uilt\', :111<! Ii\'<' 1l11ilar' will hc :i suni"i .. 111 
j;, • to he li:>ml. . . ~ • lJaW: ()f ('Ollr'l' it is lllllh•rstlllll] thnt the wJ"ifl<'ll ill· 
No. 1. as W<•ll ns I ill' n·rlml instruction giw11 lo 
e jury Ii~· tlu• ('1111rt ·an• oh.i<'< 0kil to hv 1·111111."j, 
for ~t\•111l1111t :111-I 1·xu•ptr1l to. 'l'h1• :11·IV<'t• 
of tl1e ('ciiii'M~~1·,,,. 
the rea1<011>< ·h!'rcloforl' 'tal1·1l. -
The Conl'I: Ye~. 
,__ 
-
co 
-::c:: 
x 
LLJ 
,__ 
co 
Mr. llnw: ""t• nlso l'X<'<•11t, Y<onr Ilnnor, to tlll' n•111ark~ 
of the Co111mo11\\0 \':Jlth'' ,\ff,.1·1w,· wlii<'h W<'n• not .1111111•• a• 
lll"!('lllllellt, hnt i11 i11strm·ti11~ tl11• I '1111d wha~ the (1nnrt sh .. 1dil 
1!01 uml which Wl.'rl' prl'.i111li1·ial t11 lhl• 1lcfe1111:111t 's l'll"•'. i11 that it 11111011111l•1l to 1111 l'xlrn ill"lr111·li1111 !!i1•1•11 hv thl' ('111111111111· 
w!'nlth's Attornev. · :I:: )!'i\'l'll loy t 111· >< 
Cllf-'l', ltl't•;i t1:-o" LlJ 
'l'\11, Con rt: \\'ell, wlll'll till' i11st rndi111i i" 
0ourt, it !'oi1l1l uot pn•.i11ili1·1· tl11• 1li•fl'111ln11t'~ 
the Court has instrndl•<l 1111• j11r.'". 
NotC': At this poi11t t111· j111v n·lin• to co11~idcr of llll'ir 
verdict. 
{ Note: ·'I"11c i-e11111rk>< of lh1• ('111111111111wc11lth's Attor11<',. 1·1'-
ferrC'cl to nhovC' hy l\lr. Hnw \\'l"l'l' ns follows: 
Mr. Si111pki11s: Cun von h·ll ll1l'lll that the 111nxinm111 iilll' 
for mistlC'mcanor is $'100.00 ! 
L) 
I 
I 
~ 
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The Court: Yes, thii'Inaxi~um fine for misdemeanoi: is 
$500.00, but $5.00 will lie a sufficient fine to fix in tllis case': 
l\Ir. Simpkins: Do you want to say anything 
page 126 } to the jury r 
· Mr. Haw: '\Ve don't cure to argue it, gentle-
men. 
l\Ir. Simpkins: I would like to make a statement to the 
jury. --
1\Ir. Haw: I don't think it is necessary to have any argu-
ment in the case. 
Mr. Simpkin~: There is onl' thinb'"-
Mr. Huw: If you want to m11kc a statement, we will urgue 
it. 
.Mr. Simpkins: Well, I will use five minutcs-
'l'hc Court: I cannot prcv!'11t you gcntle111cn from arguing 
the ense if you wnnt to,_\Jut I do nut ~C'c the nccessity of urgu-
111l'nt. I hnve iustrnctc1l the jury thnt, if they believe from 
!Ill' l'Vidc11ce 1Je\'Oll1l a re11sorn1blc tlo11ht thut .\Ir. l•'rnncisco 
sul1l IJcer on ~11;1tlay 1 that tl1l·y must li111l hi111 g-uilty. 
~Ir. :Si111pki11s: 111 other words-Wait n mi1111te, nuw-
Mr. llaw: You t•nu't tell me whc11 to sit dow11 aml stall!! 
lip. 
~Ir. Ri111pkins: All 1 wnnt, if Your Honor plcnse-
~I r. llnw: Arc ~·ou going" to mldrrss your l'l'J11arks to the 
Court or the .iuryT 
.\Ir. :Si111pki11s: I will ml1lrcss lhl'rn lo the Court, nntl if 
!ht• Cv11rt dol•s as I nsk, I want lo 11u1kc a state111ent lo the 
jury. If Your I!onor plt•nse, I 111erely w1111t to 
pngl' l:!i } tli"·nss the i11str11l'tio11 1 so if you will stnte to 
the jur~· thnt it lt·nVl's out of th'" cnse the qucs-
tiou which !ht·~· hnvr hl•nnl us t11lld11g- nhuut lien• all day, 
wlirthl'r it was a nceessity or not, nm! t!1al tlie Court has 
rnlt•1l it is 1111! a n~t'l'ssily, 11ml if lhC'y hdie\'t' he sold it, tl1L'll 
ht· is guilty. 
Note: Aftc1· stnying- out five 111i11utcs the jury knocb. 
'l'he Clerk: llnVl' you ugreetl upon 11 venlict, )!'Clltlcmen T 
'l'l1e l•'urc1111111: Yes, sir. 
'J'l1c l 'lcrk: "'\Ve, the jury, find tht• at•t•use1l g·uilty us 
t•h11rge1l in Ilic within imlict111l'llt nml fix his p1111isl1111cnt at 11 
li11c of $:i.00. Ri)!'ncd, .Ja111l's .Jo11l's, Jr., l•'ort•111:111." ls tl111t 
~·011~ Yl'rdic·t, g-l•11tll'men ! 
'I'll(~ Porcnu\11: Yes, si1·. 
'l'hc Court: Now, 11;cntlc11w111 yon urc discharged until 
Wl•dnC's<la~·, Octoli!'r '.!9th. 
9( Suprentf! Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Note: Jury leaves the <.'011rtroo111. 
Mr. Ellis: If Your Honor pl<'ns<', on IJelmlf of the 1lc-
fendant we move to set nsill<' tlll' n•nlicl of the jury 11~ hei11;... 
contrary to the law and the ,.,.;,J,·11C'1', und for 111is1lirl'l'liu11 
of the jury hy I ht' ('umt. 
pagt! 128 ~ The Court: All rit!l•I, ~ir, 11nd we wi11 t·trn!i11m· 
tlmt 111otion 111111 I will l1<•:1r vou on it. 
Mr. Ellis: Yon wnnt to ht•nr 11r~11111t•1;t on it1 
'l'he Court: Yes, sir. 
Note\ 'l'hc followhi!.:' instrm·ti1111~ were otforl'1l: Nn. l 1111 
hcl111lf of the Connno1111•c:1lth, :111.1 :\rn<. :!, ;;, 4, :-,, G, 7, I{, 11 
nm\ 11-A on lll'hnlf of thL• :ll'l'llS<·•l. 111structio11 No. I wa• 
~.rnntetl, nil the others rcfu~c·cl. 
J~S'I'Hll("l'll 1;\ :\0. J. 
'l'hl' ('ourt inslrncts the jnry tli:it if the~· Idil'l'C !'1·0111 111•· 
evi<lt•llct' hc\·01111 a rt'nso11alilc• clc11il1t ll1:1t tl1e a1·cllst•1l ~I. 1:. Frnnci~co .ii1l kl'l'fl ope11 :11111 111:1i11tai11 on Sn1uhy 111" Ith 
of Scp!C'111lit•1· i11 JlnnoVL'I" I '11u11I ,. a l111oi1wss for \11<• sal" .. r 
hc1•r 1111tl 1li11 011 Rai,] Snlllla~· s1·l·I l11·l'r, they slionld fin.I l1i111 ~nilly :111tl !ix his pu11ish1111•11I al a lint' of uot h·~~ tli:111 Ji\'1· 
dollnrH. 
(Given.) 
IN8'1'Hlll''l'lll;\' ;\ll. :!. 
,__ 
co 
::?:: 
>< 
Lu 
The Court instnwts tl1t• j11r." tlwl tl1e 1n11·post• of th1• 1:111· t-
c....; 
in prol1il1ili11i: \\'orJ; l'ro111 lll'itw ,111110 on Sn11da,· 
page l::!fl ~ is to givt• lo tl1t• p11l1li .. :1 ""'t fro111 its !'Usto111al'\ CC 
lnhnt• fo1· tlie l11•1wlil uf 11111 lt the lllornl 11111! pli."si- - w 
en! nnture of 111:111ki111l, 1111tl 11111 fur 1111• pnrpose of t•11ful'l'i11;.!' ::C: 
the h<•lit•t's or lt•11ds of :111•: ro·li·"·iu11~ l'l'<'t'<I ol' 1lc110111'111ali1111. >< 
(Refused.) u..i 
1N'S1'RFl"l'lt 1~: ;\O. ;1, 
Th<' ("uurt iusfnwls till' j11r.<· tlmt tl1t• hnnlcn of prrn•I' i · 
on th<' C01111111111wcr.lth tu l'sl:il1li.•h l11•\'0t1tl 11 rcnso1111hh· tln11l1I 
thnt the 1lt'fe111l:111t i11 llll' 0111·r:t1iu11 ·,.r his 1111si1wss sol1l "" 
81111!111'' llt'er r.>< :illt•g"i\ tu Ii:\\'" J.,.1•11 sol1l in the i11tlil'11111·11t. 
nml tlint thC' lahor n.rnl lrnsi11t':'~ in "' 1lni11g ll"l'l'l' not a worl: 
of ll<'l'l'Rsitv or «hnrit~·. :11111 11111,.,~ th<> C111mnom1·<'111tlt ha' 
llll'f t Iii,, ]111 nll'll, t Jip~· <11011 Id lim 1 1 ltl' tlefcntln 11t 11nt ~n i It y. 
(Refused.) 
M. G. Francisco v. COmmonwealth 
-- ·-
9'.5 
INSTRUCTJQN NO. 4. 
TJie Court iush-ucts the jury that if they find from the 
evidence tb11t the keeping open by the <lefcndnnt of his pince 
of business on Sum.Inv nud the ~nle t!tcreiu of the beer u~ 
nllcg-ed in the indictuient teml<'d to promote t!Je rensonablc 
rccrention, nml necessnry convenience of tlw travclli11g pub-
lic, nnd that thC?·-premises where ~aid bnsiucss wns trans-
ncted were kept in nu or<lerly nnd quiet mnn-
pnge 130 ~ ner nnd that the work therein done wns mornlly 
fit nnd proper lo bc done 011 Su11tlny, then lhL•y 
mny find thnt the work of eon1lucting such fillin.!{ stntiou for 
the 11urposes ontlinecl, is ueccssnry within the 11ll'n1ti11~ or 
the ~tntnte nml they shonltl !ind the 1lefcn1lnnt not guilty. 
( Refusc1l.) 
INS'rRUCTION NO. 5. 
'l'hc l'onl'l i11strucl1> the jurv that a work of Jll'l'<'Ssil\· as 
llll':tllt ""the ~t:itnll' or Vir:.:iuia, is not n pl1ysil':tl l11H1 nl""" 
Int" 11t•1"essit~-, liul n moral lit111•ss or proprietv of tl1<• \l'urk 
or lnl101· or net donLl nmler !lit• circu111st:u1ees of enl'i1 pa1'-
tie11lnr l'HS<'. 
( llt'1'11~ed.) 
IN~'J'JlUC'J'ION NO. Ii. 
'!'I"'. Court instrnl'ls th1• .inr~· that tl1t• q11,•slio11 uf wl1ell1t•r 
the net of kt·1•pi111~ lh<• <lefc111l:111t 's plllt'<' of 1111.,im'.'·' 01w11 
m11l sl'llin!.:' hc1•r 011 8111111nv wns a work of lll'l't•ssity wi11ti11 
tl1e lll_L'llllillg of till' Stntnlt', is II qtll'stion of fal'I. for I lie 
jnr~-, :11ul in 1lL•l'itli11g 11111! <Jlll'slion lht• ,illl'y 111ay t•t111sith·1· 
_ ll11• 111a1111er i11 whi .. li the Jll'l'lllist•s lll1tl 1ht• l111si11Pss l'lllllll'l'lt•tl 
ll1t•1· .. with wen• nlll, tl1t• 1•ff1•<·I wliielt 111!' opl'11i11g of ll1t• pla1·" 
:1111! !l1t• s:tll' of liPCr tlicrcfn>111 l111s 011 Jl11• :..:""d ord1•r :111.t 
moral Wt'lfnn• of flit' e01111111111ily, and wl1t·ll1er or 
pagti i:n ~ 110!. it ll'rnls to the onh•rly a11tl 11111rnl n•t'1'l·:1\io11 
of the p11hli1·. 
( Rt•f\1sml.) 
lNSTHUCTION NO. 7. 
Tlw <'omt iu~trm•ts lltt• jnry thnt if tht•1• ti111l frn111 till' 
1•1·i1!1•nrl' that the ope11i11~ of the 1ll'ft•1ul1111t 's pl:u·1! of li11si-
llt'ss awl the s:ilt• lht•ref1·0111 ol' hccr 011 S1111t!11_1', is 11 prrlilie 
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necessity within the meanin~ of thl' Stntute, then the de· 
fondnut shoul<l be found not ~uilly. 
( I il' fusi:d.) 
INSTRUCTIO=' :'\11. 8. 
'l'hc Cout"t instl"ucts the jur~· that lhl0 rc is 110 fixed 01· uu-
vnryiug definition uf thl! word "lll"l"l'""ily", but on tl1e ulill'r 
hunt!, it i~ 1111 l•lnstic nllll relnth·l' wunl llllll uue thnt must 
l:e construl'tl in the lit.:ht of the 1·11111lili11n" umfor which \\'l' 
live ut thc prl'scut, nu~! nut in ll1L' li.t.:hl of the pnst, fur 11111n~· 
thi1ws that were l'Oll>'idcrctl lnxuri,•s lhl•u, ur eveu hntl 1111 
exi,.tcnce at 1111, ure uow con>'hll'l"l"li ll<"l"l'ssilics. 
(HefnSl'<l.) 
INSTR!JC'l'lll:\ :\II. I 1. 
Thc ('omt iustnwl- II"' jun· that b1• au ;wl 
·pn~~;c 1:~2 } of the Ut·11t.·1·al A~st·111l1I.'· ul' V.ir;.:-iuia 1;as:·wd nl 
the )!1:1-i Sl•s,.ion lh<·1· .. \\·ns <"l"l'llll'<I lllL' Alt·oholi:· 
Bevern~l' Control lloanl with l'""·"r lu issllL' to rdaill'rs in 
the Stnte uf Virt.:i11i:1 li<"l'll"l'" fu1· 11•1• sal•• of hl0l'I" niul wi111· 
11ml pnrsi1mt tl1cr•·l11 sai,\ !:oar.I l.:1"' p1·11<0 <'1°1h•<I In iss111• 111 
the ret11ile1·s in Virginia, i11<·li11li11!:- 1111• <ll0 l\•11<l:111t, >'lll'h li-
l'l'llJ<l'S without llll\" n·sl1·idi1111 tl11·n·i11 "" lu sal<•s 011 S1111tl:I\·; 
fnrlher th:it ti~· n fmtl1<0 1· ad ~·t' 11 ... <.'1·11:·r:d ,\.s-<t0111hly pass;·.! 
· i11 l!J::8 thc B1111nl of Sup<•1·1·1~.,,., .. r 1111· , .. 1·1°ral ( '01111li1·" in 
Vi1·i.:i11i11 \\"('!'(' l'llllJll\\'l'rl'.l lo l"I"' ur.li11all<0 <0s lo prohiliil lhl' 
1<nk· of wi11e nntl h<•t•r 011 Su111la~. wl1i1·li 11l"t pro1•i•h•1\ th:il 
nothi11t.: then•_in sh1111hl J.e t·ousl nw.J :1" alh•rinµ;, 111nl'mli11µ; 111· 
rl'1Jl'llii11!.!: ~e1·tio11 4:i7ll of 111<' ( 'udl" (•·1111111101111" k1111w11 ns 1111· 
8u11cln:v hlne law). · 
Fnrthl'r the l'onrt h•lls lh<.• jnr.v that it llJlJll'lll"s fr11111 lh.-
l'Vitll'11cc that sin<"l' !ht• passa;.t1• of lliP ;\\'t of rn:lS 11pplil':I· 
lion l111s hee11 111111ll' lu thl' H11:1rtl ut' S11111·1'1"isor~ of llan11l'l 0 r 
Countv to pass nu <1rtlin:tnl'l' prulail1iti11.~ tlie :-::nk! of Ju.•t•J' :11ul 
wi11C' in Ilnnovel' Cou11tv ou S1111d:"·· ln1t l'l1~:u·llle:-;s ol' il:--
fiower to <lo so till' Ho;1nl or S1qoc:r1·isors r~·fns<•<l lo !'""" 
sneh onli11:11irt• 11111\ 111111 lh<•r1• ;, i11 1•\ish-11t'<' in !l:11111\·1·r 
l.'011nt~· 110 1Jl'lli11a11c·t• <•t' >'llicl 1:11:1r;1 \\·hi1·h prohibit,- 111<· ,al" 
-_of llC'Pr uul1 wi11e on RtuHlav~. 
(Hcfusc11.) . 
pnµ-e 1:m ~ INSTIHJCTIO:-\ ~11. 11-A. 
'\'he Court iustrncts tl1c jun· that n111h•r the lnwR or Vi1--
,l!inin ~iu,\!" the yea1· l!l38 tho floar,\ ul' Supervisors of Ilnn: 
,__ 
cc 
=z:: 
>c: 
LU 
,__ 
co 
, J 
::c:. . '-' 
>< 
L&.J 
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over County has bud the authority to adopt an ordinanc11 
(effective outside of the Town of Ashlnn<l) spl!eifically mnk-
in" it unlawful to sell beer nn<l wine in the Cou11ty, ulthoug·h th~ stntute conforring that power upon the Board of Super-
visors forther prnvi<lcs thut nothing therein contained, nor 
n11y or<linnnce ndopted by the Bourd of Supervisors in pUl·-
sunnce thereof, shall be constrtH!l\ ns in nny wny changing 
or reper.ling the lnw-gt>nernlly known as the "Sunday" law, 
under which this ZJl'OSectiut1 is hnd. 
(Refused.) 
page 134 ~ I, Leon M. Bazile, Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Hnnover County, Virg-inin, do certify that the 
forl'going, which is l'mbrnced within the covers of this volume, 
l'11titled, "Virgi11i111 in the Circuit Court of Hnnovcr County, 
(\111n11011Wl'Hlth ul' Virginia v. M. G. Prn11cisco, October 17, 
]~).})" i11cl11di11~ p11!!es !'ri)m 1 to JOS (huth inclnsi\•e) n!l(l 
wl1il"l1 j, !'mthl•r i<l.•11titie,l by tlw siµ-11nture u!' th" ,J11dµ:o 111' 
ll1is court 011 the !'r1111t t·uvcr lhcrl'11l"1 is n t1·ne 1111<1 eorred 
''•'llo.!!Tnphie eupy 1111<1 n•port of 1111 th1! lcsti111011~· 1111d e1·i-
d,•n•·•· 1111 \,.•hair of the ('0111111011wL'11lth, 11ntl ubo 011 lll"l1alf .,f 
111" tlt·fo111l:111t as tl1t•n•i11 1le11ot1~tl, lh11t wns inlruduccd, nnd 
111,. otl1l'I' i111'ilh•11ts of till' trinl, i11l'111tlin!{ all or the i11strnc-
tio11s requ1.• .... h•tl, :.:-ivt•u, Hlhl l"l1 fnsL'd and uhjcctio11s anll ex· 
•·••plio11s lhl•n•lo, as lht•r•·iu i11tlirntl'll, ns well a' all questions 
1·ai~l'1I, nili11t.:s tl11•n•u11 111111 l'Xl'l'plions thl'retu in the trial of 
ti,.. 11l1111'l0-stl'h\ <'ll~t', 1111<1 that the Atlornev for lhe Com-
111011\\'t•alth l;as 111111 rea.<1111nhl1• llolil"e or tl1e 0 li111l' and plncl' 
wl11•n ll1i~ l'<'pod 111111 l·el'lifieatc wo11l1l '"' tenth·1·e1l :i11d pre-
M·1il••<l to 111,• l"o1· 111~· "i.-::11at111·••, 1111 ot' whie\1 is t•1•l'lilie1l wil11r11 
si.\l.1° 1hys 11!"1<-r li11al jn<l~lll<'nt. 
l:i1·,·11 1111'11·1· 111.'· l11111cl 011 tl1is !ith <lu~· of 11!11~-, 191:!. 
LF.ON M. BM'.ILE, 
.Jiul!!;t~ of lht• Cire11il Court of the 
l~ounty or ll:111ovcr, Virg-i11ia. 
pa.!.\l' i:::i } ~Ir. K J>. :'limpkins 
Allon1l'I" for llll' Co111111011w1•alth for Il111rnvcr ('mint~", Vir!.\'i11ia. 
Dc•nr Mi-. ~i111pld11s: 
'l'l1is js lo 11o!it\ ~·ou that Wl' will. 011 lhl• !ilh 1l11_v of ~lay HI~:!, nppl~· to the ( 'll0 1·k of llil• Cin·nit Con rt 111' ll:11111ve1· 
( 'on11ty ·ror n fran'<'ript of thc recor1I in the <'II'" or Co111111011-
\\'l':1lth I". ?II. u. l•'rn11~i"co for !lie Plll"JHlSl'S ur lllllki11y, :111 lllJ· 
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plication to the Supreme Court of "\ Jlpl'nls of Virginia for a ,__ 
writ of error. 
co 
Yours very trnly, 
:x:: 
GEO. K IL\ W. >< 
ANDBI~\\" .!. ELI.lS. LU 
Atty><. for ~!. G. Frunciseo. 
Lcl{nl nml timclY sl't·viec of tlll' nhovc notice is here]"· :H'-
ccpted IJll this Gth. llny of ~!ny, J!t~:!. · 
EDW:\IH> P. SDIPKINS, .JH .• 
Attorm'\' l'nr tl11• ('ommonwcnlth of 
llni10\·1·r !'un11ty, Virµ;inin. 
pu~e 13G f ~tnll' of Vir!(inia, 
County of lla1111\'Pr, 'l'o·wit: 
I, C. W. Tnylor, Clerk of Ill\' I 'in·nil Court for the ('011111~· 
of Hanover llo lrnrl'hv cl•rtif\' tl1:1t tll<' f11re.,.oi11"' is n ll"lll' 
copy Of !he l'l'COfd it; the :ll;llllll of 'l'hl' C(~llllt~IJWL'ltlth 11f Vir~ini1~ t'. M. G. Francisco, :11111 1.t'urthcr 1·,•rtify thnt .1111' 
notice of intention to nppl~· fur sut·li I rausrript wns ~i\"l'li 
bv ('onnscl for the Dcfontl:rnl lo tl11• Altorm•v for the ('11111· 
nionwenlth. · 
Cive11 under my l1111ul this :!~1tl11l:1y .. r ~lny, /!Ill. 
I'. W. TAYT.OTI. 
Cl1•rl; 111' tl1<• C'in:nit. l'onl'! of 
l la1111\"l'I' County. t--
Cll'rk's Fee $10.00. cc 
A Copy-Tcsle: :::c: 
>< 
\I. Tl. WATT~. C. C'. Ll.J 
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TERM 1942-1943 
RECORll No. 2633 
M. G. FRANCISCO 
tis. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
TUE ~'ACTS 
This case presents to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
for decision whether or not che business of selling beer 
in the: Commonwealth is a "trade or calling" whose 
(2] 
,__ 
prosecution on Sunday is prohibited by section 4570 a:> 
of the Code of 1936. lt cumes before this court on an - o 
appeal from a judgment of the: Circuit Court of Han- ~ 
over County. M. G. Francisco was convicted by a LU 
jury on October 17, 1941, ;ind judgment was rendered 
un March 16, 1942. A line uf $5 was assessed. 
The: facts are correctly stated, and the law clearly 
and forcefully expressc:d in the: opinion of the learned 
trial judge included in the record, which is adopted in 
toto as a part of this brief by rderence, and is not 
reprinted here. 
TllR QUF.STIUN TO Jill DECIDED 
.The final decision in this l·ase will dctermilll' 1hc 
policy with respect 111 the sak uf beer on Sunday 
throughout the Comm11nwcalth until a different poliq' 
may be declared by the l;cnrral Assembly. The: courts 
construe and interpret the: law. Capital Th<atc'i· Co.\'. 
Co111111011w<alth, 178 Ky. 7~0. 78'). Section 4570 11f thi: 
Code prohibits the lah .. rin~ :1r any trade or i.:allin~ 
on Sumby, cxi.:c:p! works ,,r ncressity or charity, :111d 
certain spe..:ilic exq:pri1111s whid1 du nut include: th.: sak 
of beer. Chapter 12'J 11! :\i.:ts of Assembly of l'H2 by 
spe..:ial proviso in the 1ht 1loes nut alter the provisi11n 
of section +570. 
A Ill; 1; M t:N'l' 
Counsel for ddendanl (I'. •J) take the: pus1t11111 1ha1 
the decision in E//i1 \'. <:u1•i11!Jl<111, 122 Va. 821, and 
H11119er v. Comrno1m·.-,,/1/i, Ill? Va. 872, an: not h1 hc 
considered as law be..:ausc thc principle cstablistml in 
.-
o:J 
::c 
:;>< 
UJ 
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(3) 
them, prohibiting the sale of soft drinks on Sunday, is 
being violated. They introduced evidence in the in-
stant case that ~t l::ast 80 per cent of the holders of 
licenses for the sale of wine and beer in Hanover County 
were selling either wine or beer or both on Sunday. 
This kind of argument and procedure might be very 
well fur jury consumption, if permitted, but, of course, 
will have nu influence here. 
In Callan V. Stalt, 156 Md. 459, 144 A. 350, 353 
( 1929) the defendant was being prosecuted for opening 
:rn opera house on Sunday. The particular portion of 
the opinion with which we: are concerned is as follows: 
"Thc:re arc: sc:vc:ntec:n exceptions to the rulings 
uf the: cuurr upon the evidence:, and as to these 
:ippc:llants contend: 
"First, that the court erred in nut allowing 
them to show that the construction placed upon 
the law by those charged with its enforcement 
was such as to permit without mulc:statiun in 
Baltimore: city 011 Sunday morning pi<.:turc: shows 
in chur..:hes, operas in the Lyri..: Theater, and 
basket ball games in public pla..:c:s, for which 
either ;1dmission was directly charged or at which 
a collection was t:iken up. \Ve find nu error in 
these: rulings. The guilt ur innocence: of the 
cravc:rsers here: i.:ould not be made: ro depend upon 
the qursrion of whether urher parties had been 
guilty of similar acts without prnse<.:utiun or i:un-
viction, any more than the fact that persons rn· 
g'1gc:d in similar occup:uions had been rnnvicted 
would be: proper evidrn<.:e for the jury to consider 
L 4 J 
in order to convict the traversers here. Ncitl11:r 
can a criminal St'1tute be repealed by the failure 
of authorities Ill prosecute and convict for its 
violation. N ini:ry-nine grand juries might n:-
fuse to indict fur the: violation of a statute and the 
hundredth might t;1kc: the opposite: view and in-
dict. It would dcarly be nut admissible: in thr 
trial of the c:1sc 111 allow evidence: of the failure 
of the ninety-nine juric:s t•> indict." 
Cf. Taylor v. Co1111111,,",.,.,i/1h. 90 Va. IO<J. 
The: court's pruvinrl· is 111 intc:rprc:t the law, and 111 
sec to it that it is cnf11rn:d. \Vholesalc violation 11i a 
statute duc:s nut rc:ndcr it \'oid or nc:gativc its force .. -\n,1 
C:vidcnce of othc:r violatie1ns by the ;a:cused is impr11p,·.-
and should not be admi11ed against him, nor should cvi· 
dencc of violations by 11ther persons be admi11cd in hi~ 
behalf. 
··The mere i:1ct th;ll a license has been gr;1111<:.t 
tu do certain ac1s ur carry un a certain husines~ 
docs nut c:xempt 1111l· holding such license lr11111 
the necessity 11! <"•1111plyin~ with Sunday laws. 
where the :1c1s or business in quc:stiun arc of sud1 
nature as tu fall within thc: prohibitions of sud> 
laws; and thi.-; is true ev.:n where the lict'.11Sl" is 
unc: grantc:d by tlu: United States." 60 C. J. 10711. 
section :\9-j :111d c1S<"> citc:d. 
This court has <lc:darcd that thc:re are 1.:ases in whid> 
what is a "necessity" is a question fur the court tu det·i1k 
as a matter of law (Pirh·y Hrothers v. Co111111u11wc•11/1/1, 
134 Va. 713, 722). The k1rncd trial judge has rightly 
1--
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[5) 
hc:ld that this is such a case. Considering the character 
of the product sold, the fact that the purchase could 
have been rrr:Ide un any day during the week, that beer 
is definitely a luxury and not a necessity under any cir-
cumstances, that the demand for sale of beer on Sunday 
comes from holders of licenses for the sale uf beer and 
wine, and that tourists, rather than residents in the com-
munity, demand and are being given the: service, and 
that beer is simply desirable, he has wisely held that 
there is no necessity as a mural fitness or propriety of 
the work and labor dune undt:r the: circumstances of thr 
casc:. 
"~ "' • The word (necessity) is elastic and 
relative, and must be construed with reference 
tu the conditions under which we live, a11J yd 
Ilic elasticity 111usl 110/ be extn1d(J so ft1r as lo 
co~>U that «Jhich is 110/ 11ud/11l but simply J;Jir-
11blc, aud t/ier(by dt/tt1/ lhe 1111111ifest purpose uf 
the statute" /CJ ut t1p11r1 S1111J11y '" a day of rest 
from ordinary l:ibur." (Italics suppli.:d.) l'iri«'y 
llruthers, supra. 
"\Vhether work dune on the Sabbath is a work 
uf nc:cessity ur charity may bc: a question of law 
to be dc:cided by the trial wurt, in c1sc:s 'll'ha,· 
the facts ar< estt1blished or 11yr;eJ 11po11. Capital 
"J'lieater C:o. Y. Co11111101nue1tf1h, llJ<J S. \V. 1076, 
178 Ky. 780." (Italics supplied) (,QC . .J. Ill%, 
note. 
\Ve have not had our attention called 10 a casc: in 
which the sale of beer on Sunday has been held tu be: a 
work u{ nc:cessity. 
(b] 
In Stal~ v. Jll erlz, I H S. E. 242, 91 W. Va. 622, 2<J 
A. L. R. 391, it is said: 
"lt cannot be said, as matter of law, tha(:° 
selling soft drinks and conducting a soft drinkco 
stand is either a w11rk uf necessity or charity." - c:::> 
:::c 
The annotation (29 A. L. R. p. +o7) deals with~ 
ordinances .dealing with Sunday dosing of places sdl· 
ing intoxicating liquors. The: dc:cisiuns cited have: uni· 
formly uphdd the urdi11;111<:t: in every case whert: the 
ordinance was made: in u1nf1Jrmity with the law autlwr-
iz.ing its adoption. 
The only persons whu ap1ll::1r in behalf of the dc:kn· • • • I A I I I 
dant, and, of course, in f:ivllr of Sunday sale of bc:er, an: 
th;;;e who hold lice1rn:s 111 sdl bc:er. His wimesscs. 
Keeton, 1'Vlrs. \Vinn, Stllnt", Baker and Bradley ;1rt" all 
licensc:c:s, and !lradky has fuur placc:s where winc :rnJ 
beer arc: suld, :ind all thc:s• sdl bc:er on Sunday. :\r,: 
these: proper pc:rsuns tu rcllcct :1 community "opinion 
of mural litness and propriety" of the: work or lahor 
dune:? They bdung tn thc ani<:ulate class. The rc.d 
community upiniun is made hy those substantial citizen, 
who rely upon and rc:spc:ct the· courts and support them. 
The costumers of these witnc:ssc:s would like: fur them 
tu sell whiskey :i!so. And the witnc:ssc:s doubtless would 
he glad tu have the: privilege of doing so. 
This court has dedarc:d that thc:rc are cases when· the 
quc:stiun is unc: uf l:iw fo.r the court (Pirk~y flro//i,•n 
wu, p. 725). Thc: lc:anwf trial judge has rightly held 
that this is such a case. t'unsidc:ring the character uf 
· the product sold, th:11 the purchase could have: been 
made: during the week, that beer is definitely a luxury 
,_ 
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and oat a necessity under any circumstances, that the 
demand is being made by beer licensees, and that "tour-
ists" demand anJ ::re bc:in~ given the service, he has 
wisely held that there is no necessity as a moral fitness 
or propriety of the work and labor done under the 
circumstances of this case. Some courts hold that where 
the nature of the act or work is patent and obvious as 
constituting a work of necessity, or the contrary, the 
question becomes one of law for the court. An example 
is found in the case where one was convicted of work-
ing in a barber shop grnerally on Sunday. S111/( v. 
Selia/I, 128 Mo. App. 622, 107 S. W. 10. 
\Vhere it was shown th:ll serious loss would be en· 
uilcd from closing a plant in which "carbon black" 
was manufactured from n:11ural gas, th( co111"t decidd 
that then: was a nc:cc:ssity and that operation on Sunday 
would not be a violation uf thc: Sunday law. It was 
shown clearly by the: evidence that it tuuk two or three 
days aftc:r the Sunday shutdown for the machinery to 
run normally ;1ml tu produce a product that was of good 
e11<1ugh quality to b-: uscd gcncrally "111 the pruccsscs 
for which it was intended. N111ur11/ Gil! l'1·0,J11ct5 Co. 
,._ "J'lt11r1111111, '.?OS Ky. 100, 265 S. \V. 475. 
In the recent case of Co11111w11wc1ilth \-'. f',furi11r1y. 
(Mass.) 40N. E. (2d) 307,308 (1942),ddendantwas 
convicted fur kcc:ping a "shop" open un Cnlumbus Day 
and selling intoxicating liquor. 
Gcnc:ral L:iws (Ter. Ed.) Chapter 1:16, Section 5, 
which is referred to as the Lord's day statute:, provides 
that "\Vhuever on this Lord's day keeps open his shop. 
warc:huuse or workhouse, or doc.-s any manner of labor, 
[ 8 .I 
business or work, except works of necessity and charity, 
shall be punished by a fine • • • ." This statute was 
amended to apply tu Columbus day. Defendant w:is 
convicted and the judgnmll was affirmed. 
In the case of People v. Waldman, 261 App. Div. 
1001, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 707, defendant was convi1:tc:J 
of selling beer on Sund:iy. The court said: 
"• • • so far as the conceded act of the: ddcn· 
dant in selling beer on Sunday is concerned, the: 
same constiturc:d a viul::ition of the Penal Law, 
secrion 2147, which statute was not amended or 
repe:iled by 1hc: prllvisiuns of the Alcoholic lkv-
cragc Control Law so far as it (sec. 2147) rnn· 
templates and, in ctlcc1, pruhibits the ddrndant's 
act. ,. • •" 
C<INCl.USION 
The record is dc:vuid ul ic:vc:rsiblc: error and the: judg-
ment should be aflirmt:d. 
Respectfully submitted, 
AllR.\M. I'. STAPLES, 
.htonuy General. 
EUll'IN B. ]ONES, 
· .-luista11/ Attorney Gr11rr11/. 
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214 
December 17th. l'1/1l. 
---- .., ______ ------· -·-----·-·-··------- --- ·--·--
-----
Garland Grubbs, an infbnt, etc. 
Vs •. '·' Upon an apreal ~rem the judcment of the Trial Ju~tice Court. 
Leroy King. 
·' ' This duy cotoe tin! IJbl"ties in, per"on, urul Ly their Attorneys, 11nd the JeJ'en..iant 
having plead not r111lty, puts hlm5elf on the Country nnd the plaintiff doth tloe like, 
tiifreupon came a ·1ury, to-wit: VI~ ::;. l!urris, Juke Hale, A. ll. Tute, IHlLur Lee 1:>tanl11y, 
and Hartwell AdolDS, who heint: '"orn the truth upon the premi<es to spealc, bov1ng fully 
,heart! the eviilencP., belnc instructed by the Court and h•vln& heurd orr.ucr.ent of counsel 
retired to their room <>nd orter rnC>etiwe returned into court anti ret;.irned the follo11ing 
verdict, to-111 t: "Ile the jury find for the defe11rl"nt." ~icneJ, ;;. :,. Horris, Foreinan. 
· /,nd the jury l1elne. Jl5clwrced it is the judcmeut of the Court thut tile ploin-
't!ff toke noth1nr Hild that the t.!efenrl&n·t recover oi the plaintiff its costs by him in 
:this c1111se tn his beh6lf ex,.emled. ~~ 'fV\. A~ '~litv ~ E x H I B I T , \JV\ " l{'-
. ·E 
.VJl•G!!IIA: In th~ Clrcul t Court for the Ccunty of iionover, iield &t the Court House thereof 
on the JOth day of !1ece:ul:.er, In the year of our Lord lltnetcen llundred and Forty-one. 
Pri••nt: Hon. Leon U. fazile, Judfe. 
Jn re the vacancy ~n the 
Qff1ce of Supervltor from 
P.PoVer Dam District. 
It appearinr, to the c.)urt th•t T. tJ. T;.ouov5on, the ':'frul;er Of the f.ourd of 
SuperviH•rs of llnnover Cnw1ty frr.m Pezver Dom DHtrlct, h•• departet.! this life, thereby 
creoting 8 v0 c 0 nc:1 tn 5ald office, JT IS O!iDEr.ED, that J. Z. Johnson, a qu&lifled voter 
resident or reaver D&in Pi strict, iia11over County, l:.e and loe is hereby appr11ted Supervisor 
frflm •aid District to fill thP une~pired ter01 of such oJ'f~ce. 
I 
In re the appolnt,,,ent of 
Jl.art~.a Conv;ay as a Cono:clssloner in Ch•ncery 
for this Ccurt. 
• 
.. 
.. 
... 
EXHIBIT 
E 
The Ccurt ce<t!Jl!lg it nec<•"c.ry J'or the cm'oVEni~11t dtsp;;tch of tlte tusiness 
of t111s Ccurt, IT !S CP.l'r=:.ED tna t !l~rtha Con\·,;:iy, a r:.e~ber of the tJor of tl11s Court, be 
ind ~he 1s !'-1ere-t.y 21:pc1nted a Ccrc::l1~!"1oner 111 Ch3ncery of tii1s Court. 
~~.~~,~~ 
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(Note: Typescript Copy of Exhibit "F" prepared by William R. VandcrKloot 
and attached following Exhibit "F" as Exhibit "F-1.") 

Exhibit "F"-1 
Type~itten Facsimile of Handwritten File Copy of Leon M. Bazile Letter 
From the Virginia Historical Society prepared by Wm. R. VandcrKJoot, June 15, 2005 
Dear Mr. Attorney General 
Elmont, Va 
NovL?] 20, 1941 
I write to urge you to start proceedings for the indictment and trial of John L. Lewis 
on a charge of treason. 
The United States are at war with Germany. Bas v Tingy, [ 4 US] 4 Dall. 3 7, 40, I L. 
ed. 731, 733-4 ((1800)]. 
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them or 
in ad-herin2: 1o their enemies. !!iving them aid and comfort." Constitution III, 3, I. 
Mt. Lewis is adhering to the cause of the Nazis, giving them aid and comfort. What 
he is doing h~ but one dominant purpose in view, namely the injury of our war efforts and 
the promotion of the cause of our enemy. This is treason. Young v The United States, 97 
US. 39, 61-66, 24 Led. 992, 998-99 [(1877)). 
I was a member of the A.E.F in 1918-1919. I was in France in the autumn of 1938, 
and I saw French labor then doing to the Franch [sic] what Mr. Lewis is now trying to do to 
·.'• 
the United States.. We know how disastrous was what labor did to France. Surely the 
responsible authorities of the United States arc not going to wait until we are brought to the 
brink of ruin before attempting to do something about it. 
I urge you to act. 
With the assurance of my esteem[,] I am 
Respectfully, 
[In the left margin in a "North-South" direction is written:] "Tills Jetter was went to the 
Attorney General of the United States by U.S. Mail, but he did not have the courtesy to 
ackno\vledge it. Leon M. Bazile." 
Exhibit "F-1" 
Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "G" 
Letter from House of Delegates Member Albert 0. Boschen on December 28, 1941 
To the Honorable Leon M. Bazile 
[Last sentence in third paragraph from end ofletter concerning "Geo Haw 
and Andrew EIIis" is significant for this thesis.] 
(Courtesy of the Virginia Historical Society, Richmond) 
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.ALBC:RT O. BOfiCH£N 
~ICH,,,.Df'K1dTT 
AICHMOND 0 YA.. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
HOUSE Of".OELEGATES 
RICH MONO 
'~. '' ... -·. ~ 
COMMITTU '4a•t0HMPl'T9 
.... n.u"'• -o .,,.,....,.. 
"'°•ou.•o 11"""'9 
Bon. L'!on M. Ea zi le, 
Ell',cnt, Vi rginia 1 
Uy Dear Leon: 
.... 
. . _ I em new adc!reEEing ycu u 11. friend,ir.nd not all Judge.Pleaea panlOJl 
the ff.lr.ilir.rity,for I have bicwn ycu that length t'bat I £holl hh t'he Hb~rtr 
to eddreEB you ae i ·have in tbie letter. 
. '. ;: ... ,.,.=.~ .... !· ;; .... ..,, ~- •.. -. 4• 
I th~k ycu for frcm.tl;ie bdtcn,i of c:y her.rt fc,r your kind lltter,.in which 
yo~ ~fpe,d rie a MV..ry F.i;;w::C'!lrl.'!ha'e e.nd J:ew Year". .. 
,: __ ·\ ;~;~ ~-' ~!.' ••· .. ._ ':~ ~ ~· -."( ~ .... r i .i:: •:, - ·~·~I;.~ ~ ·.:" i •", 
I e;<l.end to ytu ni.h all rrf. beari tne very whr.eii for a P.'appy New .Tear,r.no:! 
the. l:rrl o!bee.lth;(;h~lf l' ray,Wulth ).Vi-d a lcn'g 'and titc11~tful car11~r a.a 
Judge.: t~1.[~~:"CO:i·::f~; '/:' t::~·rt.·~· .. ( ... "1 .. t. . . .. , .. 
l talked with the Governor t'he dhr cay. relaHv·e ·to. reducing 11pe11d ·on 
the eutci:.cl::ile• r..r.d. told him of tbe e!rcrt en 'r:y 'ri_rt'.i.ci'i:.ct a jcint ruoluticm 
th~cugb to ·l:eu ~p~ Ccngree; a of tne United :0-tatcS ill) pnu •..n act to· ~ rt op 
-!.be itluiu!acture of a~tcr;cl::ilee trat cculd run r.cn thnn:45 mile'e llZl hcu'r0 
I ;,ii.ii lr.ut,hed e.t,r.nd the rtEoluticn tltepe tilently in the tcmb •"iere 
miUiy a geed iter.Eure EleEpe ell, he e.ute ot' telfi tb-.ece on the i::ii-t o·r thie or tbat 
intererle 
Ncw,we Eee a~ to ~tcp c1.re free runnir,g J?Jore thnn 35 !din cm hour. 
Th11 c11uee or the reeECn ie a prcper er.el ihculd tr..ink th .. t the livee of our 
good i;ecple 'JU a prefer_ ne.ECn to ctcp can !rem racing to eternity,but J. have 
at lllet reached ihe point tr.at the puMic dces r.ct -.·ant a"Don Qf:i,.cte",nor do 
tbey need either"AtleE;to carry the ~crld en hie thoulder or "P.'ercul11•"• 
' . . 
l'i'hile ilelldng io fbe Gcverncr,your r.e.ir.e cl!::;e up end I told 'b.i111_ that he did 
cne Hg ect irhen be encinted ycu ae Judc<lle tcld me th.et be tlad eplendid 
reports of ycur i;ood 'Jork.l did r.ot Jcr.cw that Geo .?.io.w end Andn'1Ellia 
cppct11d you but I underttend it now. 
I e..t!l glr.d you are gcing to t1.ke t!rc.e cut EJld n.tch i::e,for l know the.t I . 
n:uet ha-Jll dcne ECMthing in the f&Et to e>eke frcl!l you that kind c':&J)rettiOne. 
l.'ay God EleH you ll!ld keep ycu,co 'trat tne .Fecple of thi• Staie can ha.ve 
the 't:er.e!it o! ycur 11lility.Witb 'teet fllrEcnel r11i;r.rcie,l r.m, . ..., 
EXHIBIT 
6 
~incerely Your Frleo~ ... /' .·· · 'SJ 
~<D~ 
. . . : :<':::':~ 
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Letter from Thesis Writer William R. VandcrKloot on April 16, 2002 
To Mr. Sumpter Priddy 
Concerning his father, 1941 Hanover County Sheriff Sumpter Priddy 
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Montpelier, Virginia 
I 
\VILLIAl\1 R. VANDE!iKLOOT 
11801 GOODWICK SQUARE -
RJCHMOND, VmGrNlA 23233-3424 
( 804-754-2i75); e-mail: 1m1d<'lkl117/'anl.mm 
April 16, 2002 
EXHIBIT 
H 
Re: Jnfonnation about Francisco v. Commo1111·co/1h, 180 Va. 371{December7, 1942) 
Dear Mr. Priddy: 
You were kind enough to advise me of some particulars about this case, 1ried in Hanover County, 
Virginia beginning October I 7, 1941, when you were a young man and your father, also named 
Sumpter Priddy, was the county sheriff. 
You advised that your father had told you, in so many words, that this case was brought ih no small 
mea~ure bec:iu~e::. County Commissioner, .Joseph Johnson, from the Beaverdam area oft he County, 
had a daughter who operated a store similar to the one alltgcdly operated illegally by Mr. Francisco 
on a Sunday. The inference was, as your fother undcrs10od it and suggested to you, in so many 
words, was that Johnson hoped thereby that his cfoughtcr could gain a commercial advantage over 
Francisco, due to the latter's having been prosecuted in this case for operating his business on Sunday 
in violation of the Sunday Closing Law in force in Virginia at that time. 
You, of course, had no direct involvement in 1he case, and no access to records or major personal-
ities involved in that long-ago criminal c2se, where the defendant was fined five dollars upon con-
viction, a conviction later oven urned by 1he Vi1ginia Supreme Court. You have become, many years 
thereafter, a legislative representative for the Virginia Retail Merchants Association, and were asso-
cicated with its counsel, Lewis F. Powell, Esq., later an Associate Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, in promotion and drafting ofl~1er v~r~ions of the Virginia Sunday Closing Laws. 
It would be useful for my disscr1ation which l am writing for a Master's Degree thesis in history at 
the University of Richmond, if you could confirm the above, with the qualifications above given 
showing your lack. of direct involvement. 
Sincerely, 
WILLIAM R V A."-.'DERKLOOT 
Confirmed: ~,~:l.:./J:·,-,;-.,, 
EXHIBIT 
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(copy of letter retained) 
Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "I" 
May 1942 Hanover County Criminal Docket 
Showing Commonwealth v. Francisco "pending on motion." 
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EXHIBIT 
I 
JI:\NOVER COUNTY CRI1.!IMJU, 
DOCKET 
May, 1942 
CASES PENDING FROM LAST TERM: 
Comraonwonlth v. Wnltor McKinnon - not in cu:itody 
1/fv~ f~ · 
Commomvoalth v. Glenn - f'ivo lndlctmonta - not ln~uatody ~ f ..-o-. 
Commonwealth v. Lim10od Taylor - continuod r,oncrnlly 
Cor.u;iomveal th v. Willirur. Johna on - not in cuotody 
Conmonv1oal th v. Norr.um Gracy - not in custody 
Co1nmonwenl th Vr.rnon Hall 
-
fino to ~)0 paid l.Jny lfith // ;.o~f~ j......._ I v. 
Commonweal th v. llonry Cronohaw - not ln custody 
Commonwealth v. M. s. Eortz - oxocution lo31wll vs. !")ui;1mlmrt, bor\\l::irann 
Commonwealth v. Frnnci:ico - po1~cllne on notlon 
Commomvoalth v. Francisco 
Co:nmonweal th v. Nolaon Goodman, Simon Luck nntl IIG rir.<Jn 
,/ 
Comr.1onweal th v. Haymond Taylor ancl ~lllliam Thornton 
Commonwealth Arthur Pago ~ v. 
CommonwE:nl th v. Arthur Page V 
v' 
Com1101meal th v. V/illiam Thorr. ton J 
Commonwealth v. Arthur Puc:c an<l Rn:nnonu Taylor 
Comrr.or.wcal th v. 'iiilllar::i Thornton and Jolm f.!ason 
CASES APPEALED FROM THE TRIAL .f.JSTICE cc;UET: 
Cor.imomrnal th v. J. H. Canady - 17°1~ ~ - Af ~ d 7 -
Co::m:onwcnl th v. 
Comr::on':1eo.l th v. 
Commonwealth v, 
Commom1 eal th v. 
Com-:ion-;:eal th v. 
George H. Tdrry 
\"1illia::1 Johnoon \ 
Hobert E. Martin\ 
Chnrlie Jackson /Vl~ ~j 
J~~-J~3 
lI a rr:r JI o·;rn rd 
Co0tlr.mn 
~~ ~f~ 
EXHIBIT 
I 
Cover Sheet for 
Exhibit "J" 
Commonwealth Attorney's Motion Nolle Prosequi !dismissal) 
of Commonwealth v. Francisco 
in Hanover County [Virginia), Circuit Court 
on September 20, 1943 
Hanover County Common Law Order Book No. 19, Page 379 
Hanover County, Virginia (1943) 
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September 20th. 1~1~• 
It appearing ·to-the· Cburt t-h~t it iould hllve further u•e for the' Grnnd Jurr th•T 
1;djourned over,_ until a ln~er date, •. 
irh~ Tri-Councy BE.nit, Inc. 
I 
!vs · ORDER 
379 
IP. O. Gravatt and Gnynelle Gravatt Collcote4 
I. . Thh day cm T_he Morris Plnn ~~.2.,of\~S~.!iff~~~-~~~1 .li_t;ione.l Dank, of R1c.h- ~~~~111 mond, &.nd SouthErn Danlt end Trust Compll.ll)' of Ricluno~u ..... a for BDr-er t~ the g•rni1hee. flan Denk 
isUllllllona herein !~sued "t;ains.t them «vertlly Wltt•~red aa follo""' That. there i• on depoai ::!,~f T 
' 
Central 
in The llorris Plan lllillk o! R!cbmond to .the credit of the defw<li..nta the sum of 167.t.7, 1n r.et1 67.6' I · · !louthern 
'
the Central National Blink to the credit of P. O. GrLVlltt t::48.l7 Lnd 1n the Couthem Dank Bk & Tr 675.92 
. and Trust C_ompBD)' to tbe cndit of the de!cndr.nta f~n;.'92, •h1ch Hid rnma 6re zubJeot ,wa~~ 
respectively to the lien of the &foresll1d &&rnishee ~ummon1 i..nd the lion of the Judtment 
Wherefore it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff do rjcover of the 
' . 
several defendnnta the moneys so h•ld !Ub,lect to Hid. G_r.rn1•hee, nnmel7, or th• 6outhcrn 
.llfillk o.nd Trust CompD~:f f575.92, ot. theCent;al 1111tiono.1 bi.i,,k 1::48~17 md of The llorrb 
Plan Bank ir ~;~i,;o~d·.t:6'7. ;7j.~f.ich. fn~~ ~e~:e·~a~ ~~~;;;;G ~h~ :e1d ieveral detondanh r.re 
ordered to pay to ·c. w. Taylor~ Clerk, of thia Court to be credited on eatd Judgment • 
. ,.;,o,•·. 
It is further ordered thnt so fOOQ aa said !UIDB ~re paid to c. w. To7lor, Clerk, 
shall pay theref~om. •11 costs accrued uid p&)' over the }~L.nce thereof to George E. Haw, 
Attorney tor the pls1nt1!!. 
I 
ENDORSEllEN1'1 
I ask fbil! • 
. _ ... -'·-·r--- ... ., 
Geo. E. Bnw, Atty. for Plaintiff. 
Indictment for B M1tdcmeanor. 
EXHIBIT 
J 
110. l. 
Upon ootion of the Attorn•)' for the Cc=or.-.elllth • Nolle Protcqui is entered 1n 
this case. 
•:!> 
•C0""1'001'€Bl th 
llv~. o. Francisco. . . Upon motion of the .i.ttcr:oey for tte Cc=or..,.<•lth n Nolle Pro«qu1 is entered 1n his c£~e. Jndictmcnt for B Uifdcme•r.or. 
Cont 4.~ 
Retn1~to 
llz nnw ·.',·'· 
1187;0 
